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| IIa
110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC
STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED
BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
June _2008. - Ordered to be printed |
| report: |
|
110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY
COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN
THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
together with A
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed Filed,
under authority of the order of the Senate of June _, 2008
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States
Senate 110th Congress JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA EVAN BAYH,
INDIANA SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MUKULSKI, MARYLAND ORRIN
HATCH, UTAH RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE SHELDON
WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA HARRY REU), NEVADA,
EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX
OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO
Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Scope and
Methodology
- (U) ln February 2004 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
revised the terms of reference for its ongoing inquiry into pre-war
intelligence on Iraq. The new issue areas included "any
intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy."
The Committee pursued this issue area in 2004, but subsequently the
Committee’s attention was placed on other aspects of the terms of
reference.1
- (U) In September 2005, the Committee deferred efforts on the issue
of intelligence activities within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy OUSD(P)], when then- Committee Chairman Pat
Roberts requested that the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD
IG) review whether the OUSD(P)’s Office of Special Plans "at
any time conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate
intelligence activities." Later in September 2005 Senator Carl
Levin, then ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
issued a similar request for the DoD IG to review the activities of
the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group
and Policy Support Office, to determine whether any of their
activities were either inappropriate or improper. Senator Levin’s
request included a list of ten questions to be answered by the DoD IG.
The Intelligence Committee planned to resume its inquiry based on the
outcome of the DoD IG’s review.
- (U) The DoD IG began the review requested by Senators Roberts and
Levin in November 2005. In February 2007, the DoD IG issued the
requested report, which was titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities
of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. That
report concluded: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy OUSD(P)] developed, produced, and then disseminated
alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida
relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent
with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior
decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized,
the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the
products did not clearly show 1 To date the Committee
has published four reports based on its inquiry into pre-war
intelligence on Iraq: • July 9, 2004, US. Intelligence Community ’s
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, • September 8, 2006,
Postwar Findings about Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and
how they Compared with Prewar Assessments, • September 8, 2006, The
Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi
National Congress, • Mayg3 l , 2007, Prewar Intelligence Assessments
about Postwar Iraq. _ 1
-
page 1
- _ the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Committee and
were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products. This condition
occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from
formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative
analysis.2
- (U) The DoD IG review was focused on intelligence activities within
the OUSD(P) only with respect to the production and dissemination of
intelligence. The DoD IG stated in materials that accompanied the
release of the February 2007 report that the "review focused on
OUSD(P) assessments provided to the Executive Branch."3 The DoD
IG did not include within its report an assessment of whether any of
the OUSD(P)’s actions could be considered the collection of
intelligence even though the "collection of information needed by
the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State
and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance
of their duties and responsibilities" falls under the definition
of intelligence activities as set forth in the Executive Order on
United States Intelligence Activities.4
- (U) In February 2004 when the Committee’s terms of reference were
updated, the Committee was in the process of looking into issues
surrounding a December 2001 meeting in Rome, Italy between DoD
officials, including an OUSD(P) representative, and current and former
Iranian officials, and a related follow-up meeting in June 2003. The
Committee pursued information on these meetings in October 2003 and
conducted a number of related interviews in early to mid-2004. The DoD
IG touched on these meetings in a separate report, but did not conduct
an extensive review.
- (U) The Committee’s updated terms of reference called for a review
of any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the
Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special
Plans within the OUSD(P). The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group
was a two person group created in November 2001, after discussions on
how to pursue the Rome meeting were already underway in the OUSD(P).
No members of that group participated in the meetings that are the
subject of this report. The Office of Special Plans was created in
October 2002, after the Rome meeting had taken place. One participant
in the Rome meeting did join the Office of Special Plans after it was
formed, but his activities surrounding the Rome meeting had been
completed months before. As noted in the February 2007 DoD IG report,
however, " t]he term OSP Office of Special Plans] has become
generic terminology for the activities of the OUSD(P), including the
Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and Policy Support
Oflice."5
- (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting involved discussions with alleged
current and former members of the Iranian security service and a foreign government (Israel)
entity which included the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service. While the information obtained was related to
Iran instead of Iraq, senior OUSD(P) personnel were directed to
conduct the Rome meeting and were 2 2007-0782, February
9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the
Office of theUnder Secretary of Defense for Policy, page 4. 3
2007-0782, Materials accompanying the February 9, 2007, DoD IG report
titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. Questions and Answers, Answer to
question #5. 4 Executive Order Number 12333, dated December 4, 1981,
Part 1, Paragraph 1.4 (a). 5 2007-0782, February 9, 2007, DoD IG
report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, pages 1-3. _ 2
page 2
- _ involved in the decision—making process on how to undertake the
meeting, and an OUSD(P) employee attended the meeting. In light of the
fact that the DoD IG did not evaluate the propriety of conducting
these meetings, Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV directed that the
Committee’s review of the December 2001 and June 2003 meetings be
completed as part of its pre-war intelligence on Iraq inquiry. This
report completes the Committee’s inquiry into the Rome meeting and
the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence
collection activities.
- (U) The Comn1ittee’s review is based on interviews with current
and former Intelligence Community and DoD officials, briefings, and
documentation provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DoD,
and State Department. The DoD Office of the Inspector General provided
the Committee with additional information collected as part of its
February 2007 review of the activities of the OUSD(P).
| Michael
Ledeen, Rove's Brain |
Karl Rove, Bush's Brain |
 =
go to NFU pages |
 |
- Issues not in this report
- Forged yellow cake documents. more
- Rosen Weissman, AIPAC espionage case.
- Sibel Edmonds FBI wiretap translator, more
- Role of Judith Miller and the New York Times
Leakgate
- Project for New American Century, PNAC
- Valerie Plame, Brewster Jennings & Associates more
- Omissions and misstatements in the 911 Commission Report more
- Israeli Art Students, their addresses
tracked the addresses of the 911 hijackers. more
- 911 was an inside job (Bush,
Israel, neocons) the only people who don't
believe this are duped Americans, the rest of the world believes
it. more
|
- I The Rome Meeting Introduction · (_)
The "Rome meeting" was actually a series of sessions that
took place in an apartment building in Rome, Italy Hom December 10,
2001 through December 13, 2001. The DoD IG determined that: The
meeting included Larry Franklin (Office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense, International Security Affairs), Harold Rhode (Office of Net
Assessments), Michael Ledeen (former Office of the Secretary of
Defense and National Security Council consultant), Manucher
Ghorbanifar (Iranian exile), Iranian am (Iranian exile living in
Morocco), Iranian #2] (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Official), and an
unidentified employee of a foreign government (Israel)]. Michael Ledeen
arranged the meeting with the help of his contacts in Italy and the foreign government (Israel)] who provided the meeting place and other
logistical support.
- (U) Mr. Franklin joined the OUSD(P) in July 2001 as an Iran desk
officer within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near East and South Asia Affairs, William Luti. (Mr. Franklin was
assigned to the Office of Special Plans within Mr. Luti’s office in
late 2002, but retained his responsibilities for Iran.)7 Mr. Luti
reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs, Peter Rodman. Mr. Rodman played a 6 2007-1142,
March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DOD Involvement with the Rendon Group,
page 8. 7 Mr. Franklin is currently awaiting direction from the
Department of Justice to report to prison on matters unrelated to
those discussed in this report. He was indicted in August 2005 along
with two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
for conspiring with each other to unlawfully disclose classified
national defense information. Mr. Franklin subsequently pled guilty,
and was sentenced in January 2006 on three felony counts: conspiracy
to communicate national defense information to persons not entitled to
receive it; conspiracy to communicate classified information to an
agent of a foreign government (Israel); and the unlawful retention of national
defense information. _ 3
page3 ???
- _ significant role in the decision-making process on how DoD would
participate in the Rome meeting, and reported to the USD(P), Douglas
Feith.
- (U) Mr. Rhode was a career civilian employee in the Office of Net
Assessment and currently remains employed within the DoD. The Office
of Net Assessment is not a part of the OUSD(P). The Director of Net
Assessment reports to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
and is responsible for providing assessments on the capabilities of
the United States (U.S.) military.
- (U) Mr. Ledeen is a U.S. citizen employed by the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research. Mr. Ledeen had numerous contacts
within the DoD and other elements of the U.S. Government at the time
of the Rome meeting, but at no time during preparations for or
throughout the Rome meeting did he have a formal relationship (e. g.,
employee, contractor, or consultant) with the DoD. Without any such
affiliation, Mr. Ledeen organized the Rome meeting with the help of
the foreign government (Israel). Mr. Ledeen paid his own expenses for the trip
and never asked or expected to be reimbursed.8 The DoD’s reliance on
Mr. Ledeen to organize the Rome meeting resulted in senior DoD
officials, to include Mr. Feith and Mr. Rodman, not being aware of the
involvement of Mr. Ghorbanifar and the foreign government (Israel) until after
the Rome meeting.
- (U) It is not entirely clear how Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode were
selected to attend the meeting. Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that
during a November 200l discussion with Stephen Hadley, then serving as
Deputy National Security Advisor, he was asked who he would recommend
sending to a potential meeting with the Iranians. Mr. Ledeen said he
offered the names of Harold Rhode and Larry Franklin, due to their
expertise and language skills.9 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that
he was informed by his immediate supervisor, Mr. Luti, of a potential
trip for which the DoD needed an Iran analyst who was conversant in
Farsi. Mr. Franklin said he did not know Mr. Ledeen at that time.10
Mr. Rhode could not recall who approached him about the trip due to
the passage of time, but said it was probably Mr. Luti. Even though he
did not work within the OUSD(P), Mr. Rhode often interacted with that
office and knew Mr. Luti. Mr. Rhode stated that he was selected most
likely because he had studied in Iran and worked on the issue of how
to understand Iranians. In 2003, Mr. Luti informed the DoD’s
Counterintelligence Field Activitys that he selected Mr. Franklin, but
did not know who had chosen Mr. Rhode to participate in the meeting.l3
Ultimately, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode traveled to Rome under official
U.S. government travel orders. 8 2004-1853, Transcript
of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 12, 14-15. 9
2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of lvfr.
Ledeen, pages 5-6. 10 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff
Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages. 7-8. H 2004-0797, Transcript of
April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages. 3-6. NOTE: An
attempt was made to reinterview Mr. Rhode to clarify his involvement
in a number of the issues raised in this report. Officials within the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
informed the Committee that Mr. Rhode declined to be reinterviewed. V
12 As discussed later in this report, the DoD Counterintelligence
Field Activity conducted a review of DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar
in 2003 at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. Interviews conducted by the Counterintelligence Field
Activity are referenced throughout this report and were also a primary
source for the DoD IG review. 13 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review
Source Document #6, CIPA Report, Luti Interview. _ 4
page 4
- (U) Mr. Ghorbanifar was a long time friend of Mr. Ledeen
’s who
lived in France and had offered to arrange a meeting with current and
former Iranian officials.14 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the
meeting ultimately raised concerns because of his prior history with
the Intelligence Community and his participation in the Iran-Contra
scandal in 1986. As a result of the CIA’s prior dealings with Mr.
Ghorbanifar, the agency in l984 had issued a fabrication notice on Mr.
Ghorbanifar to its operational personnel stating that he was regarded
as an unreliable source of intelligence. A publicly available
Congressional report on the Iran-Contra scandal includes a redacted
copy of the notice that states Mr. Ghorbanifar "should be
regarded as an intelligence fabricator and a nuisance. Any further
approaches by subject or his brother Ali should be reported but not
taken seriously."15 The Iran-Contra scandal involved the illegal
sale of arms to Iran by the U.S. Government and use of the profits to
fund rebels in Nicaragua. Mr. Ghorbanifar had been a middleman in the
weapons exchange. Mr. Ledeen was a consultant to the National Security
Council at the time of the Iran-Contra scandal and also played a role
in the weapons exchange.16 According to Mr. Ledeen
, the first Iranian
participant in the Rome meeting, , was a former Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps member who was subsequently branded a traitor, but was
able to escape Iran after more than a year of torture. Mr. Ledeen told
the Committee that the second Iranian, _ was "a high-ranking
officer in the intelligence establishment of Iran."17 The
Committee’s attempts to corroborate this information with the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were complicated by several factors.
The first Iranian has a common name and there are multiple variations
of the spelling of both names. The CIA provided information on three
versions of the first name, two of which could have been the
participant in the Rome meeting. It appears the second Iranian - _ was
deemed an "information peddler" based on his attempts to
sell information. The information the CIA collected on this individual
was sufficient for the Agency
- (U) During the Rome meeting the two Iranians provided biographic
details on themselves and information on the political and economic
conditions in Iran. Specific issues discussed during the meeting
included Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s
grip on Iraq, the growth of anti-regime sentiment in Iran, and the
Iranian regime’s attitudes toward the U.S.19 14 2007-1561, DoD IG
Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum
on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 15
Declassified July 25, 1984 CIA Cable Director 023056, Subject:
Fabricator Notice — Manuchehr Gorbanifar 16 2004-1853, Transcript of
April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 3. 17 2004-1853,
Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages
17-18. 18 2007-4174, October 22, 2007 & November 28, 2007 CIA
responses to Questions for the Record 19 2004-1675, April 16, 2004,
letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, Tab 7, Mr. Franklins notes on the Iranian interviews. Two
versions, one undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a
typo). _ 5
page 5
|
|
|
New
York Times "SISMI sent the CIA and U.S. and British officials
information that it knew was forged" |
|
|
Niger Forged Yellowcake Documents more
Michael Ledeen has denied any involvement in the Niger forged
documents, but this Senate Report places him on the scene. |
- Origins of the Rome Meeting
- (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting was initiated by Mr. Ledeen
.
According to Mr. Ledeen
, soon after September 11, 2001, probably in
the October 2001 timeframe, Mr. Ghorbanifar contacted him about
"people in Iran who were willing to come out and meet with
officials of the American government to provide accurate information
about what was going on inside the country, Iranian support of
terrorist organizations and plans to kill Americans in
Afghanistan."20 This discussion prompted Mr. Ledeen to contact
U.S. Government officials.
- (U) Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Ledeen had contacted
him at some point and suggested that DoD officials meet with the
Iranian contacts, but Mr. Rodman had deferred at that time. The
tasking later came back to him through senior DoD channels as a
request from Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley for the DoD to
pursue the meeting with the Iranians.21 Mr. Ledeen advised the
Committee that he had contacted Mr. Hadley, who he described as an
"old fiiend,"22 and subsequently met with Mr. Hadley and
another National Security Council official to present Mr. Ghorbanifar’s
offer to arrange meetings with Iranian officials. Mr. Ledeen advised
the Committee that he did not endorse Mr. Ghorbanifar’s information,
but felt obliged to convey the offer to the U.S. Government. Mr.
Ledeen indicated that he was certain that the Intelligence Community
would not be interested in pursuing the information due to their
distrust of Mr. Ghorbanifar.23
- (U) According to an April 16, 2004, letter to the Committee from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, "in
November 2001, the Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley,
called the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, and reported
that Iranians with inside knowledge of Iranian security and
intelligence operations, including involvement in terrorism and
threats to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, wished to defect." The
letter also indicated that the Iranians did not want to deal with the
CIA and that Mr. Hadley asked Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to have the
DoD handle the contact. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz agreed to do so and
subsequently informed the Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld.24
- (U) A February 2004 draft chronology prepared by staff from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Committee in
April 2004 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs indicates that the call from Mr. Hadley to Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz occurred on November 7, 2001.25 The request from Mr. Hadley
prompted Mr. Rodman to ask the DoD Office of General Counsel to review
whether contact with potential defectors could take place without CIA
involvement.26 In mid-November 2001, Mr. Rodman learned from Mr. 20 2004-1853,
Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4.
21 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff
Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 22 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21,
2004, Staii Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 23 2004-1853, Transcript
of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 5. 24
2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, pages 1-2. 25 2004-1675, April 16,
2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 26 2004-1675,
April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD
office of General Counsel, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr.
Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. _ 6
page 6
- _ Ledeen that the Iranians did not want to defect, but merely wanted
to pass on information.27 The DoD chronology indicated this newfound
knowledge prompted Mr. Rodman to inform Mr. Hadley that the DoD could
make the initial contact and Mr. Hadley proceeded to obtain approval
for this course of action from the National Security Advisor,
Condoleezza Rice.28 A memorandum dated November 16, 2001, from Mr.
Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz indicated that the Deputy
Secretary authorized this course of action,29 and a subsequent action
memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld dated July 19, 2002, stated
that Mr. Hadley "strongly encouraged the meeting."3
- (U) According to the April 2004 letter from the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Legislative Affairs, in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley
coordinated the proposed DoD contact with Iranian officials with the
Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, and the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, and they did not object to
the DoD’s making the contact. 31 Deputy Secretary Armitage and DCI
Tenet were not provided with significant details regarding the
proposed meeting. A 2004 State Department response to Committee
questions indicated that Deputy Secretary Armitage recalled Mr. Hadley
contacting him in the November/December 2001 timeframe and advising
that the DoD wished to debrief some Iranians with information on Iraq.
The State Department response further indicated that Deputy Secretary
Armitage voiced no objections, but was provided no details on who
would attend the meeting or its location. 32
| Roland Carnaby displayed a signed copy of Tenet's book |
Roland Carnaby, Southwest Region CIA station chief |
| |
|
- (U) Director Tenet’s 2007 book titled At the Center of the Storm
states that in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley mentioned only
"that DoD might meet with some Iranians in Europe who had
terrorist threat information." Director Tenet notes that there
was no mention of the involvement of Mr. Ledeen or Mr. Ghorbanifar. He
also indicates that the discussion made him uncomfortable and that he
did not understand why the CIA was not being asked to get involved. He
adds, however, that "if there was information available about a
threat to U.S. interests, I wasn’t going to let bureaucratic reasons
stand in the way of our getting the details."33 In March 2008,
DCI Tenet provided the Committee with his recollections of his
conversation with Mr. Hadley. He recalled being provided no details on
the proposed meeting other than it involved access to terrorist threat
information. He reiterated that he had concerns about the information
provided by Mr. Hadley, but he was not going to stand in the way of
collecting threat information so soon after September 11, 2001. Former
Director Tenet also stated his view that Mr. Hadley’s call was not
intended to gain his permission. For these reasons he did not pursue
further details at that time.34 27 2004-1675, April 16,
2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001
Memo Bom Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. Z8 2004-1675, April
16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 29 2004-1675,
April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr. Rodman to
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz., 30 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25,
July 19, 2002, Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 31
2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2. 32 2004-3535, State
Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record,
Question #7. 33 At the Center of theStorm, George Tenet, Page 312. 34
March 10, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page
1. _ 7
page 7
- _ -) According to Mr. Ledeen
, once he received concurrence from the
DoD he directly contacted the foreign government (Israel) official, who he
described as an old friend, and told him the background on the
proposed meeting. Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the
foreign government (Israel) made any necessary arrangements for the Iranian
participants, and provided a secure location and full time intepreter
for the meeting.33 ® It is not clear at what point senior DoD
officials knew the foreign government (Israel) and foreign government (Israel)
intelligence service would play a role in facilitating and attending
the meeting. When Mr. Rhode was asked if he knew before the meeting
whether the foreign government (Israel) would be involved, he stated "I
think so."37 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that Mr. Ledeen
advised him on the first morning of the Rome meeting that "the _
foreign government (Israel)] was involved and had helped out a great deal in
setting up the place of the meeting and that they would be present at
the meeting." 8 A February 2004 chronology prepared by staff from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated DoD awareness that
the foreign government (Israel) arranged for the meeting site, but it is not
stated when this became known.39 In a September 2007 interview, Mr.
Rodman, advised the Committee that DoD officials knew the foreign government (Israel)
was involved, but they did not know the full extent of that
involvement, to include the intelligence service, in advance. 0
- (U) Regarding Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the Rome meeting,
Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that he had made it clear to Mr. Hadley
that it was Mr. Ghorbanifar who had the ability to organize the Rome
meeting. Mr. Ledeen did not indicate that he made Mr. Hadley aware
that Mr. Ghorbanifar would attend the meeting.4l Correspondence to the
Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs in 2004 stated “ n] one of the senior DoD officials involved
in this matter — Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Feith, Mr. Rodman, and Mr. Luti
— anticipated that the Iranian security officials would be joined by
Ghorbanifar, nor, I am informed, did Mr. Had1ey."42 Mr. Rodman
conhrmed to the Committee in September 2007 that he did not know in
advance that Mr. Ghorbanifar was going to be at the meeting.43 A
memorandum prepared by counsel representing Mr. Feith included the
following statement: "Before the Rome meeting occurred, neither
Hadley, Wolfowitz nor Feith knew that Ghorbanifar was involved."44
None of the three DoD-provided documents that were written during
preparations for the Rome meeting contain a reference to Mr.
Ghorbanifar. 35 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff
Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 9-10. 36 2003-4209, Cable, 11 February
2002. 37 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of
Mr. Rhode, pages 15 and 20-21. 3 3 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23,
2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 18. 39 2004-1675, April
16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, page 2 and Tab 1, Februa.ry 2004 Chronology. 40
2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff
Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 41 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21,
2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 6, and October 24, 2007,
staff` interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 2. 42 2004-1675, April 16, 2004,
letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, page 2. 43 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September
27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 44 2007-1561, July
13, 2006, Memorandum from Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. _ 8
page 8
- _ (U) The only DoD official who indicated an awareness that Mr.
Ghorbanifar would attend the Rome meeting was Mr. Rhode. Mr. Rhode
informed the Committee in April 2004 that prior to departing for the
trip he was aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar would be involved in the
meeting. When Committee staff asked Mr. Rhode if he was certain that
he was aware Mr. Ghorbanifar would be attending the Rome meeting
before the meeting, Mr. Rhode said, "yes."45 Material
provided to the Committee by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that Mr.
Rhode does not now recall whether or not he knew in advance of Mr.
Ghorbanifar’s involvement. The material also states that Mr. Rhode
can no longer recall anything he told the Committee on this point in
2004.46 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he did not know that
Mr. Ghorbanifar was involved until he was informed by Mr. Ledeen on
the morning of the first day of the Rome meeting.47
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-
- Authority to Conduct the Rome Meeting
- (U) The U.S. Government officials involved in approving the Rome
meeting had the authority to do so, even if it was considered an
intelligence activity. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the
National Security Council (through the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence) is given broad authority to identify intelligence needs,
establish priorities to meet those intelligence needs, and establish
policies relating to the conduct of intelligence activities of the
United States, "including appropriate roles and missions for the
elements of the intelligence community and appropriate targets of
intelligence collection activities."48 These specified
authorities are in addition to "performing such other functions
as the President may direct."49
- (U) Thus, Mr. Hadley, who received concurrence from National
Security Advisor Rice, had the authority to request Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz, who coordinated with Secretary Rumsfeld, to dispatch two
DoD employees to Rome to meet with Iranians who may have been able to
provide information related to the national security.
- Coordination of the Rome Meeting
- (U) While the DoD had the authority to conduct the meeting in Rome,
there was limited advance coordination of the activity outside of the
Department. Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Hadley had
advised the DoD to pursue the matter on a close-hold basis due to its
unusual nature and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had reiterated that
guidance. Mr. Rodman continued by saying that had the National
Security Council or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz not requested that it
be close-hold the meeting would have been handled through normal
channels. · But, since that request had been made, it was decided
that the first meeting would not involve any element of the
Intelligence Community.5O 45 2004-0797, Transcript of
April 20, 2004, StaH Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 4 and 9-10. 46
2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record,
Question #4. 47 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, StaH
Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 7-8 and 19-20. 48 National Security
Act of 1947, NewsFollowUp.com § 101(h). 49id.,§101(b). 50 2008-0836,
Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr.
Rodman , pages 2 and 5. _ 9
page 9
- (U) Hand written notes prepared by Mr. Rodman on November 7, 2001
indicated that in a discussion with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, the
Deputy Secretary conveyed that the Iranians’ mistrust of the CIA had
prompted Mr. Hadley to refer the matter to the DoD.5 I The draft
chronology prepared by the Department in February 2004 specifically
stated that Mr. Ledeen
, "who was facilitating the contact,
stressed the Iranians’ mistrust of CIA officials."52 In his
September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman reiterated that Mr. Ledeen was
adamant about not having any CIA involvement, citing the Iranian’s
paranoia about the CIA.53 (U) The Committee received testimony from
Mssrs. Ledeen , Franklin, and Rhode that calls into question the
willingness of the Iranians who were met in Rome to deal with the CIA.
When Mr. Ledeen was asked whether he had suggested that the Iranians
would not meet with the CIA he replied that he did not think so. Mr. Ledeen stated that Iranians to be met in subsequent meetings had made
it clear they would not meet with the CIA, but he reiterated that the
two Iranians at the Rome meeting had expressed no qualms about dealing
with the CIA. 54 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that neither of
the Iranians he met in Rome expressed concerns about who in the U.S.
Government they were meeting with. When asked if there had been an
indication beforehand that there were limitations on whom the Iranians
would talk to, Mr Franklin responded "no."55 When asked
whether it had been conveyed to him during the meeting that the
Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA, Mr. Rhode also responded
"no."56 (I) The perceived intention of the Iranians was also
a factor in the decision about whether to coordinate the Rome meeting
outside of the DoD. According to the April 2004 letter to the
Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, when Mr. Hadley first approached Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz,
Mr. Hadley indicated that the Iranians wished to defect. 7 This
prompted Mr. Rodman to seek guidance from the DoD Office of General
Counsel and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
about whether contact with potential defectors required coordination
with the CIA. Mr. Rodman received a memo, dated November 15, 2001,
from the DoD Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence) indicating that
Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 4/ 158 required each
Intelligence Community component to "report promptly _ the
identity of any walk-in or other disaffected person who may be of
interest together with all available and pertinent
information."59 He further advised that the "DIA may
initiate an intelligence collection operation with a foreign 51
2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 2, November 7, 2001, Handwritten
notes of Mr. Rodman. 52 2004-1675, April 16, 2004,
letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 53 2008-0836, Memorandum for
the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1.
54 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr.
Ledeen, pages 7-8. 55 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff
Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 31-32. 56 2004-0797, Transcript of
April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 26. 57 2004-1675,
April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, Page 1. 58 A DCID was a directive issued by the
Director of Central Intelligence providing guidance to the
Intelligence Community on a specific topic of interest. With the
creation of the Director of National Intelligence, DCIDs are being
replaced by Intelligence Community Directives. 59 2004-1675, April 16,
2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD office of General
Counsel. _ 10
page 10
- _ military member subject to internal DoD regulations and DCID 5/1
coordination."6° Directive 5/1 stated that "the CIA is
primarily responsible for the conduct and coordination of espionage to
meet the national security intelligence needs of the U.S. Government.
. ." The Directive allows that the DoD may conduct such
activities in response to tasking from the DCI or "as required
for the execution of the Secretary of Defense’s
responsibilities."61 The DIA Director, Admiral Thomas Wilson,
provided Mr. Rodman similar advice, noting that an individual could
defect to a DoD employee, but further handling would be the legal
responsibility of the CIA.62 (U) The General Counsel’s memo was
written under the assumption that the Iranians wished to defect. Their
true purpose, however, became known to Mr. Rodman about the same time
the memo was written. Once it was detemined that the Iranians did not
want to defect, but merely wanted to pass on information, DoD
personnel did not advise CIA personnel of the pending meeting, and DIA
officials were not included in further planning for the meeting. In a
September 2003 written response to the Committee’s Vice Chairman,
the CIA Director of Congressional Affairs stated on behalf of the DCI
that "DoD officials did not coordinate their contacts with CIA,
and CIA subsequently raised objections and questions about such
contacts." The response further stated that the CIA was not in a
position to conclude whether DCID 5/1 requirements were applicable to
the Rome meeting, but noted that official trips to a country would
routinely be cleared through the ambassador.63 Mr. Rhode advised the
Committee that he was unaware of the content of DCIDs 4/1 and 5/1,
while Mr. Franklin expressed some awareness, but assumed any required
action had been taken by his chain of command.64 (I) Materials
prepared by counsel on behalf of Under Secretary of Defense Feith
expressed the view that " a]lthough the U.S. ambassador to Italy
and the CIA - - complained that they were not informed about the
meeting, it was not the responsibility of the Defense Department to
inform them." The material noted that the Deputy National
Security Advisor had consulted with the Deputy Secretary of State and
the DCI in advance. 65 This response fails to consider that the DCI
and Deputy Secretary were not provided enough information to know who
to inform of the pending activity. (U) In a September 2007 interview,
Mr. Rodman summarized the issue of coordinating the Rome meeting by
stating that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had wanted to keep this
meeting "close-hold" until the DoD could determine if there
was any value to the contact and how it should be pursued further. He
added that if there had been an attempt to go through normal channels,
the State Department and CIA would have never wanted to speak with the
Iranians.66 A National Security Council legal advisor informed the
Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that Mr. Hadley had been
surprised to learn there had been no coordination with the 60
2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Hom the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from
the DoD oiiice of General Counsel. 61 DCID 5/1, , effective December
19, 1984, Section 3. 62 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source
Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. 63 2003-41 16,
September 23, 2003 letter from CIA, Director of Congressional Affairs.
64 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr.
Rhode, page 18, and 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff
Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 10-11. 65 2007-1561, July 13, 2006,
Memorandum Hom Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. 66 2008-0836,
Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr.
Rodman, page 5.
page 11
- _ ambassador and CIA.67 DCI Tenet’s 2007 book notes that after the
Rome meeting Mr. Hadley asked him if Mr. Wolfowitz had previously
called him to explain the situation and DCI Tenet had responded
"no."66 In March 2008, DCI Tenet informed the Committee that
at no time prior to or after the Rome meeting did Mr. Wolfowitz
contact him to discuss the Rome meeting.6
- (U) The limited awareness of the Rome meeting within the CIA and the
State Department, as well as the involvement of the foreign government (Israel)
and Mr. Ghorbanifar, would have a significant impact on the ultimate
outcome of this activity.
| Wayne Madsen Report |
Mario Scaramella |
| Dec. 25-26, 2006 -- "The enigmatic
Italian self-described environmental "security" expert and
alleged weapons smuggler and colleague of various right-wing
European operatives Mario Scaramella was arrested .... As
previously reported by WMR, Scaramella's links to various right-wing
"intelligence" groups in Italy and abroad have also placed
him in the middle of an attempt by former Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi and his Russian-Israeli Mafia friends to tarnish
current Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi as a "KGB
agent." Russian President Vladimir Putin was a collateral
target of Russian-Israeli mobster Boris Berezovsky. ....
The activities of Scaramella and his colleagues are now under a
criminal investigation by the Rome prosecutor's office.
... With Scaramella now under arrest in Italy and all
investigative roads -- the forged Niger documents, the kidnapping
and rendition by U.S. and Italian agents of an Egyptian Imam in
Milan, dirty tricks against Prodi, the Pentagon's pre-war
connections to Rome-based Iranian Mossad asset Manucher Ghorbanifar,
and the U.S. assassination of SISMI deputy chief Nicola Calipari in
Baghdad -- now leading to Rome, Italy may hold the key to much more
than Scaramella's dubious business dealings. That key may unlock the
door of the identities of the actual perpetrators of the 9/11 and
other terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Beslan, Istanbul, and
Casablanca." full
article |
- Country Clearance through the Ambassador
- (U) Most U.S. Government employees are required to receive country
clearance from the appropriate U.S. ambassador prior to foreign travel
on official business. The U.S. ambassador and the CIA were under the
impression that DoD employees traveling to Rome on official business
would be required to clear their travel through the embassy. According
to the State Department, no one from the office of the Secretary of
Defense or the foreign government (Israel) notified the Rome embassy about the
meeting.76
- (U) Clearing DoD personnel travel through the ambassador is
addressed in a series of DoD guidance. Mr. Rhode had a blanket travel
order issued through the Office of Net Assessment that was valid
through September 30, 2002. Such a travel order removes the
administrative burden of obtaining a new travel order for each trip
and is generally only provided to frequent travelers. Mr. Rhode’s
blanket travel order specified that the " c]learance requirements
of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed." Mr. Franklin’s
travel order was issued through the OUSD(P) and made no reference to
country clearance regulations.71
- (U) The subject of DoD Directive 4500.54 is Official Temporary Duty
Travel Abroad. The text applicable to Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode
stated that all travelers other than DoD civilian officials appointed
by the President "must obtain a ‘theater clearance’ from the
Unified Commander and/or ‘country clearance’ from the U.S.
Embassy."72 The Directive notes that the DoD Foreign Clearance
Guide outlines the procedures for obtaining these clearances. The
Directive indicates, however, that in some cases "country or
theater clearance may not be required," and again refers to the
Foreign Clearance Guide. If the Foreign Clearance Guide is not clear
on this requirement the reader is referred to the applicable embassy
U.S. Defense Attaché Officer or Office of Defense Cooperation for
additional information.76 (I) A review of the Foreign Clearance Guide
in effect for Italy at the time of the Rome meeting would indicate
that in the specific instance of Mssrs Franklin and Rhode, country
clearance was not required because they were not of sufficient rank
and did not visit the U.S. 67 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome
Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report, Bellinger Interview.
68 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page 312. 69 March 10,
2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page 1. 76
2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for
the Record, Question #1. 71 The term country clearance refers to the
process of notifying a U.S. embassy or mission of the pending travel
of a U.S. Government employee to that facility and requesting the
appropriate approval for that visit. 72 DoDD 4500.54, Official
Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.2 73 DoDD 4500.54, Official
Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.4
page 12
- _ embassy or a consulate. A country clearance would have been
required to visit an Italian government, military, or industry
organization; however, prior to their departure the DoD officials
involved were unaware of the involvement of so, it is not clear
whether the Rome meeting took place in an actual . C) There is no
evidence that the DoD officials involved in planning for or attending
the Rome meeting researched the general requirement for country
clearance. Despite the fact that his travel order said that the
clearance requirements of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed, Mr.
Rhode seemed to be unaware of these requirements and noted that he was
given no guidance to contact the embassy.75 The 2003
Counterintelligence Field Activity report on DoD contact with Mr.
Ghorbanifar stated that Mr. "Franklin assumed that all the
necessary coordination had been done at a higher level and that there
was no ‘coordination problem’ since the DEPSECDEF Deputy
Secretary of Defense] and the were involved in this matter."76
Mr. Franklin gave a similar explanation to the Committee in 2004,
noting that he had been told it had been approved up the chain of
command and therefore he did not think it was his responsibility to
check in at the embassy.77 Mr. Rodman informed the Committee in 2007
that he was puzzled by all of the interest in whether a country
clearance was obtained for the Rome meeting. He reiterated that the
whole process was directed by Mr. Hadley to be "close-hold"
and by the very definition of the term a lot of people would not be
told about the trip. He pointed out again that Mr. Hadley had told
both DCI Tenet and Deputy Secretary Armitage about the trip in
advance.78
-
- Content of the Rome Meeting
- (U) During the Rome meeting,
Mr. Rhode took contemporaneous notes on a laptop computer, while Mr.
Franklin took handwritten notes. These notes were provided to the
Committee by the DoD. Based on a review of the notes, the specific
issues discussed during the meeting included the following:79 . •
Iranian "hit teams" targeting U.S. personnel and facilities
in Afghanistan; • Iran’s long standing relationship with the
Palestinian Liberation Organization; • Tunnel complexes in Iran for
weapons storage or exfiltration of regime leaders; • Iran’s
perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq; • The growth of anti—regime
sentiment in Iran; • Iranian regime attitudes toward the U.S.; and
• Internal rivalries among Iran’s intelligence agencies. 74
December 10, 2001, DoD Foreign Clearance Guide, Europe, Italy, Section
H A. 1. 75 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of
Mr. Rhode, page 17. 76 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source
Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. 77 2004-1809, Transcript
of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 10. 78
2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff
Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 79 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter
from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab
7, Mr. Franklin’s notes on the Iranian interviews. Two versions, one
undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a typo).
_ 13
page 13
- _ (U) When the Rome meeting
ended on December 13, 2001, Mr. Franklin returned to the Pentagon and
began preparing a summary of the information provided by the Iranians.
It appears there were multiple versions of the summary as a result of
the editing process. Mr. Franklin’s summary was completed in early
January 2002. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he considered
the information provided by the two Iranians to be "good".80
The information on Iranian hit teams targeting U.S. interests in
Afghanistan was particularly interesting to him because prior to the
Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin had traveled to Afghanistan and been in
contact with U.S. Special Operations Forces. When the issue was raised
by the second Iranian at the Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin requested
details on the hit team in a particular part of Afghanistan and the
Iranian provided names and a photograph of a team member.
- (U) While preparing his
summary, Mr. Franklin attempted to corroborate the hit team
information with some of his contacts at the DIA. He could not recall
the content of his discussion with a former colleague in the Defense
HUMINT Service beyond going over the general details of the meeting,
but Mr. Franklin provided the Committee details of his discussion with
a DIA analyst. Mr. Franklin understood that the analyst had been able
to corroborate that one of the names associated with the hit team in
Afghanistan was a current member of the Iranian intelligence
structure.81 During a 2007 Committee interview the DIA analyst
recalled that he found no information in the DIA database that
specifically corroborated the name and ur1it data provided by Mr.
Franklin. The analyst stated, however, that the information provided
by Mr. Franklin had sounded plausible and credible because he had
other information indicating that Iranian forces were involved in
covert activities in Afghanistan.82
- (U) Based on his exchange
with the DIA analyst, Mr. Franklin contacted a Special Forces
Commander in Afghanistan and relayed the hit team information via
secure telephone. Mr. Franklin indicated that this exchange would have
taken place not long after he returned from the Rome meeting while he
was writing his summary report.83 That Commander subsequently invited
Mr. Franklin to attend a briefing he was giving to Secretary Rumsfeld
upon his return to the Pentagon. Mr. Franklin believed that he was
invited because his information had proved valuable. He stated that
the Commander had advised him that the information had allowed them to
turn "the tables on these Iranians" and offered as an
example the fact that they had been able to take pictures of the
Iranians loading weapons into a van registered to a warlord. Based on
his discussions with the Commander, Mr. Franklin concluded that some
of the information provided by the Iranians had "saved American
1ives."84 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin upon his
return informed the Committee that it genuinely seemed to be Mr.
Franklin’s perception that the information saved American lives, but
added that he could not speculate on whether it was truly useful.85
Mr. Franklin’s notion that the Iranian information "saved
American lives" would 80 2004-1809,
Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page
27. Note also that on page l of the September 25, 2003
Counterintelligence Field Activity interview with Mr. Rhode, he
indicated that the information was "very good." 81
2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr.
Franklin, pages 27 and 38-41. 82 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record,
December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with DIA Analyst #1], pages 1-2.
83 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr.
Franklin, pages 24-25 and 32-33. 84 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting
Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. See also
2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr.
Franklin, pages 24-25. 85 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record,
December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with DIA Analyst 1], page 2. _ 14
page 14
- _ become widely used by DoD officials and Mr. Ledeen to describe the
utility of attending the Rome meeting.
