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• The Use by the Intelligence Committee of Information from the Iraqi National Congress (SEARCHABLE TEXT CREATED BY GOOGLE) Table of Contents and Conclusions and CURVE BALL page 1Introduction page 2Information provided by the Iraqi National Congress page 3Committee Action and Additional Views under construction (see original report) BACK to Ledeen / Fascism pagesPage 11 09th Congress 2d Session SENATE REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON THE USE BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS September 8,2006 - Ordered to be printed Page 2 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS, CHAIRMAN JOHN 0. ROCKEFELLER I”. WEST VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMANORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH MIKE DEWINE. OHIO CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI OLYMPIAJ. SNOWS, MAINE CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA SAXBY CHAMSLISS, GEORGIA CARL LEWN. MICHIGAN D,ANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA RON WYDEN, OREGON E”AN BAYH. INDIANABARBARA A. MIKULSKI. MARYLAND RVSSELL 0. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN SELECT COMMllTEE ON INTELLIGENCE BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE. EX OFFICIO WASHINGTON, DC 2051LJ-6475 HARRY REID, NEVADA, EX OFFICIO JAMES D. HENSLER, JR.. STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL ANDREWW. JOHNSON. MlNORrrY STAFF DIRECTOR September 8,2006 KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE. CHIEF CLERK The Honorable Ted Stevens President Pro Tempore United States Senate Washington, D.C. 205 10 Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the Select Committee on Intelligence, we submit the following unclassified reports, together with additional and minority views, for filing with the Senate: (1) Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links toTerrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments and (2) TIze Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress. Senate Resolution 400 of the 94* Congress (1976) charges the Committee with the duty to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government, and to report to the Senate concerning those activities and programs. Pursuant to its responsibilities under Senate Resolution 400, the Committee has undertaken an in-depth examination of the matters described in the reports. Both reports have been approved by the Committee in both classified and unclassified form. The classified reports are available to Members for reading at the Committee. The classified reports will also be provided to appropriately cleared officials of the Executive branch. The unclassified versions of the reports, which are hereby transmitted for printing, are intended to provide the Senate, and through it, the American public, a substantial factual record upon which to consider the issues covered by the reports. Sincerely, John D. Rockefeller IV Vice Chairman Page 3 REPORT ON THE USE BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS September 8,2006 - Ordered to be printed SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 109th Congress PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS, CHAIRMAN JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH MIKE DEWINE, OHIO CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA RON WYDEN, OREGON EVAN BAYH, INDIANA BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE, EX OFFICIO HARRY REID, NEVADA, EX OFFICIO JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO Page 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. BACKGROUND ON IC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE INC . . . . , . . . . 5. III. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A. INC Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 B. INC-Affiliated Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 1. SourceOne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...40 a. Suspect Nuclear Facility Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 45 d. Postwar Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 2. Source Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3. Source Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @ a. Mistaken Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 b. Intelligence Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4. Source Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 a. Postwar Information on Salman Pak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 5. Source Five . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @ 6. The Would-Be Defector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 C. INC Reporting During DIA ‘s Managementof the ICP . . . . . . . . . . . . $Jj 1. CIA Debrief of INC-walk in (Source Eighteen) . . . . . . . . . . . . JOJ IV. ALLEGED INC-LINKED SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 A. CURVEBALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. SourceNineteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Page 1 Page 5 V.CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 COMMITTEE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..m ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN ROBERTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN R OBERTS JOINED BY SENATORS HATCH , DEWINE, L OTT , CHAMBLISS , AND WARNER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 ADDITIONAL V IEWS OF V ICE CHAIRMAN JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, SENATORS CARL LEVIN , DIANNE F EINSTEIN , RON WYDEN , EVAN BAYH , BARBARA MIKIJLSKI, AND R USS FEINGOLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HATCH JOINED BY CHAIRMAN ROBERTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..m ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR DEWINE 199 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS BOND, LOTT, AND CHAMBLISS. . . . . . . . . . 203 Page 104 family security. weapons procurement, and oil for food program kickbacks.307 The with other reporting were struck by Coalition forces. Others were exploited by special operations forces or other intelligence agencies following major ground operations.309 m In January 2003, the DIA disseminated one report from Source Fourteen a former Iraqi soldier. The report was attributed to a subsource, living in Samawa, Iraq, who had direct and indirect access to the information. The report noted that neither the source nor subsource had a prior reporting history and the reliability of the information was undetermined. The report said Source Fourteen spoke to the subsource in January 2003. The subsource said that earlier in January 2003 the Iraqi Republican Guard was in the process of moving chemical and biological weapons by truck into Samawa. The subsource also said that the citizens of Samawa were being forced to hide sealed boxes in their homes, which the source believed contained chemical or biological weapons. The report did not indicate that the source was affiliated with the Iraqi opposition.310 307 DIA, response to Committee staff request, reports from Source Thirteen. 308 DIA intelligence report, January m2003. 309 DIA response to questions Ii-om Committee staff. 310 DIA intelligence report, January 2003.

The Use by the Intelligence Committee of Information from the Iraqi National Congress (SEARCHABLE TEXT CREATED BY GOOGLE) Table of Contents and Conclusions and CURVE BALL page 1Introduction page 2Information provided by the Iraqi National Congress page 3 Committee Action and Additional Views under construction (see original report) . 

INTRODUCTION

• (U) On February 12, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligenceagreed to refine the terms of reference of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. The Committee agreed that five of the new elements, including “the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC),” would be reviewed in “phase II” of the Iraq inquiry. The Committee released the first phase of the Iraqi review, the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the US. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, on July 9,2004. (U) In reviewing the “use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the INC,” Committee staff endeavored to keep the scope of the review consistent with specific terms of reference to which Committee Members unanimously agreed on February 12,2004. Consistent with the overall scope of the inquiry - “prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq” - this report focuses only on the Intelligence Community’s use of prewar INC information, information provided to the Intelligence Community prior to the March 19, 2003 start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The report describes, in brief, the fact that the Intelligence Community did continue to use and fUnd the collection of INC information for over a year after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but does not provide details regarding how the Intelligence Community used that information and does not include a review of the quality or utility of INC information after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
• (U) This report also does not focus on the Intelligence Community’s use of INC information in the early and mid-1990s. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was the agency with primacy in handling the INC following the 1991 Gulf War, has had a long and tumultuous relationship with the INC, in particular, with the INC’s executive council Chairman Ahmed Chalabi. In Page 3 Page 7 reviewing the history of this interaction, the Committee found significant differences of opinion regarding what led to the termination of the relationship, with each side blaming the other for its failure. The report describes the history of that relationship to provide context to the Intelligence Cornrnunity’s later interaction with the INC, but does not attempt to resolve lingering questions regarding what led to the CIA’s and INC’s mutual disaffection. 
• (U) Finally, the report does not provide a review of the INC’s collection efforts or methods, the INC’s analysis of its own information, or information the INC may have provided to parties other than the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Committee understands that the INC made an effort to widely disseminate its information and brought its information to the attention of U.S. and foreign government officials, think tanks, the international media, foreign intelligence services, and others, all of which are outside the scope of the terms of reference agreed to by Committee Members. The report describes INC defector referrals to U.S. government and former government officials, the media, and foreign intelligence services, only when those referrals pertain to the Intelligence Community’s use of the information. 
• (U) The report describes the general history of the Intelligence Community’s use of INC information and the genesis of how the handling of INC information transitioned from the CIA to the Department of State and, eventually, to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The report focuses on information provided to the Intelligence Community by the INC, in particular, whether and how the Intelligence Community used that information, the inclusion of that information in Intelligence Community analysis, and whether the information played a role in the Intelligence Cornmunity’s judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorism. Page 4 Page 8 
• (U) For clarity, the report makes a distinction between information provided to the Intelligence Community by members of the INC and information provided by sources who were referred to the Intelligence Community by the INC. Because those sources were not members of the INC, the report refers to them as INC- affiliated sources. 
• (U) The Committee notes that the Intelligence Community may have received information from additional INC-affiliated source information from foreign intelligence services that has not been identified as INC-related. The CIA told the Committee “we believe it is likely that some reporting from INC sources may have been fed to the US Intelligence Community via liaison services.” CIA said this belief reflected its lack of visibility into liaison sources and anecdotal information that the INC was bringing sources or allegations about Iraq WMD to other intelligence services, including key liaison partners. II. BACKGROUND ON IC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE INC’ 
• (U) In the Spring of 1991, President George H. W. Bush approved efforts aimed at influencing those in the Iraqi government and military to undertake action to change the Iraqi leadership. This authorization included encouraging individuals or groups, both inside and outside Iraq, who wished to remove Saddam from power and supporting those efforts in a material fashion. It was not the objective or intent of the U.S. Government that Saddam Hussein, or members of his regime, be physically harmed, but this authorization took note that there was a strong possibility that violence of some degree would occur. ’ This section of the report has been redrafted substantially from the classified version to accommodate classification restrictions. Page 9 
• (U) In response to the authorization, and in an effort to reach out to opposition groups and generate ideas to carry out the efforts, in May 199 1, the CIA approached Dr. Ahmed Chalabi, a secular Iraqi Shiite Muslim, who had been living in exile since 1956 and was already a well known opposition figure. With mutual goals of establishing a focal point for rallying the Iraqi opposition, Chalabi and the CIA began to work together. 

