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Senate Intelligence Committee Phase II a, b - Bush lies to war.

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• _ at a higher level. Mr. Rhode advised Andrew Marshall, his supervisor in the Office of Net Assessments, and DoD Employee #2 about the encounter, but did not document the meeting in any way.l42 
• (U) In late May 2003, Mr. Ledeen prepared a letter outlining a new version of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change in Iran that was received by Under Secretary Feith. The letter proposed a 100-day agreement in which Mr. Ledeen ’s Iranian contacts would supply ten specific deliverables ranging from photographs of terrorists in Iran, locations of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that had been moved to Iran, access to Iranian officials, to events that would begin a mass insurrection within Iran. In return, the Iranians were asking for a $7 million loan, funding for Iranian media outlets in Southern California, support for moderate Iranian mullahs, and funding for an intelligence gathering group in Iran. M3 
• (U) Under Secretary Feith forwarded Mr. Ledeen ’s letter to Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Stephen Carnbone, with a note dated June 2, 2003, which said, "[].]et’s discuss."144 Officials from the DoD advised the Committee in November 2003 that Mr. Ledeen ’s new approach had been discussed with the DIA and CIA, but that no further action was taken}45 Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the $7 million proposal "was one of numerous schemes" proposed by Mr. Ghorbanifar on behalf of a group of Iranians who wanted to overthrow the regime. He added that while he thought there was limited hope of the U.S. Government agreeing to such plans, he passed them all on to his many contacts in the U.S. Government. 146 
• (U) At about the same time Mr. Ledeen was presenting the 100-day proposal, he was also conducting outreach to various members of Congress. On July 14, 2003, in a letter to DCI Tenet, former Committee Chairman Roberts wrote that he had met with Mr. Ledeen at the urging of Senators Santorum, Kyl and Brownback. Chairman Roberts noted that Mr. Ledeen expressed frustration that the CIA did not pursue access to sources of information of potential value on current high priority matters. Chairman Roberts also forwarded a statement of concern prepared by Mr. Ledeen . The statement, titled Errors 0fOmissi0r1, outlined the Rome meeting and the subsequent failure to pursue the matter further, as well as the CIA’s failure to pursue potential information on the location of Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein’s finances, and Iranian funding of terrorism. Chairman Roberts asked the DCI to review and comment on Mr. Ledeen ’s concerns.147 
• (U) The CIA responded to Senator Roberts in a letter dated September 23, 2003. The response stated that the CIA took information provided by Mr. Ledeen seriously, fully evaluated it, and acted on it accordingly. The response added that a channel through the office of the DDO had been established in February 2002 as a means for Mr. Ledeen to contact the agency with any actionable information he may have. The CIA’s response also noted that Mr. Ledeen had been 142 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #2, CIFA Report, Rhode Interview. 143 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 26, June 2, 2003, Note from Mr. Feith to Mr. Cambone. ‘“ ibid. 145 2004-0523, November 5, 2003 staff memo on October 29, 2003 meeting with DoD Officials, page 7. M6 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, StaE Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 48-50. 147 2003-3129, July 14, 2003, Chairman Roberts letter to DCI with attachments. _ 24

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• the source of several offers of intelligence lead information in the past, but stated that the "CIA has attempted to follow up on these leads, on several occasions investing significant time and manpower. To date, none of these leads has resulted in information of significant intelligence value."l48 
• The Paris Meeting 
• The next major event connected to the Rome meeting was a June 2003 meeting between Mr. Rhode and Mr. Ghorbanifar in Paris, France. The individual recollections of the origins of this meeting conflict greatly. According to a March 2007 DoD IG report and an April 2004 interview of Mr. Rhode, in June 2003 Mr. Rhode was in Istanbul, Turkey attending a conference on U.S./Turkish relations when he was contacted by two Middle East experts from the Office of the Vice President. During their discussion arrangements were made for Mr. Rhode to attend, pending approval from his supervisor, a meeting in Paris with an Iranian profossor and a Palestinian - - -, with whom the officials from the Office of the Vice President were no longer able to meet. While in Istanbul, Mr. Rhode also received a call from Mr. Ledeen , who, when advised that Mr. Rhode would be in Paris, suggested that he should meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Rhode contacted his supervisor, Andrew Marshall, in the Office of Net Assessments to seek approval for the trip. 149 
• (U) Mr. Marshall advised the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that although Mr. Rhode worked for him and provided general descriptions of what he was doing, "he often works for other people on tasks and projects outside the Office of Net Assessments .... F150 He specifically mentioned projects for Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Marshall further informed the Counterintelligence Field Activity that "he never heard much of what came out of the Rome meeting other than the meetings went well and interesting information was obtained." 151 Without an understanding of the deliberations over further DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar and his Iranian contacts, Mr. Marshall approved Mr. Rhode’s trip to Paris and the meeting with Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Rhode advised the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that he believed Mr. Marshall’s approval authorized him to meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar. When Counterintelligence Field Activity interviewers asked Mr. Rhode why he had not contacted the officials involved in authorizing the Rome meeting, Mr. Rhode stated that would have been logical, but he contacted his immediate supervisor instead. Mr. Rhode informed Counterintelligence Field Activity officials that once he received approval he telephoned one of the Middle East advisors from the Office of the Vice President and told him that he had received approval to travel to Paris and that while he was there he was going to meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Rhode stated to the Counterintelligence Field Activity officials that he also called Mr. Ledeen and told him to arrange the meeting with Mr. Ghorbanifar}52 HB 2003-4116, September 23, 2003 CIA response Chairman Robert’s July 14, 2003 letter. I 149 2007-1142, March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DoD Involvement with the Rendon Group, page 8, and 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 34-37. 150 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report, Marshall interview. 15 I 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report, Marshall Interview. 152 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #2, CIFA Report, Rhode Interview, and 2004- 0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 34-37. _ 25