- (U) After the memo was completed, Mr. Franklin went back to his
regular duties with almost no role in the decision on whether to
continue contact with the Iranians. He remained in contact with Mr. Ledeen
, and for a number of weeks after the trip received phone calls
and faxes from Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Franklin advised the Committee
that he returned the calls for a while to be polite on the chance that
Mr. Ghorbanifar could facilitate future access, however the faxes
offered no new information and he eventually discontinued the
contact.86 Mr. Franklin retained the faxed material for a period of
time, but it appears it was destroyed prior to the Counterintelligence
Field Activity’s 2003 review.87
- (U) Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he passed his Rome meeting
notes to Mr. Luti. He subsequently played no further role in the
follow up to the Rome meeting.88 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s Plan
- (U) While in Rome, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode became involved in
discussions that went beyond obtaining information from the Iranian
sources. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that during the trip to
Rome Mr. Ghorbanifar pressed his own agenda for regime change in
Iran.89 Mr. Franklin stated that late one night during a discussion in
a bar Mr. Ghorbanifar laid out his plan on a napkin. The plan involved
the simultaneous disruption of traffic at key intersections leading to
Tehran that would create anxiety, work stoppages and other disruptive
measures. Mr. Franklin recalled that Mr. Ghorbanifar asked for $5
million in seed money to facilitate this activity. He added that Mr.
Ghorbanifar indicated that if the iirst action was successful
additional money may be needed later on, but Mr. Franklin could not
recall speciiic amounts being discussed beyond the $5 million.90 Mr.
Rhode recalled Mr. Ghorbanifar discussing a plan to set up a network
that could lead to the overthrow of the regime, but could not recall a
speciiic dollar amount.91 Mr. Ledeen provided the Committee similar
recollections, noting that Mr. Ghorbanifar offered a variety of
different schemes for regime change in Iran dating to the time the two
had iirst met. Mr. Ledeen added that he believed the U.S. Government
should be supporting Iranians who want to overthrow the regime. He
stated that he had passed the notion of the plan on to Mr. Hadley, Mr.
Luti and Mr. Rodman upon returning from the ’ Rome meeting.92 (I)
The proposed funding for, and foreign involvement in, Mr. Ghorbanifar’s
plan for regime change were never fully understood. When the DoD began
receiving questions on this topic in early 2002, several summaries
were produced. A synopsis of the discussions in Rome on Mr.
Ghorbanifar’s plan, prepared by Mr. Rodman in mid—February 2002
with input from Mr. 86 2004-1809, Transcript of April
23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 29, 37 and 48-49. 87
2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report,
Franklin Interview. 88 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff
Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 33-34. 89 2004-1809, Transcript of April
23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 26. 90 2004-1809,
Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages
26-27 and 63-65. 91 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff
Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 27. 92 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21,
2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 21-22, and 2008-0836,
Memorandum for the Record, October 24, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr.
Ledeen, page 2. _ 15
- _ Franklin, stated that Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar advised Mr.
Franklin and Mr. Rhode of "the ign government] support for this
information collection opportunity and financing by foreign]
corporate enterprises midway through the interviews .... ." The
summary goes on to indicate the costs would be in the millions and
entailed "extrication /reentry of numerous sources, granting
visas, and eventual resettlement outside of Iran. . ." A later
version of this summary dated February 12, 2002 referenced contracts
"that would assure oil and gas sales in the event of regime
change."93 An action memo prepared by Mr. Rodman in July 2002
referred to " m]ultimillion-dollar business deals that the h foreign government (Israel)] arranged for the two Iranian
interlocutors."94 Despite the changing descriptions of foreign
involvement, there was no attempt by the DoD, or any other entity of
the U.S. Governrnent, to determine the true intentions of the foreign government (Israel)
with regard to interacting with the Iranians or Mr.
Ghorbanifar. (U) The confusion within DoD channels over Mr.
Ghorbanifar’s plan and foreign involvement partially reflects that
Messrs. Franklin and Rhode had focused on the assigned task of
listening to the information provided by the Iranians. Officials from
the DoD were consistent in stating that the DoD participants had been
instructed prior to the meeting that their sole purpose in attending
was to listen and bring back any useful information provided by the
Iranians.95 Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode were also consistent in stating
that they viewed the information gathering with the two Iranians and
Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan to weaken the Iranian regime as two entirely
separate issues. Mr. Franklin indicated that upon his return he made
it clear to those in the OUSD(P) that there should be no follow up on
Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He added that at no time during the
follow-on contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar did he offer encouragement for
the p1an.96 Ambassador and CIA Inquire About the Rome Meeting (U) Upon
the return of Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode, and the completion of the
Rome meeting summary, two series of events began to unfold. First,
State Department and CIA officials attempted to determine what Mr. Ledeen and the DoD representatives had done in Rome, and second, DoD
officials debated the next course of action. These deliberations
eventually became intertwined, but the decision to limit coordination
prior to the meeting, and concerns about Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for
regime change, essentially eliminated the potential for further
contact with Iranian officials via Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar. The
two series of events are outlined below.
- (U) The U.S. ambassador to Italy at the time of the Rome meeting was
Melvin Sembler. Ambassador Sembler had been sworn in on November 16,
2001. On December 12, 2001, during 93 2004-1675, April 16, 2004,
letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, Tabs 21, February 12, 2002, Note on foreign government (Israel)
Support, and 22, February 12, 2002, Rome Meeting: References to
Financin . 94 2004- F675, April 16, 2004, letter nom the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002,
Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 95 2004-0797,
Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 27
and 58, 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of
Mr. Franklin, page 13, and 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Bom the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1,
February 2004 Chronology. 96 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004,
Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 37 and 48-49. _ 16
| Wayne Madsen Report |
Ambassador Sembler |
| The Post's deputy foreign editor Peter
Eisner has just co-written a book, "The Italian Letter,"
about the forged Niger documents that
were used to lead the U.S. to war in Iraq. In the book, Eisner gives
a virtual free pass to arch-neocon Michael Ledeen
and his dealings with Iranian con man Manucher Ghorbanifar in
helping to cook up the scheme. Eisner also suggests that the U.S.
ambassador to Italy at the time, Mel Sembler
, was out of the loop on the Ledeen-Ghorbanifar meetings. In fact, Sembler
, as much a neocon as Ledeen
, was not only aware of the meetings, according to our sources, but
helped set them up. Eisner quotes an unnamed U.S. embassy source in
Rome as stating that Sembler
"blew a gasket" when he found out about Ledeen
meetings in Rome. Sembler more likely blew a gasket when the details
of the Niger forgeries and the role played by the neocon cabal in
the Bush administration, a grouping that includes Ledeen
, the Pentagon's Harold Rhode, and Sembler
as charter members, became public. full
article |
page 16
- _ the course of the Rome meeting, Ambassador Sembler had breakfast
with Mr. Ledeen
. A February 2002 State Department cable indicated that
Mr. Ledeen informed Ambassador
Sembler that he was in Italy
"under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense and that
two DoD employees were with him. Their project was to make contact
with high-level officials of the Iranian Intelligence Service."97
In Mr. Ledeen ’s 2004 testimony to the Committee he added that he had
told the ambassador they were going to have conversations with
Iranians who were promising to be helpful with terrorism, and that he
had informed the ambassador as a courtesy and requested that he keep
it to himself.98 In an August 2004 response to questions for the
record, the State Department indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen offered the
ambassador no explanation for his wish to keep it confidential. The
response further stated that Ambassador Sembler speculated that it
derived from the involvement of the foreign government (Israel).99 The February
2002 State Department cable further indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen told
that ambassador that he would provide additional information after the
Rome meeting. Later on December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had
dinner with the foreign government (Israel) official and his wife, and l\/Ir.
Ledeen. The Rome meeting was not discussed over dinner.lOO
- (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, following
the events of December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler asked a senior
official at the embassy whether U.S. officials were required to seek
country clearance to travel to Rome on official business. The
ambassador also expressed awareness that 1\/Ir. Ledeen was not a U.S.
Government employee and a lack of comfort with his activities. The
senior official at the embassy denied any knowledge of Mr. Ledeen’s
activities and confirmed the need for country clearance. The senior
official at the embassy agreed to check with the embassy’s Defense
Attaché for any further information.1O1 The Defense Attaché was
unable to find anyone requesting such a clearance who matched the
information provided by the senior official at the Embassy.]O2
- (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, on
December 23, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had dinner with Mr. Ledeen and
his family at the ambassador’s residence. The cable stated that in
a private conversation with the ambassador Mr. Ledeen indicated that
he had made contact with the Iranian officials and there was a
"sizeable financial involvement to secure their
cooperation." During the conversation Mr. Ledeen also expressed
his belief that it was a deal the U.S. should take.1 3 The ambassador
did not focus on the matter again until a call from the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, on February
1, 2002, which the ambassador and his deputy were under the impression
was prompted by the Under Secretary becoming aware of a summary of the
Rome meeting prepared by 1\/Ir. Ledeen for Mr. Hadley.1°4‘ During
that call the ambassador was provided what were believed to be the
names of the DoD participants in the Rome meeting. Unbeknownst to the
ambassador, one of the names was wrong, but after the call he
contacted his deputy and the senior official at the embassy to 97
2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). gg
2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen
,
pages 11-12. 99 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response
to Questions for the Record, Question #4. 100 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8
February 2002 (State Department Cable). ml 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8
February 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘°2 2003-4209, came,
February 1, 2002. 103 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State
Department Cable). 104 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004
Response to Questions for the Record, Question #3. _ 17
page 17
- _ discuss the matter. Neither of them recognized the correct name of
Mr. Rhode}05 The ambassador would memorialize his recollections of his
prior discussions with Mr. Ledeen in a February 8, 2002 cable to Under
Secretary Grossman, and defer further action on the matter to hjmlros
(_) As noted above, in early December 200l Mr. Hadley had mentioned to
DCI Tenet that the DoD might meet with Iranians in Europe to discuss
terrorist threat information. The DCI had no details, however, on the
location of the meeting or its participants.l°7 For that reason,
during a January 14, 2002, meeting in the DCI’s office that 01010000
S0¤i0r CLA officials, the CIA participants were surprised when the foreign government (Israel)
intelligence service asked if they were aware of
DoD officials "coming to Italy to talk about Iran."1°8 The
conversation was cut short and was not pursued at that time. When
approached by the ambassador after his February 1, 2002, call from
Under Secretary Grossman, however, - _ question durin the meeting at
CIA headquarters with the activities of Mr. Ledeen
. the ambassador had
indicated that the DoD participants "were talking about 25
million U.S. dollars] for some k.ind of Iran program." - noted
that the ambassador speculated that "perhaps it was for some sort
of opposition sup ort."1°9 . he DCI was in contact with Mr.
Hadley about the matter. The DDO also expressed a number of
concerns:110 First, I was not advised, the DCI was not advised, and
you were not advised of DoD’s apparent use of- foreign government (Israel)]
to facilitate some sort of dialogue with the Iranian government. We
were not asked to trace the names of the Iranians. We were not asked
to comment on the substance of the alleged Iranian offer. 0n
F¢bf¤¤1"y 7. 2002. indicated that the ambassador had clarified
that it was the Iranians who had told the DoD officials that for $25
million they could provide “certain unspecified information and
services."m He noted that the ambassador planned to inform Under
Secretary Grossman that "given the discussion of money for
services, this effort may be crossing into the area of covert action,
for which he is not aware of any residential authorization."u2 -
“" ibid 106 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State
Department Cable). 107 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page
312, and March l0, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George
Tenet, page l. ‘°" 2003-4209, cebre, February 1, 2002. ‘°’
ibid “° 2003-4209, cebre, February s, 2002. ‘“ 2003-4209, cebre,
February 7, 2002. *12 ibid _ 18
page 18
- _ Defense Department Decision on VVhether to Continue Contact
- (U) Mr. Franklin’s summary of the Rome meeting had been passed up
his chain of command via Mr. Luti to Mr. Rodman. On January 7, 2002,
Mr. Rodman drafted a letter for Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to send to
DIA Director Wilson with a copy to Mr. Hadley. The draft letter
reminded the Director of their previous interaction on the matter,
advised that the meeting had taken place once it became known the
Iranians merely intended to provide information and not defect, and
requested that the Director review the attached summary to determine
whether the DoD should pursue the matter further through DIA channels.
This letter was never sent.115 Instead, a meeting was arranged between
Mr. Rodman and Director Wilson for February 2, 2002. In a January 31,
2002, handwritten memo to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Rodman
advised that the meeting was set, that a new version of the summary
had been prepared, and reminded the Deputy Secretary that he had
previously instructed him not to hand the summary over.116 Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz responded with a note indicating that the DoD
needed to insulate the activity "from the appearance of being a
policy channel, but it might be possible to include Rhode or Franklin
as part of a DIA team." Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s response
also reiterated the requirement that Director Wilson be allowed read
the summary, but not ma.ke a copy, and observed that this would
underscore that the Director was not to discuss the matter with anyone
else until further authorized. The response also instructed Mr. Rodman
to ask Director Wilson his opinion on the intelligence value of
proceeding with further contact and how he would handle it if given
the assignment.] 17
- (U) Mr. Rodman met with Director Wilson on February 2, 2002, and
later that day prepared a memorandum to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
summarizing the meeting. The memo noted that Director Wilson had been
shown a copy of the summary, but it had not been left with him, and
stated that the Director had found the information to be "mildly
interesting." H8 Mr. H3 2003-4209, came, February 11, 2002. U4
2003-4209, came, March 21, 2002. 115 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter
from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab
11, January 7, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the
Iranian Debrief 116 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 14,
January 31, 2002, Handwritten note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on
the Iranian Matter. 117 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 15,
February 1, 2002, Handwritten notes from Mr. Wolfowitz to Mr. Rodman
on DIA Director Meeting. Us 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17,
February 2, 2002, Memo Hom Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting
with the DIA Director. NOTE: Admiral Wilson was DIA Director Hom July
1999 to July 2002. Committee staff interviewed Admiral Wilson via
telephone on June 10, 2004. Admiral Wilson could not recall many of
the events relating to the Rome meeting beyond advising Mr. Rodman
that DIA could handle any further contacts with the Iranians and that
they should be coordinated with the CIA. He could not recall reading
the Rome meeting summary or referring to the information as _ 19
page 19
- _ Rodman’s memo also indicated that Director Wilson had offered
several different ways to pursue the matter ranging from continued
debriefings to full recruitment. Director Wilson had noted that the
DIA was capable of handling any of the options, but a clandestine
recruitment would require coordination with the CIA, although DIA
could perhaps do a one-time interview without informing the CIA in
advance. Director Wilson wrote down the names of the Iranians and
offered to conduct name traces, but was told to hold off until it was
authorized at higher levels. Mr. Rodman reminded him to discuss the
matter with no one else without author·ization.u9
- (U) On February 5, 2002, Mr. Rodman prepared handwritten notes for a
memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld outlining
the potential options for moving forward with the Iranians. The
options offered were to drop the matter, continue in non- intelligence
channels, or to do it through the DIA without telling the CIA who the
sources were.l2° An undated draft memo from Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld that expanded on the material in the
handwritten notes offered the same choices, but included the option to
seek Presidential authority to override the DCID requirement for CIA
coordination. The overall recommendation in the draft memo was to
"put it into regular intelligence channels," but the memo
noted the conflict between the alleged reluctance of the Iranians to
deal with the CIA and the requirement to coordinate future contact
with that agency. 121
- (U) Handwritten notes from Mr. Rodman, dated February 9, 2002,
indicate his awareness that the Rome meeting issue had become known to
the CIA, Under Secretary Grossman, and the U.S. embassy in Rome. The
notes indicate that because of Mr. Ghorbanifar the "whole world
is involved," and contain the reference "$25 m illion]
??" with no further explanation.122 The notes also state that Mr.
Ledeen played a role in raising that awareness and that Mr. Rodman
contacted him at his home that day.l 3 According to a draft chronology
prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, on
February 9, 2002, the State Department and CIA indicated their
opposition to further contact and as a result the DoD dropped the
matter.124 (U) When the DoD decided to drop the matter in early
February 2002, the information provided by the two Iranian sources had
not been fully evaluated or vetted with other known information by the
Intelligence Community, beyond Mr. Franklin passing a portion of the
information collected to Special Forces in Afghanistan. Mr. Franklin
told the Committee that mildly interesting. When interviewed in 2003
by the Counterintelligence Field Activity Admiral Wilson provided a
similar response. 119 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17,
February 2, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting
with the DIA Director. 120 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 18,
February 5, 2002, Handwritten Note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz.
121 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 19, Draft Memo from Mr. Wolfowitz
to Secretary Rumsfeld on Iranian Sources. 122 2004-1675, April 16,
2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs, Tabs 21, rcbmapy 12, 2002, Nm.-; pp _ Support, and 22,
Febmapy 12, 2002, Rome Muang; References to Financing, and 2004-4231
indicate that on February 12, 2002 Mr. Rodman researched the financial
proposals discussed at the Rome meeting. To the best of Mr. Rodman’s
recollection, Mr. Franklin assisted in drafting a memo on the subject
dated February 12, 2002. 123 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 20,
February 9, 2002, Handwritten Notes from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz.
124 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August
2003 Chronology of Events. _ 20
page 20
- _ Mr. Rodman informed him that he had handed the Rome meeting
summary to DIA Director Wilson and that "since it was given to
the Director I knew that he would pass it down to desk analysts."
However, he also stated that he was unaware of: any intelligence
reports that were generated from the information; it being passed to
another element of the Intelligence Community; or any actions that
Director Wilson may have taken with his summary. He added that no one
ever called him and asked for input.125 The Defense HUMINT Service
representative that Mr. Franklin contacted after his return from the
meeting told the Committee that beyond the verbal briefing from Mr.
Franklin he never saw any intelligence reports or requests for further
follow-up.126 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin informed the
Committee that to his knowledge there was no subsequent entry of the
information provided by Mr. Franklin into DIA databases and it was not
used in any DIA analytic products.12 As noted above, Director Wilson
had not been allowed to retain a copy of the summary.
- (U) In April 2002, the Defense HUMINT Service received an
"executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen
. A Defense HUMINT Service contact
memorandum describing the meeting indicated that the tasking resulted
from a briefing on the Rome meeting from Mr. Ledeen to representatives
in Mr. Rodman’s office. The Defense HUMINT Service document outlined
the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen
, and noted that Mr. Ledeen
repeatedly declined to provide details that the interviewer deemed
necessary to assess the validity of Mr. Ledeen
’s contacts such as
specific names, locations, and contact information. The document
indicated Mr. Ledeen promised more details once the DoD expressed real
interest in pursuing further contact.1 8 (-) Information
provided by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that after the interview
of Mr. Ledeen
, the Defense HUMINT Service held discussions with
several <>¤mr¤¤¤¢¤tS Of the CTA, During the meeting, the
Defense HUMINT Service learned that Mr. "Ledeen
had a history of
approaching his USG U.S. Government] contacts with various ‘schemes’
to gain USG interest and/or support for various issues normally
related to Hizbollah, Iran, and or Terrorism." The Service also
became aware that some of Mr. Ledeen
’s contacts were considered
"nefarious and unreliable." The Defense HUMINT Service
determined that no further contact with Mr. Ledeen was warranted or
advisable.129 The Ongoing Actions of Mr. Ledeen
- (U) After the Rome meeting, Mr. Ledeen continued to press for
continued contact with the Iranians through his variety of contacts
inside the U.S. Government. In mid-January 2002, 125 2004-1809,
Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages
35-36 and 39. 126 2004-2735, Transcript of June 8, 2004, Staff
Interview of DIA Employee #1], pages 4-6. As noted later in this
report, in April 2002, the Defense HU`M]NT Service received an
"executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen
. A Defense HUMINT Service contact
memorandum outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen
, but
noted that Mr. Ledeen repeatedly declined to provide details such as
specific names, locations, and contact information. 127 2008-0836,
Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with DIA
Analyst #1], page 2. 128 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source
Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary
of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 129 2008-1182, March 12,
2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #14. _ 21
page 21
- _ Mr. Ledeen
held
discussions with Mr. Rodman on how best to continue the exchange, and
had scheduled a meeting with Mr. Hadley for January 16, 2002, to
discuss the matter.13 Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he
became aware of Mr. Ledeen
’s efforts to push for other elements of
the U.S. Government to hear Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He recalled
being approached by an official from the Office of the Vice President
in early 2002 requesting his opinion of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and
his judgments of its prospects for success. Mr. Franklin stated that
he recommended that it not be pursued. 131
- (U) According to a draft chronology prepared for the Secretary of
Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, a memorandum that Mr. Ledeen had
been circulating was sent from former Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich to Secretary Rumsfeld in June 2002. The memorandum expressed
concern about the failure to continue contact with Iranian officials
who had provided valuable information in the past.132 The DoD provided
the Committee with a copy of the memorandum with an explanatory note
stating that while a stamp on the memorandum indicated the Secretary
saw it on June 27, 2002, it merely reflected that the memorandum had
"passed through" the Secretary’s office. The use of that
stamp had since been discontinued.133
- (U) According to a July 18,
2002 cable from Ambassador Sembler to Under Secretary Grossman, on
July 4, 2002, Mr. Ledeen contacted Ambassador Sembler and at the end
of a social conversation informed him that he would be returning to
Rome in early August to "resume that program." The
ambassador advised the Under Secretary that he presumed this to be a
reference to the December meeting with Iranian officials and noted
that these activities had undermined the credibility of the U.S.
Government. The ambassador also indicated that Mr. Ledeen had only
provided him with a small amount of information on the subject and
went on to state that "I am increasingly concerned that his
activity borders on, or has already entered, an area which would
require explicit Presidential authorization and notification of the
Chief of Mission."134 There was no response to the cable.
The DDO added that CIA leadership had been informed and he had asked
that the National Security Council be queried immediately. 136
According to handwritten notes prepared by Mr. Rodman and dated July
13, 2002, a special assistant to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, DoD
Employee #2, had advised him that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had
spoken with DCI Tenet and determined that the DCI now supported
further contacts with the Iranians. In addition, Assistant 130
2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 12, January 16, 2002, Note from DoD
Employee #1] to Mr. Rodman. m 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004,
Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 43-44. 132 2007-1561, DoD IG
Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of
Events, page 2. 133 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 23, May
10, 2002 fax to Secretary Rumsfeld, and attached explanatory note. 134
2003-4617, Rome 03565, 18 July 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘”
2003-4209, came, July 15, 2002. 126 2003-4209, came, July 16, 2002. _
22
page 22
- _ Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, Charles Allen,
had been selected to coordinate on the matter.137
- (U) On July 19, 2002, Mr.
Rodman prepared an action memo for Secretary Rumsfeld in response to
the Secretary’s request about what the DoD should do with respect to
contacts with Iran, as described in the memo forwarded to him by
former Speaker Gingrich. The action memo described the origins of the
Rome meeting, and outlined complications due to the involvement of Mr.
Ghorbanifar and the previous objections of DCI Tenet and Secretary of
State, Colin Powell. The memo concluded with the recommendation that
the "DoD be prepared to continue the contact, through regular DHS
Defense HUMINT Service] channels and with CIA coordination." The
memo was reviewed by Under Secretary Feith, on July 25, 2002.13 8
<j> in 0 July 25, 2002, according to the ambassador, Under
Secretary Grossman had raised the issue with Secretary Powell, who had
proceeded to pursue it with Secretary Rumsfeld and the National
Security Council. h at each step, Secretary Powell was advised that
Mr. Ledeen
’s desire to continue the program at the planned August
meeting was not authorized.139 An August
8, 2002 the CIA had been told by a National Security Council legal
advisor that Mr. Hadley had personally chastised Mr. Ledeen for
continuing to pursue the matter even though he had been told to desist
in December 2001, and advised Mr. Ledeen in strong terms to
"cease his activity on the issue." At that point, the DDO -
concluded the matter was behind them.140 No such meeting organized by
Mr. Ledeen occurred in the August 2002 timeframe.
- (U) Ambassador Sembler
traveled to Washington, D.C. for a series of meetings on September 4,
2002. During this visit the ambassador met with National Security
Advisor Rice and Mr. Hadley and was advised that Mr. Ledeen
’s
activities would not continue. He received a similar response from
Deputy Secretary Armitage in a separate meeting.141
-
- Other Related Activities
- (U) The only other event related to the Rome meeting that occurred
in 2002 involved a chance meeting between Mr. Rhode and one of the
Iranians he and Mr. Franklin had met in Rome. According to a September
2003 interview of Mr. Rhode by the Counterintelligence Field Activity,
in December 2002 Mr. Rhode attended a U.S. Government endorsed Iraqi
opposition conference in London, England. According to Mr. Rhode a
number of DoD and State Department personnel attended the conference.
At the conference he unexpectedly encountered one of the Iranians he
had met at the Rome meeting. The Iranian asked Mr. Rhode about U.S.
views on regime change in Iran and Mr. Rhode indicated that those
types of decisions were made 137 2004-1675, April 16,
2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
AEairs, Tab 24, July 13, 2002, Handwritten Notes of Mr. Rodman on a
Discussion with DoD Employee #2] , and 2007-1561 DoD IG source
document #1, Draft 8/11/03 chronology, page 2. 138 2004-1675, April
16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo Hom Mr. Rodman
to Secretary Rumsfeld. 139 2003-4209, Cable, July 25, 2002. "°
2003-4209, cubic, August 8, 2002. 141 2004-3535, State Department
August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #5.
_ 23
page 23
continued
|
| |
- the Al Husseir1, with an estimated range of 630 km, and
"possibly" the Al Abbas, with an estimated range of 900 km.
-
(U) The intelligence community also assessed that Iraq was working to
develop new ballistic missiles with a range of 750-3000 km, which would be
greater than its presumed "Scud-type force", but available
intelligence indicated that Iraq was still at the early stages of
development on this project President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October
7, 2002)
- (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated
that "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of
hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also discovered through intelligence that
Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could
be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re
concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions
targeting the United States."H2
- (U) As noted above, the IC assessed
at that time that Iraq had a small force of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant
missiles, with a likely range of 630-900 kilometers, or roughly 400-560
miles. The IC also assessed that Iraq was in the final stages of
development of new short-range ballistic missiles, but estimated that the
range of these missiles was 150-300 km, or under 200 miles. These
judgments were contained in several assessments, including the October 1,
2002 NIE.m
- (U) The October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq was developing and
flight-testing small-to-medium sized UAVs, and had a UAV development
program that was "probably intended to deliver biological warfare
agent". The majority of the IC also believed that at least one of
these UAVs was close to being ready for operational use. The intelligence
branch of the US Air Force disagreed with this part of the analysis of the
UAV program, however. Air Force intelligence noted in the NIE that "CBW
chemical
and biological weapons] delivery is an inherent capability" of UAVs,
but judged that "the small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests
a primary role of reconnaissance."H4 110 National Intelligence
Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile Proliferation Activity, March
1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August
2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel,
December 2002. U1 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H2 White House
Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. U3
National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile
Proliferation Activity, March 1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD
Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002; Prepared Statement of
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel, December 2002; and
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons
of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Committee staff were also permitted to
view a one-page summary of the NIE, which was prepared for the President.
This one-page summary included two sentences on delivery systems, which
stated "Baghdad has some SRBMs that exceed UN range limits of 150 km.
It has UAVs, probably fgrrcéegvery of biological weapons and less likely
for chemical weapons agents? 1 . 53
- (U) Despite the fabrication notice, the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE cited
four sources (not three as was included in the President’s speech the
following January) of the mobile biological lab intelligence, including
al-Assaf by name.
- (U) The October 2002 NIE said, "Baghdad has mobile
facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities
can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these
units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that
Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war." The NIE also said,
"an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the IC said seven mobile BW
production units were constructed and that one began production as early
as l997."57
- (U) Prior to the President’s address, some CIA
operations officers had doubts about the credibility of CURVE BALL and
debated the point at high levels within the Directorate of Operations.
Additionally, on December 20, 2002, the Chief of the relevant station
cabled CIA headquarters to describe a meeting that day with the head of
the foreign intelligence service handling CURVE BALL. The cable summarized
the meeting and noted that the head of the service wrote a letter to the
DCI to the effect that CURVEBALL’s reporting on mobile facilities
"has not been verified." The CIA station did not send the actual
letter from the head of the foreign intelligence service to CIA
headquarters until February 5, 2003. On January 27, 2003, the same Chief
of Station cautioned CIA headquarters in another cable to "take the
most serious consideration" before using CURVEBALL’s information
publicly. The Committee has found no evidence that then-Director Tenet or
policymakers were informed of the doubts that some Intelligence Community
officers had about CURVEBALL’s reliability or about concerns with using
CURVEBALL’s information publicly. Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the
UN Security Council (February 5, 2003)
- (U) Secretary Powell’s
presentation delved into greater detail on Iraq’s biological weapons
program and capabilities. He said there "can be no doubt" that
Iraq possessed biological weapons and discussed their means for delivery.
He stated that rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare
agent were dispersed to various locations, many of them hidden in large
groves of palm trees, and moved every one to four weeks to escape
detection.
- (U) Secretary Powell described the mobile labs in great detail.
He cited sources with "iirst-hand descriptions" of the
factories, and described four human sources in terms of their professions
and access to the information. Powell stated that the labs — "at
least seven" in number — on truck and rail cars "can produce a
quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed
to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War."
- (U) Secretary
Powell specified that the mobile labs can produce anthrax and botulinum
toxin, and that overall, "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of
biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus,
tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the
wherewithal to develop smallpox." 57 The National Intelligence
Council subsequently notified recipients of the NIE that the term
"several days" was an error and should be replaced with "three
to six months."
page 25
- (U) Finally, Powell referenced human sources that told the intelligence
community that Iraq had experimented with biological weapons on human
beings. (U) In addition to the intelligence assessments described above,
reports relevant to whether specific claims in the February 5 speech were
substantiated by the intelligence are described below.
- (U) The DIA issued
a report in February 2003, Iraq: Denial and Deception: Iraqi
Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and
deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among
other things, "palm and date tree groves. . .," but this report
was issued after Secretary Powe11’s speech and did not mention
biological weapons. There was operational intelligence traffic on this
issue prior to the Secretary’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of
prior analytical assessments.
- (U) The number of mobile labs — "at
least seven" — was included in, among other reports, the December
2000 ICA and October 2002 NIE as described above. Multiple reports
described seven mobile production facilities and provided schematic
details on two- or three-railcar systems.
- (U) Secretary Powell stated that
Iraq has investigated dozens of biological agents, and named eight
specifically. All eight were included, along with 13 others, in a list in
the October 2002 NIE entitled, "BW Agents that Iraq has
researched." A report produced by CIA WINPAC on November 13, 2002
said that "Iraq probably possesses at least 20 to 25 different
microbes or toxins for possible BW use."58 The same report had noted
that Iraq ‘°has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of
smallpox] for use in various delivery systems."59 Numerous other
intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s capability to produce smallpox
and other biological agents.
- (U) On the topic of human testing, the
October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General
Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were
transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing-—probably to
the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons
in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim." Additional
Statements • "So, we know that he has stored the biological
weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he
has looked for ways to weaponize those and I deliver them. — National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 58
November 13, 2002 CIA WINPAC assessment, Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents
Pose Growing Threat to US Interests (CIAWINPAC IA 2002-060CX). 59 ibid. _
page 26
- "But I can say obviously that they have had an enormous
appetite for weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. They’ve
taken these capabilities and weaponized them. They are continuing to do so
today. They are looking not only at a variety of biological capabilities,
but at a variety of ways of dispensing or weaponizing them so that they
have a range of choices with respect to it." — Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee,
September 18, 2002 • "His regime has amassed large clandestine
stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulinim toxin and
possibly smallpox. — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. •
"They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons
including anthrax and possibly smallpox." — Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 - •
" The Iraqi declaration has] no information about Iraq’s mobile
biological-weapons production facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq has
not accounted for some two tons of anthrax growth media." — Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Address to Council on Foreign
Relations, January 1, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was
padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of
questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq
has no ongoing WMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete
list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include
...tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." —
President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20,
2003 • "Where is the evidence that Iraq has destroyed the tens of
thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum we know it had before it
expelled the previous inspectors? This isn’t an American determination.
This is the determination of previous inspectors... What happened to the
three metric tons of growth material that Iraq imported which can be used
for producing early, in very rapid fashion, deadly biological agents?
Where the mobile vans that are nothing more than biological laboratories
on wheels?" — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World
Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 -• Firsthand witnesses have informed us
that Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of
biological agents -— equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade
discovery. — President Bush, February 8, 2003, Radio address
- (U) These
statements were consistent with the intelligence described above.
-
-
page 27
-
Conclusions
- (U) Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well
additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of biological agent,
weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories
were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments
from the late l990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq
retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more.
Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities
of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the
October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments left open the question as
to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively
producing them, though other assessments did not present such
uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq’s
biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE.
Postwar Intelligence
- (U) The postwar review by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
determined that Iraq was not conducting biological weapons production on
research after 1996.60 The ISG determined that depending on its scale,
Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks
to months of a decision to do so, but found no indications that Iraq was
pursuing this option.61
- (U) The ISG found "no evidence that Iraq
possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road
vehicles or railway wagons."62
- (U) The Committee’s report,
"Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism
and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments" described the postwar
findings on CURVE BALL. It noted that the ISG "harbors severe doubts
about the source’s credibility." The CIA and DIA issued a joint
congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was
assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production
project and that his reporting had been recalled.63 ET Comprehensive
Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Biological
Section, p. l. Ibid, p.2. 62 rnd. 63 CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs
Notification, June 7, 2004
page 28
- IV. Chemical Weapons • "The lraqi regime has in fact been very
busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological
agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many
years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee,
August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband
his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons
programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms." - Vice President
Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "United
Nations’ inspections also revealed that lraq likely maintains stockpiles
of VX, ` mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is
rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical
weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "We know that the regime has
produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas,
sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using
chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on lran, and on more
than forty villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at
least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in
the attacks of September the 11th." — President George W. Bush,
Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Eleven years ago, as a
condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required
to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of
such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The lraqi
regime has violated all of those obligations. lt possesses and produces
chemical and biological weapons." - President George W Bush,
Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "And surveillance photos reveal
that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce
chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that
lraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the
Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep
these weapons despite intemational sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation
from the civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati,
Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have
tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action,
the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological
weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make more." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
"Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the
last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he
agreed to disarm of (sic) all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12
years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his
country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these
weapons — not
page 29
- economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even
cruise missile strikes on his military facilities. " — President
George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "Our
intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to
produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such
quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s
not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has
destroyed them." — President George W Bush, State of the Union
Address, January 28, 2003 • U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam
Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical
agents. Inspectors recently turned up sixteen of them — despite Iraq’s
recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not
accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He’s
given no evidence that he has destroyed them." - President George W
Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know that
Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons
infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry." - Secretary
of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure,
Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely
associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical
weapons." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq’s procurement
efforts include: equipment that can filter and separate A microorganisms
and toxins involved in biological weapons; equipment that can be used to
concentrate the agent; growth media that can be used to continue producing
anthrax and botulinum toxin; sterilization equipment for laboratories;
glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive
chemical weapons agents and precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride,
a precursor for nerve and blister agents; and other chemicals such as
sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today
has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.
That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end
of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties
across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times
the size of Manhattan.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to
the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Saddam
Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And
Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again — against his
neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that
he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn’t
be passing out the orders if he didn’t
page 30
- _ have the weapons or the intent to use them." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "We also have sources who tell us that since the
1980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect
its biological or chemical weapons." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee Mugust 26, 2002)
- (U) In the Vice
President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that Iraq has been
"busy enhancing its capabilities in the iield of chemical"
agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to husband
his resources and] to invest in his ongoing chemical" weapons
program.
- (U) The Committee reviewed prewar intelligence assessments in its
July 2004 report, US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq. That report described a December 2000 Intelligence
Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities,
which represented the iirst comprehensive, coordinated report on all
aspects of Iraq’s WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors
departed Iraq.
- (U) The ICA stated that "Iraq’s expansion of its
chemical industry is intended to support CW production" but that
"we have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged
in large-scale production of CW agents, but we cannot rule out that
small-scale production has occurred."
- (U) The ICA judged that
"We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in
bulk storage, production equipment, and iilled munitions that are still
militarily useful." And that " w]e assess the size of the CW
agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent
and condition of Iraq’s stockpile, although we believe mustard agent-
and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX — and related munitions
probably are key components." The ICA noted that the available
intelligence "suggests that a small portion of Iraq’s prewar
stockpile of iilled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to
produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical
agents." - The intelligence produced between the December 2000 ICA
and the Vice President’s August 2002 speech tended to reiterate and
confirm the ICA views. For example, a December 14, 2001 DIA assessment
stated that "Saddam Hussein will continue to pursue a chemical weapons
(CW) program to help ensure his personal survival and the survival of his
regime, and to increase respect for Iraq as a regional power." It
also stated that "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of
chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions."64 The
same assessment noted that DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq is currently
producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish
a large—scale CW production capability. However, "we assess that
Iraq has plans to re-establish such a capability." And "DL°1
judges that 64 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December 14,
2001 (DI-1650-57-Ol).
page 31
- Saddam Husayn’s goal is to re-establish a robust chemical weapons (CW)
progra1n." Also in December, the CIA wrote a Senior Executive
Memorandum which stated that "_ - Iraq in the past several years has
rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing
dual-use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plans.66
- (U) A
January 2002 Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-I I September,
stated "DIA cannot confirm with conidence that Iraq has successfully
restarted an offensive CW program. However, if it has, Iraq probably can
produce mustard, sarin or GF, and VX, though mustard may be the only agent
it can produce without external resources."66 The assessment also
commented on the possibility of using dual use facilities to produce
chemical weapons agent, noting that "DIA cannot state with confidence
the composition or total output of chemical products at (Iraq’s
suspected CW) facilities, but production lines are currently operational.
.. Currently, DIA cannot identify where the CW center of gravity exists,
but it could be hidden in dual-use and industrial facilities." _ The
question of Iraq’s production capabilities was also addressed in a May
16, 2002 CIA report, Iraq: Seeking To Expand CWProduction Capability. This
report assessed that "Iraq in the past three years has sought foreign
equipment and chemicals that would give it the capability to roduce
chemical warfare (CW) agents for a limited strategic stockpile, according
to reporting." The report went on to state that "Small-scale
chemical agent production, probably of mustard, sarin, GF, and VX, could
be hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry. Baghdad has the
equipment and the expertise to match its pre-Gulf war production of nerve
and blister agents, but Iraq’s inability to produce key precursors could
limit nerve agent production."67
- (U) On August l, 2002, the CIA
prepared another assessment which said, "Iraq probably has rebuilt a
covert CW production capability by expanding its chemical industry. It is
rebuilding former CW facilities, developing new chemical plants, and
trying to procure CW-related items covertly. We judge it has the
capability to produce mustard blister agent and the nerve agents sarin, GF,
and VX. Iraq’s CW agent production capability probably is more limited
than it was at the time of the Gulf war.68 (U) Thus while the intelligence
community believed that the Iraqi regime had retained some chemical
weapons and had worked to develop the capability to produce new chemical
weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure. The
Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions on whether Iraq had
actually begun production of chemical weapons. President’s Speech to the
UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 65
- CIA, SPWR, The Iraqi Threat,
December 15, 2001 (SPWRl2l50l-07). 66 DIA, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs.· Post-!] September,
January 2002 (DI- l 600-50Q-02-SCI). 67 CIA SEIB, Iraq: Seeking T 0 Expand
C WPr0ducti0n Capability, May I6, 2002 (PASS SEIB 02-l l4 CHX). 68 CIA,
Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Post Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 32
page 32
- (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, he stated that UN inspections "revealed that Iraq
likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical
agents." This statement was consistent with the statements and
intelligence above.