• (U) In June of 1992, more than 200 Iraqi opposition leaders met in Vienna. This conference saw the creation of the INC and established a general committee, and smaller leadership and executive committees, to direct opposition efforts against the Iraqi regime.2 
• (U) After the Vienna meeting, Ahmed Chalabi says he began to plan for a larger conference that would include a wider spectrum of opposition parties, including the Islamic groups, which had not participated in the Vienna conference. In October 1992, several hundred representatives attended the INC’s conference in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. The INC elected a three-member leadership council, chose a 25member executive council, and elected Chalabi as its Chairman. The INC also established an office in northern Iraq and announced its political program which included three primary goals: 1) the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime; 2) the establishment of democracy in Iraq; and 3) putting Saddam Hussein and his regime on trial.3 

The Real McCain   and Scoop  McCain's role in WMD cover-up.

Truthout  "But there is another, very different side to John McCain. Away from the headlines and the stirring speeches, a less familiar figure lurks. It is a McCain who plans to fight on in Iraq for years to come and who might launch military action against Iran. This is the McCain whose campaign and career has been riddled with lobbyists and special interests. It is a McCain who has sided with religious and political extremists who believe Islam is evil and gays are immoral. It is a McCain who wants to appoint extreme conservatives to the Supreme Court and see abortion banned. This McCain has a notoriously volatile temper that has scared some senior members of his own party. If McCain becomes the most powerful man in the world it would be wise to know what lies behind his public mask, to look at the dark side of John McCain.  ...    John McCain is an American hero in an age of war and terrorism. As young Americans return in body bags from Iraq and Iranian mullahs cook up uranium, an old soldier like McCain seems a natural choice in a dangerous world. He is the son and grandson of warriors. Both his father and grandfather were four-star admirals. He was even born on a military base, on 29 August 1936, in Panama. And his life story reads like a movie script. The young, rascally McCain, nicknamed 'McNasty' by his classmates, attended the elite West Point military academy. He became a navy pilot, long before Tom Cruise made 'Top Guns' famous, and began his first combat duty in Vietnam in 1966, carrying out countless missions. Then came disaster. He was shot down and held prisoner for five years by brutal North Vietnamese captors. In his stiff gait and damaged arms, he still bears the scars of their tortures. His CV for the White House is written in his suffering as much as in his career as a senator.  ...   That military legacy has made John McCain a legend. But it has not turned him into a peacemaker, at a time when most Americans desperately want the war to end. Anyone hoping for a new president who will quickly bring America's troops home from Iraq had better look elsewhere. McCain has always supported the invasion of Iraq and he wants to support it until at least 2013, or perhaps for many years beyond. He believes withdrawal would be a surrender to terrorists.    ...    That warlike spirit was on full display in Denver when McCain's speech was interrupted repeatedly by anti-war protesters. They stood up, unfurling banners and shouting for a withdrawal from Iraq. When it happened a third time, McCain had had enough. In a voice suddenly filled with steely resolve, McCain broke from his carefully scripted speech and gripped the lectern. He looked out at the audience and spoke slowly. 'I will never surrender in Iraq,' he rasped. 'Our American troops will come home with victory and with honour.' The crowd cheered and chanted: 'John McCain! John McCain!' It was a perfect moment for unrepentant supporters of the Iraq invasion and a McCain who still smarts from defeat in Vietnam. No retreat. No surrender. This time America will win.  ...   McCain believes in projecting American military power abroad. So it is no wonder that the neoconservatives who pushed for war in Iraq have now regrouped around him. McCain's main foreign policy adviser is Randy Scheunemann, who was executive director of the shadowy Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. Other leading neocons on board include John Bolton, America's belligerent former UN ambassador, Bill Kristol, editor of the Neocon bible the Weekly Standard, and Max Boot, who has pushed for a US version of the old British Colonial Office. Another close McCain adviser is former CIA director James Woolsey, who has openly advocated bombing Syria.   ...   Such a group of warlike counsellors has raised fears that McCain may strike Iran to stop its suspected quest for a nuclear weapon, triggering a fresh war in the Middle East. The Republican candidate has openly joked about bombing Tehran. It was just over a year ago, in the tiny borough of Murrells Inlet in South Carolina, and McCain faced a small crowd in one of his characteristic town hall meetings. As McCain stood on the stage, one man asked him about the 'real problem' in the Middle East. 'When are we going to send an airmail message to Tehran?' the man pleaded. McCain laughed and - to the tune of the Beach Boys' classic 'Barbara Ann' - began to sing: 'Bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran.' But some think McCain's joke may well become policy. 'I think a McCain presidency would be very likely to strike Iran,' says Cliff Schecter, author of a new book, The Real McCain

• (U) While the US and the INC continued to work toward mutual goals of undermining Saddam Hussein, the relationship experienced some difficulties, in part due to differing views of Chalabi’s role in CIA’s Iraq intelligence efforts. The CIA officers interviewed by Committee staff commented that Chalabi was 2Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1, 2006. 3Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006 Page 6 Page 10 difficult and some said that Chalabi did not provide useful intelligence and did not deliver on assurances that disaffected Iraqi military officers wanted to defect to the opposition.4 Several officers also believed that the INC’s radio stations and other media outlets were not as productive as they should have been.5 Some CIA officers complained about Chalabi’s efforts to lobby Members of Congress, while other officers said that Chalabi’s security force was too large, too much like a private army of Iraqi dissidents.6 
• (U) Chalabi told Committee staff that he was the leader of a political process and not a US intelligence asset. He did not believe he had an obligation to act under CIA control. Chalabi told Committee staff that his strategy from the beginning was to get support for the INC from Congress. He acknowledged that this strategy caused “friction” with CIA officers who were uncomfortable with him talking to Congress. Chalabi also told Committee staff that he was not tasked to collect intelligence until October 1994. Chalabi said that before that time, the INC did collect information, including from Iraqi military walk-ins, but that the information was used by the INC for their own media operations.7 
• (U) The Chief of the Iraq Operations Group at the CIA told Committee staff that Chalabi was a “very controversial character” and “came with some baggage,” but said that of all of the opposition, Chalabi “was always the one who really got things done.“’ 4 Staff interviews with CIA officers. 5Staff interviews with CIA officers. 6 Staff interviews with CIA offkers. iStaff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006. Staff interview with CIA officer. Page 7 Page 11 
• (U) In October 1994 the INC provided a steady stream of low-ranking walk- ins from various Iraqi army and Republican Guard units who generally had interesting information.’ CIA officers described Chalabi’s propaganda operations noting that: parts of the operation were very impressive given the isolation of [ the location] and the power problems. . . . Less than impressive was the TV programming [deleted text]. The facilities are not plush, but expenses are high because of the high cost of spare parts, power and items imported through tenuous supply lines. The conditions at the protective force compound are especially spartan. The INC, however, could easily rent down to a less ostentatious HQS building. It is rarely used and not worth whatever the cost is.” 
• (U) Former CIA officials also described problems with Chalabi as the result, in part, of squabbles within the CIA about which Iraqi opposition members to support. Several current and former CIA officers told Committee staff that there was a degree of “clientism” within the agency in which operations officers with primacy in dealing with specific opposition members tended to side with, and at times adopt the views of, those individuals.” CIA reports indicate that Iraqi opposition members constantly complained about each other and about their perception that CIA gave more time, attention and funding to some opposition members over others. 
• (U) Nonetheless, according to a 1997 CIA report on Chalabi, “Chalabi was 9CIA Operational cable, December 1995. “CIA Operational cable, December 1995. 11 Staff interview with CIA officers. Page 8 Page 12 the only INC leader willing to devote his time and energy to the organization.“12 The CIA awarded Chalabi for his efforts in 1994 in recognition of his distinguished service in facilitating a cease-fire agreement between two warring Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. The award submission praised Chalabi and another INC leadership council member noting: Their display of perseverance and fortitude during this trying and dangerous time was invaluable in helping concerned parties to bring about a cease-fire and establish mechanisms for policing a sustained period of calm. Due to their combined efforts, negotiations were successfully carried out between the two principal Kurdish leaders and the viability and integrity of INC efforts in Northern Iraq were sustained. 
• (U) Despite this process, problems between Chalabi and the CIA escalated in late 1994 and early 1995 when a tenuous ease-fire between the two Kurdish parties in northern Iraq was breaking down while, at the same time, the opposition was making plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein. (U) In December 1994, the INC leadership council member reportedly made claims that the U.S. supported a plan to lead an opposition force into Iraq to join with military commanders of an Iraqi Corp in an attack against the regime. This plan was reportedly an attempt to prevent renewed fighting between Kurdish opposition groups, by telling the two groups that renewed fighting would interfere with the operation against the Saddam regime. The plan was soon abandoned due to an admonishment from CIA.13 ‘2CIA’s Relationship with Ahmad Chalabi, July 1997 13CIA Operational cable, January 1995. Page 9 Page 13 (U) At the same time, Chalabi was also concerned about the continuation of Kurdish fighting and reports that the Iranians intended to send their own “mediators” into northern Iraq. In late January. 1995, a senior Department of State officer went to northern Iraq to meet with Chalabi and the Kurdish leaders to discuss a possible cease-fire. I4 In response, the US encouraged a cease-fire agreement by offering U.S. funding for INC mediation efforts and suggesting that the U.S. would cease enforcing the northern Iraq no-fly zone if the two groups did not agree. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) agreed to accept a cease-fire based on that understanding.” 