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• _ (U) A February 2004 draft chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Committee in April 2004 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs contained an inaccurate version of events. According to that document, Mr. Rhode encountered Mr. Ledeen at the conference in Istanbul, Turkey, and mentioned that he would be traveling to Paris. Information provided by the DoD in March 2008, states that this information reflected the Department’s understanding of the facts at that time. The March 2008 information restates Mr. Rhode’s recollection that Mr. Ledeen was not in Istanbul, but rather Mr. Rhode talked to him by telephone while Mr. Rhode was in Istanbul.156 This version of events conforms to the recollections of Mr. Ledeen . The Committee questioned Mr. Ledeen in 2004 about his attending a conference in Istanbul in mid-2003, and he indicated that he had no recollections of being there and supported this claim by noting that his passport contained no stamp or visa from Turkey.154 
• (U) When asked whether he was aware that Mr. Rhode had met with Mr. Ghorbanifar in Paris in 2003, Mr. Ledeen told the Committee in 2004 that he had "read about it in the papers."155 He stated that it would have made no sense for him to set up such a trip because Mr. Rhode and Mr. Ghorbanifar could talk to each other directly. Mr. Rhode informed the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that he could not call Mr. Ghorbanifar directly because he had no contact information for him and his only means of such contact was Mr. Ledeen .166 When Mr. Ledeen was asked if perhaps he had suggested to Mr. Rhode that since he was going to be in Paris he might want to meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar, he stated "I don’t think that ever happened."167 In a subsequent interview in 2007, Mr. Ledeen reiterated his original position, but added that it was certainly possible it happened the other way.166 The Committee is unable to reconcile the inconsistencies in the explanations for how Mr. Rhode came to meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar in Paris in 2003. 
• (_) A March 2007 DoD IG report indicates that Mr. Rhode traveled to Paris and on June 30 and July 1, 2003, met with Mr. Ghorbanifar and a news broadcaster named Merteza Lotfi.169 According to Mr. Rhode’s notes from the meeting, which were provided to the Committee, also present at the meeting was an Ayatollah -.160 The purpose of Mr. Rhode meeting with Mr. Ghorbanifar was to receive "an update on the current political situation and conditions in Iran."161 Based on Mr. Rhode’s notes, the subjects covered included the current situation in Iran, Iranian relations with Syria, the state of Islam in Iran, and Iran’s activity in Iraq.162 Mr. Rhode acknowledged that Mr. Ghorbanifar had revisited the issue of funding for 153 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #16. 154 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 47-48. 155 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 47. 156 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #2, CIFA Report, Rhode Interview. 157 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 47. 156 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, October 24, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 159 2007-1142, March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DoD Involvement with the Rendon Group, page 8. 166 NOTE: It is imclear who Ayatollah Maliki was. Mr. Rhode refused the Committee’s 2007 request to be interviewed. The DoD was also provided a series of questions in July 2007 that requested clarification on the participants in the Paris meeting. The response received on March 12, 2008, offered no new insight into this topic. See 2008-1182. 161 2007-1 142, March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DoD Involvement with the Rendon Group, page 8. 162 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &0m the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 27, Mr. Rhode’s notes on the Paris meeting. _ 26

Michael Ledeen, Rove's Brain	Karl Rove, Bush's Brain	= go to NFU pages
	Issues not in this report Forged yellow cake documents. more Rosen Weissman, AIPAC espionage case. Sibel Edmonds FBI wiretap translator, more Role of Judith Miller and the New York Times   Leakgate Project for New American Century, PNAC Valerie Plame, Brewster Jennings & Associates  more Omissions and misstatements in the 911 Commission Report more Israeli Art Students, their addresses tracked the addresses of the 911 hijackers.  more 911 was an inside job (Bush, Israel, neocons) the only people who don't believe this are duped Americans, the rest of the world believes it.   more

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• _ regime change in Iran at the meeting, but Mr. Rhode stated that he offered no encouragement.163 Mr. Rhode advised the Committee in 2004 that while in Paris he also met with the Iranian professor _ in Paris and the Palestinian that the officials from the Office of the Vice President were to have met originally.164 
• (U) Mr. Rhode began discussing the Paris meeting results upon his return, but it took a month or so for him to compile his notes. Among those initially briefed were Mr. Marshall, Mr. Franklin, and one of the Middle East experts from the Office of the Vice President. Mr. Rhode informed the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that once his notes were finalized, he believed that he gave a copy to Mr. Rodman, one of the Middle East experts from the Office of the Vice President, and possibly Mr. Marshall.166 There is no indication that the information collected during the Paris meeting was shared with the Intelligence Community for a determination of potential intelligence value. 
• (U) According to an April 2004 letter to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Mr. Rhode met on his own individual initiative in Paris on June 30-July 1, 2003, with Ghorbanifar .... .He did not consult with the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy organization."166 In a November 2003 briefing to Committee staff, Mr. Rodman and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense/Intelligence, Carol Haave, opined that approval for the meeting should have been coordinated with the OUSD(P). They further claimed that if it had, the meeting would not have been authorized.167 Mr. Rodman informed the Committee in a September 2007 interview that had Mr. Rhode asked him about the Paris meeting before going, Mr. Rodman would have advised him not to go.166 
• (U) Mr. Rhode was aware of the internal DoD deliberations over the decision not to pursue further contact via Mr. Ghorbanifar. He advised the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that he understood that after the Rome meeting the CIA and State Department had opposed pursuing the matter and as a result the U.S. Government decided not to pursue further contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar or the Iranians. He added his belief that Mr. Luti and DoD Employee #2 had told him in early 2002 that the activity had been shut off, which meant that he would have no further contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar or the Iranians.169 For this reason, responsibility for his attending the Paris meeting would appear to be solely his. There was no formal reprimand of Mr. Rhode for failing to coordinate the Paris meeting with personnel from the OUSD(P), or to clarify the current DoD position on further contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Rodman advised the Committee in 2007 that he had admonished Mr. Rhode and from that point forward Mr. Rhode was careful to ask permission prior to meeting with foreign contacts.17° 163 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 39-43. 164 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 38. 165 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #2, CIFA Report, Rhode Interview. 166 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs letter, page 3. 167 2004-0523, November 5, 2003 staff memo on October 29, 2003 meeting w DoD Officials, page 8. 168 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 3. 169 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #2, CIFA Report, Rhode Interview. 176 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 3. _ 27

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• Events of August-September 2003 
• (U) In August 2003, Mr. Ledeen continued to push information presented by Mr. Ghorbanifar to U.S. Government officials. According to a 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity interview with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict, Thomas O’Connell, on August 6, 2003, Mr. Ledeen met with Mr. O’Connell, General William Boykin, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and General Ron Burgess, the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, to discuss a source who knew where enriched uranium was buried in Iraq, but was unwilling to meet with the CIA. According to the interview, the DoD officials recognized that the CIA was responsible for locating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, so the information was turned over to the CIA. Mr. O’Connell was later informed by Mr. Ledeen that Mr. Ghorbanifar was the conduit to this source. 
• (U) An article in the August 8, 2003, edition of the Long Island Newsday brought the DoD’s interaction with Mr. Ghorbanifar into the public arena. The article began with the following sentence, "Pentagon hardliners pressing for regime change in Iran held secret and unauthorized meetings in Paris with a controversial arms dealer who was a major figure in the Iran-contra scandal .... ." The article went on to state that at least two officials from the OUSD(P) had held several meetings with Mr. Ghorbanifar and identified Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode by name. The article also noted the role of Mr. Ledeen . While the article contained several inaccuracies, it generally outlined the issues surrounding the Rome and Paris meetings. 
• (U) An August 9, 2003, article in the Washington Post followed up on the Newsday article. It contained an August 8, 2003, comment from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld acknowledging what was in fact the Rome meeting, and noted that updated information indicated a second meeting had occurred in June 2003 in Paris. The article offered greater insight into the Rome and Paris meetings, but still contained several inaccuracies and reflected confusion over the details of the two meetings. (U) The newspaper articles prompted DoD officials to begin documenting the contacts involving Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Rodman prepared a chronology of Iranian contacts for Secretary Rumsfeld on August 11, 2003. The cover letter noted that the chronology only covered the December 2001 Rome meeting because the June 2003 Paris meeting "seems to have taken place without the knowledge of anyone in ISA [International Security Affairs] or Policy."m The chronology outlined the events previously described in this report, ending with a reference to the Secretary of State continuing to disapprove of further contacts. 
• (U) The Pentagon’s efforts to fully define the Iranian contacts continued into September. On September 1 1, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld requested that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz provide an answer on the issue that day. He noted that Secretary Powell and National Security Advisor Rice were interested in the response. 173 Mr. Rodman prepared a document for Deputy Secretary m 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIF A Report, O’Connell interview, and 2004- 1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 36-42. 172 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. 173 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 29, September 11, 2003, Memo to Mr. Wolfowitz from Secretary Rumsfeld on Iran. _ 28