- (U) The President’s statement that Iraq was
"rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of "` producing
chemical weapons" suggests more coincedence in Iraq’s progress than
the intelligence assessments at the time. Ir1 addition to the reports
described earlier, a July 22, 2002 CIA assessment noted that "Iraq
has rebuilt destroyed CW-related and civilian facilities while building a
number of new, ostensibly civilian chemical production facilities.
Although CIA does not know the function of these new facilities, chemical
precursors and, in some cases, agent production could be conducted at
dual-use chemical facilities.69 An April 2002 CIA paper noted that
"Iraq has obtained technical and logistical support to rehabilitate
its industrial chemical industry and potentially to rebuild its CW
program. Most ... assistance has involved the reconstruction of the
chlorine facility at Al Tareq. Al Tareq probably is still connected to
Iraq’s CW program and could be converted quickly to CW precursor
production."70
- (U) The September DIA report had written on this topic
that "Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the
blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of G—series
nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key chemical
precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production facilities
during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM inspections. In
the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely experience difficulties in
producing nerve agents at the rate executed before Operation Desert
Storm" and that "Baghdad is rebuilding part of its chemical
production infrastructure under the guise of a civilian need for
pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical products, giving Iraq
the potential for a small ‘breakout’ production capability."71
President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002)
- (U) The President
discussed chemical weapons in greater detail at his Cincinnati speech of
October 2002. He stated that "we know" that Iraq "has
produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas,
sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas" and that Iraq has used chemical
weapons before. The President stated that the Iraqi regime "possesses
and produces chernical" weapons. He cited "surveillance
photos" of rebuilding at facilities that had previously been used to
produce chemical weapons.
- (U) A September 2002 DIA report stated that
"There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has —-or will--establish its
chemical warfare agent production facilities." The same report,
however, also said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and
biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq’s
effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) program."72
69 Iraq: Ensuring CBW Survivability, July 22, 2002, p.2. 70 Iraq: Chemical
Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers, April
2002, p. l. 71 The DIA included similar language in a November 2002 report
described later in this report. 72 DIA, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An
Operational Support Study 2900-51 l-02, September 2002. 33
-
page 33
- (U) Intelligence community products clearly stated that Iraq had
produced large volumes of chemical agents in the past, during and after
its war with Iran. The intelligence community also agreed that Iraq had
used chemical weapons before, against Iran in the 1980s and against Iraqi
Kurds. As stated above, intelligence products prior to this speech but
before the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons
- 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled
munitions. Director Tenet’s testimony to Senate Committees in September
2002 stated that "We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least
100 tons of agent" but did not state an upper end for the estimate.7
-
(U) Between the President’s September speech to the UN and the October
speech in Cincirmati, the intelligence community had produced and
disseminated its October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
In most respects, the NIE’s judgments were more assertive than previous
intelligence judgments, stating that "We assess that Baghdad has
begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX."
-
(U) On the question of chemical weapons stockpile, the NIE updated the
previous assessment- 100 tons or less — to an assessment that
"Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and
possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last
year." A footnote in the body of the report added that the 100 ton
figure was a "conservative estimate" and that the "500-ton
upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds .... " In
saying that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons" of agent, the
President did not give the time frame for this production or say that Iraq
had this volume of agent stockpiled. The intelligence at the time did not
suggest that Iraq had produced — or was producing such quantities at the
time of the speech, though Iraq had produced such quantities since the
inception of its chemical weapons program. The NIE didn’t specifically
state how much chemical agent Iraq could produce. It did state that
"Iraq’s CW capability probably is more limited now than it was at
the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent shelf life
probably have been improved." - the intelligence community had
produced reports on construction and activity at suspected chemical
weapons facilities, in particular the Fallujah plants. These plants also
had legitimate dual-use purposes for producing chlorine, but the
intelligence community assessed that plants were producing more chemicals
than were needed for civilian purposes. The NIE noted that Iraq’s
legitimate needs were being met through authorized imports and other
chlorine plants in the country, and listed other reasons to be skeptical
that the plant was being used for legitimate purposes.74 President ’s
State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) 73 Testimony of Director
George Tenet to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 17, 2002.
74 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. The other reasons were: a
concern about the plant’s cover story, shallow burial of equipment for
denial and deception purposes, Iraq’s use of its procurement network to
obtain chemical weapons precursors, and that personnel identified with the
previous weapons program were linked to the facility.
page 34
|
|
 - The moral majority, perverts, child abusers.
- Power and pedophilia, sexual deviants.
|
-
NFU followups
-
9/11
Investigation
Cheney, war games
-
AIPAC
Israeli influence
-
Amdocs, NSA
Spying on America
-
Aspartame
Poison in our food
-
Balkans
US / Russia
-
B-52
nuclear, Iran, Cheney
Iran attack stopped
-
Bees, pollination crisis
-
Blackwater
/ DeVos
Mercenaries
-
BushWatch
Goodbye
celebrations
-
Catholic
Church sexual
abuse of children
-
CIA
interrogation tapes destroyed
-
Clintons,
DLC
-
Clintons,
Death List
-
Clinton,
Iranian arms to Bosnia Muslims
-
Cloned Food
-
Creation
Museum Jokes
-
Dirty Tricks,
GOP
-
Draft
Selective Service Registration refusal news
-
Environment,
Global Warming
-
Fascism,
Ledeen,
Rove's brain
|
The worst President ever.
|
| |
|
- (U) In the President’s State of the Union Address in January 2003, he
said nothing has restrained Saddam Hussein from his pursuit of chemical
weapons (along with other WMD). He cited intelligence estimates that
Hussein "had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin,
mustard and VX nerve agent" and a former stockpile of "upwards
of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents” that had not
been accounted for. A _
- (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE
stated that Iraq had, as an upper limit, 500 tons on chemical agent and
that Iraq had renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and
VX.
- (U) A November 2002 DIA report had stated that "Baghdad probably
has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric
tons of CW agents -- much of it added in the last year.” That same
report also contrasted with the NIE’s judgment that "Baghdad has
begtm renewed production” of certain CW agents, saying that "No
reliable information indicates whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling
chemical weapons, or where the country has — or will — establish its
chemical agent production facilities." The report also stated,
however, that "Iraq probably has resumed some chemical and biological
agent production, but no conclusive proof is available because of the
effective national-level denial and deception program.”75
- (U) The
Intelligence Community regularly reported that Iraq had not accounted for
its previous chemical weapons or precursor stockpiles and that Iraq
retained a large number of munitions capable of delivering chemical
weapons. The NIE stated that "Iraq provided little verifiable
evidence that it unilaterally destroyed 15,000 artillery rockets after the
Gulf war."
- (U) The reference to 30,000 (empty) chemical agent
munitions was based on UNSCOM reporting. The Intelligence Community had
provided assessments to policymakers in December 2002 and January 2003 on
Iraq’s WMD declarations. One assessment stated that " The
declaration] fails to address unaccounted chemical munitions disputed by
the UN, including 550 155mm mustard filled artillery shells or 30,000
empty CW munitions."76 Another, provided by the CIA in advance of
Secretary Powell’s speech, stated that, "Baghdad did not account
for 30,000 empty prewar munitions, which leaves us concerned that Iraq
retained a supply for later filling with CW agents."77 Secretary of
State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U)
Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech repeated many of the statements
addressed above. He stated that ‘%zve know Iraq has embedded key
portions" of a chemical weapons program into its civilian industry
and reconstituted facilities associated with its past weapons program.
Secretary Powell addressed the intelligence on Iraq’s stockpile as had
been done in speeches described above, saying that " o]ur
conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100
and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent." 75 DLA, Iraq’s Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapon and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects,
and Potential Vulnerabilities DI-1569-44-02, November 2002. 76 US Analysis
of Iraq’s Declaration, 7 December 2002. 77 CIA input for Powell speech,
provided to the White House in mid-January 2003.
page 35
- (U) Also described in this statement but not the others previously
addressed, Secretary Powell referenced human sources who said that Saddam
Hussein had authorized field commanders to use chemical weapons. He also
referred to sources claims that Saddam Hussein’s regime had experimented
on human beings as part of its chemical weapons program.
- (U) As described
above, the October 2002 NIE assessed that 100 tons of chemical weapons
agent was a "conservative estimate" and that Iraq could possess
"possibly as much as 500 MT." A footnote to the NIE elaborated
that the Intelligence Community believed that "the Iraqis are capable
of producing significantly larger quantities of CQ agent in some
scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical
bounds, such as Iraq’s limited delivery options, and approximates Iraq’s
stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm."78 According to the Committee’s
first report, analysts believed that the 500 ton figure was meant as an
upper bound, and not as an estimate of Iraq’s stockpile.79
- (U) In two
places, the October 2002 NIE states that Saddam Hussein had delegated the
authority to use chemical weapons to "corps-level commanders" at
the end of the Iran-Iraq war or shortly aferwards.
- (U) On the topic of
human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate
of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995
were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing—probably
to the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files
from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in
1998, adding weight to the source’s claim.”80 Other Statements •
There’s no doubt that he has chemical weapon stocks. We destroyed some
after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there’s no doubt in
our mind that he still has chemical weapon stocks and he has the capacity
to produce more chemical weapons. — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox
News Sunday, September 8, 2002. • "So, we know that he has stored
the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we
know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and deliver them. —
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8,
2002 7* me at 28. 79 SSCI report at 206. 80 Additional reporting on human
experimentation was in a CIA SPWR (Senior Publish When Ready), Possible
Experimentation on Prisoners, December 30, 2002, which reported that
"Baghdad is experimenting on prisoners with toxic substances"
and that Iraq had used prisoners for biological and chemical agent testing
in the 1980s and 1990s.
page 36
- • “His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical
weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas." — Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, September 18, 2002. • “He’s got chemical weapons; he
needs to get rid of them, all of them." — President George W Bush,
Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002. • "They have amassed
large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and
possibly smallpox. They have amassed large clandestine stockpiles of
chemical weapons including VX and sarin and mustard gas. His regime has an
active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27,
2002 • "His regime has large, unaccounted for stockpiles of
chemical and biological weapons - including VX, sarin, mustard gas,
anthrax, botulism, and possibly smallpox - and he has an active program to
acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Remarks to ROA, January 20, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002
declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to
address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when
it says that Iraq has no ongoing VVMD programs. Illustrative examples —
but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by
UNSCOM include: 550 artillery munitions filled with mustard agent; tons of
unaccounted for chemical weapons precursors; 30,000 empty chemical
munitions; tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological
agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to
the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, January 20, 2003 • "What happened to nearly 30,000 munitions
capable of carrying chemical agents? Saddam should tell the truth, and
tell the truth now. The more we wait, the more chance there is for this
dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more
time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons
again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World
Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 (U) These statements were consistent with
the intelligence described above.
-
- Conclusions
- (U) Conclusion 3: Statements
in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding
Iraq’s possession of chemical weapons were substantiated by intelligence
information. Intelligence assessments, including the December 2000 ICA
stated that Iraq had retained up to 100 metric tons of its chemical
weapons stockpile. The October 2002 NIE provided a range of 100 to 500
metric tons of chemical weapons.
page 37
-
- (U`) Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior
to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s
chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the
intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was
ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to
have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to
hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence
assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that
analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing.
- Postwar Findings
-
(U`) The Committee reported on postwar findings on Iraq’s chemical
weapons program in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq
’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar
Assessments. The Committee found the following.
- (U`) Following the war,
the Iraq Survey Group conducted its review of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction programs and found that there "were no caches of CW
munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions." Additionally,
"the ISG has high confidence that there are no CW present in the
Iraqi inventory."8l Some pre-1991 chemical weapons munitions have
been found since the end of the combat operations.
- (U`) The ISG found no
credible evidence indicating Iraq resumed its chemical weapons program
after 1991, but said that "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to
resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged
favorable."82
- (U`) The ISG investigated whether Iraq had intended to
produce chemical weapons through its civilian chemical industry. It found
that Iraq had an inherent capability to use its civilian industry for
sulfur mustard CW agents, but did not find any production units that had
been configured to produce CW agents or key chemical precursors. The ISG
found that Iraq did not have a capability to produce nerve agents.83 gl
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,
Chemical Section at p. 123. 82 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor
to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. land 97. 83
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,
Chemical Section at p. 25. _ 38
page 38
-
- V. Weapons of Mass Destruction • "Simply stated, there is no
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no
doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies,
and against us." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville,
Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "As former Secretary of State
Kissinger recently stated: ‘The imminence of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable
inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein
combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action."’ - Vice
President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 •
"And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to
their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the
technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime
— we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms,
exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to
confront." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime
is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against
the evidence." - President George W Bush, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "But Saddam Hussein
has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass
destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -
nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one." - President
George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September
12, 2002 • "If we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons
today — and we do- does it make any sense for the world to wait to
confront him as he grows stronger and develops even more dangerous
weapons?" - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7,
2002 • "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of
terror, the instruments of death and destruction." - President George
W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "From intelligence
sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel
are at work hiding documents and materials fiom the UN inspectors,
sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors
themselves." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address,
January 29, 2002 • "Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show
that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce
more weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
page 39
- "Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not
just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep
them from being found by inspectors." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
• "VVe also have satellite photos that indicate that banned
materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction facilities." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address
t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
- (U) In major
policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of
State all stated that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass
destruction. In later speeches, both the President and the Secretary of
State said that the Iraqi government was engaged in a large- scale
deception effort to conceal weapons of mass destruction programs from
United Nations inspectors.
- (U) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ (or ‘WMD’) is commonly used to refer collectively to
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and this is the official
Department of Defense definition.84 No official definition existed for the
intelligence community at the time of the speeches being examined, and
different intelligence products have used different definitions. A
substantial number of policymaker statements regarding Iraq referred
generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction"‘, without specifying
whether the weapons in question were nuclear, biological, chemical, or
some combination thereof. This section examines statements that refer
generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and compares them to
intelligence regarding these three types of weapons. Statements regarding
specific types of weapons are discussed in the other, corresponding
sections of this report. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August
26, 2002)
- (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he
stated that "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of
mass destruction," and that "there is no doubt he is amassing
them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing
"the imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction"
with regard to Iraq, and "the huge dangers it involves", as
evidence that preemptive action was necessary.85
- (U) As noted, the term
‘weapons of mass destruction’ is commonly used to refer collectively
to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community
never assessed that Iraq 84 Discussions of WMD frequently include
references to ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery systems, but
delivery systems by themselves are specifically excluded from the official
Department of Defense definition. The Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms dennes "weapons of mass
destruction" as "Weapons that are capable of a high order of
destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large
numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield
explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but
exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such
means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon." 85 White
House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention,
August 26, 2002. 40
- possessed nuclear weapons, but reached different conclusions about
chemical and biological weapons.86
- (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s
the intelligence community had consistently assessed that Iraq possessed
remnants from its previous biological weapons stockpile. Some reporting
also assessed that Iraq had an active biological weapons program, and that
production of biological weapons was ongoing.87
- (U) During this same time
frame, intelligence assessments noted that Iraq maintained a small
stockpile of pre-Gulf War chemical weapons. Some assessments stated that
Iraq had developed the capability to produce new chemical weapons at
unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure, while other
assessments were not conclusive on this point. The Intelligence Community
had not reached conclusions about whether Iraq had actually begun
production of chemical weapons.88
- (U) The intelligence community’s
assessments regarding Iraqi possession and production of chemical and
biological weapons remained consistent until the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly
(September 12, 2002)
- (U) In the President’s September 2002 address to
the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein’s
regime was a "grave and gathering danger", and "continues
to develop weapons of mass destruction." He did not state that Iraq
possessed or produced weapons of mass destruction at that time.89
- (U)
Several intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s development of
"weapons of mass destruction" generally. While not from a
iinished intelligence product, a briefing book prepared by the CIA in May
2002 for the Prirrcipals’ Committee of the National Security Council
said that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has
repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production
capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement? As of
September 2002, intelligence community assessments stated that Iraq had
worked to rebuild a chemical weapons production capacity within its
civilian industry but did not state that production was ongoing. The
intelligence community also assessed that Iraq maintained the capability
to produce biological weapons, and the CIA assessed that production was
ongoing.9° 86 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments
regarding nuclear weapons and Iraq can be found in the Nuclear Weapons
section of this report. 87 A summary of the intelligence community’s
assessments regarding biological weapons and Iraq can be found in the
Biological Weapons section of this report. 88 A summary of the
intelligence community’s assessments regarding chemical weapons and Iraq
can be found in the Chemical Weapons section of this report. 89 White
House Transcript, President ’s Remarks at the United Nations General
Assembly. 90 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; CIA Iraq
Seeking To Expand C WProduction Capacity, May 16, 2002; DIA Iraq:
Biological Warfare Program Handbook. _ 41
page 41
- (U) The intelligence community did not publish a coordinated community
judgment that Iraq had begun to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program
until October 2002. I However, as discussed in the Nuclear Weapons section
of this report, by September 2002 both the CIA and the DIA concluded that
reconstitution had begun.92 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October Z
2002)
- (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated
that "we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today"
and that "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of
terror, the instruments of death and destruction." He also implied
that Saddam was likely to develop "even more dangerous
weapons."93
- (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed with high levels of
confidence that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons and
was continuing with active production programs. This represented a shift
from previous intelligence community assessments, which concluded that
Iraq probably possessed a small stockpile of chemical weapons and
biological weapons. Previous community assessments did not judge that Iraq
was actively producing chemical weapons, and had lower confidence that
biological weapons production was ongoing. Intelligence agencies did not
agree on the question of whether Baghdad was attempting to reconstitute
its nuclear program, but the majority view of the NIE (which all agencies
except State/INR supported) concluded that reconstitution had begun, and
that Iraq would probably be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the next
five to seven years.94 President’s State of the Union Address (January
29, 2003)
- (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he
stated that "thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding
documents and materials from the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection
sites, and monitoring the inspectors themselves."95
- (U) As of January
2003, the intelligence community had not produced a coordinated assessment
regarding the Iraqi government’s response to the ongoing UNMOVIC
inspections. However, both the CIA and the DIA had produced multiple
reports suggesting that active deception efforts were underway, and that
these efforts ir1cluded sanitizing weapons facilities as well as
concealing 91 The 2002 NIE represented the first collective intelligence
community assessment on this topic since the December 2001 NIE, Foreign
Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. The
December 2001 NIE was consistent with previous assessments that Iraq did
not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. 92 National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction, October 2002; Defense Intelligence Assessment Iraq 's
Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002; CIA Iraq: Expanding
WILID Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 93 White House
Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 94
Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily Pursuing WMD
Capabilities, December 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 95
White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union
", January 28, 2003.
Page 42
- documents and other evidence. The reports generally did not describe
the number of Iraqis involved in these apparent efforts with any
speciiicity.96 Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council
(February 5, 2003)
- (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 5, 2003
address to the United Nations Security Council, he said that the Iraqi
regime was actively concealing "efforts to produce more weapons of
mass destruction." He stated that numerous hrunan sources had
reported that Iraqis were concealing "not just documents and hard
drives, but weapons of mass destruction" from UN inspectors. He said
that satellite photos "indicate that banned materials have recently
been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
facilities."9'
- (U) A coordinated Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)
from February 2003, entitled Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities
judged that Iraq successfully employed a number of denial and deception
techniques against UN inspectors and US intelligence agencies. The ICA
stated that these techniques included moving prohibited materials and
evidence among multiple "hide sites", and that this conclusion
was based on reporting from human sources and "defector
testimony". The ICA also included recent satellite imagery of a
storage facility that "showed the removal of possible chemical
munitions from this site, almost certainly to thwart the UNMOVIC
inspections conducted there."98 Additional Statements • "Every
world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation
which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation
which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of
mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." —President
George W Bush, Press Conkrence, March I3, 2002 • "And Saddam
Hussein] is a man who refuses to allow us to determine whether or not he
still has weapons of mass destruction, which leads me to believe he does.
He is a dangerous man who possesses the world’s most dangerous
weapons". — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 22,
2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now
has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing
them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us.
And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him
into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that
96Iraq.· Bolstering Ejjbrts to Deceive Inspectors, November 30, 2002;
CIA, Iraq: Moving C WInto Underground Facilities, December 17, 2002; DIA
Executive Highlight, Iraq: Reports of Iraq concealing experts on weapons
of mass destruction increased notably during the past week January 6,
2003; CIA, Iraq: Undermining WMD Inspections, January 6, 2003; DIA
Executive Highlight, Iraq: The Iraqi Intelligence Service has taken on an
increased role in concealment of Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction
experts, January 9, 2003. 97 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of
State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 98
Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq 's Denial and Deception
Capabilities, February 2003.
page 43
- will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will
continue to develop with his oil wealth. ... In the face of such a threat,
we must proceed with care, deliberation and in consultation with our
allies. ...What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give
in to wishful thinking or to willful blindness.’ — Vice President Dick
Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio,
Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "l’m deeply concerned about a leader
who has ignored all -- who ignored the United Nations for all these years,
has refused to conform to resolution after resolution after resolution;
who has weapons of mass destruction. And the battlefield has now shifted
to America, so there’s a different dynamic than we’ve ever faced
before." - President George W Bush, Remarks at the Afghanistan
Embassy, September 10, 2002 • "l would respond this way. lf failure
to comply with weapons of mass destruction inspections is a casus belli,
the UN already has it." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002
• "... I]t’s clear from the Iraqi regime’s eleven years of
defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the
contrary, contair1ment is breaking dowr1." — Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September
18, 2002 r • "And Saddam Hussein] has biological and chemical
weapons. And he is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The region knows
that." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • " Saddam
Hussein] has in place an elaborate organized system of denial and
deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts.
...We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of
mass destruction, that they’re pursuing nuclear weapons, that they’ve
a proven willingness to use those weapons... ...We do know that Saddam
Hussein has been actively and persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for
more than 20 years, but we should be just as concerned about the immediate
threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons." - Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, September 19, 2002 • " T]his is a man who has weapons of
mass destruction and says he doesn’t. He poses a serious threat to the
American people." — President George W Bush, Remarks at OHS
Complex, September 19, 2002 • "We can have debates about the size
and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and of mid- and long-range
missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United
Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for twelve
long years." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before
the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 _ 44
page 44
- • "These four years have been more than enough time for Iraq to
procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the
kinds of inspectors that were subject to Sadda.m’s cheat and retreat
program from 1991 to 1998." — Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September
19, 2002 • ". . . N]o one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator’s
intentions have not changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as
clearly as he wants to remain in power." — Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee,
September 19, 2002 • "The point is this: we know Iraq possesses
biological weapons, and chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving
their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit as much
concern as Iraq’s potential nuclear capability." — Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, Testimony before SASC, September 19, 2002 • "For
eleven years he’s claimed he has had no weapons and, yet, we know he
has." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Trenton, New Jersey,
September 23, 2002 • "We know they the Iraqi regime] have weapons
of mass destruction. We know they have active programs. There isn’t any
debate about it." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Department of Defense Press Conference, September 26, 2002 •
" Saddam Hussein’s] got chemical weapons; he needs to get rid of
them, all of them. He’s got biological weapons; he needs to destroy all
of them. There’s no doubt in my mind he wants to have a nuclear weapon,
and he’s got some capacity. I’m not saying he’s got one yet, but he’s
developing the capacity, as we learned right after Desert Storm...The
burden of proof is on Saddam Hussein." — President George W Bush,
Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002 • "We can have
debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile, we can have
debates about how long it will take him to reach this level of readiness
or that level of readiness with respect to these weapons, but no one can
doubt two things: One, they are in violation of these resolutions. There’s
no debate about that. And secondly, they have not lost the intent to
develop these weapons of mass destruction, whether they are one day, five
days, one year, or seven years away from any particular weapon, whether
their stockpile is small, medium or large, what has not been lost is the
intent to have such weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, September 26, 2002 • "The danger to our country is
grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses
biological and chemical weapons." — President George W Bush,
Statement in the Rose Garden, September 26, 2002 • "The man who
said he would get rid of weapons of mass destruction still has them. And
we need to fear the fact that he has weapons of mass destruction. He’s
used them before.
page 45
- He’s used them on his own people before. He’s invaded two
countries. He’s lied and deceived the world." — President George
W Bush, Remarks in Denver, Colorado, September 27, 2002 • "We know
Saddam’s] got chemical weapons, probably has biological weapons."
— President George W Bush, Remarks in Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
November 1, 2002 • "Well, we know that Saddam Hussein has chemical
and biological weapons. And we know he has an active program for the
development of nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Dejense Donald
Rumsfeld, CBS Radio, November 14, 2002 • "In short, we have not
seen anything that indicates that the Iraqi regime has made a strategic
decision to disarm. On the contrary, we believe that Iraq is actively
working to disrupt, deny and defeat inspectors." — President George
W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 •
"So far, however, there are no signs that the regime has taken the
decision to make a strategic shift in its approach and to give up its WMD.
Indeed, there are many troubling and serious signs that it has no
intention to disarm at all." — President Bush, Report on Matters
Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2003, January 20, 2003 • "Even more serious is Iraq’s
response to UNSCR 1441 ’s requirement that Iraq make a "currently
accurate, full and complete" declaration of its weapons of mass
destruction activities. Iraq’s declaration was incomplete and
inaccurate." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant
to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, January 20, 2003 • " Saddam Hussein] has been told to disarm
for eleven long years. He’s not disarming." — President George W
Bush, remarks with economists, January 2], 2003 • " Saddam Hussein]
has weapons of mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which
pose a direct threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends
and a1lies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists,
January 2], 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has actively and secretly
attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons." —— President George Bush, Press Conference,
February 6, 2003 • "In this case, we’re dealing with a country, a
regime that has chemical weapons, biological weapons and a nuclear
program, and has used chemical weapons against its neighbors and its own
people." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference,
February 7, 2003.
page 46
- "So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction by the leadership of Baghdad? I think our
judgment has to be clearly not." — Secretary of State Colin Powell,
United Nations Security Council, March 7, 2003 • "But we also have
to address the question of where might these terrorists acquire weapons of
mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons?
And Saddam Hussein becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his
past track record and because we know he has, in fact, developed these
kinds of capabilities, chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s
used chemical weapons. We know he’s reconstituted these programs since
the Gulf War. We know he’s out trying once again to produce nuclear
weapons and we know that he has a long-standing relationship with various
terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda organization." — Vice
President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 • "lntelligence
gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq
regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons
ever devised." — President George W Bush, Address to the Nation,
March 17, 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has violated all of those
obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It
is seeking nuclear weapons." — President Bush, Report in Connection
w/ Presidential Determination under PL 107-244, March 19, 2003
- (U) The
above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches
analyzed. The statements below differ in significant ways, either by
making different assertions or addressing different topics. • "They
now have massive tunneling systems. . .They’ve got all kinds of things
that have happened in the period when the inspectors have been out. So the
problem is greater today. And the regime that exists today in the U.N. is
one that has far fewer teeth than the one you are describing." -
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "Even the most intrusive
inspection regime would have difficulty getting at all of Saddam Hussein’s]
weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile; they
can be hidden from inspectors no matter how intrusive. He has vast
underground networks and facilities and sophisticated denial and deception
techniques." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • " W]e
simply do not know where all or even a large portion of Iraq’s WMD
facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. . . O]f the
facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. A
good many are underground and deeply buried. Others are purposely located
near population centers —— schools, hospitals, mosques — where an
air strike could kill a large number of innocent people. The Iraq problem
cannot be solved by air strikes alone." — Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee,
September 19, 2002
page 47
- • "Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical
agents to avoid detection by inspectors. In some cases, these materials
have been moved to different locations every l2 to 24 hours, or placed in
vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods." — President George
W Bush, National Press Conference, March 6, 2003 • "He claims to
have no chemical or biological weapons, yet we know he continues to hide
biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as
often as l2 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential
neighborhoods." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press
Conference, March I 1, 2003
- (U) In testimony before Congress on September
18 and l9, 2002, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Iraqi regime had
developed extensive underground facilities and elaborate deception
techniques to conceal WMD prograrns.99
- (U) Throughout the late 1990s and
early 2000s, intelligence agencies consistently assessed that the Iraqi
regime engaged in aggressive denial and deception tactics, particularly
with regard to weapons programs}0 - The Iraqi regime was known to have
constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the
intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried
facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be
using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was
some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency
claimed to know the location of any active underground WMD facilities, and
none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense
Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that "elements of the regime’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs robably
are located in underground facilities", but noted that "neither
_ ¤<>r i¤t¢11ig¢¤<>¢ S<>¤r<>¢S have
confirmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground
facilities." An August 2002 DIA report noted that "Iraq has
reportedly rebuilt its full offensive BW program in well- concealed,
underground, mobile or difficult-to-locate facilities" but went on to
state that "no biological weapons (BW)-related underground facilities
are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq".1°1
- (U) In November
2002, the National Intelligence Council prepared an assessment on
underground facilities in response to a request from the Secretary of
Defense. This report stated that Iraq had an extensive network of
underground facilities "consisting primarily of earth- bunkered
aboveground structures, basement bunkers, and shallow-buried
facilities." It went on 99 Department of Defense Transcript,
Testimony as Delivered before the House Armed Services Committee regarding
Iraq, September 18, 2002; Department of Defense Transcript, Testimony as
Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald Rums eld be ore the Senate Armed
Services Committee re ardin Ira , Se tember 19, 2002. M mA. mq.- 1r¤qiDe¤i¤1
and Deception: Countertargeting Methods, February 28, 1998; CIA, Iraq:
Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear
Program Handbook, May 2002. wl DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program
Handbook, December 14, 2001; DLA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program
Handbook August 2002. Both of these assessments noted that Iraq had stored
some biological and chemical munitions underground during the Gulf War.
page 48
- to say that "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried
UGFs, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we
have not been able to locate any of these. . .A1l the military and
regime-associated UGFs underground facilities] we have identified thus
far are vulnerable to conventional, precision- guided, penetrating
munitions because they are not deeply cd>»·lO2 • "Iraq must be
disarmed of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, weapons
production capabilities, and the means to deliver these weapons. This will
be a complex, dangerous, and expensive task -- one for which detailed
planning is underway. Third, we must also eliminate Iraq’s terrorist
infrastructure." — Mr. Stephan Hadley, Remarks before the Council
on Foreign Relations, February I2, 2003
- (U) In a speech in February 2003,
the Deputy National Security Advisor stated that Iraq needed to be
disarmed of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, production
capabilities and delivery systems. The October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq
possessed chemical and biological weapons, but the intelligence community
did not assess that Iraq had nuclear weapons.1°3 _ The assertion in the
final two statements about movement of materials matched a February 2003
CIA assessment, reporting a "mid-ranking Iraqi security officer
involved in the surveillance of United Nations Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) activities in Iraq" who said
Iraqi authorities had "decided that prohibited materials would never
remain in any one location for more than 12 hours or 24 hours at the most
and only under specifc circumstances."1°4 A second report sourced to
an "Iraqi Security Officia1" said that Iraq’s WIWD "had
begun being moved to new locations every 12 hours."1°6 Conclusions
-
(U) Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary
of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq’s possession of weapons
of mass destruction were generally substantiated by intelligence
information, though many statements made 102 National Intelligence
Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National
Security, November 2002. '°3 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s
Continuing Programs or Weapons 0 Mass Destruction, October 2002. IM CIA
assessment, DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, Feb 12, 2003. CIA DO
Memorandum Intelligence Report, Q Fcbm 12, 2002. CIA 2003.
page 49
- regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher
level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior
policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no
doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass
destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that
the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most
reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding
production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was
ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not
collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing
any weapons of mass destruction.
- (U) Conclusion 6: The Secretary of
Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD
facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional air strikes because
they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available
intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that
the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD
activities, no active underground WMD facilities had been positively
identified. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities
that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from
conventional air strikes. Postwar Findings
- (U) Postwar findings regarding
weapons of mass destruction can be found in the nuclear, biological, and
chemical sections of this report. 50
page 50
- VI. Delivery • "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type
missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work
at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more
long-range missiles that it can sic] inflict mass death throughout the
region." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Iraq possesses ballistic
missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also
discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned
and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or
biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is
exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United
States." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
• "For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for
Mirage jets." - ` Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "1n 1995, an
Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that
Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been
converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with
spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack
using biological weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address
to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "While
inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous
intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq
indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen
Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to
900 kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "What 1 want
you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce
ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a
liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200
kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq has been working
on a variety of UAVs for over a decade." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
• "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to
developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs."
- Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003 • "According to Iraq’s December 7m
declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected
one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500
page 51
- kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted
here." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq could use these
small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver
biological agents to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries,
including the United States." - Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
- (U) In
major policy speeches the President and the Secretary of State described
Iraq as possessing and developing advanced weapon systems, particularly
unmanned aerial vehicles and longer-range ballistic missiles. Both the
President and the Secretary of State suggested that these weapon systems
could be used for long-range biological or chemical
attacks. President’s
Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002)
- (U) In the
President’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated
that "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges
beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and
production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles
that it can sic] inflict mass death throughout the region."l°7 This
statement included two separate assertions: that Iraq possessed missiles
with greater-than-permitted range, and that Iraq was building more
long-range missiles and increasing the size of its missile force. This
statement also implied that these missiles could be used to deliver
weapons of mass destruction, but this was not specifically stated.
- (U)
Iraq’s ballistic missile force, as viewed by US intelligence analysts in
2002, can be broken into three fairly distinct categories: 1) older
Scud-type missiles with ranges of 625-900 km, remaining from its pre-Gulf
War missile force, 2) newer A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles with
estimated ranges of 150-300 km, and 3) future medium-range missiles with
ranges of 750- 3000 km (which were assessed in 2002 to still be in the
development stage). The maximum range permitted by UN sanctions was 150
km.
- (U) The CIA and DIA both assessed that Iraq was in the process of
deploying the A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range missiles. Estimates of
these missiles’ range varied between 150 and 300 km.‘°8
- (U) At this
time the intelligence community also assessed that Iraq possessed a small
number of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant short-range ballistic missiles.
Estimates varied as to the size of this force, but a May 2002 assessment
from State INR stated that "the highest estimates are on the order of
25-30 missiles."In March 2002 the DIA assessed that this force
"probably" included 107 White House Transcript, President 's
Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September l2, 2002. 108
CIA, Iraq: Al Samoud Program Advancing Toward Deployment, February 13,
2001; DIA, Proly’eration of Ballistic Missiles, January 9, 2002; DIA,
Iraq Missile Proly’eration Activity (TS-9l, 650-02) March l, 2002; CIA,
Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 109 State/INR,
Iraq: WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs, May 8, 2002. _ 52
| AIPAC, Rosen Weissman Timeline excerpt .... go
to page 4 of Timeline |
- Aug 27, 2004 the
FBI raided (first of two raids) the office of AIPAC director
Steve Rosen, copied his hard drive.
- Aug 27, 2004 CBS Investigator
said they want AIPAC information on contacts between Franklin,
Feith and Wolfowitz. An Israeli spokesperson denied
everything. CBS
- Wolfowitz and Feith
- Dan Rather, CBS issue, check dates? smokescreen?
Rathergate.
- National
Review by Michael Ledeen on
"my pal' Larry Franklin, ho hum. Aug 31 04
- August 29, 2004 United
Jersalem "Allegations of Israel spying Usually
go away" see indictment
- August 29, 2004"..... Feith has
been a target of criticism from Democrats who claim that two
offices in his branch -- the Office of Special Plans, headed by
Luti, and the Counterterrorism Evaluation Group -- sought to
manipulate intelligence to improve the Bush administration's
case for war against Iraq. House and Senate intelligence
committee investigators found no evidence for allegations that
the Pentagon offices tried to bypass the CIA or had a major
impact on the prewar debate. But in the Senate panel's report on
prewar intelligence" Washington
Post, file
- Sept 2004, Franklin
probe went dark?
- Sept 1, 2004 "FBI
SEIZES COMPUTER FROM AIPAC OFFICES
By Janine Zacharia The Jerusalem Post September 1, 2004 NEW YORK
— FBI agents on Friday copied the computer hard drive of a
senior staffer at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
who has been questioned in relation to the case of a Pentagon
official suspected of turning over a classified document either
directly to Israel, or via the pro-Israel lobby group".