• (U) In early February 1995, the CIA learned of a new opposition plan to remove Saddam Hussein from power. A former senior Iraqi intelligence official said the plan centered on seizing Saddam when he visited his residence in the town of Ujah, where he assessed Saddam would go if he felt vulnerable in Baghdad. A clan member of the former official and military instructor at a nearby tank school was to provide armor to take Saddam’s Ujah residence complex. Another military officer, who was assigned to Saddam’s special security detail, was responsible for informing them of when Saddam was about to leave for Ujah. The CIA learned that the former official wanted to implement the plan within two- to-three weeks and said nothing other than minimal assistance was needed, although the former official would expect strong U.S. public support for the coup immediately after Saddam would be seized.16 
• (U) Immediately thereafter, the CIA received many additional details about the plan, including the fact that “the coup will occur on either 4 or 5 March, depending on when Saddam travels to Ujah” and that the former official expected 14CIA operational cable, January 1995 and staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi. “CIA operational cable, January 1995 and staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi. 16CIA Operational cable, February 1995. Page 10 Page 14 the U.N./U.S. to declare a no-fly zone, noting that the movement does not need air support, just a warning for the Iraqi air force not to fly.17 
• (U) In early February 1995, the CIA learned about continuing tensions between the Kurdish opposition groups. One Kurdish leader said unless an INC peace-keeping force was immediately deployed to the confrontation lines, he could not show continued restraint.18 
• (U) In mid-February 1995, the U.S. learned that a cease-fire was agreed to only because of strong U.S. support, including for an INC mediation force. A CIA report stated: While an uneasy truce has generally held since the cease-fire proposal was agreed to on 22 January, it will not last unless [fighting Kurdish] forces soon are separated by an INC force. Should the U.S. not fund the INC peace-keeping force and another round of fighting occurs, any attempt for the U.S. to mediate a second cease fire would be unlikely to succeed.” 
• (U) In mid-February 1995, the CIA received information that the official was continuing to contact his network and was prepared to implement his plan as early as February 22, 1995. The CIA explained that the U.S. is not a participant in the coup and is not funding the coup. The CIA told the former official the U.S. believes Iraq would be better served with a different government and that “the I7 CIA operational cable, February 1995. I8 CIA operational cable, February 1995. 19CIA operational cable, February 1995. Page 11 Page 15 U.S. will itself not remove Saddam, but rely on the Iraqi people to do so,” the same message that had been passed to other prominent opposition officials.*’ 
• (U) In mid-February 1995, CIA Iraq elements inquired about support for the INC peace-keeping force. Chalabi had informed them he only had funds to pay his security force until February 15, at which time he would have to start letting personnel go. Chalabi had been informed by the State Department that U.S. support would be available before mid-February. CIA elements were seeking to expedite the payment.*l (U) On February 17, 1995, CIA Iraq elements were informed that policymakers wished to pursue the proposal as an overt U.S. diplomatic initiative with Department of State leading the effort’s funding and administration. Department of State lawyers tentatively concluded that State had the legal authority to fund the initiative and were seeking to verify whether there were “any actual funds available.” Chalabi still owed the Department of State a budget for the INC effort, and CIA headquarters commented that Chalabi’s “own administrative weaknesses are not serving his case we11.“22 An immediate response from the CIA Iraq elements attached a budget that Chalabi had previously passed to CIA which they believed had previously been given to the Department of State.23 
• (U) On February 17, 1995, headquarters received a field report describing the status of opposition politics in northern Iraq. The cable noted that Chalabi was focusing on the plan to detain Saddam in Ujah, but Chalabi did not believe *‘CIA operational cable, February 1995. *lCIA Operational cable, February 1995. 22CIA Operational cable, February 1995. 23CIA operational cable, February 1995. Page 12 Page 16 Saddam could be removed simply by detaining him in Ujah and waiting for the Iraqi people to rise up. The plan would only be workable if there were large diversions in Mosul and Kirkuk, coordinated with uprisings in the Shi’a south. Accordingly, the cable noted that Chalabi was in close contact with the Kurdish groups about these plans and was attempting to reinvigorate ties with Iran and Shi’a opposition exiles in Iran. The cable said that the KDP and PUK were too busy fighting each other to think much about Chalabi’s plan. The field report concluded that instability in Iraq could “provoke the opposition to implement its ‘plan’ on very short notice. CIA Field elements estimated that opposition ‘planning’ that may seem farfetched at this point could, with another sharp downturn of the situation in Iraq, come to pass.24 
• (U) In early March, field reports noted a deteriorating situation in northern Iraq, including the movement of Turkish troops along the Iraqi border and Iraqi tanks shelling the town of Kifri. Unilateral CIA reporting indicated that the KDP intended to attack PUK positions, and might have been cooperating in a Turkish plan to launch large-scale counterinsurgency operations against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish terrorist group, in PUK controlled areas.25 The reporting also noted that the plan to detain Saddam in Ujah appeared to be gaining support in the south and the north, In early March, a CIA representative met with a representative of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), who said SCIRI’s armed wing, the Badr Corps, Shi’a tribes, and other Shi’a resistance groups in the south would support the early March coup attempt.26 The details of the plan were outlined in a March 2, 1995 CIA intelligence report. 24CIA Operational cable, February 1995. 25CIA Operational cables, March 1995. 26CIA Operational cable, March 1995. Page 13 Page 17 
• (U) A CIA representative accompanied Chalabi to discuss the plan and seek the participation of other senior opposition figures. According to Chalabi and CIA officials, the CIA representative went to these meetings to imply U.S. support for the planned effort.27 These senior opposition officials told the CIA representative they would support the plan. One promised to send 15,000 troops to create a diversion and the another promised to move its own troops around Mosul. 
• (U) On March 3, 1995, Chalabi made contact with Iranian intelligence officials to discuss Iran’s position on the proposed action and their support for possible action against southern Iraq. In response to questions from Committee staff, the CIA representative who had been liaising with Chalabi said he was aware of the meeting ahead of time and was aware that the purpose of the meeting was to gain both Iranian support for the opposition action and signal to the Iranians that the U.S. was supportive of the plan. CIA headquarters denied his request to join the meeting. He was informed, however, that it was not a problem for Chalabi to seek the help of the Iranians. Nonetheless, the CIA representative said that he was present outside the meeting space, was seen by the Iranians, and was aware that Chalabi intended for the Iranians to see him there as a signal of U.S. supprt. 
• (U) In early March 1995, a foreign government provided the U.S. information on the Iranians’ view of this meeting. It was indicated that Iran thought that the U.S. was seeking Iranian support for the Iraqi oppositionist uprising against Saddam Hussein planned for early March 1995. Iranian officials also believed that the U.S. person involved in the matter was a CIA officer. Indications were that Chalabi “handed” the Iranians a message at the meeting, purportedly from the U.S., that said America would welcome the involvement of Islamic forces in the operations against Saddam Hussein, on the condition that the 27Staff interviews with CIA officers, and staff interview of Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1, 2006. 28Staff interview with CIA officer, February 17,2006. Page 14 Page 18 independence and unity of Iraq are preserved, and the Iraqi borders are not changed. 
• (U) The same foreign government information provided additional details about a meeting between Chalabi and SCIRI representatives the day prior to his meeting with Iranian intelligence. When the SCIRI representatives questioned Chalabi about the seriousness of the uprising, Chalabi exited the meeting and returned with the previously identified American. The Iranians believed the American to be a member of the National Security Council. It was reported that the American told the SCIRI representatives that he wanted to kill Saddam and that he was serious. 
• (U) The CIA representative told Committee staff that he did not tell the SCIRI representatives that he wanted to kill or assassinate Saddam Hussein but he did say that we, meaning the U.S., wants to “get rid of him.” 
• (U) Further intelligence about the same meeting indicated that Chalabi told the SCIRI representatives that America has promised to prevent any action by the Iraqi army and to target them; to impede Iraqi army tank movements in the cities, not in the marshes, via aerial bombardment; and to prevent Saddam’s army from suppressing this initiative, through exploitation of resolutions 688 and 949, 
• (U) Several CIA officers told Committee staff that there was a firestorm in the National Security Council after receiving this information, with urgent phone calls to the CIA to find out what was happening in Iraq and why a CIA agent was posing as a member of the National Security Council and allegedly planning an Page 15 Page 19 assassination of Saddam Hussein.2g Senior CIA officials immediately sought to ascertain whether there was any truth to the information.30 
• (U) In early March 1995, CIA elements confirmed that they continued to tell the parties involved that: This is not a U.S.-backed action. It is purely an Iraqi “plan.” No money or material support has been or will be given to it. The U.S. military will not provide a no-fly zone, or in any way will the U.S. military support the action. The U.S. will not support assassinations or unnecessary bloodshed. [A CIA representative] has underscored the point that the US. is opposed to an action that leads to civil war or a popular uprising. The U.S. strongly opposes the Kurds attempting to occupy Mawsil and Kirkuk for the sake of making these Kurdish cities.31 
• (U) This was the first time the CIA representative reported that opposition leaders had been informed that the U.S. would not provide a no-fly zone or that the U.S. opposed an action that would lead to a popular uprising. 