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• _ Wolfowitz indicating that the only contacts with Mr. Ghorbanifar of which DoD personnel were aware were the Rome and Paris meetings.174 Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode provided input to this document. A February 2004 chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicates that in September 2003 Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz advised Mr. Rodman to make clear to Mr. Rhode that he was to get "all potentially sensitive contacts with foreigners approved by Policy,"175 even though he worked in a different office. In November 2003, DoD officials advised the Committee that the Secretary of Defense had issued a verbal mandate that there would be no further DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar.176 According to Mr. Ledeen , at some point after the articles on the Rome meeting appeared in the press, DoD personnel, to include Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode, were forbidden from speaking with him on the subject of Iran.177 When interviewed in 2007, neither Mr. Franklin nor Mr. Rodman could recall such a directive regarding Mr. Ledeen .178 (U) On September 19, 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Stephen Cambone, tasked the Director of the Counterintelligence Field Activity, David Burtt II, to conduct a "thorough, complete, and expeditious" inquiry into the events surrounding any meetings between Mr. Ghorbanifar and DoD personnel. Mr. Cambone noted that the tasking was at the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.179 At the direction of Mr. Cambone, the Counterintelligence Field Activity halted its inquiry on October 21, 2003. A March 2007 DoD IG report indicates that Mr. Cambone halted the investigation because the information collected by the Counterintelligence Field Activity was satisfactory and there was no need to continue the inquiry.l80 
• (U) The final version of the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s report indicated that its staff conducted 19 interviews of DoD personnel, reviewed open source materials, and reviewed documentation from the interviewees and other sources. The report stated that at the time the inquiry was discontinued, no violations of law had been identified. The Scope of Inquiry section of the report, however, contained the following comments on the limitations placed on the Counterintelligence Field Activity: (U) Pursuant to direction from the offices of DoD General Counsel and USD(I) [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence], the inquiry has been limited in scope. The inquiry has been restricted to interviews of some of the principal DoD personalities identified in news articles as being associated with this matter and 174 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 30, September 11, 2003, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on Iran Contacts. 175 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. NOTE: This reference indicates that during the month of August 2003 Mr. Rhode continued to _ receive phone calls and faxes &om Mr. Ghorbanifar as a result of the Paris meeting, but did not pursue the matter further. 176 2004-0523, November 5, 2003 staff memo on October 29, 2003 meeting w DoD Officials, page 9. m 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 34-35. Us 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman , page 4, and Memorandum for the Record, October 3, 2007, Staff Interview with Mr. Franklin, page 4. [79 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #5, September 19, 2003, Memo from Under Secretary Cambone to Director, Counterintelligence Field Activity. 180 2007-1142, March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DoD Involvement with the Rendon Group, page 7. _ 29

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• their supervisors, review of material voluntarily provided by interviewees, review of records from DoD agencies, and open source information. 
• (U) Analysis of the information obtained by this limited scope inquiry, suggests there are several interviews of people both internal to DoD and external to DoD that have not been completed and would likely corroborate and/or enhance the information obtained to date. Analysis also suggests there are records and information possessed by the CIA that would likely corroborate and/or enhance the information obtained to date. The offices of the USD(I) and DoD General Counsel have advised CIFA not to conduct the key interviews CIFA has recommended. The DoD Office of General Counsel has not forwarded CIFA’s letter to the CIA, which was drafted for DoD General Counsel review and dissemination
• (U) The final CIFA report contained a list of seven unresolved issues. These included: • A National Security Counsel staff report of a possible third meeting between Mr. Rhode and Mr. Ghorbanifar in early October 200318 , • The lack of follow-up with the CIA, • The lack of understanding of the role of the Office of the Vice President or the role of the National Security Counsel in the Rome and Paris meetings • No independent corroboration of the information or timelines provided by DoD personnel involved in the two known meetings with Mr. Ghorbanifar, and • The lack of information on the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) in the Rome meeting. 183 _ 
• (U) The most significant matter raised in the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s report was the possibility that Mr. "Ghorbanifar or his associates are being used as agents of a foreign intelligence service to leverage his continuing contact with Michael Ledeen and others to reach into and influence the highest levels of the U.S. Government."l84 The report noted that there were multiple occasions where information from Mr. Ghorbanifar entered U.S. Government channels via Mr. Ledeen . These channels included personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, DoD, the White House, and Congress. As a result, Mr. Ghorbanifar was able to communicate with U.S. Government officials via Mr. Ledeen without having direct contact. While the report concluded that Mr. Ledeen was likely unwitting of any counterintelligence 181 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6. NOTE: The DoD was provided a series of questions in July 2007 that requested clarification on the content of and response to the 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity review. Also, in September 2007, Chairman Rockefeller requested that DoD provide the Committee with copies of the materials collected and created by the Counterintelligence Field Activity during their 2003 review. To date, a response on this issue has not been forthcoming. 182 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report. The possible third meeting was reported by National Security Council staff who believed Mr. Rhode and Mr. Ghorbanifar were part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Rome in early October 2003. Mr. Ledeen was confirmed to be at the October 2003 meeting, but interviews and a review of travel records by the Counterintelligence Field Activity could neither prove nor disprove that Mr. Rhode attended. :2 2g)g7—156l, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report. I I _ 30