Shalom
Center
- Sept 1, 2004 article search
terms: Office of Special Plans, David Wurmser (see Cheney), 'A
Clean Break' Netanyahu, Likud, Road Map, Counterpunch
- Larry Franklin, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, reports to
William Luti
- Sept 6, 2004,
MSNBC
story: "In the Pentagon, a suspected spy allegedly passes
secrets about Iran to Israel". Larry Franklin turns
up while FBI monitoring lunch conversation. Was there an
Abu Ghraib smokescreen story? Newsweek interviews
Ledeen on the story and he says Franklin charges are
"nonsensical". and Newsweek tries to spin
Franklin as a loner in the case and supports view that Israel no
longer spies on U.S. Linked Franklin to Luti, Gingrich,
Feith and Likud. and also Washington
Monthly Franklin, Rhode were involved in contacts with
Manucher Ghorbanifar and other Iranian exiles ....all in waring
administration camps on 'regime change' in Iran versus a more
cautious approach. Ledeen / Iran Sep
01 Sep 03, Sep
04 Latest
Entries
|
page 53
- _
- (U) The NIE also described an older UAV program that used larger
aircraft. Analysts assessed that this program involved "as many as
ten L-29 1960s vintage Czech-built trainers" which had been converted
into UAVs as of 2000, and noted that these planes’ operational status
was unknown. The NIE noted that the US Air Force assessed that "no
flyable L-29 airframes remain", and included a footnote pointing out
that "the Military Intelligence Community assesses that the role of
the L-29 UAV-modified aircraft is largely historical and that
concentrating on it distracts from other more viable delivery mechanisms
for CBW".ll5
- (U) The NIE went on to state that Iraq had "at
least one small UAV that could be employed eovertly against the
continental United States", and that this UAV "might be
available for operational use within months". The NIE also described
an incident in which an Iraqi procurement network "attempted to
procure commercially available route planning software and an associated
topographic database that would] provide coverage of the ‘50
states"’. The NIE concluded that this information suggested that
"Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting
the United States".u6
- (U) Intelligence assessments regarding UAVs
shifted after the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE, Nontraditional
Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, published in January 2003, did
not describe Iraq’s UAV program as "probably intended" for
biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that "Iraq may be
modifying UAVs" for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted that Iraqi UAVs
could reach the United States, if they were transported (in some
unspecified manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers."m
- (U)
The January 2003 NIE also discussed Iraqi attempts to procure mapping
software, but stated only that this software "could support
programming of a UAV autopilot for operation in the United States."H8
-
(U) The Air Force continued to dissent hom even these less conclusive
judgments. Joined by the DIA and the Army intelligence branch, the Air
Force stated that, while most UAVs were capable of being used to deliver
biological weapons, evidence that Iraqis were modifying UAVs for this
purpose was "unconfirmed, and is not sufficiently compelling to
indicate that the Iraqis have done so." These services further noted
that they believed that "the purpose of the Iraqi request for route
planning software and topographic database was to acquire a generic
mapping capability — a goal that is not necessarily indicative of an
intent to target the U.S. Homeland."1 9
- (U) The President did not
mention Iraqi missiles or UAVs in the 2003 State of the Union Address.12°
*15 md. “‘ mid. t lljlbagional Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional
Threats t0 the US Homeland, January 2003. 1 . “° mid. 120 White House
Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union", January 28,
2003.
page 54
- Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5,
2003)
- (U) The Secretary of State made several mentions of prohibited
missiles and UAV capabilities in his February 2003 address to the UN
Security Council. He asserted that "Iraq had a program to modify
aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets", and that "In 1995, an Iraqi
military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq
intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG- 21 that had been
converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with
spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack
using biological weapons."l2
- (U) Both of these statements were
substantiated by intelligence assessments, however both referred to
pre-Gulf War programs - The Secretary made two central assertions
regarding prohibited missiles, first stating that "numerous
intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq
indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen
Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to
900 kilometers."m This assertion was included in the earlier NIE and
a number of other intelligence reports. However, the NIE did not r ort any
direct evidence of this Scud-variant force and stated that this assessment
was basedch _”" His other key assertion regarding missiles was that
"Ira has no arms that are intended to produce ballistic
missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel
missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers."125
These programs were also referenced in the earlier NIE, which noted that
they were in an earlier stage of development than shorter-range missile
pro grams.126
- (U) Regarding UAVs, the Secretary made four major
statements, including "Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for
over a decade."m Intelligence assessments had indicated the existence
of the pre-Gulf War MiG UAV program, as well as the L-29 program mentioned
in the NIE. Reporting on Iraq’s smaller UAV program was more recent, and
appears to have begun in 2001. The Committee is also aware of intelligence
provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which also substantiated
this statement.128 m White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin
Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. m DIA, Iraq
’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs:
Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May
2000. 123 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell
Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 124 National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction, October 2002. 125 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of
State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003.
126 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 127 White House Transcript, US.
Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council,
February 5, 2003. 128 DIA, Iraq ’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential
Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May 2000; National Intelligence
Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,
October 2002; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Shopping for UA V
Equipment, September 14, 2001. _ 55
page 55
- (U`) The Secretary went on to say that "we detected one of Iraq’s
newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot
in the racetrack pattern depicted here."129 The January 2003 NIE
described this flight data, and stated that the UAVs autonomous flight
range was at least 500 kilometers.]3°
- (U`) The Secretary drew a
connection between the apparent UAV program and biological weapons,
stating that "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much
effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for
UAVs." Finally, he argued that "Iraq could use these small UAVs,
which have a wingspan of only a few meters, to deliver biological agents
to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries, including the
United States."13l
- (U) Iraq’s pre-Gulf War program to fit Mirage
jets with aerosol spray tanks was mentioned in numerous intelligence
assessments, as well as Iraqi declarations to the UN.132 As noted above,
the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may be modifying UAVs to deliver
CBW agents, according to numerous sources." The Air Force/Army/DIA
dissent to this NIE agreed that biological weapons delivery is an inherent
capability of most UAVs," but concluded that "a reconnaissance
mission for the UAV program is more likely."133
- (U) The January 2003
NIE stated that "UAVs could strike the homeland if transported to
within a few hundred kilometers." It noted that "Iraq has at
least one small UAV" with a range of "at least 500 krn," or
roughly 300 miles.134 Additional Statements • "And let there be no
doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles and is working
to extend their range in violation of U.N. restriction." - Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, September 18, 2002 • "His regime is pursuing pilotless
aircraft as a means of delivering chemical and biological weapons." -
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, September 18, 2002 129 White House Transcript, US.
Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council,
February 5, 2003. 130 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional
Tltreats to the US Homeland, January 2003. 131 White House Transcript,
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N Security Council,
February 5, 2003. 132 CIA, Iraq: Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program: Well
Positioned for the Future, April 14, 1997; CIA, Iraq’s L-29: A
Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces, July 12, 2001; DIA,
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile
Programs: Post September lim, January 1, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Biological
Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002; National Intelligence Estimate,
Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002. 133 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the
US Homeland, January 2003. 13* rpm. _ 56
page 56
- • "The Iraqi regime has acquired and tested the means to deliver
weapons of mass destruction. All the world has now seen the footage of an
Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank modified to spray biological agents
over wide areas. Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on
unmanned aerial vehicles with ranges far beyond what is permitted by the
Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast
could reach hundreds of miles inland." — President George W Bush,
Statement in the Roosevelt Room, February 6, 2003
- (U) The above statements
are all consistent with the five major policy speeches analyzed. The
statement below differs from these speeches. • The Iraqi regime
possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to
make more, and according to the British government, Iraq] could launch a
biological or chemical attack in as little as forty-five minutes after the
order is given." — President George W Bush, Radio Address,
September 28, 2002 - On September 28, 2002, the President cited the
British government as the source of a statement that the Iraqi government
was capable of launching chemical or biological attacks with forty-five
minutes of warning. A report from _ that same month had cited an
intelligence source who said that the Iraqi government possessed chemical
and biological munitions that could be deployed (apparently against
neighboring countries) with a forty-five minute response time. Conclusions
-
(U) Conclusion 7: Statements in the major speeches and additional
statements analyzed regarding Iraqi ballistic missiles were generally
substantiated by available intelligence. The intelligence community was
consistent in its judgments that the Iraqi military possessed a small
number of Scud-type missiles left over from the Gulf War era (although the
October 2002 NIE noted that these judgments were based on accounting gaps
rather than direct evidence), and that Iraq was developing short-range
missiles whose range exceeded the range permitted under UN sanctions by as
much as 150 km, or 93 miles. The corrnnunity also judged that Iraq was
pursuing the capability to build longer-range missiles, but assessed that
this project was still at the early stages of development.
- (U) Conclusion
8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of
State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could
be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally
substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the
substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the
intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UAV program that was intended
to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented
from this view, and argued that the new UAV was probably being developed
for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that
Iraq "may" be modifying UAVs for chemical or biological weapons,
and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence 57
- Agency argued that the evidence for this was "not sufficiently
compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so."
- (U) Conclusion
9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering
using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence
judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few
months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase
commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and
said that this suggested that the Iraqi governmentwas considering using
UAVs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said
only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army
and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and
argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic
mapping capability. Postwar Findings A
- (U) Postwar findings confirm that
Iraq was developing the Al-Samoud and Al-Fat’h (formerly Ababil-100)
missiles, and that both had ranges that exceeded 150 km. In early February
2003 the intelligence community revised it’s assessment of the al-Samoud’s
maximum range down iiom 300 km to 170 km, which was consistent with
postwar iindings.135 In late February 2003 Saddam agreed to UN demands
that his Al-Samoud inventory be destroyed. Postwar findings indicate that
the Iraqi government unilaterally destroyed its remaining Scud-type
ballistic missiles in 1991.
- (U) Postwar findings confirmed that Iraq’s
UAV development program was primarily intended for reconnaissance. Postwar
investigations did not find any evidence that Iraq had conducted any
research to develop a chemical or biological weapons capability for its
developmental UAV program, or that Iraq had intended to use its UAVs for
missions targeting the United States.136 135 National Intelligence
Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
Through 2015, February 2003. 136 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s
WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar
Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report
109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 58
page 58
- VH. Links to Terrorism • "Iraq continues to shelter and support
terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and
Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In
1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former
American President. Iraq’s government openly praised the attacks of
September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and
are known to be in Iraq." - President George W Bush, Address to the
United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • " The Iraqi
regime] has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror
against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s
eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Over
the years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal,
whose terror organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20
countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12
Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who was
responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American
passenger. And we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives
assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East
peace." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002
• "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that
go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq.
These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical
treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning
for chemical and biological attacks. We’ve learned that Iraq has trained
al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." -
President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 •
"Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of
terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be
trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide
them to a terror network. " - President George W Bush, Cincinnati,
Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret
communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam
Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda.
Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden
weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.” — President
George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "But
what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more
sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus
that combines classic terrorist organizations and modem methods of murder.
Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al—Zarqawi
an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida
lieutenants.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United
Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 59
page 59 see NewsFollowUp.com  FEMA
Concentration Camp, Beech Grove, Indiana YouTube
are these meant for US citizens? Sounds ridiculous until you watch
the video.
- • "Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants
operating in northem Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled
Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical
organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000,
this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region." - Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some
of those members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today."
- Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003 • "Zarqawi’s activities are not
confined to this small comer of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in
May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two
months while he recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly
two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of
operations there. These al- Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now coordinate the
movement of people, money, and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his
network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more
than eight months." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Last year, two
suspected al-Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi
Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them
received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide." - Secretary
of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
February 5, 2003 • "We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring
Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long
experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al- Qaida. Going back to
the early and rnid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida
source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that
al- Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida
ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with
al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida."
- Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know members of both organizations
met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels
since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that
bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and
later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service." -
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in
his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former
intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan
sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on
document forgery." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 60
page 60
- • "The support that this detainee describes included Iraq
offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida
associates beginning in December 2000." - Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Address t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
-
(U) The Committee addressed the pre-war intelligence linking Iraq and
terrorist organizations in its first Iraq report, US. Intelligence
Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments 0n Iraq, in July 2004. The
Committee reviewed the accuracy of the prewar intelligence in its report,
Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links t0 Terrorism and
How They Compare · with Prewar Assessments, in September 2006.
- (U) Scope
Note: This section addresses statements that referenced past or present
Iraqi links to terrorism. Statements regarding possible future links or
cooperation between the Iraqi regime and terrorism are discussed in the
Intent section. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002)
-
(U) The Vice President made no reference to links between Iraq and al Qaeda
or any other terrorist group in his August 2002 speech. President’s
Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002)
- (U) In this speech,
the President stated that "Iraq continues to shelter and support
terrorist organizations" in violation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1372, and that "al Qaeda terrorists escaped from
Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq."
- (U) The intelligence
community believed that Iraq had long supported, through safeharbor,
financial support, and training various regional terrorist organizations
such as Abu Nidal and Palestinian groups. For example, Director Tenet
testified before the Committee on February 6, 2002 that, "Iraq
provides safe haven, financial support, and low-level training to a number
of terrorist groups——including the Palestine Liberation Front, the Abu
Nidal Organization, and the Mojaheddin al Kha1q." 137 (U) The
February 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), International
Terrorist Threats t0 US Interests, included a section on Iraq under the
heading of state sponsors of terrorism. The NIE stated that "Saddam
will continue contacts with several terrorist groups and will weigh
carefully the risks and possible beneifits of supporting their
operations." It continued that "As Iraq strengthens ties to
other countries and sends its intelligence officers abroad, under official
or commercial cover, its ability to conduct or sponsor terrorism will
increase." 137 See also CIA, SEM, The Terrorist Threat jrom Iraq,
December 15, 2001, "Baghdad continues to provide safehaven, financial
support, and low-level terrorist training to a number of terrorist groups.
Iraq continues to support to varying degrees the Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF), the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
Abu Ibrahim of the 15 May Organization, the Arab Liberation Front, and the
Abu Nidal Organization, which appears to be rebuilding with help from
Iraq." _ 61
page 61
- _ A CIA r ort in June 2002 discussed al Qaeda operatives moving from
Afghanistan to Iraq, saying ‘ reporting show that unknown numbers of al Qaeda
associates fleeing Afghanistan since December have used Iraq—including
the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, Baghdad, and other regions—as a
safehaven and transit area." The paper continued, "We lack
positive indications that Baghdad is complicit in this activity, but the
persistence of an al Qaeda presence and the operatives’ silence about
any harassment from Iraqi authorities, who closely monitor the population,
may indicate Baghdad is acquiescent or finds their presence
useful."l38 _ A June 24, 2002 c1A··se¤rer, Pubirsh VVhen Reeayr
(sewn) repea, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to Al-Qa 'ida, stated that ‘
reporting indicate some al Qaeda operatives and fighters, including
most notably senior al- Qa’ida operative Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, have
fled to Baghdad as well as to the Kurdish regions since the Taliban
collapsed. 1 intelligence gives no indication of Iraqi regime complicity
but also reveals no concern about possible arrest or scrutiny by Iraqi
security services."1 9 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7,
2002)
Chalabi, and John McCain support of Chalabi  |
- Think
Progress "Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi was
one of the most sordid figures in the run-up to the Iraq war.
Paid by the Bush administration to muster pre-war intelligence,
Chalabi drummed up claims that Saddam Hussein had WMD, helping
lead the United States into war. More recently, he promoted the
“surge” to the Iraqi government. A new book by Aram Roston
reveals that Chalabi supported John McCain (R-AZ) for president
in 2000, believing that the senator would be the most receptive
to his agenda. Muckraked reports:
One of his key backers has been John McCain,
who was one of the first patrons of Chalabi’s grand-sounding
International Committee for a Free Iraq when it was founded in
1991. McCain was Chalabi’s favored candidate in the 2000
election since Chalabi knew that he would be able to free up the
$97 million in military aid plus millions pushed through in
Congress and earmarked for Chalabi’s exile group, the Iraqi
National Congress, but held up by the Clinton State Department.
Indeed, McCain was a Chalabi backer long
before President Bush took power. In 1997, he tried to pressure
the Clinton administration into setting up an Iraqi government
in exile. Despite opposition from the Pentagon and the State
Department, the next fall, McCain co-sponsored the Iraq
Liberation Act, committing the United States to overthrowing
Saddam and funding opposition groups. According to a 2006
article by John Judis: McCain welcomed Ahmed Chalabi, leader of
the Iraqi National Congress (INC), to Washington and pressured
the administration to give him money. When General Anthony Zinni
cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the Iraqi opposition,
McCain rebuked him at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
In 2003, McCain joined four other Republican
senators and asked Bush to “personally clear the bureaucratic
roadblocks within the State Department” that blocked increased
funding for the Chalabi’s group. Also that year, McCain said
of Chalabi, “He’s a patriot who has the best interests of
his country at heart.”
-
-
Iraqi National Congress research
-
YouTube
|
-
- (U) This speech made a number of distinct claims about Iraq and
terrorism. The President reiterated his earlier statement about Iraq
providing shelter and support to terrorism, specifically citing safe haven
for Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas and financing of terrorist groups undermining
Middle East peace.
- (U) The President stated that "We know that Iraq
and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade." He
referenced al Qaeda leaders fleeing Afghanistan for Iraq, noting in
particular Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as having "received medical treatment
in Baghdad." The President added that "We’ve learned that Iraq
has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly
gases."
- (U) Finally, the President stated that Saddam Hussein was
"harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments
of mass death and destruction." While this statement was not specific
to any group, the placement in the speech and the context suggests that
the President was stating that Hussein was harboring al Qaeda. The
statement appeared two paragraphs after statements that ". . .Iraq
and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy," that some
"al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq," and that
"Iraq has trained a1 Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and
deadly gases." (These statements are discussed elsewhere in this
report.) The President’s statement came in the same paragraph as the
statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning
the war on terror."
- (U) The President’s statement on contacts
between Iraq and al Qaeda did not elaborate on the nature of these
contacts or whether they reflected a substantive relationship between the
two 138 Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq and al Qaeda: Interpreting a
Murky Relationship, June 2l, 2002, 9. Other reports on al Qaeda’s
presence in Iraq include CIA, SEIB, Sep l0, 2002, al Qaeda Determined
to Strike Soon; and May 24, 2002 State Department INR document entitled,
Iraq terrorists Al-Qaida Operatives Moving into Baghdad. 139 CIA SPWR,
Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida, (SPWRO62402-Ol). 62
page 62
-
- _ sides. The intelligence community reported numerous times on
interactions between elements in the Iraqi regime and members of al Qaeda and, through direct contacts with Saddam Hussein as well as with various
high-level Iraq regime officials. (U) DCI Tenet’s statement to the
Committee on February 6, 2002 underscored the duration of the contacts but
provided additional analysis on the nature of those contacts. He wrote
that "Baghdad’s connections to al Qaeda are tenuous, but they
appear to have maintained a mutually wary relationship for nearly a
decade. Intelligence reports indicate that Iraq has maintained a liaison
relationship with Bin Laden. At the same time, we assess that their
divergent ideologies make it difficult for Baghdad and al Qaeda to
forge the kind of cooperation that Baghdad has with terrorist groups such
as the PLF, AN O, and the MEK." (U) A CIA paper from June 7, 2002
noted that intelligence reporting "of varying reliability indicates
that the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda have had mutually wary contacts for
the last decade. It is possible that the two have forged ties that could
have resulted in cooperation on specific terrorist operations, but the
available reporting does not point to such a relationship."l 0 (U) In
part of an intelligence summary that dismissed a claim that Saddam and bin
Laden met in Iraq in 2000, the DLA assessed that "an alliance between
the two individuals is unlikely as Saddam views Bin Laden’s brand of
Islam as a threat to his regime and Bin Laden is opposed to those Muslim
states that do not follow his version of Islam."m This theme was
repeated in a June 24, 2002 CIA paper, which assessed that
"interaction between Saddam and Bin Laden appears to be more akin to
activity between rival intelligence services, each trying to use the
relationship to its own advantage."142 (U) The same report also noted
that "contacts between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appear to
reach back over the past l0 years and possibly strengthened around 1998. CIA
analysts agree al- Qa’ida gained some tangible benefits from these
contacts but do not agree on Sadda1n’s agenda. Some think he is
concerned principally with penetrating and monitoring al Qaeda, while
others see more collusion."143 (U) Another CIA report in June 2002
said, "intelligence reporting highlights more than a decade of
contacts between the Iraqi Government and al Qaeda based on shared
anti-US goals and Bin Laden’s interest in unconventional weapons and
safehaven."144 This report was "purposefully aggressive in
seeking to draw cormections, on the assumption that any indication of a
relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers
to the United States." Nonetheless, the report assessed that the
"pattern of contacts and cooperation reflects wariness coupled with
recognition of potential mutual benefit. In contrast to the traditional
patron-client relationship Iraq enjoys with radical secular Palestinian
groups, the ties between 140 CIA SPWR dated June 7, 2002 titled, Possible
Meeting Between Bin Laden and Iraqi Ojicials in Sudan. H1 AFebruary 6,
2002, and a February 7, 2002 DITSUM (No. 031-02 and No. 032-02). 142 - A
June 24, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida
(SPWR062402-0 l). Later, the report states "_ reporting indicates
that Bin Laden, while in Sudan in 1993, reached an ‘understanding’
with Saddam under which Bin Laden’s followers would not undertake
actions against the Iraqi leader. The report indicated the two also agreed
to cooperate, although no details were provided." 1 . 144 CIA, Iraq
and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 21, 2002. _ 63
page 63
- Saddam and Bin Laden appear to be much like those between rival
intelligence services, with each side trying to exploit the other for its
own benefit."
- (U) The intelligence on the contacts between Iraq and
al Qaeda appears to have grown by Fall of 2002. A CIA paper from September
13, 2002, stated that "We have identified about 12 meetings between
Iraqi officials and senior al-Qa` ida leaders from a review of reporting
we assess to have at least some credibility. Ten of these reports mention
specific discussions involving top al- Qa’ida operatives."]45 _ DCI
Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the Committee elaborated on
these contacts, saying that "there is solid evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda
have had sporadic contacts over the past decade. Intelligence
reports point to various Iraq-al Qaeda meetings through high-level and
third-party intermediaries.
- (U) Tenet also described in his testimony
"credible reporting of about a dozen direct meetings between senior
Iraqi intelligence officials and top al Qaeda operatives from the early
1990s to the present." He noted that the intelligence sources on the
contacts "do not describe Iraqi complicity in, control over, or
authorization of specific terrorist attacks carried out by al Qaeda.
Taken together, the mass of reporting outlines a relationship in which
both sides probably were determining how best to take advantage of the
other.”]46
- (U) On the topic of Iraqi providing harbor for al Qaeda
members, Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony began by saying that
"most of the reporting on this involves Kurdish-inhabited northern
Iraq, which Baghdad has not controlled since 1991. Intelligence confirms
that al- Qa’ida fighters have relocated to the north, where they are
hosted by a local Kurdish extremist group called Ansar al Islam. The
relocations have increased since the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan
began late last year. We estimate there are about 100 to 200 al-Qa’ ida
members and associates in the area." _ Tenet added that "an
unknown number of al Qaeda associates have fled during the past six
months to or through other parts of Iraq .... 1 intelligence in May 2002
indicated that several militants associated with al Qaeda were checking
into hotels in Baghdad and were using the Iraqi capital as a base for
financial transactions and other activities.” Tenet concluded these
statements, however, by saying that "we do not know to what extent
Baghdad may be actively complicit in this use of its territory for safe
haven and transit. The operatives have not mentioned Iraq’s security
presence, but their conversations often are cryptic, sprinkled with code
words, and short on specifics. Given the pervasive presence of Iraq’s
security apparatus, it would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an
active, long-terrn presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or
without at least their acquiescence." 145 SPWR dated September 13,
2002 titled, Terrorism: Contacts Between al-Qu 'idrz Ojjicials and Iraqi
Intelligence O cers. l4gSeptember 17, 2002 testimony by DCI Tenet to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. _ 64
page 64
- (U) The President’s next statement in the Cincinnati speech was that
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "received medical treatment in Baghdad.”
Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony noted this point
specifically, saying that, "Of particular interest is senior al Qaeda
planner Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who was in Baghdad under an assumed
identity in late May, possibly seeking medical treatment. We do not know
his current location, but his close associates remain active in Baghdad,
leaving open the possibility that he could be elsewhere in Iraq." The
issue of Zarqawi’s medical treatment was also discussed in reports by
the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the DLA.147
-
(U) The President’s final terrorism statement in the speech was " w]e’ve
learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb making and
poisons and deadly gases .” The intelligence community had produced
assessments on the topic of bomb making. The intelligence reports on
chemical and biological weapons training came primarily from the
interrogation of al Qaeda detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi.
- (U) The
September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was
coordinated with the DLA, stated that al-Libi said Iraq had
"provided" unspecified CBW training for two al-Qa’ ida
associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi "did not know the
results of the training."148 In the June 2002 paper, Iraq and al Qa
’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationshqr, the CIA also stated that al-Libi
claimed Iraq had "provided" unspecified CBW training for two al Qaeda
associates in 2000.149
- (U) Director Tenet testified in September 2002
that, " t]here is evidence that Iraq provided al- Qa’ida with
various kinds of training—combat, bomb-making, and CBRN. Although Saddam
did not endorse al Qaeda’s overall agenda and was suspicious of
Islamist movements in general, he was apparently not averse, under certain
circumstances, to enhancing Bin Laden’s operational capabilities.
- (U)
The October 2002 WMD National Intelligence Estimated stated that
"Detainee Ibn al- Shaykh al-Libi—who had significant responsibility
for training—has told us that Iraq provided unspecified chemical or
biological weapons training for two al Qaeda members beginning in
December 2000."150
| |
- Christian
Science Monitor "J
Street," a new lobby which
describes itself as pro-Israel. It's directed by Jeremy Ben-Ami,
a former Clinton official whose father fought alongside Menachem
Begin for Israel's independence. J Street (a play on the K
Street address of many lobbyists), seeks a less hard-line US
policy in the Middle East and wants to create an environment in
which politicians can confidently discuss such a change without
fear of political punishment or being labeled anti-Semitic.
Several US groups share J Street's views but they don't have
much political muscle. J Street wants to build clout by using
the Internet to raise money from small donors, and to contribute
to congressional campaigns. ... Next week, it will endorse
several candidates who support a major US push for a negotiated,
two-state solution to the Palestinian crisis. J Street also
favors dialogue with Israel's enemies, including Hamas and Iran;
an Israeli-Syrian peace deal; and US withdrawal from Iraq.
|
- (U) Months prior to the speech and the latter
intelligence products cited above, questions were raised in iinished
intelligence about al-Libi’s credibility. A February 22, 2002 DLA
Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary noted that Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi]
"lacks specific details on the Iraqi’s involvement, the CBRN
materials associated with the assistance, and the location where the
training occurred. It is possible he does not know any further details; it
is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers.
Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be
describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their
interest. Saddarn’s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic
revolutionary 147 State INR, Iraq/Terrorism: Al-Qaida Operatives Moving
into Baghdad, May 24, 2002; DIA, Transnational/Iraq; Senior al-Qaida
Operative Reportedly in Iraq, May 28, 2002 DIA. 148 CIA, Iraqi Support for
Terrorism, September 2002, p. I2 (SSCI # 2005-5178). 149 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa
’ida.· Interpreting a Murky Relationship, July 2002, p. 6 (SSCI#
2002-3005). 150 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, 68. _ 65
- movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a
group it cannot control."m
- (U) DIA reiterated some of these points in
additional reports. On August 7, 2002, the CIA reported on al-Libi’s
credibility. The summary of the report stated that "questions persist
about al-Libi’s] forthrightness and truthfulness" and later
elaborating, "In some instances, however, he seems to have fabricated
information. Perhaps in an attempt to exaggerate his own importance, Ibn
al-Shaykh claims to be a member of al Qaeda’s Shura Council, a claim
not corroborated by other intelligence reporting"l52 President’s
State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003)
- (U) President Bush stated
that "Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members
of al Qaeda." He also reiterated the concern that Iraq could secretly
provide weapons to terrorists or help them develop their own. The
intelligence relating to these claims was described above.
- (U) The
November 2002 NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007
repeated much of the intelligence cited above on the relationship between
Iran and al Qaeda.l53 The NIE said that "the relationship between
the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appears more to be two sides trying to
feel one another out or exploit each other." The NIE cited
"solid reporting" that "Iraq and al-Qa’ ida have had
senior-level contacts going back to the rise of Usarna Bin Laden.
Intelligence reportirrg-albeit fragmentary and at times corrtlicting-indicates
a series of contacts over nearly a decade between the Iraqi Government and
al Qaeda .... "l54
- (U) The NIE also stated that " w]e have
credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought help from Baghdad in
acquiring WMD capabilities and that Iraq provided training in bomb-making
and, according to one detainee, in the area of chemical and biological
agents," and that " w]e have solid evidence of the presence in
Iraq of al Qaeda members including some that have been in Baghdadrm
Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5,
2003)
- (U) Secretary Powell’s statements repeated and amplified those
previously mentioned. His stated that Iraq "harbors a deadly
terrorist network" headed by Zarqawi; that an Iraqi agent
"offered al-Qaida safe haven" in the northern Kurdish regions;
and that "al-Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now ... have been operating
freely in the capital for more than eight months." 151 DIA DITSUM
044-02 of February 22, 2002. 152 CIA, Terrorism: Credibility of Ibn al-Shaykh
al—Libi and the Information He Has Provided While in Custody (SPWR080702—05),
August 7, 2002. I 153 This NIE was not published until I anuary 2003. 154
National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland
Through 2007, NIE 2002-15HJ, November 2002, 16-17. *55 ibid, 17. _ 66
page 66
- (U) Secretary Powell referred to "secret Iraqi intelligence
high-level contacts with al-Qaida" that resulted in an understanding
between Hussein and bin Laden that al—Qa’ida would not to support
terrorist activities against Baghdad. Powell cited "at least eight
meetings] at very senior levels since the early 1990s." He cited
"a foreign security service as providing information on meetings
between bin Laden and an Iraqi intelligence offrcer in 1996 and the head
of the Iraqi intelligence service afterwards. Powell laid out cooperation
between Iraq and al-Qa’ ida, including Iraq’s provision of assistance
in document forgery, bombmaking, and chemical and biological weapons
training.
- (U) Many of these statements are consistent with ones made in
speeches previously described. Additional intelligence relating to
Secretary Powell’s statements is below.
- (U) On January 31, 2003, the
State Department Undersecretary for INR, Carl Ford, wrote a memo to
Secretary Powell laying out the intelligence on Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda.
He wrote that "Our evidence suggests that Baghdad is strengthening a
relationship with al-Qaida that dates back to the mid-1990s, when senior
Iraqi Intelligence officers established contact with the network in
several countries." Ford added that "we have some evidence that
Iraqi Intelligence has been in contact with elements in the northeastern
area. And the al-Qaida operatives there are in regular contact with other
operatives located in Baghdad. The Iraqi governmenthas also received
information from other sources alerting it to the presence of al-Qaida
operatives in Baghdad."
- (U) Ford wrote that Zarqawi "has had a
good relationship with Iraqi intelligence officials" and that
"we have hard evidence that al-Qaida is operating in several
locations in Iraq with the knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam’s
regime." Ford wrote that intelligence "revealed the presence of
safehouse facilities in the city as well as the clear intent to remain in
Baghdad. Also, foreign NGO workers outside of Iraq who we believe provide
support to al-Qaida have also expressed their intent to set up shop in
Baghdad."
- (U) Secretary Powell stated that the Zarqawi network had
freedom of movement in Baghdad the ability to command and control
terrorist elements throughout Iraq. As discussed previously, several
intelligence reports noted Zarqawi’s presence in Baghdad, including a
September 2002 CIA assessment which said "Although most al Qaeda operatives in Iraq are adjacent to the Kurdish safehaven in northern Iraq,
an unknown number of individuals have used Baghdad and other regions of
the country as bases to orchestrate operations."156 - Director Tenet
testifred to the Committee on Se tember 17, 2002 that "In Jaw , an sl-
aids assssists brsggsd that the situation in W was ood, that Baghdad could
be transited quickly formally or informally, ."
- (U) A CIA SPWR dated
December 21, 2002 titled, Iraq: Extremists in Baghdad Aid Al-Zarqawi
Operations, relayed that " Reporting] indicates more than a dozen al Qaeda
affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad beginning in May and have since
been coordinating the movement of people, money, and supplies into Baghdad
and northeastern Iraq. Veteran Egyptian Islamic Jihad 156 CIA, Iraqi
Support for Terrorism, September 2002, p. iv. _ 67
page 67
- (EIJ) operative Yusif al-Dardiri a.rrived in Baghdad in mid-May—about
the time Abu Mus’ab al- Zarqawi went there for medical treatrnent-and
signed a one-year house lease for his associates." The CIA reported
again on al-Dardiri in a January 2003 report, Iraqi Support for Terrorism,
stating that he was in Baghdad and facilitating Zarqawi’s operations.
-
(U) Secretary Powell described the group Ansar al-Islam in northern Iraq,
and area that Powell said was outside of Saddam’s control. He that an
Iraqi agent that was in a senior position in Ansar al-Islam had offered
al-Qaida safe haven in the north. The intelligence community agreed that al Qaeda
and Ansar al-Islam had a relationship and that terrorist
training and plotting was ongoing in northern Iraq.
- (U) A February 2003
CIA report noted that "In an August 2000 meeting, al Qaeda officials met with three Kurdish Islamist leaders, now all senior AI
officials, who agreed to provide al Qaeda a safehaven if the group lost
Afghanistan as a sanctuary, according to a PUK detainee."157 A
separate CIA report noted that "Abu Wa’il, whose role as a senior
AI official and close al Qaeda associate allows him to know the full
scope of activities in northeastern Iraq and in Baghdad, was identified as
an IIS associate by three detainees in PUK custody."158
- (U) The link
between Baghdad and Ansar al-Islam was, however, questioned in
intelligence channels. An August 15, 2002 State Department INR assessment,
Terrorism: Al-Qaida ’s Presence in Iraq—An Update, stated that
"We still have not seen definitive evidence of cooperation between
Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaida, but the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(IIS) almost certainly is aware al-Qaida operatives are present in
Iraq." Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the
Committee included that "Baghdad reportedly has had contacts with
Ansar al-Islam that include IIS penetrations of the organization, but we
ca.nnot determine their frequency or purpose."
- (U) Secretary Powell’s
UN speech repeated previous Administration statements about the length and
number of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. This issue is addressed
above. Secretary Powell did reference "an understanding that al-Qaida
would no longer support activities against Baghdad."
- (U) A May I4,
2002, CIA paper Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities, noted that
"In 1993, Bin Laden reached an ‘understanding’ with Saddam under
which al Qaeda forbade operations against the Iraqi leader, according
to sensitive reporting that was released in US court documents during the
Aiiica Embassy trial." The September 13, 2002, CIA paper Terrorism:
Contacts Between al-Qa ’ida Officials and Iraqi Intelligence Officers
included a comment that "Sensitive reporting indicates that Bin Laden
reached an ‘understanding’ with Baghdad in 1993 that al Qaeda would
not support any anti-Saddarn activities. We have no information about how
such an agreement might have been reached." Additional Statements 157
CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terrorism: Ansar al Islam’s
Threat to the US (SEIB 03-028CHX) February 4, 2003. 158 Abu Wa’il was
one of the three AI officials in the February 2003 CIA report. 68
page 68
| Wayne
Madsen Report |
 |
- January 18-20, 2008 - Plame and Edmonds were looking at the
same covert network
WMR has learned that former CIA covert agent Valerie Plame
Wilson, whose covert status was leaked by the Bush White House,
and former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds, who was focused on a
major covert network involving Turkish, Israeli, and key members
of the Bush administration and Republican Party and weapons and
drug smuggling, were essentially looking at the same network.
The nexus of Turkey with both the covert CIA Brewster
Jennings and Associates operations and the Turkish-Israeli
network of influence active within the Defense and State
Departments, is the key factor in understanding the complicated
counter-espionage operation conducted by both the FBI and CIA.
The congressional investigation by Senators Pat Leahy and
Charles Grassley in support of Edmonds' revelations and
congressional and judicial efforts to obtain White House emails
on the leak of Plame's identity have been stymied by a powerful
array of top Bush administration officials, including Vice
President Dick Cheney, Bush adviser Karl Rove, Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage, convicted Cheney Chief of Staff I.
Lewis "Scooter" Libby, former Deputy Defense Secretary
for Policy and Plans Douglas Feith, and Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs Marc Grossman. full
article
|
-
- • "There is certainly evidence that al Qaeda people have been in
Iraq. There is certainly evidence that Saddam Hussein cavorts with
terrorists. 1 think that if you asked, do we know that he had a role in
9/11, no, we do not know that he had a role in 9/11. But I think that this
is the test that sets a bar that is far too high." — National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002. •
"He plays host to terrorist networks,’assassinates his opponents,
both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate a former
president of the United States." - Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September
18, 2002. • " Since we began after September 11th,] we do have
solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some
that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable
reporting of senior level contacts going back a decade, and of possible
chemical and biological agent training. And when I say contacts, I mean
between Iraq and al Qaeda. The reports of these contacts have been
increasing since 1998. We have what we believe to be credible information
that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq,
reciprocal nonaggression discussions. We have what we consider to be
credible evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who
could help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We do
have -- I believe it’s one report indicating that Iraq provided
unspeciied training relating to chemical and/or biological matters for al
Qaeda members. There is, I’m told, also some other information of
varying degrees of reliability that supports that conclusion of their
cooperation." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumskzld, Press
briefing, September 26, 2002. ‘ • "We also know that Iraq is
harboring a terrorist network, headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist
planner. The network runs a poison and explosive training center in
northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad."
- President George W Bush, Press conference, February 6, 2003.
- (U) These
statements are consistent with those described above. • "We know
that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq
without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. We also know that
there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the
years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror himself, including the
attempted assassination of a former U.S. President" — Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, September 19, 2002. • ". .. it’s been pretty well
confirmed that Mohammed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a
senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last
April, several months before the attack. Now, what the purpose of that
was, what transpired between them, we simply don’t know at this point,
but that’s clearly an avenue that we want to pursue." - Vice
President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, December 9, 2001. 69
page 69
-
- • ". .. We’ve seen in connection with the hijackers, of
course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead hijacker, did apparently travel to
Prague on a number of occasions. And on at least one occasion, we have
reporting that places him in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence
official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center. The
debates about, you know, was he there or wasn’t he there, again, it’s
the intelligence business. Tim Russert:
What does the CIA say about that?
Is it credible?] It’s credible. But, you know, I think a way to put it
would be it’ s unconfirmed at this point." - Vice President Dick
Cheney, Meet the Press, September 8, 2002.
- (U) Shortly after the 9/11
attacks, the intelligence community produced reports of a meeting between
9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official. A
September 17, 2001 CIA report, Iraq: Indications of Possible Iraqi Links
to Attacks, noted "a foreign government service last Thursday
reported that the local Iraqi Intelligence Service chief met in mid-April
with suspected American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta.159
Shortly thereafter, the CIA reported that Saddam Hussein was trying to
"avert a US strike by asking other Arab governments to convey to
Washington that Baghdad is not complicit in the ll September
attacks."16O
- (U) There were several intelligence reports between
September 2001 and September 2002 that both repeated the initial claims
that Atta met with Iraqi officials and stated that the claims could not be
corroborated or verified. Some of the reports stated that the only
confirmed trip by Atta to Prague was in 2000, most reports stated that a
2001 visit could not be confirmed. A
- (U) On November 1, 2001, a CIA report
relayed the Czech Government’s public confirmation that Atta met with an
Iraqi intelligence official and cited a "foreign government
service" as saying the meeting occurred. The CIA stated that the
agency "cannot corroborate Atta’s travel to Prague in April through
travel or financial records but he could have traveled under an
alias" and that CIA has no new information on the substance of the
alleged meetings."161 A follow-up CIA report on March 19, 2002, said
that the CIA was "pursuing conflicting leads and repeated that it was
"trying to confirm a report that American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker
Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in
April of last year."l62 The report stated that "Neither the
Czechs nor we have been able to verify Atta’s alleged trip to Prague in
April of last year." (U) A May 14, 2002 CIA report again cited the
foreign government service reporting from September 2001 and said that
"Fragmentary intelligence reporting points to indirect ties between
Baghdad and the 11 September hijackers but offers no conclusive indication
of Iraqi complicity 159 Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq:
Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks, September 17, 2001. 160
Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq: Using Back Channels To Refute
Terrorist Allegations, September 28, 200 1. 161 - Central Intelli ence A
enc , SPWR titled, Terrorism: Muhammed Atta 's travels to Prague -
November 1, 2001. CIA, SPWR dated March 19, 2002, T errorism: Reporting on
Muhammad Atta in Prague. 70
page 70
- or foreknowledge. Foreign government service sensitive reporting in
September. indicated that Muhammad Atta met with an IIS officer in Prague
in April of 2001. There is contradictory reporting on this trip and we
have not been able to verify Atta’s reported trip through other
channels."463 A DIA report on July 31, 2002 stated that "There
are significant informationgaps in this reporting that render the issue
impossible to prove or disprove with available information."4 4
Conclusions (U) Conclusion 10: Statements in the major speeches analyzed,
as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s support for terrorist
groups other than al Qaeda were substantiated by intelligence
information. The intelligence community reported regularly on Iraq’s
safe harbor and financial support for Palestinian rejectionist groups, the
Abu Nidal Organization, and others. The February 2002 NIE fully supported
the claim that Iraq had, and would continue, to support terrorist groups.