• (U) In early March 1995, on the day the operation was set to go forward, the U.S. Government, at the instruction of the National Security Council (NSC), delivered to all of the opposition members involved a message which outlined two points: A) The action you have planned for this weekend has been totally compromised; and 29 3OStaff interviews with CIA offkers. Staff interview with CIA officer. 31CIA Operational Cable, March 1995. Page 20 B) We believe there is a high risk of failure. Any decision to proceed will be entirely on your own. 
• (U) A third point, to be delivered only to Chalabi, said: C) To eliminate any possible ambiguity, the U.S. government has not sought through you or any other channel to pass a message to the government of Iran on this matter32 
• (U) When Chalabi was given the NSC message, the CIA representative told him that the message left it up to Chalabi whether to proceed with the plan.33 Chalabi, believing it was too late to turn back, went ahead with the planned operation. Chalabi reportedly called another opposition figure and told him that the “U.S. no longer supported the plan.“34 The former Iraqi official leading the operation believed that it was too late to stop the internal networks from carrying out their assigned tasks.35 Chalabi told Committee staff that one opposition leader whom he phoned agreed to go ahead with the operation as planned, a third opposition leader had left even before the message had been passed and would provide limited symbolic support to the operation, only because attacks were highly popular with the Kurds.36 
• (U) In response to the U.S. message, Chalabi and the former official leading the operation indicated they “have never claimed U.S. military support” for the 32CIA Operational cable, March 1995. 33Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006, and staff interview with CIA offker, February 17, 2006. 34 CIA Operational cable, March 1995. 35 CIA Operational cable, March 1995. 36 CIA Operational cable, March 1995. Page 17 Page 21 plan. One added that he “had never claimed or will claim the U.S. has promised military, financial, or material support for the March plan.“37 After the start of the action, the former official said that, because phone lines were cut off within Iraq, he was unable to communicate with Iraqi officers inside Iraq and requested that the U.S. fly a single airplane over Sammara to reassure the people and warn Iraqi helicopters not to fly. In response to this request, the Iraqi Operations Group sent instructions to the CIA representative that “if asked, and only if asked, about a response to [the former official leading,the operation’s] request for a flight over Sammara, you should state ‘there is no response.’ “38 
• (U) Both CIA officials and Chalabi told Committee staff that the initial stages of the plan had worked to some extent. Exchanges of light infantry weapons and artillery fire were observed. Iraqi military equipment and several hundred Iraqi soldiers had been captured. While one group of opposition forces were occupied fighting Saddam’s military, another opposition group used the opportunity to attack the other from the rear, which effectively ended the operation.39 Nonetheless, there was never confirmation that Iraqi military units had followed the plan and the Iraqi people did not rise up against the regime. 
• (U) Afterwards, CIA headquarters sent word to the opposition members. The points for Chalabi were: A) In the wake of this weekend’s events, we need to clarify the basis on which we can work together in the future. 37 CIA Operational cable, March 1995. 38 CIA Operational cable, March 1995. 39CIA Operational cable, March 1995, Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1, 2006, and Staff interview with CIA officer. Page 18 Page 22 B) As you know, we were surprised by your plan to move this weekend and were very concerned about claims that this plan had U.S. support. C) This cannot happen again if we are to work together. The U.S. government must not be put in the position of having its name invoked, or having to make decisions which could involve American lives, without adequate prior consultation. D) We are concerned that in the aftermath, a desire to assign blame will lead to the weakening of the opposition to Saddam Hussein. We hope this urge will be resisted. E) The task now is to regroup around our common objective. Saddam Hussein is increasingly isolated. Our efforts among UNSC members have helped ensure the maintenance of sanctions. F) Saddam has to believe his position is eroding. Efforts in the period ahead need to be focused on exploiting his weaknesses rather than on recrimations.40 (U) CIA field and headquarters officials responsible for Iraq told Committee staff they believed that the NSC had been surprised by the opposition plans because the Chief of CIA’s Near East (NE) Division made himself the only channel of communication with the NSC and did not tell the NSC about the uprising plans.4* The Chief of NE told Committee staff that he made himself the point of contact with the NSC to avoid mixed messages coming from the NE Division, but he said that his role in no way limited the CIA Iraq Headquarters element’s ability to disseminate intelligence reporting on their activities. The Chief of NE also said he did not recall field elements sending in a “sharply articulated plan” and did not believe that the plan would succeed.42 :yCIA Operational cable, March 1995. Staff interview with CIA officers. 42Staff interview with CIA officer, March 10,2006. Page 19 Page 23 
• (U) The intelligence report disseminated on March 2, 1995 that explained the coup plan never made it to the White House, according to the Iraq Operations Group chief. He told Committee staff that he knew the National Security Council was surprised by the plan because after the uprising “numerous offices were torn apart trying to find this report, and eventually I believe it was found in the office of the DDO and that it didn’t go to the White House.“43 
• (U) Animosity toward Chalabi from some groups within the CIA grew, particularly from those officers who had prior problems with Chalabi. For example, a cable from a European Station referring to the opposition operation as “the recent unpleasantness” recommended removing Chalabi from northern Iraq. The cable stated, “we hold Chalabi responsible for the debacle in the north” while recognizing that “he accomplished much for us before going off the rails. We would not be as far along as we are in the total effort against Saddam if we had not been able to stand on Chalabi’s shoulders.“44 A response from CIA headquarters stated: We are unsure of what station holds [Chalabi] responsible for, per [Station cable’s] debacle reference. If this applies to the infighting, that is the Kurdish “fact of life,” which the INC has always attempted to prevent. If this refers to [Chalabi’s] ill-advised association with [former official who planed the operation] and the Iranians, we concede his poor judgment. That said, the low-level series of attacks by opposition elements on the Iraqi military’s northern positions have had the salutary effect of further lowering Iraqi army morale and placing increased pressure on the Iraqi government.45 43Staff interview with CIA officer, March 14,2006. 44CIA Operational cable, March 1995. 45CIA Operational cable, March 1995. Page 20 Page 24 (U) In a June 1998 letter to the Committee in response to the questions from Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, the CIA stated: The failed uprising with [a former regime official] in March 1995 caused us to reassess our relationship with Chalabi because he had unilaterally entered into this plan without consulting CIA while at the same time claiming that the United States supported the uprising. 
• (U) Yet, CIA’s reporting outlined previously shows that Chalabi did not enter the plan unilaterally and did consult CIA from the beginning. Both field elements and CIA Headquarters’ Iraq officials told Committee staff that Chalabi did inform field elements about the plan and that the CIA representative’s role in working with Chalabi to seek the support of the Kurdish leaders did signal to the opposition that the plan had U.S. supprt. 