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• _ issues related to his relationship with Mr. Ghorbanifar, their association was widely known, and therefore it should be presumed other foreign intelligence services, including those of Iran, would know. 
• The Inquiry Conclusion section of the report noted that pursuing this issue was outside the scope of their tasking and would require collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and CIA. To address the matter, however, the report contained the following recommendations: 185 • A comprehensive inter-agency analysis be conducted of CI [counterintelligence] implications related to the ability of Mr. Ghorbanifar or his associates to directly or indirectly influence or access U.S. Government officials. • An attempt be made to map Mr. Ghorbanifar’s relationship within Iranian elite social networks and, if possible, his contacts with other governments and/or intelligence organizations. • In conjunction with the FBI and CIA, an evaluation of the potential for exploitation of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s activities in the context of a campaign against the Iranian intelligence services. • Attempt to exploit contacts with DoD, particular (sic) those with OUSD(P) officials, by putting a CI program in place in ODUSD [Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense] (International Affairs). I 86 
•  
• Conclusions 
• (U) According to DoD officials, the Rome meeting arose within the unique set of circumstances created by the post-September 11, 2001 environment, allegations that the Iranians offering to provide information had precluded CIA involvement, and the belief that the CIA would be unwilling to pursue information made available through either Mr. Ledeen or Mr. Ghorbanifar. The Committee’s review of applicable laws and regulations indicates that Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz acted within their authorities in directing DoD personnel to attend the Rome meeting. The final version of the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s report also identified no violations of law regarding the DoD contacts with Mr. Ghorbanifar as of the date their review was halted. 
• (U) Officials from the DoD made inquiries into the appropriate course of action for involving the CIA when it was believed the Iranians wished to defect. Once the Iranians’ true intent became known, however, there was no further attempt to coordinate with Intelligence Community personnel until after the trip had taken place. The reason provided for this course of action was direction from Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to keep the meeting close-hold until the DoD could make a determination on the value of the contact and how it should be pursued further. 
• (U) The involvement of a foreign government (Israel) intelligence service and alleged current and former Iranian security service personnel in the Rome meeting was an indicator of Intelligence Community equities in the activity. The DoD’s dependence on Mr. Ledeen to organize the ‘“ ibid N6 Staff discussion with DoD IG personnel indicated there was no DoD response to these recommendations, and to date, the DoD has not provided a requested response to this issue. _ 31

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• Rome meeting, and failure to research in advance his avenues for arranging the meeting and the background of the participants, however, resulted in the DoD officials who decided on how the meeting would be undertaken being unaware of the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and Mr. Ghorbanifar. Once the information was collected, however, the DoD’s immediate response was to limit the ability of DIA Director Wilson to evaluate it. He was not allowed to retain the information for evaluation by the DIA or to run name traces on the Iranian participants, and he was not made aware of foreign government (Israel) involvement and the potential that they were pursuing additional contacts with the Iranians. 
• (U) Mr. Franklin had a portion of the information collected in Rome evaluated, and forwarded the results to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He considered this information to be "actionable intelligence."187 The U.S. Government never processed the remaining information to determine its potential value or the benefit of continued contact with the Iranians. In April 2002, four months after the Rome meeting, the Defense HUMINT Service received an "executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . The Defense HUMINT Service contact memorandum outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , and requested name traces on the two Iranians, but noted that Mr. Ledeen had repeatedly declined to provide details such as specific names, locations, and contact information until the DoD decided whether or not to pursue the contact. 188 Information provided by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that after the interview of Mr. Ledeen , the Defense HUMINT Service contacted the CIA and learned that Mr. Ledeen regularly approached his U.S. Government contacts with various proposals he deemed of interest. The Defense HUMINT Service determined that no further contact with Mr. Ledeen was warranted or advisable. 189 
• (U) There can be varying opinions on the extent to which the Rome and Paris meetings represented intelligence information collection. For example, DoD IG interviews conducted during their review of the OUSD(P) produced differing opinions based on the interviewee’s interpretation of intelligence collection.190 Even Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode reached differing conclusions on what the information they collected represented. Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he viewed the information received not as intelligence, but data to help understand what was going on in Iran.191 Mr. Franklin stated that he viewed the information in his meeting summary as "intelligence or information that I thought was useful to intelligence agencies. . ."192 In addition, Mr. Franklin opined to Counterintelligence Field Activity personnel that after his return from Rome the situation changed from debriefing Iranians to them being intelligence sources. 1 93 187 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 40. 188 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral. 189 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #14. 1911 2007-1561, DoD IG interviews with [DoD Officer #3], Wolfowitz, and [DoD Officer #2], and 2003-2975, June 28, 2003 letter from Under Secretary Feith to Chairman Roberts on the cell set up in his office to review intelligence. 191 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 12 and 32. 192 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 37. 193 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin interview. _ 32

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• (U) In sum, the Rome meeting represented information gathering on Iran by DoD policy personnel with an intent to determine its potential intelligence value after the fact. This determination was never made. Iran is a denied area where the Intelligence Community has limited sources of information. Greater inclusion of the Intelligence Community might have resulted in a direct attempt by the Community to pursue further information from the Iranians, or an attempt to determine if the foreign government (Israel) was developing a conduit to potentially valuable Iranian sources. While some DoD officials lament the failure to pursue this avenue of information further, their decision-making upon the return of the DoD personnel from Rome was a contributing factor. (U) Based on its review, the Committee has reached the following conclusions: Conclusion #1: Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley failed to inform DCI Tenet and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage of the full nature of the planned contact with the Iranians in Rome, to include the involvement of Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar in proposing and facilitating the meeting. Conclusion #2: The role Mr. Ledeen played as interlocutor for Mr. Ghorbanifar and in setting up the Rome meeting, and potentially the Paris meeting, was inappropriate. There is no indication that the Iranian officials attending the Rome meeting refused to meet with CIA officials. It is likely that this allegation was used by Mr. Ledeen , Mr. Ghorbanifar or others as a means of circumventing the Intelligence Community’s knowledge of and involvement in the meeting given the CIA’s fabrication notice against Mr. Ghorbanifar. Also, Mr. Ghorbanifar, aided by Mr. Ledeen , used the opportunity presented at the Rome meeting to propose an agenda for regime change in Iran directly to DoD officials, including a proposal for U.S. funding of covert activities. Conclusion #3: The decision by Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to keep the Rome meeting close hold was ill—advised. The Decision prompted DoD officials not to coordinate their activities with the Ambassador or other U.S. Embassy officials prior to meeting with the Iranians and Mr. Ghorbanifar, and led to the withholding of pertinent information from the Intelligence Community and the Department of State both before and after the meeting. Conclusion #4: DoD officials collected potentially useful and actionable intelligence information during the Rome meeting. Unfortunately, senior DoD officials would not allow this intelligence to be placed into proper Intelligence Community channels once it was collected. As a result Intelligence Community officials never became fully aware of the information provided by the Iranians, the full involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and foreign government (Israel) intelligence service, or Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attempts, repeated at the Paris meeting, to convince DoD officials to fund covert activities in Iran. Conclusion #5: The limitations placed by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz on DIA Director Wilson’s access to the intelligence information collected in Rome were particularly inappropriate. _ 33