-
(U) Conclusion 11: Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi and other al Qaeda-related terrorist members were
substantiated by the intelligence assessments. Intelligence assessments
noted Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate
within the country. The intelligence community generally believed that
Iraqi intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least
tolerated, Zarqawi’s presence in the country.
- (U) Conclusion 12:
Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State
suggesting that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had
provided al Qaeda with weapons training, were not substantiated by the
intelligence. Intelligence assessments, including multiple CIA reports and
the November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al Qaeda were
cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE,
there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq
would provide weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda. The credibility
of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had
provided al Qaeda with biological and chemical weapons training was
regularly questioned by DIA, and later by the CIA. The Committee repeats
its conclusion from a prior report that "assessments were
inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al Qaeda."465
-
(U) Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well
additional statements, regarding Iraq’s contacts with al Qaeda were
substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers’
statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the
nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to
substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al Qaeda. M3 CIA, SPWR
dated May 14, 2002 titled, Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities.
464 DIA, July 31, 2002 DIA Special Analysis, Iraq ’s Inconclusive Ties
to al-Qaida. 165 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs
and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September
8, 2006. 71
page 71
- (U) Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not confirm that
Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. Postwar
Findings
- (U) The Committee issued a number of conclusions in its September
2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to
Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, relating to the
pre-war links between Iraq and terrorism. The Committee found the
following.
- (U) Iraq and al Qaeda did not have a cooperative
relationship. Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al Qaeda and viewed
Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al Qaeda
to provide material or operational support.
- (U) Most of the
contacts cited between Iraq and al Qaeda before the war by the
intelligence community and policymakers have been determined not to have
occurred. One of the reported contacts has been confirmed, and two other
meetings have since been identified.
- (U) Postwar information supports
prewar assessments and statements that Abu Musab al- Zarqawi was in
Baghdad and that al Qaeda was present in northern Iraq.
- (U) No postwar
information has been found that indicates Iraq provided chemical and
biological weapons training to al Qaeda. The detainee who provided the
key prewar reporting about this training recanted his claims after the
war. In 2004, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted his earlier statements about
biological and chemical weapons training. Al-Libi told debriefers that he
had fabricated information while in US custody to receive better treatment
and in response to threats of being transferred to a foreign intelligence
service which he believed would torture him. He also said that later,
while he was being debriefed by a foreign intelligence service, he
fabricated more information in response to physical abuse and threats of
torture. The Committee’s prior report on post-war findings cited a CIA
officer who explained that while CIA believes that al- Libi fabricated
information, the CIA cannot determine whether, or what portions of, the
original statements or the later recants are true or fa1se.166
- (U)
Intelligence gathered after the war has led analysts to doubt that Mohamed
Atta had ` meetings with Iraq officials in the Czech Republic. According
to the Committee’s prior report, "Postwar findings support CIA’s
January 2003 assessment, which judged that ‘the most reliable reporting
casts doubt’ on one of the leads, an alleged meeting between Muhammad
Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague, and confirm that no such
meeting occurred."l67 M6 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s
WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar
Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report
109-331, September 8, 2006, 108. 167 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism,
January 2003, as quoted and described in Report on Postwar Findings About
Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With
Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report
109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 72
page 72
- VIII. Intent • "And containment is not possible when dictators
obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with
terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United
States." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee,
August 26, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and
gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To
assume this regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the
peace of the world in a reckless gamble." - President George W Bush,
Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 •
"In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and
building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest
fear is that terrorists will frnd a shortcut to their mad ambitions when
an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive
scale. In one place — in one regime — we frnd all these dangers, in
their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive
threat the United Nations was born to con’rront." - President
George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September
12, 2002 • "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a
biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual
terrorists." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7,
2002 • "Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final
proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7 2002
• "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to
terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m
convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President George W
Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "With nuclear arms or a
full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could
resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly
havoc in that region." - President George W Bush, State of the Union
Address, January 29, 2003 • "Evidence from intelligence sources,
secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that
Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaida.
Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden
weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." - President
George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "Some
believe, some claim these contacts do not add up to much. They say Saddam
Hussein’s secular tyranny and al-Qaida’s religious tyranny do not mix.
I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to
bring Iraq and al-Qaida _ 73
page 73
- together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated
bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al Queda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass
destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the
United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know that
Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is
determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression,
given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his
terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on
those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use
these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a
time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond‘?" -
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security
Council, February 5, 2003
- (U) In major policy speeches the President, the
Vice President and the Secretary of State all discussed Iraq’s
intentions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Both the President and
the Vice President indicated that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share
weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. Vice President’s
Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002)
- (U) In the Vice President’s August
2002 speech on Iraq, he discussed "the case of Saddam Hussein",
and indicated that Saddam was "prepared to share weapons of mass
destruction] with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties
on the United States."166
- (U) At the time of the Vice President’s
speech, the intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein was
prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists. The
intelligence community had previously assessed that Saddam was interested
in acquiring WMD to counter his neighbors’ capabilities, deter hostile
foreign powers (including Israel, Iran, and the US—led Coalition) and as
a means of achieving "regional preemir1ence."
- (U) The
intelligence community had also assessed that Saddam was unlikely to take
actions that he believed would threaten the survival of his regime, and
that he believed hostile actions such as a re-invasion of Kuwait would in
fact threaten his regime’s sru·vival.
- (U) There were few recent
coordinated intelligence assessments regarding Saddam Hussein’s
intentions at the time of the Vice President’s speech. In 1998 the
intelligence community had assessed that "Saddam has three primary,
and interrelated, goals: maintaining power, having sanctions lifted as
soon as possible, and, over the long term, reasserting Iraq’s regional
dominance. . .Saddam is committee to seeing Iraq reemerge as the dominant
power in the region: He is determined to retain elements of his WMD
programs so that he will be able to intimidate Iraq’s neighbors and
deter potential adversaries, such as Iran, Israel, and the United
States".169 166 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW
103'6 National Convention, August 26, 2002. 169 Intelligence Community
Brief, Iraq: Prospects for Confrontation, July 17, 1998. _ 74
page 74
- (U) In 1999 the intelligence community produced a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) entitled Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, which
discussed Saddam’s likely perceptions and intentions. In 2004, the
National Intelligence Council informed the SSCI that the views expressed
in the 1999 NIE were "generally held by the IC until well into 2002
with some views carried over into" an October 2002 NIE on Saddam’s
military intentions and capabilities.17°
- (U) Specifically, the 1999 NIE
noted that: (U) Reading Saddam’s intentions is difficult. He can be
impulsive and deceptive; critical factors in shaping his behavior are
largely hidden from us. . .But there are two fundamental guideposts that
drive our calculus of his actions. First, we judge that Saddam would be
careful not to place his regime’s survival at risk. Second, he probably
believes that a re-invasion of Kuwait would provoke a Coalition response
that could threaten to destroy his regime. `
- (U) ...We judge that Saddam
continues to believe that Iraq needs WMD and long-range missiles to: 1)
counter Israeli and Iranian capabilities. . .; 2) deter military attacks,
including by Coalition forces; 3) achieve regional preeminence.171
- (U) A
separate CIA memorandum on this topic, published in December 2001, stated
that "Saddam sees himself as a pan-Arab leader and views his regime
as the most glorious chapter in Iraqi history. . .His decision-making is
guided by opportunism, distrust for others, a personal need for power, and
the sense that he is an historic figure who must take bold risks to
advance Iraq’s interests. He views state power primarily in military
terms — twice launching wars against his neighbors — and his strategic
aim is to establish Iraq as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf"
President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002)
- (U)
In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General
Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein was a "grave and gathering
danger", and that to assume Saddam’s good faith would be tantamount
to betting "the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a
reckless gamble."
- (U) The President also implied that the Iraqi
regime was dangerous because it might provide weapons of mass destruction
to terrorists ("And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a
shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with
the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one
regime — we find all these dangers .... ").m
- (U) The intelligence
community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in
good faith, and assessments regarding the potential use of WMD were
not based on 170 Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. m
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003,
1999. 172 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United
Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002. _ 75
page 75
- assumptions of good faith. The 1999 NIE on Iraqi military capabilities
noted that it was difficult to gauge Saddam’s intentions, but judged
that he would be careful not to put his regime’s survival at risk.173
-
(U) At the time of the President’s UN speech, the October 2002 NIE was
still being prepared, and was two weeks away from release. While the
document itself was not available at this time, its consistency with the
1999 NIE, and the lack of contradictory assessments in the intervening
four year period, illustrate the continuity of the intelligence community’s
judgments on this topic.
- (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed that
"Saddam’s past actions suggest that a decision to use WMD probably
would come when he feels his personal survival is at stake even after he
has exhausted all political, military and diplomatic options". It
noted that the US would be unlikely to know when Saddam felt that he had
no other options for self-preservation, but pointed out that "Iraq’s
methodical conventional defensive preparations also suggest Saddam thinks
an attack is not immmcmr-."*
- (U) Additionally, the NIE pointed out
that "Iraq’s historical use of CW against Iran and its decision not
to use WMD against Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates that an
opponent’s retaliatory capability is a critical factor in Saddam’s
decisionmal<ing."l75
- (U) The NIE also examined a variety of ways
in which Iraq might conceivably use WMD, and noted that overall "we
have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD."l76
President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002)
- (U) The President
spoke further on Iraqi intentions during his speech on Iraq in Cincinnati,
where he said that "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a
biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual
terrorists." In discussing Iraq’s alleged nuclear program, he
stated that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the
final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud." Finally, he concluded that "we could wait and hope that
Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to
blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all
evidence."m
- (U) While the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq
possessed chemical and biological weapons, it judged that Saddam was
unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that
time. According to the NIE, "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a
line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW
against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement
would provide Washington a stronger case for making war."m 173
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003,
1999. 1;; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs
for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H6 iii 177 White House
Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 178
National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons
of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 76
-
-
 Harold
Rhode
page 76
- (U) The NIE concluded that Iraq would be more likely to conduct a
terrorist-style attack on the US if Saddam perceived that the US could not
be deterred from invading Iraq and destroying his regime. It assessed that
if he made such a decision, Saddam would be most likely to rely on Iraqi
intelligence officers under his command. It considered the possibility of
Saddam employing an outside terrorist group to assist in such an attack,
and concluded that this "extreme step" was conceivable if Saddam
were "sufticiently desperate" and seeking a "last chance to
exact vengeance." The NIE also noted that "although Saddam has
not endorsed al-Qaida’s overall agenda and has been suspicious of
Islamist movements in general, apparently he has not been averse to some
contacts with the organization." The NIE stated that the intelligence
community had low confidence in its own ability to assess when Saddam
might use WMD and whether he would engage in clandestine attacks on the US
homeland}79
- (U) As discussed elsewhere in this report, in October 2002
most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear
weapons program. The State Department’s Office of Intelligence and
Research (State/INR) believed that Saddam Hussein wanted to possess
nuclear weapons, and was maintaining some capabilities with dual uses, but
judged that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling
case for reconstitution."18° President’s State of the Union
Address (January 29, 2003)
- (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the
Union Address, he said that Saddam Hussein "could provide one of his
hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." He
also stated that Saddam had "ambitions of conquest in the Middle
East" that he could resume if he had "nuclear arms or a full
arsenal of chemical and biological weapons".l8l
- (U) As discussed, the
October 2002 NIE judged that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to conduct
terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. More
generally, it suggested that Saddam would probably decide to use WMD only
if he felt he had no other options for survival and that "an opponent’s
retaliatory capability" would be a key factor in making this
decision}82
- (U) A November 2002 NIE on nontraditional threats restated the
October NIE’s assessment about Saddam’s willingness, if
"suff1ciently desperate" to employ an outside terrorist group to
conduct an attack on the US as his "last chance for vengeance."
This NIE included the caveats U *79 mid. 180 Ibid. As discussed in a
previous Committee report (Senate Report 109-331) the Director of Central
Intelligence also released a public statement regarding the President’s
speech. This statement did not specifically address the possibility of
Saddam providing WMD to terrorists, but said "There is no
inconsistency between our view of Saddam’s growing threat and the view
as expressed by the President in his speech. Although we think the chances
of Saddam initializing a WMD attack are low — in part because it would
constitute an admission that the sic] possesses WMD — there is no
question that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD against the United States
or our allies in the region grows as his arsenal continues to build."
I; E/hiite House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union
", January 28, 2003. 1 . _ 77
page 77
- that the intelligence community had low confidence in these
assessments, and that "IN`R believes that the intelligence community
has no reporting to support this assertion."183
- (U) The October 2002
NIE’s conclusions were essentially repeated again in a January 2003
Intelligence Community Assessment which said that "Saddam probably
will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing Washington with
justification to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow,
especially if he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is '
inent."184
- (U) Neither of these reports specifically focused on what
Saddam might do if he had nuclear weapons or a "full arsenal" of
chemical and biological weapons, possibly because the intelligence
community believed that Iraq was still years away from possessing either
of these. Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council
(February 5, 2003)
- (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 2003 address
to the United Nations Security Council, he stated that "arnbition and
hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together", and that
"al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on
weapons of mass destruction."185
- (U) The intelligence community did
not assess that Iraq and al Qaida had a cooperative relationship. In
June 2002 the CIA wrote that "in contrast to the traditional patron—client
relationship Iraq enjoys with secular Palestinian groups, the ties between
Saddam and bin Laden appear much like those between rival intelligence
services, with each trying to exploit the other for its own benefit."186
While there was evidence of limited contacts throughout the 1990s, the CIA
did not assess that these contacts added up to an established, cooperative
relationship. In a January 2003 report the CIA noted that the Iraqi regime
and al-Qaida shared mutual enemies, and that several reports of varying
reliability mentioned "the involvement of Iraq or Iraqi nationals in
al-Qaida’s efforts to obtain CBW chemical and biological weapons]
training. However, the same report also assessed that "Saddam Husayn
and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural partners", and stated
that while there was little specific intelligence about Saddam’s opinion
of al-Qaida, "his record suggests that any such ties would be rooted
in deep suspicion."187
- (U) The Committee is also aware of
intelligence provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which echoed
these assessments.
- (U) As discussed, the October 2002 NIE assessed that
Saddam Hussein was unwilling to provide weapons of mass destruction to
terrorist groups at that time, because he did not want to put his 183
National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland
Through 2007, November 2002 H4 Intelligence Community Assessment, Key
Warnings for 2003, January 2003. 185 White House Transcript, US. Secretary
of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003.
186 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June
21, 2002. H7 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 29, 2003. The Iraqi
regime’s possible links to terrorist groups are discussed in the
Terrorism section of this report. _ 78
page 78
- regime’s survival at risk. It noted that information on possible
training of terrorists was "second hand, or from sources of varying
reliability."188 Additional Statements • "And as I have said
repeatedly, Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to use a terrorist
network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind." —
President George W Bush, Remarks with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair,
January 31, 2003 • "Every world leader that comes to see me, I
explain our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements
that it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the
past; a nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not
afraid to use them." — President George W Bush, Press Conference,
March 13, 2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam
Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is
amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies and
against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions
will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors;
confrontations that will involve both the weapons that he has today and
the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth." — Vice
President Dick Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War,
San Antonio, Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "But we should be just as
concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has
these weapons. They’re simpler to deliver and even more readily
transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them
without Iraq’s fingerprints." — Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Testimony before the HASC September 18, 2002 • "There are
a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction -- Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Syria to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses
a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the
stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq."
— Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "We do know that the Iraqi
regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction,
and we do know they’re currently pursuing nuclear weapons, that they
have a proven willingness to use those weapons at their disposal and that
they’ve proven an aspiration to seize the territory of and threaten
their neighbors, proven support for and cooperation with terrorist
networks and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric
against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all." —
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, September 18, 2002 188 National Intelligence Estimate,
Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October
2002. _ 79
page 79
- _ • "He’s hostile to our country. Because we have denied him
the ability he has fought to impose his will on his neighbors, he has said
in no uncertain terms that he would use weapons of mass destruction
against the United States. He has at this moment stockpiles of chemical
and biological weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Testimony before the 1:L4SC, September 18, 2002 • "There are ways
Iraq can easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. For example, they
could give biological weapons to terrorist networks to attack the United
States from within and then deny any knowledge. Suicide bombers are not
deterrable." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 •
"Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his
responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to terrorists
would be an effective way of doing so." — Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
September 19, 2002 • "We now see that a proven menace like Saddam
Hussein, in possession of weapons of mass destruction, could empower a few
terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people." — Secretary of
State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House Committee on International
Relations, September 19, 2002 • "Every month that goes by, his WMD
programs are progressing and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the
capability to strike our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage
to blackmail." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Prepared
Testimony before the SASCZ September 19, 2002 • "Al Qa’ ida
hides, Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert.
The danger is, is that al Qa’ida becomes an extension of Sadda1n’s
madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass
destruction around the world... Y]ou can’t distinguish between al Qa’ida
and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror." — President
George W Bush, Remarks with Columbian President Uribe, September 25, 2002
• "Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime
gives anthrax or VX -- nerve gas -- or some day a nuclear weapon to a
terrorist ally." —- President George W Bush, Remarks in the Rose
Garden with Congressional Leaders, September 26, 2002 • "We know
that the Iraqi regime is led by a dangerous and brutal man. We know he is
actively seeking the destructive technologies to match his hatred. And we
know that he must be stopped. The dangers we face will only worsen from
month to month and year to year. To ignore these threats is to encourage
them -— and when they have fully materialized, it may be too late to
protect ourselves and our allies. By then, the Iraqi dictator will have
had the means to terrorize and dominate the region, and each passing day
could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas
or 80
page 80
- _ someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group." — President
George W Bush, Radio Address, September 28, 2002 • "The danger to
America from the Iraqi regime is grave and growing. The regime is guilty
of beginning two wars. It has a horrible history of striking without
warning. In deiiance of pledges to the United Nations, Iraq has stockpiled
biological and chemical weapons and is rebuilding the facilities used to
make more of those weapons. Saddam Hussein has used these weapons of death
against innocent Iraqi people, and we have every reason to believe he will
use them again. Iraq has longstanding ties to terrorist groups which are
capable of, and willing to, deliver weapons of mass death." —
President George W Bush, Radio Address, October 5, 2002 • "Indeed,
the more time passes the more time Saddam Hussein has to develop his
deadly weapor1s and to acquire more. The more time he has to plant sleeper
agents in the United States and other friendly countries or to supply
deadly weapons to terrorists he can then disown, the greater the danger.
The notion that we can wait until the threat is imminent assumes that we
will know when it is imminent." — Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, Remarks at Fletcher Conference, October 16, 2002 •
"After September the llth, we’ve entered into a new era and a new
war. This is a man that we know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This
is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qa’ida as a forward
anny." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Dearborn, Michigan,
October 14, 2002 • "His regime has had high-level contacts with al
Qa’ida going back a decade and has provided training to al Qa’ida
terrorists. And as the President has said, ‘Iraq could decide on any
given day to provide biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group
or to individual terrorists’ -- which is why the war on terror will not
be won till Iraq is completely and verifiably deprived of weapons of mass
destruction." — Woe President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the Air
National Guard Conference, December 2, 2002 • "He has weapons of
mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which pose a direct
threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends and
allies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists,
January 21, 2003 • "The more we wait, the more chance there is for
this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida,
more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these
weapons again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the
World Economic Forum, January 26 2003 • "Saddam Hussein’s pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave danger —· not only to his
neighbors, but also to the United States. His regime aids and protects
terrorists, including members of al Qa’ida. He could decide secretly to
provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against us. And
as the President said on Tuesday night, it would take just one vial, one
canister, one crate to bring a day of horror to our 81
page 81
- nation unlike any we have ever known." —
Vice President Dick
Cheney, Remarks to the Conservative PAC January 30, 2003 • "I
believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to the American people. I believe he’s
a threat to the neighborhood in which he lives. And I’ve got a good
evidence to believe that. He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has
used weapons of mass destruction in his neighborhood and on his own
people. He’s invaded countries in his neighborhood. He tortures his own
people. He’s a murderer. He has trained and financed A1 Qaida-type
organizations before -- A1 Qaida and other terrorist organizations."
— President George W Bush, News Confrence, March 6, 2003 • " The
Iraqi regime] has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And Iraq] has
aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qa’ida.
The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear
weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their
stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent
people in our country or any other." — President George W Bush,
Address to the Nation, March 1 7, 2003
- (U) The above statements are all
consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. Conclusions (
- (U)
Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and the Vice President
indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass
destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were
contradicted by available intelligence information. The October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Saddam Hussein did not have
nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks the US
using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part
because he feared that doing so would give the US a stronger case for war
with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by both earlier and later intelligence
community assessments. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam’s
intentions was quite difficult, and most suggested that he would be more
likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a US invasion was imminent.
Postwar Findings (U) Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was
distrustful of al-Qaida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his
regime, and refused all requests from al-Qaida to provide material or
operational support. No postwar information indicates that Saddam ever
considered using any terrorist group to attack the United States. (U) In
2004, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Saddam had aspired to rebuild
weapons of mass destruction capabilities if and when international
sanctions ended, but that the Iraqi regime had no strategy or plan for the
eventual revival of such capabilities. _ 82
page 82
- (U) The Iraq Survey Group also concluded that Saddam and his advisors
had judged that a US invasion was the greatest potential threat to regime
survival, but that Saddam believed that such an invasion was very
unlikely. According to the Survey Group’s findings, Saddam’s military
policies were based primarily on his desire to deter neighboring countries
— particularly Iran — from taking direct military action against him.
189 189 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and
Links to Terrorism and How Hey Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8,
2006. _ 83
page 83
- _ IX. Post-War Iraq • "Regime change in Iraq would bring about a
number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are
eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to
promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of
the Arab ‘street,’ the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami
predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘sure
to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the
Americans.’ - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August
26, 2002 • "With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation
once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has
unlimited potential for a peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal would be
an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic
and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic and
religious group are recognized and protected. In that troubled land all
who seek justice, and dignity, and the chance to live their own lives, can
know they have a friend and ally in the United States of America." -
Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 •
"The lives of Iraqi citizens would improve dramatically if Saddam
Hussein were no longer in power, just as the lives of Afghanistan’s
citizens improved after the Taliban." - President George W Bush,
Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Iraq is a land rich in
culture, resources, and talent. Free from the weight of oppression, Iraq’s
people will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time.
If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will
help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions
of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.” - President
George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 Intelligence
- (U) The
Committee summarized and analyzed the intelligence products written
between April 19, 1999 and the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom on
March 19, 2003 in its previous report, Prewar Intelligence Assessments
About Postwar Iraq. 190 The Committee received dozens of all- source
intelligence reports as part of this review. As described in that report,
two Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) provided the best snapshots
of the IC’s views on postwar Iraq. Both were produced in January 2003,
and thus are not applicable in determining whether statements made in
August and October of 2002 were substantiated by the intelligence
information.
- (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced two briefing
presentations in April 2002 that discussed the challenges that could arise
for US military and coalition forces in the Phase IV post-combat phase of
the war plan for Iraq.l9l The Erst DIA briefing assessed that the Iraqi
190 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Prewar Intelligence
Assessments About Postwar Iraq, May 31, 2007. An unclassified copy of this
report can be found at http://intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf 191 DIA,
Knowledge of Iraqi Society: Policymaker Need for Insight and Looking at
Post-Saddam Iraq, April 2002. 84
page 84
- _ Baath Party "will attempt to return by any means necessa.ry"
that "large portions of the population will remain intirnidated,"
and that the "Iraqi populace will adopt an ambivalent attitude toward
liberation." The briefing also assessed that "Significant force
protection threats will emerge from the Baathists, the Jihadists and Arab
nationalists who oppose any US occupation of Iraq."192
- (U) The second
DIA briefing noted that "managing rivalries will be a major challenge
to the new regime." DIA assessed that most seams and fissures will
remain, but should be manageable and noted that most rivalries are
intra-communal, not between ethnic or religious groups." It also
outlined that potential post-war challenges that included,
"preventing Kurdish separation, eradicating terrorists in Ansar area,
managing inter-ethnic/tribal violence, gaining control of the regime’s
geographic power base, and accounting for WMD."193
- (U) In August
2002, the CIA produced a report, Can Iraq Ever Become A Democracy? , at
the request of the National Security Council. In the report’s scope
note, the CIA stated that: "This assessment fully accepts that
traditional Iraqi political culture has been inhospitable to democracy.
Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to explore, in a necessarily
initial and speculative fashion, to what extent post-Saddam Iraq might
possess some democratic building blocks, and under what circumstances
these blocks might be used to construct a democratic government in post-Saddarn
Iraq."194
- (U) The report stated that, "On the surface, Iraq
currently appears to lack both the socio- economic and politico—cultural
prerequisites that political scientists generally regard as necessary to
nurture democracy. Nevertheless, we believe that Iraq has several
advantages that, if buttressed by the West, could foster democracy in
post-Saddam Iraq."195 The advantages cited I by the report included
the return of exiled elites, a weak tradition of political Islam, near-
universal revulsion against Saddarn’s dictatorship, and economic
resources. The report emphasized that "None of these factors should
be seen as minimizing the obstacles to democratization in Iraq after
Saddam."196
- (U) The CIA also pointed to Iraqi Kurdistan as a
potential model for democratic development in the rest of Iraq. The report
noted, for example, that "Iraqi Kurdistan has become one of the more
democratic regions in the Middle East. In 1991 it was as badly off—both
economically and from the viewpoint of political culture and history—as
the rest of Iraq would likely be should Saddam be defeated."197
- (U)
The report noted such "words of caution" as "we are
uncertain how rapidly Iraq. .. can recover from the massive socio-economic
and political damage inflicted by Saddam, especially since 1991 ."
The report assessed that without "long-term, active US/Western
military, political, *9* ibid *99 ibid 194 CIA, Can Iraq Ever Become a
Dem0cracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv. *99 1b1d,p. *99 1b1d,p. 111 *9*
ibid, p. 1 85
page 85
- and economic involvement with the country" the chance of achieving
even "the partial democratic successes of, for example, Iraqi
Kurdistan to be poor." 19
- (U) The report assessed that, "In
theory, Iraq should be better placed than its current dire economic
statistics and dictatorial government suggest to recuperate lost ground and
forge a more modern society once Saddam is toppled. It is also possible,
however, that Saddam’s rule has damaged the Iraqi body politic and set
back Iraqi socio-economic development in more severe ways that will
require many more years to overcome. We simply cannot know until the
dictator is gone." 199
- (U) The CIA wrote a second August 2002
intelligence assessment in response to tasking by the National Security
Council. This report, The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative
Consequences of Invading Iraq, was intended to set forth worst—case
scenarios that might emerge from US-led regime change in Iraq. The scope
note stated that the "spirit of the paper reaches beyond what we
normally would assess as plausible" and that the report was intended
to "look at a number of situations that, when taken separately or
together, could complicate US efforts in a campaign against Iraq."
The negative consequences highlighted in the paper were: anarchy and
territorial breakup in Iraq; instability in key Arab states; a surge of
global terrorism and deepening Islamic antipathy toward the United States;
major oil supply disruptions; and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance.
-
(U) In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council published a
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), entitled Saddam ’s Preparations
for War: Intentions and Capabilities.2°° While not the central focus of
the NIE, it did note that ". . .US and Coalition forces will face
enormous requirements to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians.
If Saddam adopted a scorched earth policy — and some intelligence
reporting suggests he will- advancing forces will be confronted with
large-scale destruction of oil and power facilities, the contamination of
food supplies and other potential environmental devastation."2°1
Additional Statements • "Now, I think things have gotten so bad
inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we
will, in fact, be greeted as liberators." - Vice President Richard
Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • MR. RUSSERT: If your analysis
is not correct, and we’re not treated as liberators, but as conquerors,
and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the
American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with
significant American casualties? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: Well, I don’t
think it’s likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe
that we will be greeted as liberators. - Vice President Richard Cheney,
Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. 198 Ibid, pp. i - iv. 199 CIA, Can Iraq
Ever Become a Democracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i- iv. 200 NIC, Saddam ’s
Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities, October 2002, p i 201
NIC, Saddam ’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities,
October 2002, p i _ 86
page 86
- • MR. RUSSERT: Every analysis said this war itself would cost about
$80 billion, recovery of Baghdad, perhaps of Iraq, about $10 billion per
year. We should expect as American citizens that this would cost at least
$100 billion for a two-year involvement. VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: I can’t
say that, Tim. There are estimates out there. It’s important, though, to
recognize that we’ve got a different set of circumstances than we’ve
had in Afghanistan. . .. In Iraq you’ve got a nation that’s got the
second-largest oil reserves in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia. It
will generate billions of dollars a year in cash flow if they get back to
their production of roughly three million barrels of oil a day, in the
relatively near future. - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press,
March I 6, 2003. • ". .. The point is this is not a nation without
resources, and when it comes time to rebuild and to make the kinds of
investments that are going to be required to give them a shot at achieving
a truly representative government, a successful government, a government
that
can defend itself and protect its territorial integrity and look to the
interests of its people, Iraq starts with significant advantages. It’s
got a well-trained middle class, a highly literate work force, a high
degree of technical sophistication. This is a country that I think, but
for the rule of Saddam Hussein and his brutality and his diversion of the
nation’s resources and his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, can
be one of the leading, perhaps the leading state in that part of the
world in terms of developing a modem state and the kind of lifestyle that
its people are entitled to." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet
the Press, March I 6, 2003. • MR. RUSSERT: And you are convinced the
Kurds, the Sunnis, the Shiites will come together in a democracy? VICE
PRESIDENT CHENEY: They have so far. One of the things that many people
forget is that the Kurds in the north have been operating now for over 10
years under a sort of U.S.—provided umbrella with respect to the no-ily
zone, and they have established a very strong, viable society with
elements of democracy and important part of it. . .. - Vice President
Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • ". .. I think
the prospects of being able to achieve this kind of success, if you will,
from a political standpoint, are better than they would be for virtually
any other country in under similar circumstances in that part of the
world." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6,
2003.
- (U) These statements were made roughly five months later than the
statements in the major I speeches described above, and the intelligence
community had written several intelligence products in the intervening
period. In particular, the National Intelligence Council had produced two
coordinated Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) in January 2003 as
described above. A redacted copy of both reports can be found as
appendices in the Committee’s report, Prewar Intelligence Assessments
About Postwar Iraq.
- (U) In the first ICA, entitled Regional Consequences
of Regime Change in Iraq, the Intelligence Community analyzed the
"most important political, economic, and social consequences of _ 87
page 87
-
- regime change in Iraq .... "202 The second ICA, Principal
Challenges in P0st—Saddam Iraq, examined "the internal dynamics of
Iraq that will frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the
regime of Saddam Hussein."203
- (U) The two lCA’s did not directly
assess whether U.S. personnel would be "greeted as liberators,"
but did address underlying factors that would likely shape Iraqi’s
views. The Committee’s May 2007 summarized the assessments in the two
January 2003 reports. These prewar assessments were that: • Establishing
a stable democratic government in postwar Iraq would be a long, difficult
and probably turbulent challenge. • Iraq was a deeply divided society
that likely would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power
prevented it. • The Iraqi government would have to walk a fine line
between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam’s police, security, and
intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce nationwide
peace. • Iraq’s large petroleum resources would make economic
reconstruction a less difficult challenge than political transformation,
but that postwar Iraq would nonetheless face significant economic
challenges. • The new Iraqi government would require significant outside
assistance to rebuild Iraq’s water and sanitation infrastructure.
Conclusions
- (U) Conclusion 16: Statements by President Bush and Vice
President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the
political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and
uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products. There were
relatively few intelligence products on this subject prior to January
2003, and senior policymakers did not request them. The Committee
recognizes that there were many other sources of information available to
policymakers that would inform their views about post-war Iraq. The
Committee did not explore these other sources as it is beyond the scope of
this report. 202 National Intelligence Council, Regional Consequences of
Regime Change in Iraq, January 2003. 203 National Intelligence Council,
Princzpal Challenges in P0st-Saddam Iraq, January 2003. 88
page 88
- ADDITIONAL Views or Chairman John D.
Rockefeller IV On April 1,
2008, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved on a bipartisan
vote of l0-5 the remaining two reports of its investigation into pre-war
intelligence on Iraq and related matters. The first Committee report
evaluates whether the public statements of senior United States government
officials
leading up to the war were substantiated by underlying intelligence
information. The second report, building on previous work done by the
Committee and the Department of Defense (DoD) inspector General, further
details the intelligence activities of Defense Department policy officials
conducted outside the Intelligence Community. These two reports are part
of a second phase of the Iraq investigation authorized unanimously by the
Committee on February 12, 2004. in undertaking these additional lines of
inquiry, the Committee acted to tell the complete story of how
intelligence was not only collected and analyzed prior to the Iraq
invasion but how it was publicly used in authoritative statements made by
the highest officials of the Bush Administration in furtherance of its
policy to overthrow Saddam Hussein. For three years, the Committee’s
investigative mandate foundered. Under the direction of the then-majority,
the Committee failed to show the same disciplined and objective oversight
it demonstrated in producing its July 2004 report on the Intelligence
Community’s pre-war intelligence assessments on Iraq. Committee Chairman
Pat Roberts halted the investigation on the intelligence activities of the
Defense Department officials and farmed out the work to the DoD inspector
General in November 2005. The public statements section of the
investigation was slow-walked and a draii report was never presented to
the Committee membership prior to the change in the Senate majority in
2007, evidently a task too politically sensitive to handle. Upon assuming
the Committee chairmanship, I directed that work be restarted on the
remaining sections of the investigation (another report on pre-war
assessments on post-war Iraq was approved by the Committee and released in
May 2007). Soon thereafter, on February 9, 2007, the DoD inspector General
issued its own report reviewing the activities of DoD policy officials
prior to the war. The Inspector General’s report, based on extensive
interviews and a thorough review of documents, concluded that the policy
office in the Pentagon had expanded its role and mission from formulating
policy and had inappropriately disseminated an alternative analysis
drawing a link between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorists who carried out
the attacks on September llth that the Intelligence Community was unable
to substantiate. The Committee uncovered this attempt by DoD policy
officials to shape and politicize intelligence in order to bolster the
Administration’s policy of invasion in its July 2004 report. After the
release of the February 2007 DoD inspector General report, Vice Chairman
Christopher "Kit" Bond wrote me urging that the Committee not
finish the investigation of the Pentagon policy office it officially
authorized three years earlier. As a concession to the Vice Chairman’s
request, I agreed to not revisit the same events examined in the inspector
General 89
page 89
- report, but rather to restart a portion of the Committee’s
suspended Pentagon investigation unexamined by the Inspector General:
clandestine meetings in Rome and Paris between DoD policy officials and
Iranians in 2001 and 2003, facilitated by Manucher Ghorbanifar, the
Iranian exile and fabricator implicated in the 1986 Iran—Contra scandal,
in which intelligence was collected but kept from the Intelligence
Community. The Committee began examining the circumstances surrounding
these meetings in 2003 based on an agreement between Chairman Roberts and
me (serving then as Vice Chairman) pursuant to the original terms of
reference of the Committee’s investigation. We agreed at the time that
while these meetings concerned Iran and not Iraq, it was important
nevertheless to fully understand how the meetings came to be, what was
discussed and proffered at them, and why they were not handled in normal
diplomatic or intelligence channels. These were matters of fundamental,
statutorily-mandated congressional oversight that the Committee was not at
liberty to ignore. The resulting report is based on interviews of numerous
Administration officials, including those Pentagon officials attending the
Rome and Paris meetings, and a careful examination of hundreds of pages of
documentation, including cable traffic, meeting notes, and an internal DoD
review concerning the propriety of the meetings. Whereas the Committee’s
2004 report presented evidence that the DoD policy office attempted to
shape the CIA’s terrorism analysis in late 2002 and, when it failed,
prepared an altemative intelligence analysis denigrating the CIA for not
embracing a link between Iraq and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the most
recent report shows that the rogue actions of the office were not
isolated. The Committee’s findings paint a disturbing picture of
Pentagon policy officials who were distrustful of the Intelligence
Community and undertook the collection of sensitive intelligence without
coordinating their activities or reporting the information they collected
through proper channels. The actions of DoD officials to blindly disregard
the red flags over the role played by Mr. Ghorbanifar in these meetings
and to wall—off the Intelligence Community from its activities and the
information it obtained were improper and demonstrated a fundamental
disdain for the Intelligence Community’s role in vetting sensitive
sources. In preparing its report on public statements made by U.S.
government officials prior to the war, the Committee decided to
concentrate its analysis on those statements that were central to the
debate in 2002-2003 over the decision to go to war. The Committee
identified five major policy speeches made by President George W. Bush,
Vice President Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell during
this period as the most significant expressions of how the Bush
Administration communicated intelligence judgments to the American people,
the United States Congress, and the international community. Additional
statements made by senior Administration officials during this time frame
containing assertions not included in the five major policy speeches were
examined as well. _ 90
page 90
- The Committee decided not to consider public statements made prior to
the summer of 2002 in its review or those made by lower level Executive
Branch officials. They were not deemed to be as central to the lead-up to
war in Iraq. Statements made by members of Congress also were not
evaluated. A bipartisan majority of the Committee agreed that these
statements do not carry the same weight of authority as statements made by
the President and others in the Executive Branch who are charged with
representing the views of the U.S. government in a State of the Union
Address viewed by 50 million Americans or in a speech before the United
Nations. In addition, members of Congress did not have the same ready
access to intelligence as senior Executive Branch policymakers. As the
Committee’s 2004 Iraq report highlights, it took requests by members of
the Committee to the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in
September 2002 for the Intelligence Community to produce its National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
programs. The hastily produced NIE was not published until October 2002,
mere days before Congress was scheduled to vote on the resolution to
authorize the use of force in Iraq. By this time, the Administration had
made repeated public assertions regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction and links to terrorism as a predicate for the pre-emptive use
of military force that would soon follow. The Committee carefully examined
these public statements against the intelligence products distributed by
the Intelligence Community at the time of the statement. The report’s
conclusions highlight which statements were substantiated by the
intelligence reporting and which statements were not. The Committee’s
findings are fair and objective. In those instances where a statement is
not substantiated by the intelligence, the Committee renders no judgment
as to why. As the report details, Administration statements prior to the
war often reflected the reporting of the Intelligence Community, even when
the judgments underlying the reporting were based on flawed analysis or
false information. However, senior Administration officials repeatedly
spoke in declarative and unequivocal terms about Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction programs and support for terrorists. These declarative
statements were not substantiated. In the push to rally public support for
the invasion of Iraq, Administration officials often failed to accurately
portray what was known, what was not known, and what was suspected about
Iraq and the threat it represented to our national security. The report
documents significant instances in which the Administration went beyond
what the Intelligence Community knew or believed in making public claims,
most notably on the V false assertion that Iraq and al-Qaeda had an
operational partnership and joint involvement in carrying out the attacks
of September llth. The President and his advisors undertook a relentless
public campaign in the aftermath of the attacks to use the war against al-Qaida
as a justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Representing to the
American people that the two had an operational partnership and posed a
single, indistinguishable threat was fundamentally misleading and led the
Nation to war on false premises. The Committee also found instances where
a public statement selectively used that intelligence information which
supported a particular policy viewpoint while ignoring 91
page 91
- contradictory information that weakened the position. While on its
face, a statement may have been accurate, it nevertheless presented a
slanted picture to those who were unaware of the hidden intelligence. The
Administration’s misuse of intelligence prior to the war was aided by
the selective declassification of intelligence reporting. The Executive
Branch historically exercises the prerogative to classify information in
order to protect national security and, unlike Congress, it can declassify
information unilaterally and with ease. The Administration exploited this
declassification authority in the lead up to the war and disclosed
intelligence at a time and in a manner of its choosing with impunity,
knowing that others attempting to disclose additional details that might
provide balance or improve accuracy would be prevented from doing so under
the threat of prosecution. This unlevel playing field allowed senior
officials to disclose and discuss sensitive intelligence reports when it
supported the Administration’s policy objectives and keep out of the
public discourse information which did not. The canon of the Committee’s
Iraq investigation - a series of six reports issued over a four-year
period — demonstrates why congressional oversight is essential in
evaluating America’s intelligence collection and analytic activities.