• (U) Concerns about Chalabi’s meeting with the Iranians also fueled CIA resentment toward Chalabi. A 2004 assessment of Chalabi says the CIA placed him under scrutiny following this incident due to concerns about his “coziness” with Iranian intelligence and accused Chalabi of fraudulently acting on behalf of the U.S. Government when he alleged to Iranian intelligence that Washington was interested in enlisting Tel-n-an’s support for operations against Saddam. The assessment said, “Chalabi passed a fabricated message from the White House to an MOIS officer in northern Iraq. In addition, Chalabi claimed that U.S. warplanes would come to the aid of oppositionists.“47 The CIA representative that communicated with Chalabi in this period told Committee staff he had learned from investigators of this incident in which Chalabi had fabricated a message on National Security Council stationary that Chalabi let the Iranians see. He also told 46 Staff interview with CIA offkers. 47Ahmad Chalabi 5 Ties to CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, July 1,2004. p. 2. Page 21 Page 25 Conxnittee staff, however, that he knew Chalabi intended to seek Iranian support for the operation and knew that his presence outside the meeting was intended to signal U.S. support for the plan.48 (
• U) Chalabi told Committee staff that he did seek Iranian support for the operation, but never fabricated a written communication from the White House or any part of the U.S. government.49 
• (U) A Committee staff review of intelligence on the Iranian view of the meeting with Chalabi determined it was imprecise in its characterization. It did not indicate that Chalabi handed the Iranian intelligence officer a message, rather that Chalabi said the White House had sent the message that America welcomed Iranian involvement in the uprising. (U) Chalabi also told Committee staff that he had long worked openly with the Iranians as part of his efforts to establish and maintain the INC, given that much of the Iraqi opposition was living in Iran and much of the opposition that traveled to northern Iraq had to transit through Iran.” CIA officers told Committee staff that they were aware at the time of Chalabi’s frequent contact with the Iranians and travel to Iran.” One CIA officer told Committee staff that “we always knew he was close with the Iranians” and added, “I did not want the [field elements] to be dealing with the Iranians. So sort of in absentia the only way you could know what the Iranians were doing would be through what Chalabi 48 Staff interview with CIA officers. 49Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1, 2006. : YStaff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1, 2006. Staff interview with CIA offkers. Page 26 would tell us or not tell us and what we might pick up through corroborating intelligence.“52 (U) The CIA reduced contact and support for the INC after the failed uprising and began intensifying efforts to develop contacts within the Iraqi military and other opposition groups.53 
• (U) Chalabi said that despite his problems with the CIA, he still tried to warn them of specific Iraqi intelligence operations targeting U.S. intelligence capabilities. He said that in March of 1996 he arranged a meeting with then DC1 John Deutch and the NE Chief and alerted them of one such attempt.54 The NE Chief told Committee staff that he did attend the meeting with Chalabi and the DCI, but did not recall Chalabi making this point. He remembered Chalabi trying to sell himself as the only trusted opposition figure.55 The CIA was unable to locate any operations traffic outlining the details of this meeting, but did provide a cable written in response to a news story about the meeting. The cable stated that the NE Division Chief said Chalabi made only perfunctory and general comments that CIA’s activities against Saddam were ineffectual and that whatever the CIA hoped to do against Saddam would not succeed without Chalabi’s involvement.56 
• (U) The risk allegedly articulated by Chalabi was real and intelligence capabilities and assets were exposed. CIA officers told Committee staff that Saddam’s regime did use this vulnerability to communicate to a CIA asset in a Middle Eastern country that the CIA operation was exposed and that his children 52 53Staff interview with CIA officer. Staff interview with CIA officers. 54Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006. 55 Staff interview with CIA officer. 56 CIA Operational cable, April 2000. Page 23 Page 27 would be executed. Saddam arrested hundreds of Iraqi solders and executed many of them, including the CIA asset’s three children.j7 
• (U) Fighting between the Kurds continued into the summer of 1996. Chalabi told Committee staff that he learned that one Kurdish leader intended to invite Saddam’s forces into northern Iraq to help him topple the other Kurdish group and that Chalabi alerted the CIA.j8 CIA officers told Committee staff that they were aware, from intelligence reporting, that Saddam was massing forces toward the border with northern Iraq.j9 In August 1996, Saddam’s forces entered northern Iraq, executed 100 members of the INC, and forced the rest to evacuate.60 
• (U) In December 1996, the Deputies Committee met and approved the termination of the CIA’s relationship with the INC. According to a January 1997 memorandum: As a result, however, of the incursion of the Iraqi army into Northern Iraq in August 96 and the subsequent evacuation of INC employees from Iraq, the INC lost its ability to serve as a unifying force in the Northern Iraq opposition milieu. Dr. Chalabi’s general credibility within the Iraqi opposition, in particular with the KDP, as well as with USG’s regional partners, has also diminished. Since the INC can no longer serve as a neutral arbiter in Northern Iraq and has limited effectiveness as an umbrella opposition organization, we concluded that the CIA should cease funding of the INC.61 57Staff interviews with NE Division Chief, and Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006. 58Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006. 59 Staff interviews with CIA officers. ZyStaff interviews with CIA offker. CIA Memorand , January 6, 1997. Page 24 Page 28 
• (U) Former DC1 George Tenet told the Committee in July 2006 that “there was a breakdown in trust and we never wanted to have anything to do with him anymore .“62 
• (U) Chalabi told Committee staff that he was unable to keep the Kurdish factions from fighting because the U.S. did not provide the funding promised to help the INC establish a mediation force.63 In February 1997, the CIA terminated its relationship with Chalabi and the INC.
•  (U) In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized U.S. assistance to support a transition to democracy in Iraq and required that the President designate one or more Iraqi opposition organizations as eligible to receive federal assistance. In 1999, after President Clinton designated the INC as one of seven eligible organizations, the INC established the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) as a tax-exempt corporation organized in the United States.64 Beginning in March 2000, the Department of State entered into a series of cooperative agreements with the INCSF which included funding of almost $33 million for several programs, including a weekly newspaper publication, radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iraq, a public information campaign, and the collection of information on the Saddam regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity.65 62 Committee interview with former DC1 George Tenet, July 26,2006. 63 Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006. 64 Funding for the INCSF came from appropriations made to carry out the Economic Support Fund provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 196 1, and was subject to all statutory conditions applicable to the obligatio 25 and expenditure of those appropriations. GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department, Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (GAO-04-559) April 2004 and responses to questions from Committee staff, April 24,2004 (SSCI# 2004-3535). While the first grant including funding for Information Collection activities was signed in September 2000, activities and expenditures were not ultimately authorized under that program heading Page 25 Page 29 
• (U) From the outset, the Department of State was uncomfortable with part of the INC’s original proposal that called for an INC office inside regime- controlled Iraq.66 According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report that examined issues affecting funding of the INCSF, State officials said, “the presence of U.S.-funded INCSF staff within Iraq could open the door to potentially disastrous diplomatic situations if INCSF operatives were caught and/or killed by Iraqi tr00ps.“67 The Department of State told the Committee it was concerned about funding what it believed constituted a clandestine intelligence capability inside Iraq. According to the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, the bureau that handled the INC grant, he believed there was an incompatibility between the use of State Department Economic Support Funds - which usually fund economic and social development activities - for the INC and the INC’s sense of its own mission, which was a national liberation movement. He told Committee staff that operations inside regime-controlled Iraq “whether for espionage purposes or for other purposes wasn’t clear to me, but that was a constant element of tension between us and the INC. And I make no judgments on the validity of their agenda, simply that for an ESF-funded program it did not seem to me to be a good fit.“68 (U) The INC resisted the policy prohibiting operations inside Iraq, believing that doing so was essential for the success of its programs. The conflict between State and the INCSF about this issue delayed authorization and funding for INC collection activities until a March 2001 amendment to the cooperative agreement until Mar@ 200 1. According to Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, the policy prohibiting INC programs inside regime-controlled Iraq was set by the Principals’ Committee after extensive and thorough consideration of the risks and rewards of such action by the INC. The policy was reviewed on a number of occasionsObut remained unchanged until just prior to start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. August 24,2004. GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department, Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress6ppport Foundation (GAO-04-559), April 2004, p. 9-10. Committee staff interview with former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Near East Asia, July 14, 2006. e 26 Page 30 when the INCSF agreed that it would not operate in Iraq.69 This cleared the way to finding the Information Collection Program (ICP). The March 200 1 amendment authorized the INC to “continue its Information Collection Program from countries surrounding Iraq” and provided an office in Washington, D.C. for the “purpose of testing, analyzing, translating and distributing information received from Iraq.“70 (U) Under the ICP, the INC used offices in Tel-n-an, Damascus, and Cairo to maintain contact with Iraqi dissidents and collect information from them on the political, economic, and military activities of the Saddam Hussein regime. One of the goals was to “collect evidence on the Saddam regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity and conduct media work to promote human rights and democracy in Iraq.“71 The information collected under the program was disseminated primarily through an aggressive publicity campaign that relied on media outlets to bring defectors and their information to the public. The Department of State told the Committee that it was generally aware that the INCSF was using the information from the ICP in the media, but did not provide the INCSF specific guidance in this area.72 (U) In an October 2001 report to the Department of State, the INCSF provided information on ICP activities. The report, in outline form, included under field activities and training, “Release of internal reports,” “Collect sensitive information that reveal Iraq’s link with September 1 l* aftermath and anthrax 69GA0 Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department, Issues Aficting Funding of Iraqi National Congress7fupport Foundation (GAO-04-559), April 2004, p. 10. U.S. Department of State, Amendment to Federal Assistance Award, Iraqi National Congress Support Foundatigp, March 3 1,200 1, p.3. INC Proposal for a Grant Awarded by the U.S. Department of State to the INCSF to Advance and Establish7yperationa1 Programs, 2000. Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24,2004. Page 27 Page 31 exposures in USA,” “Successfully chasing after the Iraq intelligence activities in both Europe and USA,” and “Contacting defected Iraqi officers and held a meeting with them for better coordination.