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• Conclusion #6: The actions of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Cambone and the DoD Office of General Counsel to limit the scope of the Cotmterintelligence Field Activity inquiry prevented a full understanding of the contacts between Mr. Ghorbanifar and U.S. Government officials and a thorough assessment of the counterintelligence issues related to these contacts. Conclusion #7: The decision of Under Secretary Cambone to terminate the Cotmterintelligence Field Activity inquiry into the meetings between DoD officials and Mr. Ghorbanifar was premature. Conclusion #8: The senior leadership of the DoD failed to implement the recommendations of the Counterintelligence Field Activity to conduct an inter-agency analysis of the counterintelligence implications of Mr. Ghorbanifar and his ability to directly or indirectly influence U.S. Government officials. Recommendations 
• (U) Recommendation #1: (For the Director of National Intelligence) In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as appropriate, determine whether there is a need to update current DoD regulations, Intelligence Community Directives, or Intelligence Community agreements with the DoD to clarify the requirements for DoD Policy officials to coordinate their activities with the Intelligence Community. Provide the appropriate Congressional oversight committees with the outcome of this determination no more than 90 days after the issuance of this report. V 
• (U) Recommendation #2: (For the Director of National Intelligence) Direct the National Counterintelligence Executive, in coordination with other appropriate Intelligence Community entities, to prepare a report on the U.S. Government’s policies and procedures for identifying and countering attempts by foreign agents or entities to directly or indirectly influence or access U.S. Government officials. Such a report should cover the procedures for U.S. Government employees to report foreign contactsl94, the utilization and effectiveness of those procedures, the steps taken to analyze the information collected, and the actions resulting from that analysis to counter future attempts to influence the U.S. Govermnent. This report should be provided to the appropriate Congressional oversight committees no later than September 30, 2008. 194 Note that the Committee’s review did not evaluate the requirement for Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode to report their contact with the Iranians because, like the requirement for cou.ntry clearance, they believed that issue had been addressed by the involvement of senior U.S. Government officials. _ 34

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• Minority Views or Vice  Chairman BoNn and Senators Chambliss, HArcrr, AND BuRR* The much anticipated report published today purporting to conclude the Committee’s inquiry into "any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCT EG) and the Ojice of Special Plans within the Ojice ofthe Under Secretary of Defense for Policy " will be a disappointment to those who have been expecting that the Committee would uncover wrongdoing by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP). In spite of comments from the Chairman of this Committee twice alleging that the OUSDP, or its former head, Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, may have engaged in unlawful activities, the report released today found nothing to substantiate that claim; nothing unlawful about the alleged "rogue intelligence operation" in the PCTEG, nothing unlawful about the Office of Special Plans, and nothing unlawful about the so-called failure to inform Congress of alleged "intelligence activities." Just last year, the Chairman released a press statement following the release of a Department of Defense Inspector General report into the OUSDP claiming that it appeared that the office’s activities were "not in compliance with the law." Press reports at the time noted that the Chairman vowed to pursue the issue in the Committee. In 2004, the Chairman accused the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy of "eff`orts to run intelligence past the intelligence community" and wondered ‘\2vas he running a private intelligence failure [sic], which is not lawful." Yet, rather than pursue these allegations, the Chairman directed that this portion of the Committee’s inquiry focus on an issue unrelated to either office identified in the Committee’s terms of reference or the DoD Inspector General report. Despite allegations that the OUSDP may have contributed to faulty intelligence on Iraq, he decided to pursue an issue unrelated to intelligence and Lmrelated to Iraq. He pursued an inquiry of an exploratory meeting held in Rome in 200l between two Department of Defense officials and two Iranians about Iran (hereafter called the "Rome meetings"). As the majority report clearly shows, the Rome meetings occurred in December 200l, nearly a year before the Office of Special Plans even existed. While the PCTEG did exist at the time of the Rome meetings, it was a two person group involved in other work and neither of these individuals was involved in the Rome meetings. While one of the Rome meeting participants did join the Office of Special Plans after it was formed, his activities pertaining to the Rome meetings had ceased many months before. The other Rome meeting participant was not even an employee of OUSDP. In fact, the Rome meetings had very little to do with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at all, and had almost nothing to do with former Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith. ° * I concur with the Vice Chairman’s views on the substance of the report as well as the Minority’s amendments. I am unable to comment on any Phase I or Phase II activities that preceded my membership on this Committee. _ 35

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• We cannot explain why the Chairman would direct the Committee to undertake a review unrelated to the task outlined in the terms of reference after four years of arguing for the necessity of the Committee completing this portion of Phase ll, and after vociferously criticizing the previous Chairman for his effort to move the review along by asking the Department of Defense Inspector General to examine the issue. The Chairman claimed on numerous occasions that the Inspector General was not a substitute for the Committee’s work, but nearly a year after the release of the Inspector General’s findings, the Committee has done nothing to pursue that effort. At the Committee’s business meeting to vote on this report, the Chairman told the members of the Committee that he and the previous Chairman had agreed that the Rome meetings would be included as part of Phase H, but a 2006 letter from then-Chairman Roberts belies that claim. In the letter, Chairman Roberts restated the Committee’s agreed upon terms of reference and added: You have asked to restart the Committee investigation into the Pentagon’s Rome meetings. Clearly, this does not fall within the scope of Phase Il. As you know, the Committee reviewed this issue nearly three years ago and found that it involved Iran and not Iraq. In addition, the Committee found nothing which required additional investigation. One would imagine that to go to such great lengths to abandon the Committee’s terms of reference and abandon an investigation of offices and activities which Chairman Rockefeller himself alleged to have been potentially ‘R.1Ill&Wf\ll,” the Rome meetings would have involved even more wrongdoing. The majority report released today, however, shows that this was not the case. The majority report shows that there was nothing unlawful about DoD’s, or any other entity’s, role in or conduct during the Rome meetings. The majority’s report states: The Committee’s review of applicable laws and regulations indicates that Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz acted within their authorities in directing DoD personnel to attend the Rome meeting. Ironically, after all of the allegations of unlawful activities, rather than state this prominently as one of the eight main conclusions, this most significant finding is buried in a summary paragraph. Instead, the report’s eight conclusions are dedicated to vague allegations of "inappropriate" activities or of failures by administration officials with little explanation to justify such claims. For example, the report concludes that Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley "failed" to inform Director of Central Intelligence Tenet and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage of the full nature of the planned contact with the I.ranians in Rome. The _ 36