During the course of its investigation, the Committee uncovered that the
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s alleged weapons of
mass destruction was based on stale, fragmentary, and speculative
intelligence reports and replete with unsupported judgments. Troubling
incidents were reported in which internal dissent and warnings about the
veracity of intelligence on Iraq were ignored in the rush to war. The
Committee’s investigation also revealed how the Administration
policymakers applied pressure on intelligence analysts prior to the war to
support a link between Iraq and those terrorists responsible for the
attacks of September llth that did not exist. Our investigation detailed
how the Iraqi National Congress attempted to influence United States
policy on Iraq by providing false information through defectors directed
at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction and had links to terrorists, and how this false information
was embraced despite warnings of fabrication. The Committee’s
investigation also documented for the public how the Administration
ignored the pre-war judgments of the Intelligence Community that the
invasion of Iraq would destabilize security in-country and provide al-Qaida
with an opportunity to exploit the situation and increase attacks against
United States forces during and after the war. After tive years and the
loss of over 4,000 American lives, these ignored judgments were tragically
prescient. Overall, the findings and conclusions of the Committee’s Iraq
investigation were an important catalyst in bringing about subsequent
legislative and administrative reforms of the Intelligence Community
designed to learn from these painful lessons of the past. Finally, I am
disappointed that Vice Chairman Bond was unable to support the issuance of
these two remaining reports. From when the initial drafts of both reports
were presented to 92
page 92
- Committee members on January 15, 2008, to their adoption two and a half
months later, every effort was made to accommodate changes proposed by all
members. In the end, the Vice Chairman was the only Committee member to
file amendments seeking further revision to the report. Of the over 170
amendments he filed, the Committee was able to accept or resolve more than
half. By the time the reports were adopted on April lst, they reflected
over 300 changes made at the request of the Vice Chairman. The Vice
Chairman’s remaining amendments were requested changes that would have
gutted the reports’ conclusions, changed the factual underpinnings of
the investigation, and significantly delayed completion of the
long-overdue reports. When the Vice Chairman repeatedly refused my request
at the April lst meeting that he call up those remaining amendments he
wanted considered and voted on, the Committee, on a bipartisan basis,
voted 10-5 to approve and release the final installments of the Committee’s
investigation. _ Conmacrion Sunrvnrrian BY CHAIRMAN J orm D. ROCKEFELLER
IV _ An error appears on page 8 of the report on public statements. An
additional sentence should be included in the paragraph discussing the
views of the National Ground Intelligence Center, so that it reads:
"A later memo from State/INR said that ‘the IAEA and - pertinent
technical expert has concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are
not intended for Iraq’s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket
casings. . .’ The memo also stated that ‘l-Iigh-grade aluminum is used
for tactical rockets by a number of countries. Examples identified by DOE.
. .include the United States, Russia (905 x 80mm rockets), and apparently
Switzerland and Italy, whose 81rmn rocket design is assessed to have been
reverse- engineered for the Nasser MLR system’, with the note that ‘DOE
and DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) concur on this
assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on
tactical rockets."’ (U) This correction was not made in the body of
the report due to an objection by the Vice Chairman. J orm D. ROCKEFELLER
IV _ 93
- ADDITIONAL Vnzws or Senator Dianne Feinstein
I applaud the completion of
the Committee’s Phase II investigations. Since the Committee’s first
report in July 2004, we have known that the prewar intelligence on Iraq
was both bad and wrong — it was the result of flawed tradecraft and
produced the inaccurate belief that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction. It has been four years since the Committee began the second
phase of its review. The results are now in. Even though the intelligence
before the war supported inaccurate statements, this Administration
distorted the intelligence in order to build its case to go to war. The
Executive Branch released only those findings that supported the argument,
did not relay uncertainties, and at times made statements beyond what the
intelligence supported. I am pleased that these reports have been
completed and released for the public’s review. We can now tum our full
attention to the present and the future, and making sure the mistakes of
the past are not repeated. DLANN12 FE1Nsr121N _ 94
page 94
- _ ADDITIONAL Vmws or Senator FEINGOLD The Administration, and
particularly President Bush and Vice President Cheney, made repeated
assertions about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein that were not
supported by the intelligence available at the time. Those assertions
overstated the nature and urgency of the threat, as described in the
intelligence, ignored ongoing disagreements and uncertainty within the
Intelligence Community, and, at times, outright contradicted intelligence
assessments. Together, the statements sought to make the case for a war in
Iraq by convincing the American people, first, that Saddam had, might
have, or was on the verge of obtaining a nuclear weapon, and, second, that
Saddam had a relationship with Al Qaeda and would provide Al Qaeda with
weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of attacking the United
States. Even the deeply flawed October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) did not support the claims made by the President and the Vice
President regarding an Iraqi nuclear program. That NIE assessed that Iraq
did not have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that
without sufficient fissile material acquired from abroad, Iraq probably
would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 or 2009. Yet the President
made the following statements: " Saddarn] possesses the world’s
most dangerous weapons" (March 22, 2002); " w]e don’t know
whether or not Saddam] has a nuclear weapon" (December 31, 2002);
and, of course, " i]acing clear evidence of peril, we carmot wait for
the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the forrn of a
mushroom cloud" (October 7, 2002). Meanwhile, Vice President Cheney
insisted that assessments related to Iraq’s nuclear program that were
disputed within the Intelligence Community were known "with absolute
certainty" (September 8, 2002) and through "irrefutable
evidence" (September 20, 2002). And, on the eve of war, after the
IAEA had reported that its inspectors had found "no evidence or
plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq,
the Vice President asserted, " w]e believe Saddam] has, in fact,
reconstituted nuclear weapons" (March 16, 2003). Administration
ofl·icials’ claims of a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda were
even more outlandish. Before the war, the Central Intelligence Agency
assessed that "Saddam has viewed Islamic extremists operating inside
Iraq as a threat," that "Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden are
far from being natural paitners," and that assessments about Iraqi
links to al Qaeda rested on "a body of fragmented, conflicting
reporting from sources of varying reliabi1ity." Moreover, the
Intelligence Commiuiity consistently assessed that Saddam’s use of
weapons of mass destruction against the United States rested on his being
"sufficiently desperate" in the face of a U.S. attack and his
possible desire for a "last chance at vengeance." Yet the
President not only repeatedly suggested an operational relationship
between Iraq and al Qaeda, but asserted that Saddam would provide weapons
of mass destruction to al Qaeda for an unprovoked attack against the
United States: "you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam
when you talk about the war on terror" (September 25, 2002); " e]ach
passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX
— nerve gas — or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally"
(September 26, 2002); " Saddarn] is a man who, in my judgment, would
like to use al Qaeda as a forward army" (October 14, 2002);
" Saddam] is a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda. .. A]
true threat facing our country is that an al Qaeda-type network trained
and armed by Saddam could attack American and not leave one ’ringerprint"
(November 7, 2002); and " t]he danger is clear: using chemical,
biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help _ 95
page 95
- of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill
thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or
any other" (March 17, 2002). Yet, as the Committee report has
concluded, " s]tatements by the President and Vice President
indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass
destruction to terrorist groups against the United States were
contradicted by available intelligence information." Further, " s]tatements
and implications by the President and the Secretary of State suggesting
that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al
Qaeda with weapons training, were not substantiated by the
intelligence." Even statements that Saddam harbored al Qaeda, such as
the President’s assertion that he "aids and protects terrorists,
including members of al Qaeda" (January 28, 2003) were not supported
by the intelligence available at the time. As the CIA acknowledged,
"we lack positive indications that Baghdad is complicit" in the
presence of operatives associated with al Qaeda in Iraq in 2002. These and
other assertions that were contradicted by the available intelligence,
including predictions of a smooth transition to a stable democracy, were
intended to drive the country into a war that has cost thousands of
American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, visited untold misery
on the Iraqi people, and severely damaged our national security.
Administration officials used the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
to justify a war that has not only been waged in a country that had no
connection to the attacks, but has seriously damaged our ability to fight
al Qaeda. In that respect, the President’s statement, on October 2,
2002, that "the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency" was
perhaps most inaccurate of all. In October 2002, and still today, the
threat of unique urgency facing the United States does not come from Iraq,
but from the Afghanistan/Pakistan safe haven and global capabilities of al
Qaeda and its affiliates. Russsu. D. FEINGOLD 96
page 96
- _ ADDITIONAL Vmws or SENATORS HAGEL AND SNowE On February 12, 2004, the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
issued a joint statement regarding the Committee’s Review of Pre-War
Intelligence in Iraq. Specifically, the Chairman and Vice Chairman
announced that the Committee had "unanimously agreed to refine the
terms of reference of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into pre war
intelligence with regard to Iraq." The Chairman expressly stated that
the "resolution adopted unanimously today illustrates the commitment
of all members to a thorough review, to learning the necessary lessons
from our experience with Iraq, and to ensuring that our armed forces and
policymakers benefit from the best and most reliable intelligence that can
be collected. I believe that the report which we are currently reviewing
will have a profound impact on the future of our intelligence
Community." We concurred completely. We also believe that the process
by which the Committee drafted and approved the reports could have been
significantly improved. The Committee took more than four years to review
information of great import. The process was marked by partisan quarrels;
however, we believe that every member had sufficient time to review and
comment on the respective reports. In fact, of the 165 amendments filed to
these reports, over 50% were resolved or withdrawn. Unfortunately, members
never had an opportunity to vote up or down on the remaining amendments.
We endorse the reports as the final chapter of the Committee’s inquiry
into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. However, given the
opportunity to vote, we also would have likely supported some of the
amendments that had been filed, which would have improved the final
product. On balance, these reports contain critical information that
should unequivocally be publicly released, enabling the public to
formulate their own conclusions. These reports in no way preclude the
committee from undertaking additional inquiries ir1to the prewar
intelligence with regard to Iraq. These reports simply bring closure to
the Committee’s review. Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq
Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office
of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy The February l2, 2004 terms of reference of the Com1nittee’s
inquiry mandated that the Committee review "any intelligence
activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism
Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy," (OUSDP) as well as
"other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee’s
review." The Committee began its review of intelligence activities by
the offices reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in
2004, but the effort was suspended in September 2005, when the Committee
requested the Department of Defense Inspector General (`DoD IG) to review
whether the Office of Special Plans, which reported to the OUSDP, "at
any time, conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence
activities." _ 97
page 97
- The DoD IG reviewed whether personnel assigned to the PCTEG, OSP or
OUSDP had conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence
activities from September 2001 through June 2003, completing its report in
February 2007. The IG report concluded that "the Offrce of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated
alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with
the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision makers.
While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were. .
.inappropriate. . . .] This condition occurred because of an expanded
role and mission of the Ofiice of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy from policy formulation to altemative intelligence analysis and
dissemination. As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy did not provide "the most accurate analysis of
intelligence" to senior decision makers." We endorse the DoD IG’s
iinding that the OUSDP personnel’s actions were inappropriate, and,
given the thorough work completed by the DoD IG on this issue, we do not
believe it would serve the public interest to go over the same ground
again. Based on the results of the DoD IG’s review, the Committee
decided to examine intelligence collection activities within the OUSDP,
which had not been included in the DoD IG report. Both reviews demonstrate
that intelligence activities undertaken by the United States Government
should rely on the professional Intelligence Community. We believe it is
important for the American public to be aware of the results of this
inquiry. Whether Public Statements regarding Iraq by U.S. Government
Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information The Committee
unanimously agreed to evaluate "whether public statements and reports
and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the
Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were
substantiated by intelligence information." According to the
Committee report, the "Committee decided to concentrate its analysis
on the statements that were central to the nation’s decision to go to
war," and "specifically, the committee chose to review {ive
major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the
threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi
ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of
Iraq." No amendments were iiled to either strike or revise this
language. The Committee report continued stating that the "speeches
are the best representations of how the Bush Administration communicated
intelligence analysis to the Congress, the American people, and the
international community" and that the speeches "are also fairly
comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular
statement in a speech was substantiated can be extrapolated to cover
similar statements made at similar times." In order to conduct this
review "the Committee assembled hundreds of intelligence reports
produced prior to March 19, 2003 in an effort to understand the state of
intelligence analysis at the time of various speeches and
statements." _ 98
page 98
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AIPAC,
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Common |
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| Millions Worldwide Believe
9/11 Conspiracy Theories |
| Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories Monday, 27 Sep
2010 01:21 PM Article Font Size By: Arnaud De Borchgrave
No sooner did Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggest from the
rostrum of the U.N. General Assembly that most of the world believes the
U.S. government was involved in a 9/11 conspiracy, than 32 nations
followed the U.S. delegation as it walked out.
These were members of NATO, the European Union (21 countries are
members of both), Australia, New Zealand, and Costa Rica.
More importantly, 167 nations didn't budge and went on listening to
the Iranian's incendiary speech.
We keep forgetting that countless millions in the world, including
millions of Americans, have swallowed the monumental canard that the
United States and Israel were part of a conspiracy designed to
legitimize the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.
The first to finger the United States and Israel was Hamid Gul, two
weeks after 9/11, in an interview with this reporter in Islamabad.
Gul, a former head of Pakistani intelligence and notorious
anti-American, added the U.S. Air Force to the conspiracy mix. The
"evidence" he provided was that no U.S. fighter aircraft were scrambled
on 9/11 to intercept the passenger planes that had abandoned their
flight plans.
Gul, a friend of Osama bin Laden dating to the days when they were
allies against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, has yet to explain
what he was doing in Kabul with his Taliban friends for two weeks
immediately preceding 9/11.
More recently, in Cairo, two former Egyptian ambassadors to the
United States told me they believed there was a Mossad-CIA plot designed
to keep Israel and America in lockstep in a war on terror. They pointed
out that when President George W. Bush declared Global War in Terror,
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was the first to sign up.
For the two Egyptians, that validated their suspicions.
There were also bestselling books about the "fact certain conspiracy"
written in both French and German, by different authors, that each sold
a million copies in both countries.
For Gordon Duff, a Vietnam veteran and senior editor of "Veterans
Today" and frequent "self-hating American" guest on radio and TV
stations the world over, there is no doubt he is to the conspiracy
theory born.
"In America," he wrote last week, "groups have been popping up for
years, not 'fringe' types but military and professional organizations,
architects, engineers, pilots, intelligence officers. There is a vast
underground that is never reported, never spoken of in the news and
continually threatened. The FBI and Homeland Security have infiltrated
these groups, illegal surveillance has been on a massive scale and, as
the groups have grown and their reach has touched millions of Americans,
the government, in the usual whispers, is talking about mass arrests,
'unplugging' the Internet, all those things the militia movements of the
'90s said would happen."
Outside of the United States, Duff adds, not in the Middle East, but
Canada, Europe, Latin America, and the Far East, "finding people who
accept the Bush and Obama administration's 'party line' about 'box
cutters and hijackers' is difficult. No one wants to risk the public
scorn of seeming like an imbecile."
more
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Senate Intelligence Phase IIa page 3____________home___archive
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| IIa
110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC
STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED
BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
June _2008. - Ordered to be printed |
|
- Then, importantly, the report acknowledges that the "Committee is
fully aware that officials may have had multiple credible sources of
information upon to which to base statements, but has not attempted to
document or analyze source materials other than intelligence, so that is
beyond the scope of this report.” The report focuses on major
coordinated inter-agency intelligence reports and assessments. The
Committee deemed that these reports were the most "authoritative”
and represented the "full Intelligence Community position.” The
Committee elected to not include "less formal communications between
intelligence agencies and other parts of the Executive Branch” or
reports "from the field.” Although we have repeatedly advocated for
releasing as much information to the public as possible, we agreed that in
this context, basing the report on major coordinated interagency
intelligence reports and assessments, which represent the collective
informed views of the Intelligence Community, was appropriate. Although we
would have likely supported amendments expanding the scope if afforded the
opportunity to vote, the scope and methodology was consistent with the
unanimously agreed to charter, and, therefore, we supported it. In the
event that assessments were referenced in the report and not included or
cited, we would have clearly supported their inclusion. However, these
assessments arguably would not have had a profound impact on the report or
significantly affected the overall conclusions; they would have only
provided context. The report accomplished its primary objective,
unanimously agreed to by the committee: to evaluate "whether public
statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government
officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of
Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.”
CHUCK HAGEL OLYMPIA J. SNowE
page 99
- _ MINORITY Views or Vrcn CnA1mv1AN BOND AND SENATORS CHAMBLISS, Hxrcn,
AND BURR* This majority-only written report by the Senate Intelligence
Committee is a great disappointment to us and an unfortunate commentary on
the political nature of intelligence oversight in the Congress today. We
regret that at a time when the Committee should be focusing its full
attention on improving our intelligence community, closing the gaps in
critical intelligence, and making our country safer, that the Committee
Ends itself again consumed with political gamesmanship. Although we asked
from the beginning of this investigation to be included in it, we were cut
out; although we asked that the Members of the Committee produce the
conclusions on this report, two majority staff were assigned to the task;
and although we had over 50 amendments on the table at our Committee
meeting on this report, we were not allowed to offer any of them. We have
rarely seen such a poorly handled congressional investigation, and we
believe the facts detailed below speak for themselves. Early History In
late 2003 the Democrats first proposed that the Committee expand its
inquiry of intelligence on Iraq into how administration policymakers
"used" intelligence, frankly, we were not sure what they meant.
At the time, it was already becoming clear to the Committee that the
intelligence community’s performance in its estimate of Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction capabilities had been a serious failure. Having heard
many of the statements those policymakers had made, it seemed obvious to
us that they "used" the intelligence on Iraq the same way
policymakers in Congress at the time and policymakers in previous
administrations had: they read it, made decisions based on what they read
(as well as other available information), and they spoke to the American
public about their policies and decisions. Once the Committee’s inquiry
began to reveal that analysts were not "pressured" by the
administration to assess that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and
that, in fact, the intelligence itself was wrong, it appeared that the
Democrats wanted to add a more subjective element into the investigation—how
policymakers "used" intelligence. The reason for this initiative
became clear in November 2003 when the press exposed a memo which outlined
the "plan" by Committee Democrats to explore "vague notions
of use" in order to make the greatest political gain from the
Committee’s Iraq investigation. They intended to "pull the majority
along as far as we can on issues that may lead to new disclosures
regarding improper or questionable conduct by administration
officials." The memo said that "we don’t know what we will End
but our prospects for getting access we seek is far greater when we have
the backing of the majority." The memo also noted that "we can
verbally mention some of the intriguing leads we are pursuing"——presumably
to the press and in violation of the Committee rules. . In spite of this
disturbing revelation that the Democrats were seeking to politicize
deliberately the national security oversight function of the Congress, in
an effort toward bipartisan compromise, in February 2004 the Committee
agreed to examine "whether public * I concur with the Vice Chairman’s
views on the substance of the report as well as the Minority’s
amendments. I am unable to comment on any Phase I or Phase H activities
that preceded my membership on this Committee. 000
page 100
- _ statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S.
Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement
of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information”
as part of a second phase of the Iraq inquiry. Given what we had already
learned, we warned that this could quickly devolve into an unfortunate use
of the Committee’s time and resources, but we were willing to agree to
the compromise nonetheless, confident that any fair inquiry would show
clearly that the statements of administration officials were substantiated
by the intelligence available to them at the time, intelligence that, as
described in the Committee’s unanimous Phase I report, was flawed.
Unfortunately, the report released today confirmed our early suspicions.
The Phase II effort has indeed resulted in a partisan exercise and
requests made by the Democrats of the then- Republican Committee
leadership from 2004 to 2006 for the inquiry itself and for unnecessary
interviews and documents were clearly intended as roadblocks to prevent
the inquiry’s completion and to allow bogus charges of "obstruction”
intended to help the Democrats’ political goals. Ironically, but not
surprisingly, even when the Democrats gained control of the Committee and
were in a position to take their best shot at fashioning a purely partisan
inquiry— specifically by instructing only two majority staffers to
conduct the review, cutting out the minority entirely, twisting the
statements of the policymakers they reviewed, and cherry picking the
intelligence that helped best make their case—the reports essentially
validate what we have been saying all along: that policymakers’
statements were substantiated by the intelligence. As the Committee’s
Phase I report showed, it was the intelligence that was faulty. In the
cases in which the majority concluded that statements were not
substantiated by intelligence or did not convey fully the intelligence
community’s analysis, it is clear that either the words of the
policymakers in question or the body of intelligence available at the time
were distorted in order to make these false charges. We have addressed
each of those cases in the attached amendments in Appendix A (see
amendments 42, 68, 85, 86, 96, 119, 120, and 136) With the partisan
elements of this inquiry now fully exposed, we hope that others will see
why we are so disappointed that Committee time and resources have been
wasted at this critical juncture in our nation’s history. We have not
had an Intelligence Authorization Bill become law in this Congress or the
last Congress, we have not had a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
reform bill become law in this Congress—two badly needed bil1s—both to
improve the functioning of the intelligence community and protect the
nation. Yet, we have been forced to waste countless man-hours to show what
we and the American people already knew four years ago, that policymakers’
statements turned out to be wrong after the war because the statements
were based on flawed intelligence. The Committee’s Phase I report, which
investigated that intelligence failure and explained how it happened, was
a judicious and valuable act of intelligence oversight. Distorting
intelligence and misleading the public, as the current majority report
does, is not. We are also disappointed that in a zealous, but ultimately
failed, attempt to expose alleged "distortions" by the
administration, the majority chose to cover up and distort information
themselves. Specifically, the majority report excludes from consideration
all of the statements made by Members of Congress and the previous
administration that were submitted wl
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page 101
- _ for review by the Republican Members. It also excludes relevant
intelligence information requested for inclusion by Republican Members
including instances ir1 which the Committee knew that specific
policymakers’ statements were fact-checked and approved by intelligence
community agencies. It treats policymakers unfairly by distorting their
words and refusing those individuals the opportunity to respond to what
has been alleged about their statements. Because these issues are our most
serious concerns about this flawed majority report, we address each in
more detail below. Cover-up for Democrats Following the Committee’s
agreement on February l2, 2004, to examine "whether public statements
and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made
between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi
Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information" the Chairman
and Vice Chairman each provided a list of statements their respective
Members wanted examined by the Committee staff. In the reports released
today, only those statements submitted by the Democrats were reviewed. The
Republican Members of the Committee submitted approximately 100 statements
for review. These were statements made by officials in the previous
administration and Members of Congress. Many of our Members believed it
was relevant and important to include those statements, particularly from
Democrats in Congress, to show that during the debate leading up to and
during the authorization of the war in Iraq and during previous efforts to
use force in Iraq, Members of both parties with access to intelligence
information, not just the Republican administration, made very similar
statements about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and
links to terrorism. In our opinion, the statements from most policymakers,
whether or not they supported the decision to go to war in Iraq, were
similar because everyone saw virtually the same intelligence and used that
same intelligence in speeches to explain their own decision—making.
Nuclear In the nuclear area, for example, the majority report’s first
conclusion notes that policymakers’ statements about Iraq’s nuclear
activities were substantiated by intelligence, but the majority concludes
that some statements did not convey disagreements that existed within the
intelligence community. Many Democrats in Congress also discussed Iraq’s
nuclear efforts during the Iraq war debate and in other venues and
similarly did not describe disagreements within the intelligence
community. For example, all of the following statements discussed Iraq’s
efforts to develop nuclear weapons, but none of them noted that there was
a dissent from one of the agencies within the intelligence community.
Conversely, the report is critical of administration officials who did not
discuss this dissent even though the dissent had not even been published
by that agency at the point the statements by the administration officials
were made. The majority apparently believes some policymakers should be
mind-readers. All of the following statements made by Democrats in
Congress were made after the publication of the Iraq WMD NIE in which the
nuclear alternative judgment was published, yet none of them was allowed
to be included in the report. 102
page 102
-
- • In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports
show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological
weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program.
He has also given aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qa’ida
members. — Senator Hillary Clinton, Congressional Record, October 10,
2002. • There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working
aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear
weapons within the next 5 years. He could have it earlier if he is able to
obtain fissile materials on the outside market, which is possible—difiicult
but possible. We also should remember we have always underestimated the
progress that Saddam Hussein has been able to make in the development of
weapons of mass destruction. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional
Record, October 10, 2002. • Saddam Hussein is an evil man, a dictator
who oppresses his people and flouts the mandate of the international
community. While this behavior is reprehensible, it is Hussein’s
vigorous pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and his
present and potential future support for terrorist acts and organizations,
that ma.ke him a terrible danger to the people to the United States.
Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 • There
is no question that Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons and
that he seeks to acquire additional weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons. That is not in debate. Senator Christopher Dodd,
Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • We know that he has chemical
and biological weapons. He has already used them against his neighbors and
his own people, and is trying to build more. We know that he is doing
everything he can to build nuclear weapons, and we know that each day he
gets closer to achieving that goal. Senator John Edwards, Congressional
Record, October 10, 2002. • Almost no one disagrees with these basic
facts: that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a menace; that he has weapons
of mass destruction and that he is doing everything in his power to get
nuclear weapons; that he has supported terrorists; that he is a grave
threat to the region, to vital allies like Israel, and to the United
States; and that he is thwarting the will of the international community
and undermir1ing the United Nations’ credibility. Senator John Edwards,
Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 The following statement from
Senator John Kerry went a step further, claiming that "all U.S.
intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons." In
fact, not "all" intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was
seeking nuclear weapons; as noted in the majority report, one agency
considered the evidence inadequate to reach such a judgment. 103
page 103
- • According to the CIA’s report, all U.S. intelligence experts
agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that
Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons. The more difficult
question to answer is when Iraq could actually achieve this goal. That
depends on is its ability to acquire weapons- grade fissile material. If
Iraq could acquire this material from abroad, the CIA estimates that it
could have a nuclear weapon within 1 year. Senator John Kerry, October 9,
2002. This comment from Senator Durbin, made nearly a year earlier,
actually indicated that I Saddam Hussein had “perhaps even nuclear
weapons" at his disposal. At no time did the intelligence community
assess that Iraq perhaps had nuclear weapons. • When you look at what
Saddam Hussein has at his disposal, in terms of chemical, biological, and
perhaps even nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the threat that he poses to
the region and the fact that he has fomented terrorism throughout his
reign. Senator Dick Durbin, December 21, 2001, Larry King Live. Why were
none of these statements considered worthy of analysis by the majority's review staff, particularly those made by Senators Durbin, Edwards, and
Rockefeller, who were all members of the Senate Intelligence Committee at
that time, and by Senator Clinton, who has publicly acknowledged being
briefed on the NIE? UA Vs Regarding Iraq’s UAV capability, the report
notes that some administration statements did not convey disagreements or
evolving views within the intelligence community about whether Iraq
intended to use UAVs for chemical or biological weapons delivery. The
report, however, failed to analyze statements made by Democrats like: •
Saddam’s existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real
threats to America today, tomorrow. Saddam has used chemical weapons
before, both against Iraq’s enemies and against his own people. He is
working to develop delivery systems like missiles and unmanned aerial
vehicles that could bring these deadly weapons against U.S. forces and
U.S. facilities in the Middle East. He could make these weapons available
to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his
government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the
United States and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I
fear that greatly. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record,
October 10, 2002. • In addition, Iraq is developing umnanned aerial
vehicles UAVs, capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare
agents, which could threaten Iraq’s neighbors as well as American forces
in the Persian Gulf Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9,
2002. 104
page 104
- “Intent " In a section titled "Intent" the majority
report includes statements from several administration officials which
discussed their concerns about what Saddam Hussein could do with his
weapons of mass destruction considering his disdain for the United States
and his long association with terrorist groups. We believe that these
statements were not about Iraq’s "intent" at all, as the
majority report says, but were explaining that with a lack of information
about Iraq’s intent, these policymakers were concerned about Iraq’s
capabilities. We note that many Democrats also expressed the same concerns
about the threat Iraq posed or might have posed to the United States due
to his weapons of mass destruction capabilities, connections to
terrorists, or both in speeches that were not analyzed in the majority
report: • I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the threat
posed to America by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction is so serious
that despite the risks and we should not minimize the risks we must
authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that
threat. There has been some debate over how "imminent" a threat
Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe
after September ll, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the
nature of these weapons that he has and the way they are targeted against
civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent
may be the only warning we get. To insist on further evidence could put
some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we afford to take that chance? I
do not think we can. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record,
October 10, 2002. • Is Saddam Hussein] a greater threat than he was in
l99l‘? He surely is. There’s different ways of launching scuds and all
kinds that go faster, farther. There is no question on that. .. And if
our allies] are not there for us, does that mean in this debate,
precedent-based, historically-based, that we sort of sit and take it, or
are we going to end up basically being unilateral anyway because we cannot
have our children smallpoxed. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV,
Congressional Record, September 25, 2002. ` • When I vote to give the
President of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary,
to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat
to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. Senator
John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • I believe that
Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime represents a clear threat to the United
States, to our allies, to our interests around the world, and to the
values of freedom and democracy we hold dear .... Thousands of terrorist
operatives around the world would pay anything to get their hands on
Saddam’s arsenal, and there is every possibility that he could tum his
weapons over to these terrorists...we can hardly ignore the terrorist
threat, and the serious danger that Saddam would allow his arsenal to be
used in aid of terror. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record,
September 12, 2002. 105
page 105
- • When I consider that Hussein could either use or give to
terrorists weapons of mass destruction biological, chemical or nuclear and
that he might just be mad enough to do it I End, aiter careful research,
the answer to my question: we cannot afford to leave him alone over the
next 5 or even 3 years. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record,
October 10, 2002 • If you allow someone like Saddam Hussein to get
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons,
how many people is he going to kill with such weapons? He’s already
demonstrated a willingness to use the weapons. He poison-gassed his own
people. He used poison gas and other weapons of mass destruction against
his neighbors. This man has no compunction about killing lots and lots of
people. So this is a way to save lives and to save the stability and peace
of a region of the world that is important to the peace and security of
the entire world. Vice President A1 Gore, Address to the Nation, December
16, 1998. • Our strategic objective is to contain Saddam Hussein and
curtail his ability to produce the most deadly weapons known to
mankind-weapons that he has unleashed with chilling alacrity against his
own people. Leit unchecked, Saddam Hussein would in short order be in a
position to threaten and blackmail our regional allies, our troops, and,
indeed, our nation. Senator Joe Biden, Congressional Record, February 12,
1998. • Saddam Hussein, with one nuclear weapon, would be far more
dangerous than the Soviet Union with 20,000. The difference is, they would
not use their weapons]. They were not suicidal. He would. Senator Carl
Levin, Congressional Record, October 9, 1998 • With the peace of the
region and, and in fact, much of the world at risk, we cannot allow Iraq
to continue its maneuvers designed to protect such a dangerous buildup of
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV,
Congressional Record, December 16, 1998. • It is not possible to
overstate the ominous implications for the Middle East if Saddam were to
develop and successfully militarize and deploy potent biological weapons.
We can all imagine the consequences. Extremely small quantities of several
known biological weapons have the capability to exterminate the entire
population of cities the size of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. These could be
delivered by ballistic missile, but they also could be delivered by much
more pedestrian means; aerosol applicators on commercial trucks easily
could suffice. If Saddam were to develop and then deploy usable atomic
weapons, the same holds true. Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record,
November 9, 1997 This is only a sampling of the approximately 100
statements submitted by Republican Members of this Committee for review
and which we repeatedly requested be included in the 106
page 106
- _ report as agreed previously by the Committee Members. This request was
ignored by the majority during two iterations of comments on the report
drafts and a motion to include such statements, offered by the
Vice-Chairman at the Committee’s business meeting, was denied a hearing
by the Chairman. Che —Pickin Intelli ence We have several concerns about
the intelligence information the majority chose to include, and chose to
ignore, in its report. j First, the majority chose to include only "finnished
disseminated intelligence" for comparison with policymakers’
statements. This is not only a departure from the Committee’s agreed upon
terms of reference, it is unfair to policymakers whom we know had access
to far more than just published intelligence assessments. For example, in
preparation for Secretary Powell’s statement before the UN on February
5, 2003, the CIA provided an intelligence report called a TD (telegraphic
dissemination) for use in the speech. In spite of the fact that the CLLX
informed the Committee about this in early 2004 and that the information
was included in the Committee’s first Iraq report published nearly four
years ago, the majority refused to include, or even consider, the TD in
its majority report. Instead the majority report included an intelligence
assessment published after the Secretary’s speech and noted the
existence of "operational intelligence traffic." Any
intelligence officer who has been on the job more than a week knows that a
TD is an intelligence report, not "operational traffic."
Moreover, after refusing our request to include the TD, incorrectly
arguing that it was "operational," the majority drafters
included several actual operational cables of their choosing in another
section of the report. Worse, these were operational cables which the
Committee knows were not finished intelligence reports for policymakers
and were not given to any administration officials; yet the much more
widely disseminated TD, specifically provided to Secretary Powell for use
in his speech, was not included in the majority report. Even worse,
excluded those sections of the report which specifically analyze the
President’s statements, is the President’s Summary of the NIE, a
summary document prepared for and presented to the President. This is most
disturbing since in two important cases- regarding reconstitution of Iraq’s
nuclear pro gram and Iraq’s intent to use its small UAVs for biological
weapons delivery—the judgments and dissents were presented differently
than in the NIE’s key judgments and main text. In fact, in the case of
Iraq’s UAVs, the dissent was not included in the President’s summary
at all. Second, the report excludes other information relevant to any fair
inquiry of whether policymakers’ statements were substantiated by
intelligence. For example, the Committee obtained information related to
the coordination, declassifrcation, and fact-checking of the President’s
Cincinnati speech with the CIA, relevant portions of which we requested be
included in the report. Specifically, a handwritten note by a CIA officer
at the bottom of one of the drafts to then-DCI Tenet said that the CIA
terrorism analyst had "read all the terrorism paragraphs and said it
was all oka ’ (emphasis original.) We believed it was only fair to let
the public know that the CIA checked the President’s speech and said
that all of the terrorism paragraphs were M
page 107
- _ determined by CIA analysts to be "all okay." Apparently the
majority did not think this was something the public needed to know since
they denied our request to include it and did not allow a vote on the
amendment offered to tix this shortcoming. Why do the Democrats want to
hide the fact that the CIA cleared the President’s speech'? As another
example, the majority report analyzes Secretary Powell’s UN speech, but
does not explain that this speech was not only checked and rechecked by
the intelligence community to ensure that the speech was well supported by
the available intelligence, but also that the first draft of the speech
was actually written by the CIA. Notably, the report fails to mention
this. In some cases the majority report actually claims that Secretary
Powell’s statements in this speech were not substantiated by
intelligence, even though the intelligence was in the original draft
written by the CIA. We are at a loss to explain how the majority can
believe that a speech drafted by the CIA and then checked and rechecked by
the intelligence community to ensure that it was strongly supported by the
available intelligence could in any way be characterized as
unsubstantiated by intelligence at that time. Third, in several cases, the
report compares policymaker statements to intelligence published after,
sometimes months after, the statements were made. This just does not make
sense. For example, Amendment 97 addresses a conclusion which says the
"President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering
using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence
judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few
months later, in January 2003." Whether the NIE judgments were
reviewed after the President’s speech is irrelevant to whether the
statement was substantiated at the time it was made. Furthermore, we note
that t.his conclusion also distorts the President’s words because he did
not say that Iraq was considering using UAVs to target the United States.
Rather, he said: "we are concerned that Iraq was exploring ways of
using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States," a comment
that was fully consistent with the January 2003 NIE, Nontraditional
Threats to the US. Homeland Through 200 7. Obviously the intelligence
community had to be concerned that Iraq could use these UAVs to target the
homeland or they would not have been included in an NIE about threats to
the Homeland at all. We find the refusal to include all relevant
intelligence and the inclusion of information published after the delivery
of statements to be particularly ironic since in a letter on November 14,
2005, then-Vice Chairman Rockefeller, along with Senators Levin and
Feinstein, wrote to the Majority and Minority Leaders explaining that they
had "insisted that the Committee compare statements of government
officials against all intelligence information prepared for circulation
and relevant to the subject matter at issue, provided it was it was
available at the time the statement was made." This appeared to be
considered a worthwhile task when the burden of collecting all of the
available intelligence from the end of the Gulf War through the start of
Operation Iraqi Freedom fell to Republican Members and their staff, but
when the Democrats took charge, including only some of the intelligence
was deemed acceptable. Perhaps forcing the Republican staff to review over
40,000 documents was just a request intended to delay further publication
of the Phase II effort and allow the continuation of charges of
"obstruction." 108
page 108
- _ The idea of limiting the intelligence to that which was
"available at the time the statement was made" must have seemed
like a better idea when the Democrats thought policymakers would not be
able to use information published even days after their statements to
defend themselves. When it turned out that this could be used to the
majority’s own advantage, however, information that was actually
available to policymakers apparently became less important. Maybe the
majority believes those reading the report will not bother to check the
dates. On behalf of the minority, the Vice-Chairman filed 26 amendments in
the category of "che1ry picking or excluding relevant information
from the report." The Chairman refused to allow consideration of any
of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See Appendix
A, amendments 13, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 29, 32, 38, 39, 54, 71(a), 81, 82,
97, 106, 108, 130,132, and 133. Unsubstantiated Claims/Distorting Intelligence One of the most hypocritical aspects of the Majority report is that
while it purports to cast judgment on how well policymakers characterized
intelligence analysis in their public statements, the report itself
distorts many policymakers’ statements and the intelligence analysis.