“73 (U) The Department of State remained generally uncomfortable with handling the ICP, despite the INC’s agreement to stay out of Iraq. The April 2004 GAO report noted that “concerns grew in State that there were serious mishandling of money issues that needed to be examined in INCSF to avoid a potentially embarrassing situation for the administration and for State.” In addition, allegations of fraud circulated within State. The GAO report said that “in State’s view, the potential for fraud in an officially State-sponsored program posed a risk that State was not prepared to take.“74 (U) A State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit conducted September 2001 found financial management and internal control weaknesses. In particular the audit identified concerns about INCSF’s travel reimbursement procedures and its cash payment practices, but found no evidence of fraud.75 The OIG found that many of the deficiencies occurred because of a lack of understanding of and unfamiliarity with U.S. government laws and regulations related to Federal Assistance awards.76 For example, the OIG found that INCSF did not use U.S. flag carriers for overseas travel or always certify when non-U.S. flag carriers were used as required by federal travel regulations.77 In a mid-2002 follow-up audit, OIG found that the INCSF had taken “significant steps to 1:: Office of Information Collection Program (ICP) Monthly Report from October/November 10th 200. I4 GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department, Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress7ppport Foundation (GAO-04-559), April 200, p. 8. 76 Id. at 8-9. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Review of Awards to Iraqi National Congress Support Foundatiyy, report number 0 1 -FMA-R-092, September 200 1, p. 6. Id. at 16. Page 28 Page 32 implement OIG’s recommendations.” The INCSF had not fully implemented all portions of the two recommendations, in part, because a lack of funding from the Department of State prevented them from paying for Ml implementation of several accounting upgrades.78 (U) The April 2004 GAO report also said that State “doubted the value of information obtained through the information program.“79 However, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs told Committee staff that “my view all along was that there was apparently information being collected that I didn’t see and therefore couldn’t evaluate. I never held the view that I doubted whether the information was useful or not. I simply didn’t know what it was, and therefore couldn’t make an assessment.” He added “my people were totally professional throughout, but I think there was clearly a greater degree of frustration farther down the line than I had to feel, and that probably led people from time to time to express a view that they doubted there was anything there, that there was really any substance in the [ICP] program at a11.“80 (U) In a written response to the Committee, the State Department said the Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), which had overall responsibility for the program, believed it was unable to judge the ICP’s “effectiveness because it did not have sufficient access to the information being produced.” For example, in early 2002, Department of State staff visited the Washington, D.C. offices of the INCSF to observe INCSF operations. According to the Department of State, INCSF staff refused to allow the Department of State 78 Department of State, Offke of Inspector General, Follow Up Review of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundatiqp report number AUD/CG-02-44, September 2002, summary. GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department, Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress8fupport Foundation (GAO-04-559), April 200, p. 8. Committee staff interview with former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Near East Asia, July 14,2006. Page 29 Page 33 staff members access to ICP materials81 NEA also believed it was unable to determine, without a professional assessment by the Intelligence Community, the value of the information the ICP did share.82 NEA believed, therefore, that the program should be managed by other agencies more experienced in managing intelligence collection.83 These factors, in conjunction with the concerns about INCSF’s accountability of funds and operational costs, prompted State to discontinue funding of the INCSF.84 (U) In May 2002, the Department of State notified the INCSF that it had decided to cease all funding for the ICP.85 The National Security Council Deputies Committee decided that the program should be continued and, on July 25,2002, directed that the program be moved to the Department of Defense.86 The Department of Defense assigned DIA to administer the ICP. DIA told the Comrnittee it did not have advance knowledge of the Deputies Committee decision to move the ICP to the Department of Defense. CIA told the Committee that it provided memos to the NSC in December 1996 advising of the termination of CIA’s relationship with the INC and that between January 1997 and July 2002 “there were several exchanges of views on the subject of the end of the CIA’s relationship with Chalabi and the INC.“87 The Department of State retroactively approved a grant agreement to cover ICP costs incurred in June and July 2002 and ceased all funding of the INCSF on September 30, 2002.88 81 Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, March 3 1,2006,43. 821d. 83 Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24,2004, #4b. 84 Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24,2004. 85 Id. :; DIA response to Questions for the Record, March 23,2004, p. 1. 88 CIA response to question from Committee staff. Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24,2004. Page 30 Page 34 (U) During the time it managed the program, the Department of State did not interview or debrief INC-affiliated sources.*’ The Department of State did receive documents from the ICP, which it provided to the Intelligence Community for review and analysis. A discussion of the analysis of those documents follows later in this report. Several Intelligence Community agencies conducted debriefs of INC-affiliated sources during this time period, details of which are also discussed later in this report. (U) In late October 2002, the DIA assumed formal responsibility for the program. The letter of agreement between the Department of Defense and the INC stated that “the information collection effort will place primary emphasis upon debriefing Iraqi citizens worldwide who can establish and maintain a continuous flow of tactical and strategic information regarding Iraq, in general, and the Saddam Hussein regime, in particular.” Under the terms of the agreement between the DIA and the INC, the INC committed to “NOT publicize or communicate in any way with anyone any of its information collection operations or announce the names and activities of Iraqi expatriates without prior written authorization from DIA.” This was a distinct departure from the INC’s publicity activities under Department of State management. The INC also agreed to “NOT conduct any intelligence collection operations in Iraq without prior authorization from DIA.“” In a letter to the Committee in September 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz said the program would, “debrief Iraqi citizens presented by the Iraqi National Congress” as having information on key military and intelligence questions.” The letter added: :i Department of State responses to questions fkom Committee staff, February 7,2006. Letter Agreement between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Iraqi National Congress’ Informat&n Collection Program (INUICP) on the Provision of Intelligence Support to INUICP, October 25,2002. Letter to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, September 12,2002. Page 3 1 Page 35 The Iraqi National Congress will continue to provide access to Iraqi citizens who have fled Iraq and are believed to have pertinent knowledge. This is a continuation of a program under which the Department of Defense, specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency, has already debriefed certain individuals. The program is of special Congressional interest.92 (U) The CIA told the Committee that beginning in August 2002 when the DIA coordinated with the CIA on the ICP, and continuing until early 2004, the CIA “voiced concerns to DIA counterparts about both counterintelligence issues and the overall reliability of the INC in a series of written and oral communications.“93 DIA officials told Committee staff that CIA operations officers did raise verbal concerns that the INC was penetrated by Iranian, and possibly other, intelligence services and that the INC had its own agenda during DIA briefings about its intentions for the program, but provided no concerns in writing. One DIA officer noted that CIA’s comments had a general tone of “better you than us” and “you’ve got a real bucket full of worms with the INC and we hope you’re taking the appropriate steps.“94 (U) The CIA provided the Committee with one cable sent to DIA in December 2002, in response to a DIA request for information about a senior INC official. The cable said that one source, of undetermined reliability, said the senior official was suspected of being an Iraqi intelligence officer and one source, also of undetermined reliability, said the official was a known Iranian intelligence service agent and was suspected of having ties to Iraqi intelligence. The CIA provided no ;; Id. CIA responses to Questions for the Record corn the March 4,2004 Hearing on Iraq Prewar Intelligence, February@ 2005. Interview with DIA Officials, November 16,2005. Page 32 Page 36 documentation to support its contention that concerns about INC reliability were expressed to DIA counterparts in writing or that there were a “series” of concerns expressed to DIA. (U) DIA officers who were responsible for the program said they were already aware of these issues, and made sure to incorporate them into their assumptions and briefings about the program.95 October 2002 DIA briefing slides about its plans for the program noted that two of DIA’s assumptions were that the “INC will use the relationship to promote its agenda” and the “INC is penetrated by hostile intelligence services.“96 m DIA’s briefing about its intentions for the ICP also said that DIA planned to-have strong counterintelligence support as it implemented the program. DIA told the Committee that it used analysts in debriefing sessions, sometimes meeting directly with sources, to obtain first-hand feedback on intelligence information. DIA counterintelligence officers reviewed DIA’s operations and monitored intelligence and open source information for potential threats to DIA’s efforts. m The DIA provided the ICP monthly payments throughout its operation of the program. In exchange, the ICP provided the DIA 95 96 Interview with DIA Officials, November 16, 2005. 97 DIA October 2 1, 2002, 11. Operational Proposal, p. DIA to Committee staff questions, April 27,2006. response Page 33 Page 37 with access to overt sources for debriefings, and after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi regime documents.98 In the fall of 2003, approximately six months after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DIA began making plans to terminate its relationship with the INC to coincide with the establishment of a new Iraqi government in July 2004. A draft DIA memorandum drafted in January 2004 indicated that the DIA assumed the INC would become a full-fledged political party following the establishment of a new Iraqi government and that the ICP would become an intelligence-gathering arm of the party.99 DIA officials told Committee staff that the DIA believed continued funding of such an organization would be inappropriate.“’ m On May 12,2004, the DIA notified the Committee that an Iraqi Criminal Court judge had issued an arrest warrant for a senior INC official m The judge was reportedly investigating allegations of fraud and other offenses in connection with members of the INC, charges having nothing to do with the ICP.“’ DIA officials told Committee staff that its recommendation to the Department of Defense to terminate the relationship with the INC had nothing to do with these charges.lo2 On May 14, 2004 the Department of Defense notified the Committee that it had decided to terminate its relationship with the ICP.‘03 According to the Department of Defense, the decision was part of the process of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people in light of the impending standup of the Interim Iraqi Government on 1 July 2004. In addition there were 98 DIA response to Questions for the Record, March 23, 2004, p.2. 99 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, Draft Termination of the Relationship Between the DIA and & INC’s ICP. Interview with DIA officials, February 10, 2006. lo1 Congressional Notification, May 12, 2004. lo2 Interview with DIA officials, February 10, 2006. lo3 Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, May 14,2004. Page 34