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• conclusion does not make clear several relevant factors including that: (1) Mr. Hadley was not required to notify either individual; (2) although not required to do so, he notified Tenet and Arinitage of the information he had including, apparently, that the Iranians allegedly had threat information and that the meeting would take place in Europe; and (3) despite receiving this information, apparently, neither Tenet nor Armitage asked any follow up questions to obtain additional information. Yet, the majority has concluded that Mr. Hadley "failed." Other conclusions argue that Mr. Ledeen ’s role in facilitating the Rome meeting was "inappropriate” with no explanation as to why, and that the decision by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz to keep the Rome meeting close-hold was "ill-advised," because it led to the alleged "withholding of pertinent information from the intelligence commimity,” something the report explicitly shows is not true. The same information obtained during the Rome meeting was later provided to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). None of the conclusions in the majority report has merit or substance—as the text of the report makes clear. The majority seems to have borrowed an idea from the Department of Defense Inspector General in outlining vague notions of "inappropriate” activity without defining "inappropriate” or explaining the reasoning behind such accusations. After four years of making unsubstantiated allegations of unlawful activities, the calculus appears to be that proclamations of "inappropriate" behavior will generate the desired headlines focusing only on the caustic words, rather than the lack of substance or lack of evidence behind them. We hope that these additional views will help redirect that focus to the evidence, or lack thereof. There are too many problems with this report to highlight them all in these minority views. We will, therefore, attach the amendments filed by the Vice Chairman on behalf of the minority. Although these amendments were filed by the required filing deadline, the Chairman refused to allow consideration of any of them at the business meeting to vote on the reports. We highlight the following areas in which the report is particularly inadequate and makes unsupported claims. First, in several areas the report claims that Director of Central Intelligence Tenet and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage were "not provided with significant details regarding the proposed meeting." As noted above, Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley provided both individuals with the information he knew. He did not have detailed information because the meetings were exploratory—to find out what information the two Iranians involved had and to make a determination about whether their information was worth pursuing further. The report alleges that the information was insufficient, yet does not make clear why if either individual thought the information was insufficient, he did not ask the Deputy National Security Advisor for additional details. The Committee failed to interview Mr. Armitage to ask him this question or whether he believed the information was insufficient. An interview with Mr. Tenet, conducted over the phone (at the request of the minority but with only majority staff present) two days before the originally scheduled vote on the report, did not provide a sufficient response to this question. Mr. Tenet apparently did not think the information was sufficient, but he did not request additional details of Mr. Hadley, according to the majority’s memorandum for the record, _ 37

New York Times  "SISMI sent the CIA and U.S. and British officials information that it knew was forged"
	Niger Forged Yellowcake Documents more Michael Ledeen has denied any involvement in the Niger forged documents, but this Senate Report places him on the scene.

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• because he did not want to stand in the way of "collecting threat information." If minority staff had been included in such a discussion they would have pressed l\/Ir. Tenet to explain why asking a simple follow-up question would stand in the way of collecting threat information. In several places, the majority report makes leaps of logic that are also not supported by the evidence. In the body and again in the conclusions, the report questions whether the Iranians involved in the Rome meetings really did not want to meet with the CIA, as numerous interviews and documents indicate Mr. Ledeen told Mr. Hadley. The report alleges that Mr. Ledeen fabricated this claim to circumvent the intelligence community, citing testimony from the two DoD officials who participated in the Rome meeting that the issue of whether or not the Iranians were unwilling to meet with the CIA did not come up during the meetings. However, the fact that such an issue did not come up during the Rome meetings does not clarify one way or the other whether the Iranians really were unwilling to meet with the CIA. As the DoD informed the Committee in March 2008, in response to staff questions, If none of the participants expressed reservations at the Rome meeting about CIA involvement, as the Committee staff states in this question, this would seem to have little or no significance considering that the CIA in fact did not participate in the meeting, ... thus there would have been no obvious reason why this subject should have arisen at the exploratory Rome meeting. This response was excluded from the majority report. With no evidence whatsoever, the majority report extrapolated a scenario in which l\/Ir. Ledeen lied to circumvent the CIA. That is good material for conspiracy theorists, but not suitable for a report of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Several areas of the report also claim that the "limited awareness of the Rome meeting within the CIA and the State Department ... would have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of this activity." The implication of these comments throughout the report is that it was DoD’s secrecy that kept the information from being pursued by the CIA. This suggestion is not supported by any evidence in the majority report. On the contrary, according to the information in the report, the CIA and Department of State did not want to be involved in any activities that involved Mr. Ghorbanifar, and the CIA only reluctantly agreed to be involved with Mr. Ledeen , but, according to Mr. Tenet, regarding only activities not related to the Iranians involved in the Rome meetings. Had the Rome meeting not been kept limited, the only likely outcome would have been that the meeting would not have taken place at all, a significant impact to be sure, but not the one alleged in the majority report. The report also claims that the government "never processed the remaining information [obtained at the Rome meeting] to determine its potential value or the benefit of continued contact with the Iranians," a claim not borne out by the facts in the majority’s own report. In addition to bringing the information to the attention of the Director of the DIA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense referred the information to the DIA’s Defense HUMINT Service (DH) directly, by putting them in contact with Mr. Ledeen . A contact memorandum from that meeting indicates that the names of the Iranians and the information they provided at the Rome meeting were shared with DH and that l\/Ir. Ledeen offered to provide additional information the DH _ 38

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• _ deemed necessary, once a decision to pursue the contact had been made. The report also requested name traces on the two individuals and guidance from DIA on how to proceed. The DH contacted the CIA about the information, but because the CIA told the DH that Mr. Ledeen regularly approached government contacts "with various proposals he deemed of interest," the DH deterrnined that no further contact was warranted or advisable. Contrary to the claims in the I majority report, the government did pursue the information and determined that it was not advisable to pursue further contact. The majority report’s "Conclusion 4," which claims that ser1ior DoD officials "would not allow" this information to be placed in proper intelligence channels once it was gathered, is fallacious, particularly in light of the fact that these senior officials specifically referred Mr. Ledeen to the DIA. One of the more egregious omissions from the report is testimony from individuals directly involved in these issues because the Committee chose not to interview them. As noted earlier the Committee never sought an interview with Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and only interviewed Director of Central Intelligence Tenet at the eleventh hour, at the request of the minority and without any minority staff present. The Committee did not interview Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley, yet the Committee recounts conversations among these three individuals, quoting books and questions for the record rather than taking the time to talk to them directly. The review staff never interviewed Mr. Rhode, one of only two DoD officials to attend the Rome meeting. While Mr. Rhode had been interviewed by other Committee staff in 2004, several areas in need of clarification remain outstanding because of the failure to re-interview this key participant. The U.S. Ambassador to Rome, Mel Sembler, was not interviewed, nor was Under Secretary of State Mark Grossman, both integral to understanding fully false allegations that DoD was involved in a covert action. Overall, we are at a loss to explain why the Chairman went to such great lengths to investigate this issue, only to publish an incomplete report riddled with unsubstantiated claims, which, in the end, refutes his allegations of unlawful activities. It was a complete waste of time and should never have been part of the Committee’s Phase II investigation. . CHRISTOPHER S. BoND SAXBY CHAMBLISS ORR1N G. HATCH RICHARD BURR _ 39

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• A endix A Filed Amendments on Phase II Report: Any Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretaiy of Defense for Policy _ 40