This has the unfortunate consequence of undermining the Committee’s
credibility in exercising oversight. Several of the mir1ority’s
amendments focused on the issue of mischaracterizing policymakers’
statements., One example is Amendment 7 which addresses a portion of the
majority report which says that the President, Vice President, and the
Secretary of State "stated that the Iraq govemrnent had an active
nuclear weapons program." However, even a cursory examination of the
statements included for review in the report shows that none of the named
individuals "stated" that Iraq had an "active nuclear
weapons program," not one. Another amendment, Number 136, addresses a
conclusion that claims the President and Vice President made statements
that "Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction
to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States." Yet,
neither the President nor the Vice President said this. The report also
distorts the intelligence analysis to help bolster its case against
policymakers. For example, Amendment 129 addresses a portion of the report
which claims that the October 2002 NIE judged that "Saddam was
unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that
time." The NIE never said this. In fact, this NIE judged that Iraq
was investigating mapping software for its UAVs, useless outside the
United States. The NIE said this "suggests that Iraq is investigating
the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." ln
addition, Amendments 81-82 address a portion of the report which says that
the "intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried
facilities" in Iraq. This makes it sound as though the intelligence
community did not assess that Iraq had deeply-buried facilities. In
reality, the intelligence community had long assessed that Iraq had
deeply-buried facilities in Iraq; they noted only that they were unable to
specifically identify them, something hardly uncornrnon in intelligence.
109
page 109
- A final example, Amendment 58 addresses a conclusion about Iraq’s
biological weapons capabilities which states that policymakers’
statements were substantiated by intelligence information, but concludes
that they "did not discuss gaps in Iraq’s biological weapons
programs, which were explicit in the NIE." The NIE’s assessment of
Iraq’s biological weapons program was that "all key aspects—R&D,
production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are
active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were
before the Gulf war." This judgment and the NIE judgment that Iraq
had biological weapons were "high confidence" judgments. In a
ten-page discussion of Iraq’s biological warfare capabilities only one
sentence noted any gaps in knowledge of Iraq’s BW program and this was
only regarding "specific information on the types of weapons, agent,
or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal." In other words, there
were no gaps noted regarding the judgments that Iraq had an offensive
biological weapons program or stocks, only uncertainty as to what kinds of
agents were in those stocks—hardly a gap. On behalf of the minority, the
Vice-Chairman filed 31 amendments in this category- unsubstantiated claims
or distorting information. The Chairman reii1sed to allow consideration of
any of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See
Appendix A, amendments 7,11,16,17,17(a),19, 21, 22(a), 23, 30, 31, 33, 34,
4·1, 41(a), 58, 68, 70, 71, 83, 85, 86, 90, 96,
99,119,120,121,125,126,127,128,129,131,135,135,136,137, and 140. Reii1sal
to Offer Polic akers the Qpp g; to Be Heard We also disagree with the
majority’s decision not to request interviews with policymakers whom the
report alleges made unsubstantiated statements. These individuals deserve
the opportunity to respond to the majority’s allegations and be afforded
the opportunity to inform the majority of intelligence information that
may be lacking from the report that had been used in the preparation of
their statements. We note that in the last Congress the Democrats argued
that policymakers needed to be brought before the Committee to be
interviewed about their statements even before the ‘ Committee had made
a determination about whether their statements were substantiated. Then-
Vice Chairman Rockefeller even wrote to the Chairman with a list of people
to be interviewed which included Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, then-National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, and then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen
Hadley, among others. In addition, Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and
Feinstein wrote to the Senate leadership in November 2005 saying that a
task force of Committee Members discussed the importance of interviewing
current a.nd former officials within the Departments of State and Defense
and the Office of the Vice President, among others. While the letter was,
in fact, not an accurate portrayal of the discussions at that meeting (the
transcript of the meeting shows that the only individual the task force
actually discussed interviewing was Secretary Powell), it nonetheless
shows that these Members wanted to conduct such interviews. We agreed that
it was important to interview many of these individuals, and others, if
the Committee Members found that any of their statements were not
substantiated by the intelligence M0
page 110
- or if they were in another way relevant to the Committee’s inquiry.
At the time the Committee voted on the Phase II terms of reference in
February 2004, Senator Levin agreed with us, noting "but you’ve got
to ask policymakers who made statements relative to weapons of mass
destruction what was the basis in intelligence for their statements, if we
believe that their statements, reports, or testimony went beyond the
intelligence that they were given." Despite this and despite Chairman
Rockefeller’s own letter requesting these interviews, when we requested
that the interviews be conducted so that policymakers could respond to the
drafted conclusions that alleged unsubstantiated statements, the request
was ignored, and a motion to conduct these interviews offered at the
Committee’s business meeting was denied a hearing by the Chairman.
Interestingly, in the additional views attached to a Committee report on
"The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the
Iraqi National Congress," Chairman Rockefeller and Senators Levin,
Feinstein, Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold wrote that the Committee
Chairman had declined a request of the Vice Chairman for the Committee to
interview White House officials, including speech writers, to fully
understand how and why the intelligence assessments were included in major
prewar speeches, such as the President’s State of the Union Address and
Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN Security Council. Yet, none of these
Members wanted to pursue these interviews once they were in charge of the
review. The only reason we can imagine why the Democrats would not
undertake interviews that they had repeatedly requested in the last
Congress, is that the interviews were another tactic at delaying the
report and allowing more false charges of "obstruction."
Conclusion Although we are troubled by all of the issues we have outlined
thus far—that the report released today was a waste of Committee time
and resources that should have been spent overseeing the intelligence
community, that the report is part of a partisan agenda, that the report
cherry picked information and distorted policymakers’ statements and
intelligence, and that the majority refused to offer those it is accusing
the opportunity to be heard—we are most concerned about the damage that
this report will do, and that the whole Phase II effort has done for the
past several years, in creating the impression that policymakers should be
bound to make policy based on only that which is published in intelligence
assessments. This is not only wrong, it is dangerous and it is contrary to
everything else this Committee has done since it published its first
report on the Iraq intelligence failure. It has the effect of encouraging
intelligence community analysts to become policymakers, and encouraging
policymakers to adhere strictly to whatever analysts write, when we know
that intelligence analysis can be dangerously inaccurate. Have we
forgotten how wrong the intelligence judgments were in the October 2002
Iraq WMD NIE and how many other intelligence failures we had before that
one? Intelligence is not incontestable truth and it is only one factor out
of many that a policymaker must consider before making a policy decision.
This fallacy has also unnecessarily increased demands on the intelligence
community. Requesting NIEs with unclassified key judgments has become
sport in Washington as each side hopes the NIE will support its position.
Cries of "politicization" usually follow from whichever M1
page 111
- side is unhappy with the results. This is not only unfair to the
intelligence community, it is dangerous in that analysts will attempt to
please all sides and their muddied judgments will help no one. We expect
intelligence analysts to follow tried and true marching orders for
intelligence: tell me what you know, tell me what you don’t know, tell
me what you think, and make sure the policymaker understands the
difference. Analysts cannot do this if they are constantly wondering if
their assessments will be used for politics. The Democratic maj ority, in
the partisan way it attempted to suppress intelligence information and
skew the historical record, is betting that the public and the media will
not take the time to read these and other minority views that expose its
hypocrisy. We have written these views to shine a light on it, for if
there is any oversight value left in this fruitless endeavor that has
consumed so much of the resources of this Committee over a four year
period, it would be to expose the true intent of this supposed
"oversight." We regret the damaging effect the majority’s
report has on this COI1’1II1llI€€’S credibility to oversee our
intelligence community and we urge our colleagues to return to the
non-partisan underpinnings that the Senate Intelligence Committee was
founded upon. CHRISTOPHER S. Bonn SAXBY CHAMBLISS ORRIN G. HATCH RICHARD
BURR _ 112
page 112
- _ Apendix A Filed Amendments 0n Phase II Report: Whether Public
Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated
by Intelligence ("Statements") U3
page 113
- Amendment 6 Page 3, last paragraph — Overlaying this issue of the
selective use of intelligence is the more fundamental issue of the
selective declassification of intelligence. Intelligence information
contained in many of the speeches analyzed in this report had to be
declassified before being released publicly. The Executive Branch has the
prerogative to classify information to protect national security, and
unlike Congress the Executive Branch can declassified information relatively
easily. Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an
unclassified version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq ’s presumed weapons of mass destruction
programs, the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these
matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these
judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few, if
any, of the Intelligence Community ’s assessments on Iraq 's links to
terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war conditions,
or other relevant matters contained in the statements of senior officials
were publicly released before the war. This ability of the Executive
Branch to unilaterally declassified and divulge intelligence information at
a time, place, and in a manner of its choosing must also be taken into
account when evaluating policymakers ’ use of intelligence information.
Amendment 6 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment- It is misleading to
simply say that the Executive branch makes ‘“unilateral"
decisions about what to declassify. Congress can also request
declassification and usually gets what it wants unless the Executive
branch can establish a sources-and-methods reason not to disclose it. In
addition, Section 8 of S. Res. 400 offers a mechanism for the Senate to
disclose classified information. The fact that the Senate chose not to do
this does not mean that it did not have the opportunity. Amendment 7 Page
6, first full non-bullet paragraph — In major policy speeches the
President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State indicated that
the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. Amendment 7-
Strike the above sentence. Comment- None of the statements listed in the
report shows that the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State
indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program.
We believe that if this Committee is going to scrutinize each and every
word these policymakers uttered, we should clearly state what they said,
not re-interpret what they said. U4
page 114
- _ Amendment 11 Page 7, first paragraph — They agreed that y' Iraq
decided to restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign
assistance it could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon
within five to seven years, and that q' Iraq in some way acquired adequate
fissile material ]9·om a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear
weapon within one year. Amendment 11 — Strike proper, in some way, and
adequate. Comment- The coordinated assessments did not use the terms
"proper," "in some way" and “adequate." The
Committee should be accurate in describing the assessments; they should be
deleted from the report. Amendment 13 Page 7, second paragraph — In
April 2001 , the CIA noted that Iraq ’s attempts to purchase high-
strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested that a
reconstitution e]j’ort might be underway. This judgment was included in
several other CIA assessments. In August 2002 the CIA published a paper on
Iraqi WIMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WZMD Capabilities Pose Growing
Threay, which concluded that these procurement activities indicated that
the Iraqi government had restarted its nuclear weapons program.
Amendment13 — Insert after the above sentence A December 2001 CIA Senior
Executive Memorandum said that rocurement activities "show Ira is g
pg to `um -start a clandestine uranium emichment ro am to roduce the
fissile material for a wea on otentiall y late this decade assurnin it
roduces the necess com onents indi enousl ." In J anu 2002 the CIA
ublished an assessment which said "Procurement activities detected in
the ast ear are consistent with Ira attem tin to 'um -start a clandestine
uranium enrichment ro am to roduce the fissile material needed to make a
nuclear wea on otentiall y late this decade. Ira retains a si `f1cant
number of nuclear ro am scientists ro am documentation and robabl the
manufacturin infrastructure to su ort a nuclear wea ons ro a1n." 1
Comment — We requested that several relevant reports below be added to
this section, but they were added only to the footnote. We would at least
like the December 2001 report, which seems to be the most important and
relevant to policymaker’s statements in questions, added to the text.
• A July 2001 CIA assessment, Iraq: New Effort to Get Centriiiige-Related
Tubes, had the same assessment as the April 2001 paper already cited. •
An October 2001 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) discussed Iraq’s
"nuclear- related procurement efforts," including the aluminum
tubes and uranium from Ni er. • In a November 2001 Senior Executive
Memorandum (SEM) the CIA wrote that k _ reporting indicate Baghdad still
has a vast procurement network to seek materials and equipment that can be
used in a centrifuge program, including the recent effort to get aluminum
tubes for a Zippe-type centrifuge, but it is unclear if Iraq has embarked
on an extensive nuclear weapons effort." M5
page 115
- _ • Also in November 2001 a CIA SEIB titled "lraq: Seeking to
Rebuild Enrichment Capability" discussed Iraq’s procurement of
aluminum tubes. • A December 2001 SEM said "Procurement activities
detected within the past year show Iraq is trying to jump-start a
clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the fissile material for
a weapon, potentially by late this decade, assuming it produces the
necessary components indigenously." • In January 2002 the CIA wrote
in a Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR) that "Procurement activities
detected in the past year are consistent with Iraq attempting to
jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the tissile
material needed to make a nuclear weapon, potentially by late this decade.
Iraq retains a significant nrunber of nuclear program scientists, program
documentation, and probably the manufacturing infrastructure to support a
nuclear weapons pro gram." • In March 2002 a CIA SPWR said "We
assess that Iraq currently may be trying to reconstitute its gas
centrifuge program. Since intrusive inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has
increased efforts to buy critical dual-use items that could support a gas
centrifuge program, including aluminum tubes suitable for rotors, magnets,
machine tools, essential chemicals and centrifuge cascade related
equipment." Amendment 16 Page 7, last partial paragraph — The
Department 0f Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CL4 ’s c0nclusi0ns
regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was more likely that
the tubes were intended for a dyferent use, such as a c0nventi0nal r0cket
program. Based 0n 0ther evidence, including Saddam ’s meetings with
Iraqi nuclear scientists, and p0ssible attempts t0 pr0cure uranium from
Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Iraq might be attempting t0
reconstitute a nuclear weap0ns pr0gram, but suggested that the evidence
was n0t conclusive. Amendment 16 — Strike the above paragraph and insert
In a Jul 2002 p p the De artment of Ener DOE said "Multi le-source r
ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s
nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smoking gun,
continued vi 'lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re 'uvenate
its nuclear wea ons ro am." Comment- We do not believe that an
assessment which solely discusses DOE’s judgment about the end-use for
the alumintun tubes is relevant in this section because the assessment did
not discuss nuclear reconstitution at all. The statements under review
from the Vice President make no mention of aluminun tubes. The report
should say what DOE’s assessment was of reconstitution, which was:
"Multiple-source reporting suggests that Saddam Hussein is seeking to
reconstitute Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Although the reporting
produces no "smoking gun," continued vigilance is required
regarding Iraq’s attempts to rejuvenate its nuclear weapons
program." H6
page 116
- _ Amendment 17 Page 8, first full paragraph — The Department of State
’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) disagreed with the
CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with
the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes.
This view was included in congressional testimony in September 2002, but
State/INR did not publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside the
State Department until afler publication of the October 2002 NIE.
Amendment 17 — strike the above paragraph and insert INR did not ublish
y assessments outlinin their views on reconstitution of Ira ’s nuclear
ro am rior to the Vice President’s statement. Comment -— The comment
that INR "disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear
weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were
probably intended for other purposes" has no citation. If the intent
is to cite this to the Committee’s first report, the attribution is
mischaracterizing the comments in that report. The Committee’s report
was describing what INR analysts told the staff after the fact about their
views at the time, which should not be construed to mean those views were
articulated to policymakers. The report should cite a document or report
in which INR "disagreed," otherwise this discussion should be
deleted. In addition, if testimony to Congress is going to be offered in
lieu of an assessment from INR, the report should include comments
attributed to the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) at the same
hearing. Testimony at the September 17, 2002 hearing was that "State/INR
and DOE are still examining the latest specifications but currently
believe that the tubes more likely are intended for alternative
conventional weapons uses, such as the multiple rocket launcher program.
The NGIC — the U.S. experts on foreign ground force weapons systems —
notes, however, that Iraq’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are
far stricter than necessary for rocket casings." Finally, we do not
understand why testimony given in mid- September is being used in a
section which analyzes the Vice President’s speech from August. This
report is supposed to determine whether po1icymakers’ statements were
substantiated by intelligence. How can we expect policymakers to be aware
of a view that wasn’t published or briefed to them until after they made
their statement? Mi
page 117
- _ Amendment 17 a _ Page 8, second full paragraph — Several of these
intelligence agencies also made reference to assessments by the National
Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony
by the Director of Central Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC
judged that "Iraq ’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far
stricter than necessary for rocket casings. " A later memo ]9·om
State/INR said that "the L4EA and the - pertinent nuclear-technical
experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not
intended for Iraq ’s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket
casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)
concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other
DOE views on tactical rockets. " q Amendment l7(a) - strike A later
memo ]$·om State/INR said that "the L4EA and the pertinent
nuclear-technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum
tubes are not intended for Iraq 's nuclear program and are consistent with
rocket casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)
concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other
DOE views on tactical rockets. " Corn1nent— We see that the
Majority added this information to the report after the amendment filing
deadline. We asked that the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC)
information be included, but we did not request and did not consent to
including the State/INR paper for two reasons: first, because it was
published more than two months after the Vice President’s speech; and
second, because the report misquotes the INR document. The INR report did
not say that DoD’s NGIC concurred with the assessment that the aluminum
tubes were consistent with rocket casings. This is a gross distortion of
the INR assessments and the position of NGIC. If this text is included, it
will make the Committee look foolish since our own 2004 report explained
that NGIC was one of the main proponents of the argument that the tubes
were inconsistent with rocket casings. The INR report said that that NGIC
agreed only with the assessment that high strength is used for tactical
rockets by a number of countries; although NGIC said in the NIE that
because of the unsuitability of the wall thickness and weight of the Iraqi
aluminum tubes that they were "unIikely to be intended for rocket
motor cases. The report, as drafted, clearly misquotes the INR paper. This
should be deleted. H8
page 118
- Amendment 18 Page 8, third full paragraph — According t0 a DL4
report, the intelligence community continued to assess that it would take
five to seven years from the commencement of a revived nuclear program for
the Iraqi government to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon. This same report repeated the assessment that a nuclear
weapon could be constructed much faster y' adequate fissile material was
acquired from a foreign source, though an earlier CL4 assessment noted
that “we have not detected a dedicated Iraqi ejjfort to obtain fissile
material abroad. " Amendment 18 — Strike the above paragraph.
Comment/Suggestion — This is a May 2002 DLA report referring to an
intelligence community judgment which had not been updated since 2000. At
the time of the Vice President’s speech, DLA assessed that Iraq could
have a weapon as soon as 2006, and INR had no judgment on this since the
2000 ICA. This sentence should be changed to accurately reflect the
judgments of each agency. Amendment 19 Page 8, last paragraph — In the
President ’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated
that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction, and indicated
that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Amendment 19 — Strike
the paragraph above. Con1ment— None of the statements in the report
taken from the President’s speech suggest that Iraq had an ongoing
nuclear weapons program. The President commented that Iraq employed
capable nuclear scientists, retained physical infrastructure needed to
build a weapon, and made attempts to buy aluminum tubes. As noted in the
report, several intelligence community assessments mentioned these things
without concluding that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. _ H9
page 119
- Amendment 20 Page 9, 'rirst full paragraph - Though the intelligence
community as a whole had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program
was underway, some (though not all intelligence agencies believed that
Iraq ’s attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with
supporting evidence such as Saddam ’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear
science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact being
reconstituted. Amendment 20 — strike (though not alb and insert and the
end of the paragraph All intelligence a encies assessed that the aluminum
tubes could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons but DOE and
State INR assessed that the tubes were more likely intended for a
conventional weapons ro am. Comment — Again, the President did not say
that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program or had an ongoing nuclear
program in this speech. He mentioned the acquisition of aluminum tubes
"used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.” All agencies,
including DOE and State/INR assessed that these tubes could be used for
this purpose and Saddam’s meeting with nuclear science personnel were
discussed in numerous intelligence community papers from CIA, DIA, and
DOE. A discussion of whether or not agencies judged that these efforts
were part of a reconstituted nuclear program is irrelevant here because
the President did not say they were part of a reconstituted nuclear
program. Also, "some" always means "not all." This is
redundant. Amendment 21 Page 9, second paragraph — Intelligence
community analysts generally believed that the Iraqi government ’s
failure to provide certain evidence and documents regarding its pre-] 99]
nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi government was attempting to
conceal this information. However, this conclusion was not cited by the
intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted,
post-Guy War nuclear weapons program. Amendment 2l— strike However, this
conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling
evidence for a reconstituted, post-Gab' War nuclear weapons program.
Comment- Again, the last sentence is irrelevant because the President did
not cite Iraq’s concealment of documents as evidence of a reconstituted,
post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program. His comments about withholding
information refer to the pre-Gulf War program. 120
page 120
- _ Amendment 22 Page 9, third full paragraph —— Numerous
intelligence assessments made reference to open source information showing
that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (MEC).
Amendment 22 — Strike made reference to open source information showing
ar1d insert showed Comment - The majority report changed this sentence
from saying "ir1telligence reporting" to "open source
infor1nation." The report should still say "intelligence"
because numerous intelligence assessments cited the meetings between
Saddam ar1d the IAEC personnel and much of the information was from
intelligence reporting vice open source reporting. This information was
provided to the Majority as requested and still it was not included in the
report. • In January 2002, a DIA Executive Highlight (EH) said ".
.. the increased frequency of operations at former and suspect nuclear
facilities is highly suspect. In a possibly related incident, Saddam
Husayn met with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission on 10 January and
praised its efforts. Baghdad probably will continue trying to reconstitute
its nuclear weapons program. Although no firm evidence exists that
reconstitution has begun, Iraq had continued to obtain dual-use equipment
ar1d to maintain its scientific cadre." • In January 2002, ar1other
DIA assessment said, "Persistent procurement efforts to acquire
approximately 60,000 aluminum alloy tubes, coupled with recent statements
by Saddam to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, suggest an intent to
reconstitute the nuclear program." • In September 2002, a DIA Key
WMD Operational Support study on Iraq said "Iraq likely revitalized
its nuclear weapons program shortly after the end of UNSCOM inspections
ended in December 1998. There is no firm evidence of a current nuclear
weapon design effort, but we judge that continued procurement of dual-use
nuclear-related items, the assignment of key personnel to nuclear
weapon-capable sites, construction at nuclear facilities, ar1d Saddarn’s
interactions with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that
Iraq revitalized its nuclear weapon program after 1998." • CIA SPWR
9/11/2002 — "Saddarn’s exhortations to his nuclear Mujahidin,
periodically reported in the Iraqi press since 1998, are the most
compellir1g indicator that his nuclear weapons work resumed in 1998, when
inspectors were ordered out of Iraq." • DIA assessment September
2002, "The renewed regular contact between Saddam ar1d the IAEC, as
well as the enhanced security, suggests the IAEC is again the focal point
of Saddarn’s nuclear prograrn." • July 22, 2002, DOE assessment
"Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway‘?" said, "Aecording
to Iraqi press reports, Saddam recently met with personnel from the IAEC.
He reportedly commended the staff for their efforts ‘to make science
serve the programs of comprehensive development, which are under way in
Iraq despite the circumstances of the wicked embargo.’ The staff was
referred to in the press report as mujahidin . . . These meetings indicate
that Saddam continues to place a high priority on a potential nuclear
option for his strategic goals." 121
- Amendment 22 ) Page 9, fourth full paragraph —At the time of the
President ’s address t0 the General Assembly, the intelligence community
had not changed its judgment that it would take Iraq at least several
years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to
seven years ’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002
DIA report judged that it could be done in four), and that Iraq could
build a nuclear weapon within one year q' it in some way acquired an
adequate amount of fissile material from a foreign source. Amendment 22(a)
— strike it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough
fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to seven years ’ was the
commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that
it could be done in four), and that Comment- The beginning of this
sentence is not related to t.he President’s comments. He said what Iraq
could do should it "acquire" Hssile material. How long it would
take Iraq to indigenously produce fissile material is irrelevant. In
addition, since t.he 2000 ICA did not say "in some way" it
should be deleted. Amendment 23 Page l0, first paragraph - Additionally,
he said that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear
weapon, declaring that 'facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for
the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a
mushroom cloud. Amendment 23 — Strike there was clear evidence that Iraq
was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that Comment- None of the
statements cited in t.he report hom the Cincinnati speech quote t.he
President saying that "there was clear evidence that Iraq was
developing a nuclear weapon." The report should simply say what the
President said. _ 122
| |
| IIa
110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER
PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE
SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL
AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be
printed |
 Vulture
Capitalist, ...beware... limited hangout
news.- Go to Iran weapons to Bosnia / Afghanistan
Muslim extremists... Clinton impeachment a smoke screen to hide this..
1998, What did Hillary know?
|
|
-
-
Bush / Clinton Crime families,
death lists
|
go to: news,
CIA Houston station chief gunned down by HPD.... connected to Port of
Houston security, Israel, Russia mob
|
Link Deborah Jeane
Palfrey CIA, Foggo, Wilkes, Hookergate
and Gov, Bob Ehrlich ... and Cheney,
911, Iran Attack?
|
Mukasey, Schumer, Feinstein, Conflict
of Interest
|
|
Amendment 26 Page l0, third paragraph — State/INR dissentedfrom the
majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not
add up t0 a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear
weapons program. Amendment 26 — strike State/INR dissentedj$·om the
majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not
add up to a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear
weapons program. and insert State/INR dissented from the ma 'ori view and
stated in the NIE ke 'ud ents that "the activities we have detected
do not however add p to a com ellin case that Ira is currentl ursuin what
INR would consider to be an inte ated and com rehensive a roach to a uire
nuclear wea ons." In the main text of the NIE INR assessed that the
available evidence did "not add p to a com ellin case for
reconstitution" of an Ira i nuclear wea ons ro am. In the President’s
summ of the NIE INR offered another version of its 'ud ent statin that
"INR `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i
nuclear reconstitution effort." Comment - Because this section of the
report is being used to consider whether the President’s statements were
substantiated by intelligence, we believe it is appropriate to include the
President’s summary of the NIE, a document specifically prepared for and
briefed to the President. The President’s summary of the NIE said,
"Most agencies judge that Iraq is reconstituting a nuclear weapons
program. INR judges that the evidence indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi
nuclear reconstitution effort." In addition, the key judgments of the
NIE said, "The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to
a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursing what INR would consider
to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear
weapons." All of these are slightly different and should be included
to show what was available to the President. Amendment 28 Page l0, fourth
paragraph — Construction at sites known to have been part of Iraq ’s
pre—GuU War nuclear weapons program was mentioned in earlier assessments
(though not specyically in the NIE). Amendment 28 — strike (though not
specyically in the NIE). and insert includin ir1 the NIE. Comment — The
comment in the report is incorrect. Construction activity at Tuwaitha, a
facility associated with Iraq’s pre Gulf war nuclear program was
discussed in the 2002 NIE on page 24. This should be noted in the report.
123
Amendment 29 Page 10, last paragraph — State/INR ’s alternative
views, which were incorporated in the NIE, said that State/INR accepted
“the view of technical experts at the Department of Energy " who
concluded that the aluminum tubes were ’poorly suited " for a
nuclear weapons program. The alternative views also cast doubt on the
judgment that other dual-use procurement ejjzorts were related to a
nuclear program, and went on to say that “the information we have on
Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent ejjzort
to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Amendment 29 — At the end of
the paragraph insert ln the President’s summ of the NIE NR said it `ud
es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear
reconstitution eHort." Comment - Again, we believe that if the
Committee is going to compare intelligence to statements made by the
President, it should include the President’s summary of the NIE. _ 124
_ Amendment 30 Page II, first paragraph - The majority view of the NIE
assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to
seven years, and posited a “much less likebr scenario " in which
production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority
view also assessed that y' Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside
source that production time could be "within several months to a
year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic
ejfort to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia or] other
sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might
acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a
reconstituted nuclear program. Amendment 30 - strike The majority view of the
NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five
to seven years, and posited a "much less likely scenario" in
which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The
majority view also assessed that Iraq acquired fissile material from an
outside source that production time could be “within several months to a
year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a “systematic
efort to acquire foreign fissile materials j$·om Russia or] other
sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might
acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a
reconstituted nuclear program and insert The NIE ke `ud ents said "if
Ba dad a uires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a
nuclear wea on within several months to a ear." The main text of the
NIE added "althou we have seen onl a few Ira i attem ts to a uire
material from abroad those efforts do not seem to be p of s sternatic
effort to a uire forei Hssile materials from Russia or other
sources." State/INR said that it could not redict when Ira gl; a uire
a nuclear wea on since it lacked ersuasive evidence of a reconstituted
nuclear ro am. Comment - The paragraph as drafted distorts the NIE’s key
judgments which actually listed the assessment that Iraq could build a
weapon in one year as the first bullet point. The characterization in the
report makes it sound like an afterthought or as if it was the last and,
therefore, most minor issue the NIE considered, which it was not. Also,
how long it would take Iraq to indigenously develop Hssile material was
irrelevant to what the President was talking about. He specihcally said he
was discussing how long it would take Iraq to build a weapon if it
"acquired" fissile material. Also, it should be clear that the
detail about not detecting a systematic effort was from the main body of
the NIE, not the key judgments. 125
Amendment 31 Page 11, second paragraph — In the President ’s 2003
State of the Union Address, he stated that Iraq had pursued nuclear
weapons even while weapons inspectors were in Iraq. He also said that the
Iraqi regime had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that could be used
in a nuclear program, and that “the British government has learned that
Saddam Hussein recently sought signqicant quantities of uranium ]$·om
Africa. " While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had
initialhw attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following the
imposition of post-Guy' War sanctions, most agencies believed that the MEA
and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq ’s nuclear
in]$·astructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit of
nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors le]? the
country. Amendment 31 — insert after the first paragraph above He noted
that Saddam "has not credibl ex lained these activities." Strike
the second paragraph and insert The intelli ence communi assessed that Ira
had initiall attem ted to continue its nuclear wea ons ro a.m followin the
im osition of ost—Gu1f War sanctions. In Se tember 2002 the DCI
submitted testimon to Con ess that "revelations after the Gulf war
starkl demonstrated the extent of | Ira ’s denial . . . The IAEA did not
reco `ze on oin uranium emichment activities" at two sites ins ected
y the IAEA. Most a encies believed that the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded
in destro ` or neutralizin Ira ’s nuclear infrastructure in the mid—1990s.
Comment- None of the above discussion from the report is relevant to what
the President said. He said that Iraq had pursued a nuclear weapons
program while inspectors were in Iraq. This statement is substantiated by
intelligence. Director Tenet’s submitted testimony to the SSCI and SASC
from September 2002 notes that, "Revelations afier the Gulf war
starkly demonstrated the extent of that denial. Based on CIA briefings
about two suspect nuclear sites, the IAEA inspected Tuwaitha and Tarmiyah
in rnid-May 1991. The IAEA did not recognize on oin uranium enrichment
activities using Electromagnetic Isotope Separation at these sites, as
neither it nor the US intelligence community anticipated such work was
underwa ." This testimony makes it clear that the intelligence
community did say that Iraq’s nuclear progra.m continued while
inspectors were in Iraq. Current views of reconstitution and views of
whether the IAEA and UNSCOM stopped those activities are irrelevant to the
analysis. Finally, there is no citation for these claims at all. 126
_ Amendment 32 Page ll, fourth paragraph — The October 2002 NYE
contained an annex on the high-strength aluminum tubes. Although all the
intelligence agencies agreed that the aluminum tubes were a dual—use
technology, DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikely that the tubes
were being used for nuclear weapons-related purposes. Other agencies
concurred with the majority view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the
primary evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the
concurring nor dissenting agencies changed their view between the
publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq. Amendment 32 — strike
the above paragraph and insert - Ir1 the October 2002 NIE all intelli ence
a encies a eed that the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear wea ons
and that Ira was r uired to declare the im orts and sub ` ect them to UN/IAEA
monitorin but DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikel that the
tubes were intended to be used for nuclear wea ons-related u oses. On
December 17, 2002 CIA re ared an anal sis of Ira ’s wea ons declaration
which noted that it "fails to acknowled e or ex lain rocurement of gl;
s ecihcation aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in as centrifu e
uranium enrichment effort" and "fails to acknowled e efforts to
rocure uranium from Ni er as noted in the UK dossier." Comment- The
President was discussing the fact that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes
it was prohibited from importing and that it had not credibly explained
these activities. He did not say these items were part of a reconstituted
nuclear program, only that Iraq had not credibly explained why it was
importing such materials. Intelligence noting that all agencies assessed
the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear weapons and were prohibited
items is more relevant to the statement in question. 127
Amendments 33 and 34 Page ll, last paragraph — An unclassyied British
white paper from September 2002 had assessed that Iraq had sought large
quantities of natural (non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed
by a statement in the NIE, which said “Iraq also began vigorously trying
to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the
time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. " This was not cited
by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. State/INR ’s
alternative views said that “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural
uranium in Africa are, in INR ’s assessment, highly dubious. "
Amendment 33 — strike This was echoed by a statement and insert This
assessment was also included Amendment 34 - strike This was not cited by
the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. Comment- We
suggest not using the word “echoed" which makes it sound like the
intelligence community took the idea from the British White Paper, which
was not the case. In addition we do not think the characterization of
"key evidence" is accurate (we do not think the NIE used the
term evidence) and the President did not say it was key evidence of
reconstitution so this sentence is irrelevant. 128
_ Amendment 38 Page 13, last paragraph — On September 8, 2002, the
National Security Advisor said that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq
"are only realbv suited for nuclear weapons programs Although both
the CIA and DIA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a
nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best
suited " for centry'uges, and that other explanations were “inconsistent
with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was
unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was
possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were
intended to be used to build conventional rockets. Amendment 38 — strike
Although both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were
intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes
were “best suited "for centry'uges, and that other explanations
were "inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had
assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports
explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely)
that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. and
insert Both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were
intended for a nuclear wea ons ro am with the CIA notin that the tubes
were "best suited” for centrifu es and that other ex lanations were
"inconsistent with the total bod of intelli ence.” ln A ril 2001 CIA
ublished a a er which said "Ira is gyg ng to urchase items that have
little use other than for a uranium enrichment ro am." In Au st 2002 CIA
ublished another a er which said "A1thou we have considered
alternative ex lanations for the tubes — such as their use in multi le
rocket launchers Q ) — CIA concurs with ound forces wea ons ex erts in
the lntelli ence Communit that such an ex lanation is inconsistent with
the overall bod of intelli ence on the sub 'ect." More than a ear
earlier the DOE ublished an assessment that said an a lication other than
centrifu e use was "more likel ’ but noted that "re ardless of
end use the delive of aluminum tubes with the r orted s eciiications to
Ira would be rohibited” items under the Nuclear Su liers Grou and UN
Securi Council Resolutions. Comment- We believe the report as drafted
excludes relevant information which was far more likely to have been
provided to Secretary Rice than a DOE assessment published a year earlier.
These should be included andlDOE’s judgments should be put in its own
words, rather than those of the report authors. DOE used the words
"more likely" not ‘“unlikely. • CIA, SEIB 01-083CHX April
10, 2001, "Iraq is trying to purchase items that have little use
other than for a uranium enrichment program.” • CIA, August 2002,
"A1though we have considered alternative explanations for the tubes
— such as their use in multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) — CIA concurs
with ground forces weapons experts in the Intelligence Community that such
an explanation is inconsistent with the overall body of intelligence on
the subj ect." _ 129
_ Amendment 39 Page 14, second non-bullet paragraph — - Intelligence
obtained after the Guy War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs
for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives
— the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the
larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered
by missile. Amendment 39 — strike - Intelligence obtained after the Guhf
War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons.
Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the
two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which
had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. and insert 1
Numerous intelli ence assessment noted that Ira had develo ed two desi s
rior to the Gulf War. Accordin to a 1999 IC nuclear assessment
"nuclear desi efforts from 1988 throu mid-1990 were focused rimaril
on conce ts and in 1990 Ira be an to ex lore more advanced desi s to ermit
smaller size and hi er g eld." Comment- - The Secretary’s comments
were made prior to the publication of the NIE, so the citation of the NIE
here is irrelevant. The Committee should include intelligence assessments
which were published before the statement in question such as the
following: • "By 1991, Iraq had demonstrated sufficient
calculational capability and an understanding of high-explosive systems to
design devices with yields of as much as - for large diameter weapons and
as much as _ for more advanced designs." PWR031202- 12 • 1999 JAEIC
assessment- "According to all available information, nuclear desi
efforts from 1988 through mid-1990 were focused primarily on - concepts
and, in 1990, Iraq began to explore more advanced designs to permit
smaller size and higher yield." • 1999 DIA assessment, DoD Futures
Intelli ence Pro am, "It reviousl erformed field • March 14, 2002
SPWR, Iraq: Nuclear Weapon Design Program PubNo.· SPWR031402- 02,
According to Iraqi-supplied documents, seized Ir i documents, and re ortin
from Iraqi defectors, Iraq by early 1991 had researched desi and had
conducted substantial work on an advanced esign 130
Amendments 41 and 41 a Page 14, last paragraph — In September 2002
the Vice President stated that there was “irrefutable evidence "
that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. As noted, several
intelligence agencies assessed that reconstitution was underway, but the
Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive
(State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any
reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU.
Amendment 41 — strike but the Department of Energy assessed that the
evidence was less conclusive. and insert . In an assessment in Au st 2002
the DOE said multi le-source re ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is
seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin
roduces no "smokin n " continued vi `lance is re uired re ardin
Ira ’s attem ts to re `uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." At
hearin before the SSCI in S tember 2002 however the DCI testified that
"Ira ’s a essive ursuit of gh stren aluminum tubes rovides com
ellin evidence that Saddam is attem tin to reconstitute a uranium
enrichment effort for Ba dad’s nuclear wea ons ro am." No dissentin
o inion re ardin reconstitution was included in this testimon and the DOE
witness testified that his a enc had no disa eement with testimon resented
about Ira reconstitutin its nuclear ro am. Amendment 4-1(a) — strike
(State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any
reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU.
Comment — Testimony from the DCI on September 17, 2002 to the SSCI and
the SASC says "Iraq’s aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum
tubes provides compelling evidence that Saddam is attempting to
reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons
program? There are no dissenting views mentioned on reconstitution during
this testimony at all. The DOE never used the words "less
conc1usive." We also note that State/INR could not possibly convey an
agreement with DOE to policymakers if it did not publish a judgment. In
addition, this information was added to the report after the majority
imposed amendment filing deadline, without the permission of the minority,
which is inappropriate. 131
Amendment 42 Page 15 - Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice
President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding
a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by
intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial
disagreements that existed in the intelligence community. Prior to the
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies
assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons
program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence.