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The Use by the Intelligence Committee of Information from the Iraqi National Congress (SEARCHABLE TEXT CREATED BY GOOGLE)Table of Contents and Conclusions and CURVE BALL page 1Introduction page 2Information provided by the Iraqi National Congress page 3Committee Action and Additional Views under construction (see original report) .BACK to Ledeen / Fascism pages

Page 38III. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INC A. INC Documents (U) In early 2002, while managing the ICP, the Department of State received one bundle of approximately 300 pages of mostly Arabic language materials from the INC. This material was transferred to the Intelligence Community for analysis in March 2002. The Department of State has informed the Committee that it received no other documents from the INC.“’(U) In August 2002, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published amemorandum, Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, which offered a coordinated Intelligence Community assessment of the material’s contribution to intelligence on Iraq. The Intelligence Community madesummary translations of the data - in some cases verbatim translations - and analysts with Arabic language capability also reviewed the documents. The material included reports on the Iraqi military order of battle and the Special Security Organization, press clippings, meeting notes, and lists of alleged political victims of the Ba’ath party. lo6 The following are the key points from the NICmemorandum: ii$etter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, April 25,2006. Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, April 24,2004 and Responses to questionsl@m Committee staff, November 25,2005. Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, National Intelligence Council, August 9,2002 Page 35 Page 39 The written material provided to the Intelligence Community (IC) by the Iraqi National Congress contains little of current intelligence value. . Overall, the order of battle information throughout the documents was generally accurate - matching existing IC holdings that are based on all-source reporting. In some significant areas that information; although correct, is out of date and no longer useful. . An extensive report on the Iraqi Special Security Organization contained numerous errors. . Some of the documents include long lists of names and titles, but few have addresses or phone numbers that would increase their value. The intelligence value of almost all the data provided by the INC is diminished by our inability to assess the origin and authenticity of the documents. None of the documents, except press clippings, has sourcing or attribution that can be verified or traced. . The numerous press clippings included are openly available through the Internet or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.ro7 (U) The DIA received documents from INC-affiliated sources before and during its official management of the ICP. In each case documents were disseminated as reporting from sources or as attachments to the source lo7 Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, National Intelligence Council, August 9,2002. Page 36 Page 40 reporting.“* Such reporting is described below in more detail. The CIA told theCommittee it did not receive any documents from the INC after 1998.1°9B. INC-Affiliated Sources (U) The primary goals of the ICP were to maintain contact with Iraqi dissidents, collect information from them on the activities of the Saddam Hussein regime, and disseminate that information as widely as possible.“’ At the time theDepartment of State managed and funded the program, it did not act as a mechanism for the ICP to get its information to the Intelligence Community, except in the one case described above when it received ICP documents. Instead, the ICP used a “publicity campaign” to bring sources to the attention of “anyonewho would listen,” which included the media, Congress, members of theIntelligence Community and other government agencies, think-tanks, and other interested parties.“’(U) Through this publicity campaign, the INC brought six sources to theattention of the U.S. Intelligence Community, either directly or through current and former U.S. officials. Intelligence Community agencies met with and debriefed five of the six individuals. The sixth individual was said to be planning to defect, but never did. Details of the reporting from all five sources, their use in 108 DIA Response to questions from Committee staff, January 17,2006. After the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DIA did receive caches of documents from the INC, totaling over 3,000 boxes. These documents were reviewed through DIA’s document exploitation program. Documents were examined for content and those ofpotential intelligence value are summarized, digitized, and posted to the IC’s HARMONY database. Post-OperationIraqi Free&m information, including documents, provided by the INC is not the subject of this inquiry. CIA Response to questions from Committee staff, December 1,2005. ‘lo INC Proposal for a Grant Awarded by the U.S. Department of State to the INCSF to Advance andEstablishl($erational Programs, 2000,and staff interview with INC official, December 6,2006). Staff interview with INC official, December 6,2005 and Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 3 1,2006. Page 37 Page 41 finished intelligence products, and a description of the would-be defector are outlined in detail below. (U) None of the intelligence reports from the five sources indicated that the individuals were affiliated with the INC in the reports’ source descriptions. TheDIA said they did not note an opposition affiliation because the sources were not INC members.‘12 The CIA, which disseminated reporting from one of the sources,did not note the defector’s INC affiliation, although one CIA report from thisdefector did cornrnent that an INC-affiliated translator participated in a press interview with the source. CIA told the Committee that although the source was a referral from an INC-affiliated defector, CIA did not know how much, if any, support the source received from the INC. Although not specifically identified as INC-affiliated in the intelligence reporting, the information from all five sources, in some cases including their names and information about their contact with the Intelligence Community, appeared in numerous press articles as a result of the INC publicity campaign. Accordingly, the press stories alerted analysts to the sources’ INC affiliations which were noted in numerous intelligence assessmentsthat used the information from the INC sources.’ l3(U) The Intelligence Community, particularly the CIA, believed that the INC’s efforts to publicize defector information undermined the INC’s credibility.A July 2002 NIC Memorandum noted, “the INC’s pursuit of publicity hasundermined intelligence exploitation of these sources. The INC encouraged and sometimes abetted the sources in contravening their agreements with the U.S. ’ l2 Staff interview with DIA officers, November 2005.‘I3 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, CIA InternalMemorandum, February 5, 2004, staff interview with CIA analysts, CIA, SP WR, Assessment of the Iraqi defector , April 22,2002; CIA, SPWR, Iraqi defector mpril8,2002; CIA, Iraqi Support to Terrorism, September 19,2002, p. 14, and January 29,2003, p. 17-18. Page 38 Page 42 regarding secrecy. In one instance, the INC’s publicizing of the defector’s storyput his life in danger.“‘i4 According to the DIA, only one defector spoke to themedia after DIA asked him to refrain from doing so. Contact with that defector was terminated, in part, as a result of the violation.‘i5 Details of that case, and anyother cases in which press articles are pertinent to the Intelligence Community’suse of INC information or knowledge of the source’s INC affiliation, are describedbelow in further detail. (U) The Intelligence Community used reporting from two of the INC- affiliated sources in the October 2002 NIE on Iraq ‘s Continuing Programs forWeapons of Mass Destruction. The two sources were not used as the primary basis for any of the key judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destructioncapabilities. In one case, reporting from an INC-affiliated defector was assessed by analysts as corroborating other primary reporting about Iraq’s mobile biologicalweapons production capabilities. In the other case, information from the defector drove Intelligence Community concerns that an Iraqi facility may have had a nuclear association.“6(U) The CIA and the DIA used intelligence reporting from two INC- affiliated sources in intelligence assessments that discussed alleged special operations training of non-Iraqi Arabs at Iraq’s Salman Pak UnconventionalMilitary Training facility. Most of the assessments describe the sources as not having direct access to the information and in some cases as “questionable” and“exaggerated.” The CIA also included INC-supplied information in a 2003assessment that the Saddam Hussein regime assassinated dissidents. This INC i iz NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10, 2002, p. 1, 1 16 Staff interview with DIA officers, February 10,2006, p. 14-16. National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, p. 20. Page 39 Page 43 information was corroborated by a credible body of reporting from other sources.117 The specific uses of INC-affiliated defector reporting related to these issues are described in more detail below. (U) The following section of the report provides detailed information on the INC-affiliated sources, the information they provided, and how Intelligence Community analysts and collectors used their information. 1. Source One facilitated his travel to Asia and his introduction to the international media. According to the DIA, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence notified the Director of DIA that he had been contacted by former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Woolsey about Source One.“’ Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he did notrecall making this referral to the Department of Defense, though he did not rule it OUt.“g‘17 CIA response to Committee questions, January 10,2006, p. 2.’ ‘* Responses to questions from Committee staff, August 26,2005.I lg Former DC1 James Woolsey met Ahmed Chalabi in the late 1990s when both men were witnesses during a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs hearing on Iraq. Shortly after the hearing, Mr. Chalabi called Mr. Woolsey seeking his legal assistance for eight members of the Iraqi Opposition, including members of the INC, who had been detained in California by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Mr. Woolsey agreed to become co-counsel in the case, eventually winning the release of all eight Iraqis by early 200 1. Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he came to know Mr. Chalabi slightly in the course of that representation and came to know his clients well. Mr. Woolsey recalled receiving information on two sources, and believed he received the information on one of them from one of his clients or from an INC representative. He did not recall receiving any information on the sources from Mr. Chalabi, but said it was possible Page 40 Page 44 m A team of analysts from several intelligence agencies worked with DIA collectors to help vet and debrief Source One. The team’s preliminaryassessment of Source One was relayed to CIA headquarters on January 4,2002. It said that while Source One “does not have access to specific programs at variousfacilities, his knowledge of [facility] details, individual engineers, and personalities could permit subject matter experts to analyze the data and extrapolate broader program information.“‘20 DIA administered a polygraph ofSource One in early2Oi2, which he passed. 1 There were no other Intelligence Community polygraphs of Source One prior to the DIA administered polygraph.‘2’m On January 10,2002, the CIA reported that based on senior-leveldiscussions between the CIA and the DIA, “we are now considering this a jointcase.“122 The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence informationreports from Source One’s debriefings. CIA operations officers and analystsparticipated in Source One’s debriefings and each report was sent to the CIA forreview and coordination before dissemination.‘23 The source description describedthat he did. He said it was also possible that he had received information on three sources, but could only remember receiving information on two. Mr. Woolsey said that in all cases he passed the information on to the Department of Defense. He did not pass any information on to the CIA because he said the CIA tends to not talk to volunteers. He said the CIA “likes to talk to people it can recruit and control, or liaison services, and neither of these seemed to beunder tha{2ategory.” Staff interview, December 6,2005.12, CIA operational cable m, Jamtad, 2002. , 22 Press stories alleging that Source One failed a CIA polygraph in December 200 1 are inaccurate. 123 CIA operational cable -anuary mOO2. CIA operational cable m, September WOO2 and Staff interview with DIA officials.