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• _ Amendment 2 Page 2, third full paragraph - The Committee ’s updated terms of reference called for a review of any intelligence activities relating t0 Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Ojfice of Special Plans within the OUSD(P). The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was a two person group created in November 200], ajier discussions on how to pursue the Rome meeting were already underway in the OUSD(P). No members of that group participated in the meetings that are the subject of this report. The Ojfice of Special Plans was created in October 2002, a]?er the Rome meeting had taken place. One participant in the Rome meeting did join the Ojfice of Special Plans after it was formed, but his activities surrounding the Rome meeting had been completed months before. As noted in the February 2007 DoD IG report, however, "[ U he term OSP [Ojfice of Special Plans] has become generic terminology for the activities ofthe OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCT EG) and Policy Support Ojfice. " Amendment 2- strike As noted in the February 2007 DoD IG report, however, “[ U he term OSP [Ojfice of Special Plans] has become generic terminology for the activities ofthe OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCT EG) and Policy Support Ojjice. " Comment- This Committee knows what the Office of Special Plans was and what it was not. We know that it was not a generic term for the policy office, it was not related to the PCTEG, we know that it was not related to the Rome meetings, and most importantly, we knew these things when the terms of reference for Phase ll were drafted in February 2004. The Committee should help to clarify any confusion about this for the public and the press, not add to it by repeating the DoD lG’s claim that the Office of Special Plans was a "gene1ic te1m," which we know is incorrect. The Office of Special Plans was a specific office which had nothing to do with these meetings and we should not use public confusion of the issue as an excuse to delve into issues that are clearly outside the scope of what the Committee agreed to examine. _ 41

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• _ Amendment Q ) Page 2, last partial paragraph - The December 2001 Rome meeting involved discussions with alleged current and former members ofthe Iranian security service and a foreign government (Israel) entity which included the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service. While the information obtained was related to Iran instead of Iraq, senior OUSD(P) personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting and were involved in the decision-making process on how to undertake the meeting, and an OUSD(P) employee attended the meeting. In light of the fact that the DoD IG did not evaluate the propriety of conducting these meetings, Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV directed that the Committee ’s review ofthe December 2001 and June 2003 meetings be completed as part of its pre-war intelligence on Iraq inquiry. This report completes the Committee 's inquiry into the Rome meeting and the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence collection activities. Amendment 4(a) — strike senior OUSD(P) personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting and were involved in the decision-making process on how to undertake the meeting, and an OUSD(P) employee attended the meeting. In and insert mg strike Committee ’s and insert Chairman’s, strike and the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence collection activities Comment- Whether OUSD(P) personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting or an employee attended the Rome meeting is irrelevant. The Committee did not agree to look at the OUSD(P), it agreed to look at the PCTEG and the OSP, neither of which was in any way related to the Rome meetings. _ 42

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• _ Amendment 4 Page 7, first full paragraph — Deputy Secretary Armitage and DCI Tenet were n0t provided with signyicant details regarding the proposed meeting. Amendment 4- Strike the above sentence. Comment- Up until two days before the first business meeting scheduled to vote on this report, none of these individuals had been interviewed to ask them about the information provided or received. Finally, at our urging, former DCI Tenet was interviewed two days before the business meeting, but no minority staffers were included in the meeting and important follow up questions were not asked. It is also not clear whether Mr. Tenet thinks he was provided with inadequate information and, if so, why he did not ask any necessary follow-up questions of Mr. Hadley. We have confidence that if Mr. Tenet or Mr. Armitage needed information, they would have asked for it. We should be asking them about this, rather than taking comments for the report from books and questions for the record. In any case, even using these materials, we have only heard one side of the story. The Committee has not requested to interview Mr. Hadley to hear his recollections of these conversations, despite the fact that there is a conclusion in the report accusing him of having "failed" to iirlly inform Tenet and Armitage about the meetings — as if there was a requirement to do so. The Committee needs to offer Mr. Hadley the opportunity to respond. _ 43 

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• Amendment 7 Page 10, second full paragraph — Ihe Committee received testimony from Mssrs. Ledeen , Franklin, and Rhode that calls into question the willingness of the Iranians who were met in Rome to deal with the CIA. When Mr. Ledeen was asked whether he had suggested that the Iranians would not meet with the CIA he replied that he did not think so. Mr. Ledeen stated that Iranians to be met in subsequent meetings had made it clear they would not meet with the CIA, but he reiterated that the two Iranians at the Rome meeting had expressed no qualms about dealing with the CIA. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that neither of the Iranians he met in Rome expressed concerns about who in the US. Government they were meeting with. When asked gf there had been an indication beforehand that there were limitations on whom the Iranians would talk to, Mr Franklin responded “no. " When asked whether it had been conveyed to him during the meeting that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA, Mr. Rhode also responded “no. " Amendment 7 — strike The Committee received testimony from Mssrs. Ledeen , Franklin, and Rhode that calls into question the willingness of the Iranians who were met in Rome to deal with the CIA. When Mr. Ledeen was asked whether he had suggested that the Iranians would not meet with the CIA he replied that he did not think so. Mr. Ledeen stated that Iranians to be met in subsequent meetings had made it clear they would not meet with the CIA, but he reiterated that the two Iranians at the Rome meeting had expressed no qualms about dealing with the CIA. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that neither of the Iranians he met in Rome expressed concerns about who in the US. Government they were meeting with. When asked gf there had been an indication beforehand that there were limitations on whom the Iranians would talk to, MrFranklin responded “no. " When asked whether it had been conveyed to him during the meeting that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA, Mr. Rhode also responded "no. " Comment - The comment in the report which says testimony from Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode "calls into question" the willingness of the Iranians who were met in Rome to deal with the CIA is not supportable. Neither Mr. Franklin nor Mr. Rhode had any information about this topic at all. They testified only that the issue never came up in their discussions with the Iranians and there is no reason that it should have. The Committee recently received a response from DoD which made the same comments that we have been making on the drafi since day one. DoD said specifically "If none of the foreign participants expressed reservations at the Rome meeting about CIA involvement, as the Committee staff states in this question, this would seem to have little or no significance considering that the CIA in fact did not participate in the meeting ... Thus there would have been no obvious reason why this subject should have arisen at the exploratory Rome meeting." If both the Minority and DoD have independently noticed the faulty logic of this claim, readers of the report are sure to do the same. The testimony from these individuals sheds absolutely no light on the question of whether or not the Iranians really were unwilling to meet with the CIA. Furthermore, the issue is really irrelevant and adds nothing to the report. _ 44