The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being
reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State
Department ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that
reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which
argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a
nuclear program. Amendment 42 — strike the conclusion as drafted and
insert All olic aker statements reviewed in this section were
substantiated y the available intelli ence. Comment- It is impossible for
us to properly analyze the claims in this conclusion without knowing which
specific statements the report is referencing. Also, it is incorrect to
say that "others" disagreed or expressed doubts about the
evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. At most, only one agency
expressed any doubt about the reconstitution judgment and not in any
document published outside its own agency prior to publication of the NIE.
Although not stated definitely we believe that the statements this
conclusion is referencing were made prior to the ‘ publication of the
NIE, so the inclusion of INR’s dissent referenced in the NIE is
irrelevant and unfair to those speakers. Additionally, it is misleading to
discuss DOE’s dissent on the aluminum tubes but not include the fact
that DOE agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
Amendment 43 Page 16, Postwar Findings — entire section. Amendment 43
—- strike the postwar findings section Comment - None of the postwar
Endings has citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with
citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant
to whether policymakers statements made prior to the war were
substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was
already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely
to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they
turned out to be wrong. 132
Amendment 54 Page 26, third paragraph - The DIA issued a report in
February 2003, Iraq.· Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting
Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for
Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, ‘palm
and date tree groves ..., " but this report was issued ajier
Secretary Powell ’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There
was operational intelligence trajjzic on this issue prior to the Secretary
’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical
assessments. Amendment 54 — Strike the above paragraph and insert The
CIA rovided an intelli ence re ort for use in Secret Powell’s UN s eech
which said that an lra i missile bri ade commander su ervised the dis
ersal of his bri ade’s al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in order to
hide them from UN ins ectors. The re ort said that some of the missiles
had warheads containin an ‘“unknown biolo ` cal a ent’ and that the
missiles were hidden in "lar e alm oves." Comment- The document
which we asked the drafters to incorporate is not "operationa1
intelligence traf’ric" as stated in the report. lt is a TD
(telegraphic dissemination), or intelligence report, and it was provided
to the Committee by the CIA when the Committee asked specifically what
information it provided to Secretary Powell for use in this speech. The
fact that the Committee is unaware of "analytical assessments"
is irrelevant, because the Committee agreed to use
"intelligence" to compare to statements, not just "ana1ytic
assessments." This report was included in the Committee’s Erst Iraq
report on page 243 and should be included in this report as well. 133
_ Amendment 58 Page 28, BW Conclusions — Conclusion 2: Statements in
the major speeches analyzed as well additional statements, regarding Iraq
’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and
use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence
information. Intelligence assessments from the late J 990s through early
2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and
the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities
included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type
of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence
assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological
weapons or that it was activebi producing them, though other assessments
did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss
intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were
explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 58 — Strike Prior to the
October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as
to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively
producing them, though other assessments did not present such
uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s
biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE.
Comments — We do not think that the report has given any examples of
intelligence assessments prior to the 2002 NIE which "left open the
question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was
actively producing them" except the 2000 ICA, which was published
more than two years before the policymakers’ statements were made and
before any of them entered office. In addition, we do not believe there
were any intelligence gaps articulated in the October 2002 NIE about Iraq’s
BW program, with the possible exception of a lack of understanding of the
specifics about the types of weapons and biological agents that analysts
stated were in the possession of the Iraqi government. If the report
drafters think there are such gaps they should be described in the report.
Amendment 59 Page 28, Postwar Intelligence, entire section Amendment
59(a) — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe
that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’
statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence
available at the time. This information was already reported in another
Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may
think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 134
_ Amendment 68 ‘ Page 37-38, Conclusions — Conclusion 4: Statements
by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq ’s chemical weapons production
capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community ’s
uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence
community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons
production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in
its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior
to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm
that production was ongoing. Amendment 68 — Strike the above conclusion
and insert Conclusion 4: Statements y senior olic akers re ardin Ira ’s
chemical wea ons roduction ca abili and activities were all substantiated
y intelli ence information. - Comment- We dispute several of the
contentions in this conclusion. The intelligence community assessed both
before and alter the NIE that Iraq had a chemical weapons production
capability, not just that Saddam wanted one. (See the CIA SEM Dec 2001 —
"Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons
production capability by reconstructing dual- use industrial facilities
and developing new chemical plants .... ") Most of the assessments
which judged that actual production was ongoing were contemporaneous with
the NIE or slightly prior (see Tenet’s testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee and SSCI below and the unclassified White Paper), but
not all of them. More importantly, prior to the production of the NIE, no
policymakers said that production was ongoing. If the report concludes
that such statement is not substantiated, the report should clearly
identify it so that it can be analyzed. • We assess that Iraq retains a
stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent . . . Moreover, Iraq is rebuilding
former chemical weapons facilities, developing plants, and trying to
procure chemical warfare-related items covertly . . . Based on these
construction and procurement activities, we assess that Iraq has a covert
chemical wea ons roduction ca abili embedded in its civilian indus . Tenet
testimony before SASC and SSCI September 16, 2002. • The main production
building at Ira ’s Fallujah III chemical plant appears to have resumed
operation, according to h . . . The Intelligence Community suspects this
site supports production of CW precursors as well as the biological
warfare agent ricin, extracted from castor oil beans. INR, Iraq: Suspect
CB WProduction Facility Active, November 5, 200]. _ 135
Amendment 69 Page 38, Postwar Findings section Amendment 69 — Strike
the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar
findings are in any way relevant to whether policy1nakers’ statements
made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the
time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is
unnecessary, and is likely to mislead readers who might think statements
are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. Amendment 70 _ Page
40, second f11ll paragraph, (Scope Note) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons
of mass a’estruction' (or ‘WIMDQ is commonly used to refer
collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Amendment 70 -
Strike the scope note paragraph and insert Accordin to the October 2002
Ira WMD 'White Pa er Ira ’s biolo ` cal chemical ballistic missile and
nuclear wea ons ro arns were collectivel referred to as wea ons of mass
destruction { WMQ) Comment! Suggestion — We disagree that the
intelligence community’s use of the term "WMD" excluded
ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery vehicles. The Iraq WMD White
Paper (or unclassified NIE) specifically states, "The Gulf war
damaged Saddam Husayn’s biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and
nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass
destruction (WIv D)." The 2002 classified NIE on Iraq’s WMD
programs included four categories including delivery systems. The report’s
definition of what is included in the term WMD is incorrect and should
include delivery systems. 'While this report’s inclusion of the DOD’s
definition of WMD is interesting, this report is examining intelligence
community judgments, not DOD’s. What matters is what the intelligence
community included in defining WMD in 2002 which, the above reference to
the NIE and White Papers makes clear, included delivery systems. _ 136
_ Amendment 71 and 71 a Page 40, last full paragraph - In the Vice
President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that “there is no
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction, " and
that “there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a
former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of prolq’eration
of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that
preemptive action was necessary. As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass
destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed
that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Amendments 71 — Strike He also
quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of
proly'eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as
evidence that preemptive action was necessary. Amendment 71(a) - Strike As
noted the term 'weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer
collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence
community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Comments —
We have several comments about these paragraphs: (1) Again, as stated
above and as defined by the IC, the term WMD also includes delivery
systems; (2) It seems that the report is actually trying to show that the
Vice President misrepresented the intelligence because he used the
collective term WMD rather than specifically stating biological, chemical
weapons and the means to deliver those weapons. The Vice President clearly
said in the speech that Iraq was working on developing nuclear weapons—which
shows there was no effort to include nuclear weapons among the WMD he said
Iraq had; and (3) The use of a collective term does not indicate that all
elements of that term must exist for the term to be true and the
intelligence community regularly uses the term WMD to refer to some WMD
elements. For example: • Tenet’s Threat Hearing testimony said:
"Intelligence reporting on Saddam’s intentions to use WMD is clear
and consistent .... " • CIA/NESA PC briefing book points stated
that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has
repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production
capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement."
• Tenet testimony for SASC/ S SCI "Thus, experience shows that his
regime will maintain weapons of mass destruction for use, not just
deterrence" and "Saddam will never end his pursuit and
possession of weapons of mass destruction" and Saddam "rnay
decided that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in
conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance
. . . ." • August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological
Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to
address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass
destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a
strategic deterrent .... " 137
Amendments 81-82 - Page 48, third non-bullet paragraph - The Iraqi
regime was known to have constructed underground facilities for a variety
of purposes, but the intelligence community was not aware of any large,
deeply-buried facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the
regime might be using underground facilities to conceal weapons
activities, and there was some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this,
but no intelligence agency claimed to know the location of any active
underground WIMD facilities, and none expressed certainty that such
facilities existed. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that
“elements of the regime ’s weapons of mass destruction (WYMD) and
ballistic missile rograms probably are located in under round facilities
but iieieii iiiiii _ nor intelligence sources have confirmed any WMD- or
ballistic missile related underground facilities. " An August 2002
DL4 report noted that “Iraq has reportedly rebuilt its full ojfensive B
W program in well-concealed, underground, mobile or dyficult-to- locate
facilities " but went on to state that “no biological weapons (BW)—related
underground facilities are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq
Amendment 81-82 -— Strike the above paragraph and insert - The intelli
ence communi had lon assessed that the Ira i re ` e had hardened or under
ound WMD stora e facilities and W"MD facilities dis ised as civilian
installations both to im ede detection y ins ectors and intelli ence
services and to rotect facilities from air attack. Intelli ence a encies
assessed that Ira had dee l buried under ound facilities but had not
identiied y of these facilities.2O4 The Defense Intelli ence A enc
assessed in 2001 that "elements of the re `me’s wea ons of mass
destruction ( W MQ) and ballistic missile ro ams robabl are located in
under ound facilities " notin that "numerous re orts before and
after DESERT SHIELD/ STORM mentioned the existence of nuclear biolo ` cal
chemical and ballistic missile roduction and stora e sites that were
shallow buried UGFs or in a few instances even de under ound facilities.
The assessment also noted that i
have confirmed y WMD- or ballistic missile related under ound
facilities." An Au st 2002 DIA re ort also discussed r orts of
shallow and de l buried biolo `cal warfare facilities. The r ort said that
"des ite these man credible re orts and no functionin biolo `cal wea
ons B - related under ound facilities are currentl confirmed to be in use
in Ira ".2°5 Comment- Despite fixes made to this paragraph based on
our earlier comments, as draiied it still is far more dismissive of the
intelligence community’s assessments of underground facilities than the
assessments themselves were. The reports should use the language used in
the analytic papers. ’°‘N1c, Denial and Deception Nm, 1998 2°5 DIA,
Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December l4, 2001; DIA, Iraq:
Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002. iii
Amendment 83 Page 48, last paragraph — page 49, Erst paragraph - In
November 2002, the National Intelligence Council noted in an assessment
prepared in response to a request from the Secretary of Deknse, that
"all the military and regime-associated UGFs underground facilities]
we have identyied thus far are vulnerable to conventional,
precision-guided penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried
Amendment 83 — strike the above paragraph Comment- The November 2002 NIE
was published two months after the Secretary spoke and is therefore
irrelevant to what he said. In addition, only select information was taken
from this NIE which gives a distorted picture of what the NIE said. The
following relevant information was excluded: • "To date, the
Community has located over 490 Iraqi operational UGFS associated with the
military or the regime. • "We assess that Iraq has some large,
deeply buried UGFS, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception
(D&D) program, we have not been able to locate any of these. •
"All the military and regime-associated UGFs underground facilities]
we have identified thus far are vulnerable to conventional,
precision-guided, penetrating munitions because they are not deeply
buried. • "The number of UGFs identified and the suspected number
of UGFs still tmlocated pose problems for effective operations of any UN
inspection regime."2O6 206 National Intelligence Council,
Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security,
November 2002. 139
_ Amendment 85 Page 49-50, conclusions - Conclusion 5: Statements by
the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense
regarding Iraq ’s possession of weapons of mass destr·uction were
generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many
statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected
a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves.
Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that
there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing
weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at
this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological
munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence
gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether
production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did
not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively
producing any weapons of mass destruction. Amendment 85 — strike
generally and strike everything after information Comment - We disagree
with the use of the term "generally," because all of the
statements were substantiated by the intelligence. Furthermore, the lack
of identifying information about exactly which policymakers’ statements
were viewed by the authors as reflecting a higher degree of certainty than
the intelligence judgments makes it impossible for us to challenge the
assertion (which we believe we could if the specific statements were
identified). The conclusion is incorrect in asserting that there were
"many statements regarding ongoing production prior to late
2002." This is simply false. None of the statements from this time
period mentioned ongoing production at all. It is also false to state that
"many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed
that there was no doubt" about Iraq’s possession of VVIVID. Only
one policymaker used the term "no doubt" during this time period
and it was in August 2002, not early 2002. This type of careless review
certainly will be noticed by the readers of the report and harms the
credibility of the Committee. We disagree with the comment that prior to
2002 the intelligence community "expressed room for doubt" about
whether Iraq possessed chemical and biological munitions and believe, even
if it were true, assessments prior to 2002 are irrelevant to what
policymakers said in late 2002. We also disagree with including the
comment that the intelligence community did not "collectively"
assess that Iraq was actively producing any WMD. Whether the intelligence
community had a "collective" judgment is irrelevant. The task of
this report is not to look at only collective judgments; it is to examine
available intelligence. 140
Amendment 86 Page 50, conclusions - Conclusion 6: The Secretary of
Defense ’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WYWD
facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes was not
substantiated by available intelligence information. While many
intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using
underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground
WZMD facilities had been positively identyfied. Furthermore, none of the
underground government facilities that had been identified were buried
deeply enough to be sa]% from conventional airstrikes. Amendment 86 —
Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 6: The Secreta of
Defense’s statement that Ira i WMD facilities were not all vulnerable to
attack from the air was substantiated y available intelli ence
information. Comment — First, the Secretary did not say
"conventional" airstrikes, he said that sites "were not all
vulnerable to attack from the air." No intelligence assessments prior
to the Secretary’s statement said that "none of the underground WMD
facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe
from conventional airstrikes." Furthermore, the Secretary was not
only talking about facilities that were vulnerable due to being deeply
buried. He also discussed facilities that were believed to have been
located near mosques, schools, and hospitals which made them "not
vuh1erable" to airstrikes unless we were willing to possibly strike
those civilian facilities. Amendment 87 i Page 50, postwar findings
Amendment 87 — strike this section. Comment - We do not believe that
postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’
statements made prior to the war were substar1tiated by intelligence
available at the time. This information was already reported in another
Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may
think statements are unsub star1tiated if they turned out to be wrong. 141
Amendment 90 Page 54, third paragraph - Intelligence assessments
regarding UA Vs shy‘ted ajter the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE,
Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland Through 2007, published in
January 2003, did not describe Iraq ’s UA V program as 'probably
intended " for biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that
“Iraq may be modyjiing UA Vs "for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted
that Iraqi UA Vs could reach the United States, gf they were transported
(in some unspecy‘ied manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers.
" Amendment 90 — strike the above paragraph and the next two
paragraphs. Comment- We do not believe that a document published in
January, three months after the President made the speech should be
analyzed in this section. It is not relevant to what the President said in
October and, even if it were, the Threats to the Homeland NIE expressed
the same concems that the President addressed in his speech, that the UAVs
could be used to target the Homeland. Additionally, the NIE used the term
"strike" the Homeland, not "reach" the Homeland. 142
Bush / Clinton Suspicious Death List Body Count / Attack:
Aalund, James Downing; Adams, Doug, Adger, Sid; Al-huk,Mohammed Zia;
Baldridge, Malcolm;Barkley, Maj. William; Baugh, Gandy; Bates, Robert; Baxter, Clifford J.;
Bearden, Boonie; Boggs, Hale; Boorda, Jeremy 'Mike'; Branscum, Herby; Brown,
Ron; Bunch, James; Butera, Eric; Caradori, Gary; Carnaby, Roland; Casey, William;
Casolaro,
Danny; Colby, William; Coleman, Suzanne; Collins, Gregory; Curie, Betty brother
Theodore Williams Jr.; Corbin, Michael; Damus, Robert G.; Davis, L. J.; Delaney, Jack;
Delaughter,
Doc; Densberger, Col. William; Dickson, Steve; Dutko, Daniel A. Eisman,
Dennis; Farish, William S.; Ferguson, Kathy; Ferrat, Mohamed Samir; Forrestal,
James; Foster, Vincent; Fox, Cpl. Eric S.; Friday, Hershell; Fuentes, Rosa; Gandy, Baugh;
Gibbs, Judy; Gosch, Johnny; Graham, Gary; Grober, Paula; Guerrin, Larry; Haney,
Staff Sgt. Brian Harris, Lt. Col. William; Hartmann, Peter; Hatfield,
James; Heard, Stanley; Herndon, Lance; Henry, Don; Hillier, John; Hamd, Riad, Holland, Don;
Holton, Michael; Horton, Jake; Huggins, Stanley; Hume, Sandy; Hunt, Mrs. E.
Howard; Hunziker, Evan; Ives, Kevin; Johnson, Gary; Jorton, Jake Jerkuic,
Niko; Kangas,
Steve; Kelly, Col. Robert; Kelly, Shelly; Kennedy, Robert Fitzgerald; Kennedy,
John F. Jr.; Kettleson, Jordan; Killian, Lt. Col. Jerry B.; Kokal, John; Koney,
Kieth; bin Laden, Salem; Laughton, Johnny; Lawhon, Johnny Jr.; Lawrence, Larry;
LeBleu, Conway; Letelier, Orlando; Lombardi, Mark; Luna, Jonathan; Mahoney, Mary; Martin,
Florence; McCoy, Don; McDougal, James; McKaskle, Keith; McKechan, Todd;
McMillan, Colin; Meissner, Charles; Merrill, Phillip; Milam, James; list compiled by Steve
Francis, NewsFollowUp.com, Millis, John; Miller, Charles Milbourne; Miller,
Ron;Milosevic, Slobodan; Moffit, Ronni; Mohrenschildt, George de; Moody, Neal;
Moser, Tony; Nichols, Larry; Nir, Amiram; Novinger, Darlene; Olson, Paull;
O'Neil, John; Palme, Olaf; Parks, Luther (Jerry); Patrick, Dennis; Perdue,
Sally; Raiser, Montgomery; Raiser, Victor C. II; Reynolds, Capt Scott; Rhodes,
Spec. Gary; Rhodes, Jeff; Rice, Charles Dana; Robertson, Maj. Gen. William;
Rogers, Dr. Ronald; Rose, Gen. James; Ruff, Charles; Sabel, Marine Sgt, Tim;
Samples, Mike; Sanford, Paul; Schoedinger, Margie, Seal, Barry; Shelton, Bill; Sleeping Indian
Mountain C-130; Spence, Craig; Spence, David Wayne; Spiro, Ian; Standoff, Alan;
Tucker, Karla Faye; Tilly, Paul; Tower, John Sen.; Walker, Jon Parnell; Walraven,
Calvin; Watkins, James Daniel; Webb, Maynard; Weiss, Gus W.; Welch, Russel;
Wellstone, Paul Sen.; Wilcher, Paul; Wilhite, Jim; Wiley, Dr. Don C.; Willey, Ed; Williams, Robert;
Williams, Theodore Jr.; Willis, Steve; Wilson, John; Winters, Richard; Wise,
Barbera; Yeakey, Terrance; Chinese embassy Yugoslavia: Yunhuan, Shao;
Xinghu, Xu
and his wife, Zhu Ying,; 9/11 WTC victims, Flight 93 victims, Flight 77 /
Pentagon victims, 1 million Iraqis. Franklin Scandal Omaha, White House call boy
related: Aaron Owen, Shawn Boner, Bill Baker, Newt Copple, Clare Howard, Mike
Lewis, Joe Malek, Charlie Rodgers, Dan Ryan, Curtis Tucker, Harmon Tucker.
http://www.newsfollowup.com Will the Republicans
assassinate Obama? probably ... there's too much at stake and Hillary will
follow their course. Clinton Death List
Amendment 96 Page 57-58 - Conclusion 8: Statements by the President,
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing
unmanned aerial vehicles (UA Vs) that could be used to deliver chemical or
biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence
information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving
views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V
program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force
intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas
probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the
January 2003 NIE said that Iraq “may " be modiyjring UA Vs for
chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense
Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was “not
sujficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so. "
Amendment 96 — strike generally; strike but did not convey the
substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the
intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V program that was
intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence
dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas probably being
developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE
said merely that Iraq might be modiyying UA Vs for chemical or biological
weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued
that the evidence for this was unpersuasive. and i11sert @ intelli ence a
encies assessed that lra ’s UAVs could be used for CBW delive . Comments
— Again, we disagree with the terms "generally" and we
disagree that there was any disagreement within the intelligence community
about whether the UAVs "could" be used to deliver CBW as the
conclusion states. All agencies agreed that the UAVs could be used to
deliver CBW, which is all that policymakers said. We further note that the
Air Force dissent on the intended use of the UAVs was not included in the
President’s summary of the NIE. 143
Amendment 97 Page 58 - Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that
the Iraqi government was considering using UA Vs to attack the United
States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time,
but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi
procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software
that included data on the United States, and suggested that the Iraqi
government was considering using UA Vs to target the US. The January 2003
NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for
this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency
dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the
Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Amendment 97
— strike but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January
2003. strike and suggested and insert which the IC said su ested ‘
strike The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the
software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense
Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that
the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping
capability. Comment — We believe it is irrelevant whether the judgment
later changed. This report is supposed to determine whether statements
were substantiated by the intelligence policymakers had when they made the
statement, not intelligence that came out later. Additionally, the
President said "we are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using
these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." This statement
is not inconsistent with the NIE published in January. The IC remained
concerned about this possibility. Amendment 98 Page 58, Postwar findings
— entire postwar findings section g Amendment 98 — strike this
section. Comment - None of the postwar findings have citations so we
cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that
postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’
statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence
available at the time. This information was already reported in another
Phase II report, is Lumecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may
think statements are unsubstantiated if they tumed out to be wrong. _ 144
Amendment 99 Page 62, fifth paragraph - Finally, the President stated
that Saddam Hussein was "harboring terrorists and the instruments of
terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. " While this
statement was not specQ‘ic to any group, the placement in the speech and
the context suggests that the President was stating that Hussein was
harboring al Qaeda. The statement appeared two paragraphs after statements
that “...Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy,
" that some "al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq,
" and that “Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and
poisons and deadly gases. " (These statements are discussed elsewhere
in this report. ) The President ’s statement came in the same paragraph
as the statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to
winning the war on terror. " Amendment 99 — Strike the above
paragraph alter the first sentence. Comment- We do not believe the
President ever stated or implied that Saddam Hussein was harboring al-Qa’ida.
In the referenced text he spoke specifically about harboring non-al-Qa’ida
groups. We think it is stretching this project too far to not only purport
to be the judge and jury of what policymakers said, but also what staff
believes they "suggested" or "implied." Amendment 106
Page 65, third paragraph - The September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for
Terrorism, which was coordinated with the DIA, stated that al-Libi said
Iraq had ‘provided " unspecU‘ied CBW training for two al-Qa ’ida
associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi “did not know the
results of the training. " Amendment 106 —ai°rer the sentence
above insert Another version of the a er rovided to the Committee with the
same date did not include the comment that al-Libi "did not know the
results of the trainin ." The Committee did not ask wh there were two
versions of this p p and did not ask whether one or both versions were
sent to the White House. Comment - The Committee needs to get an answer
about why there were two reports and find out whether both of them were
disseminated. The report also should include the comments from both
versions, not choose the one that best supports the point the authors are
trying to make. _ 145
Amendment 108 Page 65, last paragraph — Months prior to the speech
and in the latter intelligence products cited above, questions were raised
in finished intelligence about al-Libi ’s credibility. Amendment 108 —
insert a new paragraph before the discussion of the State of the Union
which says the following: Des ite these issues when the White House
submitted the s eech for CIA fact checkin and sources and methods
clearances a CIA staff member told the DCI in writin that the CIA anal st
had "read all the terrorism ara a hs and said it was all oka .” em
hasis ori ` al (all okay should be underlined.) Comments - We know that
this speech was fact checked by the CIA and we have this handwritten
comment which shows that the CIA approved the language in the terrorism
section. This should be stated in the report 146
_ Amendment 1 19 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 12: Statements and
implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq
and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida
with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.
Intelligence assessments, including multiple CL4 reports and the November
2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al-Qa ’ida were cooperating
partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no
intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide
weapons of mass destruction to al-Qa ’ida. The credibility of the
principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al-Qa
’ida with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly
questioned by DL4, and later by the CL4. The Committee repeats its
conclusion from a prior report that “assessments were inconsistent
regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) training to al-Qa ’ida. " Amendment 119
—— strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 12: Statements y
the President and Secreta Powell that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea
ons trainin were su orted y the intelli ence. Numerous intelli ence
assessments stated that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea ons trainin
and s eciiicall trainin in oisons and ases. VVhi1e some DIA re orts raised
uestions about the credibili of this re ortin and one CIA re ort noted
that the source ma have exa erated his re ortin in a se arate area the CIA
did not raise uestions about the source’s wea ons trainin re ortin an in
fac rovided and a roved the use of this lan a e in both the President’s
and Secreta ’s remarks. Comments - None of the statements provided in
this report suggested or implied that Iraq and al- Qa’ida had
"partnership." Additionally, while there were policymakers who
commented that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, those
comments were fully supported by the intelligence. The al-Libi reporting
on CBW training was never questioned by the CIA and the information was
approved by the CIA for use in both the President’s Cincinnati speech
and Powell’s UN speech. In the case of the Powell speech CIA actually
provided the information to him to use in the speech in the draft of the
speech the CIA wrote. Furthermore, the conclusion as drafted says that
intelligence community "asses sments were inconsistent" so
accordingly, how can the Committee judge policymakers to not have any
statements substantiated by the intelligence? 147
Amendment 120 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 13: Statements in the
major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s
contacts with al-Qa’ida were substantiated by intelligence information.
However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the
intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the
impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or
support of al-Qa ’ida. Amendment 120 — strike However, policymakers’
statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the
nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the .. contacts led
to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa ’ida. Comments - We
disagree that policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the
nature of the contacts or left the impression that the contacts led to
substantive Iraqi cooperation. Policymaker comments throughout this
section nearly exactly matched what the intelligence community said about
contacts. No policymaker implied that the contacts led to any Iraqi _
support of al-Qa’ida other than the safehaven, training, reciprocal
non-aggression, which is well documented in numerous intelligence
assessments. Furthermore, the comments from many of the policymakers
outlined in the section were factchecked by the CIA. The report should
identify the policymakers and the specific statements that are judged to
be misleading so that we can analyze those statements. Amendment 121 Page
72, conclusions - Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not
confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in
2001. Amendment 121 - strike the above conclusion Comments - At the time
that the Vice President commented that "it’s been pretty well
confirmed that Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior
official of the Iraqi intelligence service" a CIA assessment said,
"The Czech governmentlast week ublicl confirmed that suspected hij
acker Muhammad Atta met with former Iraqi station chief Ahmad Khalil
Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague before al-Ani’s expulsion from the Czech
Republic last April. Al-Ani and Atta met during 8-9 April in Prague,
according to a foreign government service." (Emphasis added.) _ 148
Amendment 122 Page 72, Postwar findings — entire section Amendment
122 — strike all postwar findings Comment — None of the postwar
Endings have citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with
citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant
to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were
substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was
already reported in another Phase ll report, is unnecessary, and is likely
to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they
turned out to be wrong. Amendment 125 Page 74, first non-bullet paragraph
— In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the
Secretaigv of State all discussed Iraq ’s intentions regarding weapons
of mass destruction. Both the President and the Wce President indicated
that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with
terrorist groups. Amendment 125 — strike the above sentence.
Comment/suggestion —None of these individuals discussed 1raq’s
"intentions" regarding WMD or anything else. Both the President
and the Vice President expressed concern that Saddam could share WMD with
terrorists, not that he intended to do so and they did not say or
"indicate" that he was "prepared” to do so. _ 149
| |
| IIa
110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER
PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE
SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL
AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be
printed |
|
_ Amendment 126 Page 74, second — fourth full paragraphs - (U) In the
Vice President ’s August 2002 speech 0n Iraq, he discussed “the case
of Saddam Hussein and indicated that Saddam was ‘prepared to share
weapons of mass destruction] with terrorists who intend to inflict
catastrophic casualties on the United States. " (U) At the time of the
Vice President ’s speech, the intelligence community did not assess that
Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with
terrorists. The intelligence community had previously assessed that Saddam
was interested in acquiring WMD to deter hostile foreign powers (including
Israel, Iran, and the US—led Coalition) and as a means of achieving
"regionalpreeminence. " (U) The intelligence community had also
assessed that Saddam was unlikely to take actions that he believed would
threaten the survival of his regime, and that he believed hostile actions
such as a re-invasion of Kuwait would infact threaten his regime ’s
survival. Amendment 126 — strike the above three paragraphs and insert
In the Vice President’s Au st 2002 s eech on g, he discussed the threat
of al- a’ida’s ursuit of wea ons of mass destruction. He noted that
Cold War doctrines do not pp y in this scenario notin that
"containment is not ossible when dictators obtain wea ons of mass
destruction and are re ared to share them with terrorists who intend to
inflict catastro hic casualties on the United States." S ecificall re
ardin Ira "armed with an arsenal of these wea ons of terror" he
said "Saddarn Hussein could then be ex ected to seek domination of
the entire Middle East take control of a eat ortion of the world’s ener
su lies directl threaten America’s friends throu out the re ' on and sub
`ect the United States to y other nation to nuclear b1ackmai1."
Comment- The Vice President did not say that Saddam was "prepared to
share WMD with terrorists," nor did he indicate as much. The report
should analyze what he said, not the drafters’ interpretation of his
comments. The VP was talking about al-Qa’ida pursuing WMD and said that
Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment do not work against these
kinds of enemies. He said "containment is not possible when dictators
obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with
terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United
States." He then went on in the next paragraph separately to discuss
the case of Saddam Hussein. The report should not say that he said
something about Saddam when he never even mentioned Saddam at all. 150
Amend1nent 127 Page 75, last three paragraphs — In the President 's
September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated
that Saddam Hussein was a “grave and gathering danger and that t0 assume
Saddam ’s good faith would be tantamount to betting “the lives of
millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. " The
President also implied that the Iraqi regime was dangerous because it
might provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists (“And our
greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad
ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to
kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all
these dangers .... U The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam
Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith and assessments regarding
the potential use of WYMD were not based on assumptions of good faith. As
discussed, the 1999 NIE on Iraqi military capabilities noted that it was
dyjicult to gauge Saddam ’s intentions, but judged that he would be
carejizl not to put his regime ’s survival at risk. Amendment 127-
Strike In one place - in one regime — we find all these dangers .... U;
Strike The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt
with other countries in good faith and assessments regarding the potential
use of WMD were not based on assumptions of good faith. and insert In a
December 15 2001 assessment titled The Ira i Threat the CIA said
"Saddam sees himself as a an-Arab leader and views his re ' e as the
most orious cha ter in Ira i histo . . . His decision-makin is ided y o
ommism distrust of others a ersonal need for ower and the sense that he is
an historic fi e who must take bold risks to advance Ira ’s interests.
He views state ower rimaiil in milit terms—twice launchin wars a air1st
his nei bors—and his strate 'c aim is to establish Ira as the reeminent
ower in the Persian Gulf." Comment- The last portion of the comment
Hom the President in the second paragraph above was not referencing Saddam
giving weapons to terrorists as the draft suggests. The President had
explained several dangers in the previous few paragraphs including poverty
and raging disease, ethnic and religious strife, and outlaw groups which
accept no law and have no limit to their violent ambitions. These were the
dangers he was talking about, but when the comments are taken out of
context, that understanding is lost. Also, trying to contradict the
President by saying what the intelligence community did not assess is
ridiculous. The President did not claim that this was an intelligence
community judgment. 111
Amendment 128 Page 76, first four full paragraphs - At the time of the
President ’s UN speech, the October 2002 NIE was still being prepared,
and was two weeks away from release. While the document itseb’ was not
available at this time, its consistency with the 1999 NIE, and the lack of
contradictory assessments in the intervening four year period, illustrate
the continuity of the intelligence community ’s judgments on this topic.
(ID The October 2002 NIE assessed that "Saddam 's past actions
suggest that a decision to use WMD probabhr would come when he feels his
personal survival is at stake even after he has exhausted all political,
military and diplomatic options It noted that it the US would be unlikehr
to know when Saddam felt that he had no other options for sefpreservation,
but pointed out that “Iraq ’s methodical conventional defensive
preparations alsocsuggest Saddam thinks an attack is not imminent
".2"7 (ID Additionally, the NIE pointed out that “Iraq 's
historical use of C Wagainst Iran and its decision not to use VWWD against
Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates that an opponent’s
retaliatory capability is a critical factor in Saddam ’s decisionmaking.
"2"8 (U) The NIE also examined a variety of ways in which Iraq
might conceivably use WAID, and noted that overall “we have low
confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use VWWD. "
Amendment 128- strike all of the above paragraphs. Comment- An NIE
published after the President’s speech is irrelevant. National
Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction, October 2002. Ibid. _ 152
_ Amendments 129 Page 76, last paragraph - While the October 2002 NIE
assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, it judged
that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the
United States at that time. According to the NIE, "Baghdad for now
appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with
conventional or CBWagainst the United States, fearing that exposure of
Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war.
" Amendment 129 — strike this paragraph and the next two
paragraphs. Comment- The NIE did not say that Saddam was unwilling to
conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time.
Furthermore, we believe all of this analysis and the analysis in the '
next two paragraphs are irrelevant and should be deleted. The President
was not making a comment about what Iraq was likely to do now, he was
specifically talking about the danger of waiting until Saddam had more
powerful weapons which could change his calculations about the wisdom of
giving WMD to terrorists. Nothing in the intelligence reporting casts
doubt on the President’s comments that Iraq "could" give WMD
to terrorists. Amendment 130 Page 77, second paragraph - As discussed
elsewhere in this report, in October 2002 most intelligence agencies
assessed that Iraq reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. The State
Department ’s Oyjice of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) believed
that Saddam Hussein wanted to possess nuclear weapons, and was maintaining
some capabilities with dual uses, but judged that the available evidence
did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution. "
Amendment 130 — aher the above start a new paragraph and insert In a
statement released y the DCI about the President’s comment he said
"There is no inconsistenc between out view of Saddam’s owin threat
and the view as ex ressed y the President in his s eech. Althou we think
the chances of Saddam initializin a WMD attack at this moment are low-in p
because it would constitute an admission that he ossesses WMD-there is no
uestion that the likelihood of Saddarn’s usin W1v1D a ainst the United
States or our allies in the re ` on for blackmail deterrence or otherwise
ows as his arsenal continues to build. His ast use of WMD a ainst civilian
and milit tar ets shows that he roduces these wea ons to use not `ust to
deter. Comment- The statement released by the DCI is relevant in this
section and should be included. It explains that the President’s
comments were consistent with the intelligence at the time and that the
President and the intelligence in question were discussing two different
things. We believe it also illustrates why the entire intent section is a
distortion of what the policymakers in question were discussing, which was
not Saddarn’s intent at all. 153
Amendment 1 3 1 Page 77, last two paragraphs — page 78, iirst two
full paragraphs — As discussed the October 2002 NIE judged that Saddam
Hussein was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United
States at that time. More generally, it suggested that Saddam would
probably decide to use WI\@ only y' he jelt he had no other options for
survival and that "an opponent ’s retaliatory capability"
would be a key factor in making this decision. A November 2002 NIE on
nontraditional threats restated the October NIE ’s assessment about
Saddam ’s willingness, y' "sujjiciently desperate " to employ
an outside terrorist group to conduct an attack on the US as his
"last chance for vengeance. " This NIE included the caveats that
the intelligence community had low confidence in this assessments, and
that "INR believes that the intelligence community has no reporting
to support this assertion. " The October 2002 NIE ’s conclusions
were essentially repeated again in a January 2003 Intelligence Community
Assessment which said that "Saddam probably will not initiate
hostilities for fear of providing Washington with justdication to invade
Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow, especially y' he
perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is imminent. "
Neither of these reports specqically focused on what Saddam might do y' he
had nuclear weapons or a 'full arsenal" of chemical and biological
weapons, possibbr because the intelligence community believed that Iraq
was still years away from possessing either of these. Amendment 131 —
Strike the first and last paragraphs above Comment- The NIE did not say
that Saddam Hussein was ‘%mwilling" to conduct terrorist attacks
and the President did not say that he would, he said that he could provide
a chemical or biological weapon to terrorists. _ 154
_ Amendment 132 and 133 Page 78, third full paragraph — Secretary of
State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (ID In
the Secretary of State 's February 2003 address t0 the United Nations
Security Council, he stated that “ambition and hatred are enough to
bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, and that "al-Qaida could turn t0
Iraq for help in acquiring expertise 0n weapons of mass destruction.
" Amendment 132 - insert before ambition and hatred "Some
believe some claim that these contacts do not amount to much. The sa
Saddam Hussein’s secular g y and al- a’ida’s reli ' ous g y do not
mix. I am not comforted y this thou t. Amendment 133 — insert a new
paragraph after the paragraph in Amendment 132 which says: Several intelli
ence r oits described a mutual anti ath for the United States as a
motivation for their contacts and dealin s includin the followin : • A
ran e of intelli ence r orts indicates Ba dad and al- a’ida have been in
contact since at least the mid-1990s. Mutual sus icion has blocked coo
eration at various times but shared anti ath toward the US and the Saudi
ro al famil has rovided a otential rationale for coo eration. CIA SPWR Ma
14 2002 • Ira ’s interaction with al- a’ida is im elled y mutual
anti ath toward the United States and the Saudi ro al famil and y Bin Laden’s
interest in unconventional weapons and relocation sites. in contrast to
the atron-client attem between g and its Palestinian surro ates the
relationshi between Saddam and Bin Laden a ears to more closel resemble
that of two inde endent actors gxg gg to ex loit each other—their mutual
sus icion subomed y al- a’ida’s interest in Ira i assistance and Ba
dad’s interest in al- a’ida’s anti-US attacks. Jan 2003 Ira i Su ort
for Terrorism p 11 • Discernin the reasons for Saddam’s contacts and
dealin s with al a’ida is difficult but his main motivation ma be best
ex ressed 5; the old roverb ‘the enem of y enem is y friend} The theme r
eated y sources close to various levels of Saddam’s re ` e is that
Saddam and Bin Laden reco 'zed the United States as a common en | |
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