Page 41 Page 45 c o n t r a c t o r a t s e v e r a l I r a q i W M D s i t e s , ] 3 124 the facilities in which he worked, personalities and organizations involved in these facilities, the Iraqi Special Security Organization (SSO), and a variety of related topics. The majority of reports disseminating from Source One’s debriefs focusedon facilities on which he had worked. The reporting described him as having direct access to several Iraqi WMD sites. (U) Two reports from this defector discussed suspect terrorist training sites in Iraq. The first, dated January 2002, said that from 1997-1998, Afghan, Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained by the Fedayeen Saddam at an Iraqi special forces training facility in Salman Pak, Iraq. The report said the camp is “rumored to provide al-Qa’ida terrorist teams with training” and added, “manyIraqis believe that Saddam Hussein had made an agreement with Usama bin Ladin in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S.125 The second report, dated March 2002, provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist training camps, including one at Salman Pak. The trainees were described as members of various Iraqi groups including the Fedayeen Saddam and Iraqi Special Security Forces. The comment section of the second report provided more detail about how the defector obtained the information for the first report, noting that the information about foreigners training at Salman Pak was from his personal Page 42 Page 46 account while traveling the highway from one of his work sites to his home. The other information was “common knowledge.“126(U) In early 2002, after an article outlining Source One’s information aboutsuspect WMD facilities appeared in the media, foreign intelligence services began contacting CIA for information about Source One.‘27 In mid-February, the CIAbegan forwarding Source One’s reporting to two foreign intelligence services.‘28(U) In March 2002, in preparation for a video teleconference to discuss the new source, the DIA provided Intelligence Community counterparts with information on Source One which noted that much of his information “has beencorroborated by the IC” and that he had been “vetted extensively” but noted thathe “does NOT have specific knowledge of concealed WMD/ballistic missilelocations.“‘29m On March 6,2002, after receiving the DIA information, a Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) nuclear analyst, who had access to a copy of an hat referenced Source One’sinformation,‘30 forwarded the information to an INR chemical/biological weaponsanalyst noting the following: On the nuclear side, the source indeed has a remarkable memory and has clearly been to many sites. His information is useful. But 126 DIA intelligence 127 CIA operational 128 CIA operational ‘29 DIA briefing slides, March 6,2002.I30 The Department of State informed the Committee that the INR nuclear analyst does not recall how he came into possession of the= document. The analyst presumed copies were distributed to other Intelligence Community agenices. Page 43 Page 47 beware, because he thinks any site being constructed by personnel formerly connected to the nuclear-weapon program is, by definition, a site for ongoing clandestine nuclear work. (Not necessarily so, esp. since so many nuclear personnel have, since the early 199Os, been assigned to non-nuclear infrastructure related tasks.) . . . Don’t knowif similar problems hold for the CBW areas as well.’m A July 2002 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National CongressDefector Program, described Source One as “the most successful INC referral”with “exceptional access to information of interest to the U.S. IntelligenceCommunitv.” The assessment. coordinated onlv with the DIA. the CIA. and the---------.---., - , d , , FBI said, “he had access to as many as 150 facilitiesassociated with conventional weapons and, to a lesser extent, to facilities associated with Iraqi WMD programs.” The assessment further noted that SourceOne’s:Information is deemed highly credible and includes reports on a wide range of subjects including conventional weapons facilities, denial and deception; communications security; suspected terrorist training locations; illicit trade and smuggling; Saddam’s palaces; the Iraqiprison system; and Iraqi petrochemical plants. Many reports included geo-coordinates, diagrams, and hand drawings. The source provided 13’ Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research e-mail, March 6,2002.Page 44 Page 48 limited information regarding WMD facilities in Iraq, but he did not have access to more specific information on Iraq’s WMD programs.‘32(U) Following publication of the NIC Memorandum, the Director of the Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues in INR prepared, but never sent, a memorandum to the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia to convey concerns about the NIC Memorandum, in particular about the discussion of Source One’s information. The memorandumoutlined the concerns discussed in the INR analyst’s e-mail discussed previouslythat Source One freauentlv assigned WMD purposes to facilities in which he claims about WMD work at various facilities are not adequately substantiated in our view.“133a, Suspect Nuclear Facility Reporting m The reports from Source One which garnered the most interest from Intelligence Community analysts pertained specifically to a facility described in the reports as the “[suspect] nuclear-related facility.” The intelligence reports,dated in early 2002, described the location of the facility and security measures, including high bridge walls to prevent drivers from viewing the site and the presence of Iraqi intelligence security. Source One reported that there were individuals associated with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission who were working on the project. One of the reports noted that the facility was located on 132 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10,2002, p.2. 133 Draft INR Memorandum for NIO/NESAF, July 29,2002. Page 45 Page 49 the eastern side of the Tigris river m.134 (U) The Intelligence Community identified a site they believed matched Source One’s description, however, there were several inconsistencies betweenSource One’s reporting and the identified site. Source One reported that theconstruction of the facility had begun in 1999, but construction on the site identified by intelligence began in the summer of 1998. In addition, the facility identified was located on the eastern side of the Tigris river, but Source One told his debriefers he did not recall seeing the river adjacent to the construction site. He described a concrete pit that exited one of the buildings and drained into an open pit, which intelligence could neither confirm nor deny. Finally, Source One drew a sketch of the site indicating at least six small buildings, but intelligence of the site did not match his sketch. In each case these inconsistencies were included in the reporting.i3’(U) Source One’s reporting specifically on this facility was included in twofinished intelligence assessments, the October 2002 NIE on Iraq ‘s ContinuingPrograms for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA assessment, Iraq ‘sReemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, published a month earlier. The NIE included a text box on the reporting on the facility entitled “New NuclearFacility?” The text box outlined several points about Source One’s reporting thatdrove the Intelligence Community’s concerns that the facility may have beennuclear related. *34 DIA Intelligence Reports, July 2002 \ 135 DIA Intelligence Reports, July Page 46 Page 50 . Four of the lead engineers for the project reportedly were associated with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. . The source indicated that he had seen cylinders at [the facility] in 2000 that were similar to sketches of large uranium hexafluoride cylinders. . Several buildings reportedly were guarded by An-m Al Khas (the Special Security Organization, SSO) and Manthuma Al Amn security personnel. The text box also noted that: The overall description of the site and the timelines of its construction as described by the source were reasonably consistent with details detected through [intelligence]. The site consists of several small buildings of the shape and layout described by the defector, who participated in [the facility’s] construction. The site was constructedrapidly during the summer of 1998, although the defector claimed construction had occurred in 1999. We judge that the defector may have been confused about the year. (U) The NIE concluded that “additional intelligence reporting is necessarybefore we can confirm a nuclear association for [the facility].” Source One’sreporting was not mentioned elsewhere in the NIE, was not included amongst the four pages discussing facilities of concern, was not included in the key judgments, and was not one of the six key elements underpinning the key judgment in the NIE that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.‘36136 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,October 2002, p. 20. Page 47 Page 51 (U) In contrast to the carefully worded description of the suspect facility as a possible nuclear facility in the NIE, the September 2002 DIA assessment said an Iraqi defector “described a nuclear site near Baghdad” and “reportedly observednew cylinders similar to those used to hold UF6.” The report noted that thedefector saw special security at the facility and individuals formerly associated with Iraq’s nuclear program. The assessment concluded that the defector’s report“suggests this site is either a uranium conversion or gas centrifuge facility.” Apicture of the site identified as possibly the suspect facility was included with a caption that stated “this facility, just north of Baghdad, apparently is either auranium conversion facility or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.“137m In addition to the these two assessments, on October 17,2002, the CIA published an assessment detailing the overall reporting of two Iraq sources, one of which was Source One. The assessment noted that Source One was debriefed by the CIA and the DIA and said the debriefers described him as “cooperative and straightforward.” The assessment said that Source One did nothave access to information on the nature of the work being done at the facilities where he worked, but then added: Source One alleged was involved in nuclear-related activities. He reportedly observed known nuclear-associated personnel and steel containers labeled with radiation warning markings near two small laboratories. We cannot determine the facility’s function mm, but its location and heavy security are consistent with other Iraqi WMD-capable facilities. We do not know what was in the containers, but it could have been uranium hexaflouride or another radioactive substance. Source One reported that he never observed 137 DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002, p. 10, 12.Page 48 Page 52 WMD-related equipment installed in any sites he visited because his work- was usually completed as the building was being constructed.13* :ii CIA, SPWR, Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors, October 17, 2002. SSCI transcript, Hearing on the History and Continuity of Weapons of Mass Destruction Assessments Pertainin&o Iraq, June 19,2003, p.79. ,41 CIA, Response to questions from Committee staff, July 6,2006. Page 49 Page 53 d. Postwar Findings 

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