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• Arnendrnent g ) Page 11, penultimate paragraph - Materials prepared by counsel on behalf" of Under Secretary of Defense Feith e ressed the view that “[a]lthough the US. ambassador to Italy and the CL4 complained that they were not informed about the meeting, it was not the responsibility of the Defense Department to inform them. " The material noted that the Deputy National Security Advisor had consulted with the Deputy Secretary of State and the DCI in advance. This response fails to consider that the DCI and Deputy Secretary were not provided enough information to know who to inform ofthe pending activity. Amendment 7(a) — Strike This response fails to consider that the DCI and Deputy Secretary were not provided enough information to know who to inform of the pending activity. Comment- We do not believe that the Committee can show that the DCI and Deputy Secretary were not provided with enough information to know whom to inform, particularly since neither Mr. Hadley nor Mr. Armitage was interviewed by the Committee and Mr. Tenet was not asked necessary follow-up questions. If either of these individuals believed they were not provided with enough information, they could have asked questions of Mr. Hadley. Amendment g lg) Page 12, first full paragraph — The limited awareness of the Rome meeting within the CL4 and the State Department, as well as the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and Mr. Ghorbanfar, would have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of this activity. Amendment 7(b) - Strike The limited awareness of the Rome meeting within the CL4 and the State Department, as well as the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and Mr. Ghorbanifar, would have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of this activity. Comment- First, this is a conclusion which should not be in the findings portion of the report. Second, we do not know what the alleged "significant impact on the ultimate outcome" the Rome meeting is alleged to be. The report appears to suggest that the information obtained at the Rome meeting might have been pursued further had the DoD decided to inform more individuals within the CIA and Department of State, a suggestion that is not supported by the evidence in the report. _ 45

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• Amendment 8 Page 13, first partial aragra h - Also, it is not clear whether the Rome meeting took place in an . Amendment 8- strike Also, it is not clear whether the Rome meeting took place in an actual _ and insert In March 2008 the De artment of Defense informed the Committee that "the December 2001 Rome meetin did not involve y of these t es of visits." Comment - We believe it is clear that the meeting took place in an apartment building, not a . No one has told the Committee that the meeting took place in a _ , but several individuals told the Committee that the meetings took place in an apartment and the DoD informed the Committee that the meeting did not take place in a - I. The DoD’s statement should be included in the report. Amendment 13 A Page 16 first partial paragraph - Despite the changing descriptions of foreign involvement, there was no attempt by the DoD, or any other entity ofthe US. Government, to determine the true intentions of the foreign government (Israel) with regard to interacting with the Iranians or Mr. Ghorbany"ar. Amendment 13 — strike the above sentence. Comment- We do not understand what this sentence is trying to suggest and do not understand why anyone would be concerned about the "true motives" of the foreign government (Israel). ls the suggestion that we need to be concemed that the foreign government (Israel) had an ulterior or nefarious motive? The foreign govemment is one of our closest allies, often assisting us with all types of government issues—they even assist us in war. Why would DoD think the foreign government (Israel) had a mysterious motive? Also, we do not think it is accurate to say that the descriptions of the foreign government (Israel) involvement were "changing." Changing suggests that the same individuals we interviewed gave us different and evolving descriptions of their involvement. In fact, we received different descriptions of their involvement from different people, none of whom really seemed to know exactly what the foreign government (Israel) gained from helping in this regard. Perhaps no one felt a need to ask one of our closest allies why they were helping us. _ 46

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• Amendments 15 and 16 Page 18, first full paragraph — As noted above, in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley had mentioned to DCI Tenet that the DoD might meet with Iranians in Europe to discuss terrorist threat information. The DCI had no details, however, on the location ofthe meeting or its participants. For that reason, during a January 14, 2002, meeting in the DCI ’s oj‘ice that in¢l~d¢d Senivr CIA vriicialst the CIA particpants were surprised when the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service asked they were aware of DoD ojficials “coming to Italy to talk about Iran. " Amendment 15- strike the hrst sentence above. Comment- It is not correct to say that the DCI had "no details" on the location of the meeting or its participants. He was told that the meeting would be in Europe, was told that the meeting was with Iranians, and Mr. Tenet says that he was told that the meeting would involve some kind of terrorist threat information. Mr. Tenet could have asked for more details if he thought the information was insufficient and he chose not to do so. The Committee should have pressed Mr. Tenet for details on why he chose not to ask for such information. In addition, the Committee has never requested an interview with Mr. Hadley to ask if he provided any more information to Mr. Tenet. Amendment 16 — strike For that reason, during and insert Durin Comment- In addition, we dispute the cause and effect suggestion of this paragraph. We suggest just describing what happened at the meeting and explaining how inquiries from the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service led to additional inquires by the CIA, rather than trying to suggest that DoD was obligated to tell CIA what they were doing ir1 Rome—which they were not. Perhaps the reason that the participants were surprised was because Mr. Tenet did not ask any follow—up questions of Mr. Hadley and did not inform his staff of the information he had been provided. For example, Mr. Tenet was informed that the meeting would take place in Europe, but he did not inform the CIA’s Europe Chief who attended the meeting with the foreign government (Israel) service. Amendment 18 Page 21, first partial paragraph — As noted above, Director Wilson had not been allowed to retain a copy ofthe summary. Amendment 18- strike As noted above, Director Wilson had not been allowed to retain a copy ofthe summary. Comment- "Allowed" makes it sound like Director Wilson wanted to have a copy of the Rome meeting summary and we do not know that he did want a copy because we have not interviewed him. _ 47

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• Amendment 22 Page 25 , second full paragraph - Without an understanding ofthe deliberations over further DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbany’ar and his Iranian contacts, Mr. Marshall approved Mr. Rhode ’s trip to Paris and the meeting with Mr. Ghorbany’ar. Amendment 22 — strike Without an understanding ofthe deliberations over further DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbany’ar and his Iranian contacts, Comment- Without having interviewed Marshall, we have no basis for suggesting that it was his lack of understanding of these deliberations that led him to approve Rhode’s trip. We should either interview him, or delete the beginning of this sentence and just say he approved the trip. Amendment 25 Page 26, last partial paragraph — According to Mr. Rhode ’s notes from the meeting, which were provided to the Committee, also present at the meeting was an Ayatollah:. Amendment 25 — strike the above sentence. Comment- Who is Ayatollah:'? Why bring this up if we don’t say who he is? If we don’t know who he is we should interview Mr. Rhode to ask him, or delete this reference. If we do know who he is, we should say so. Amendment 26 Page 27, first full paragraph — to page 28, first partial paragraph - There is no indication that the information collected during the Paris meeting was shared with the Intelligence Community for a determination of potential intelligence value. Amendment 26 — strike the above sentence. Comment - The sentence in this section suggests that the information gained during discussions in Paris between policy officials and other individuals should have been put into intelligence channels, but this was not intelligence information and Mr. Rhode was under no obligation to provide it to the intelligence community. _ 48

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• Amendment 27 Page 27, last full paragraph — He added his belief that Mr. Luti and DoD Employee #2 had told him in early 2002 that the activity had been shut ojf which meant that he would have no further contact with Mr. Gh0rbany'ar or the Iranians. Amendment 27 — insert after the above sentence Mr. Rhode also told CIFA that he believed he would have to ask before meetin with Ghorbanifar a ain. Comment- This amendment is merely seeking to add additional and relevant information from the same memorandum for the record already cited in the report. It appears, based on Mr. Rhode’s additional comment to DoD’s Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIPA), that Mr. Rhode believed he would have to ask before meeting with Ghorbanifar again, which he did, and not, as the drait indicates, that he would have absolutely no further contact with Ghorbanifar. If the staff believes that there is a possible contradiction in the I\/[FR, the Committee should interview Mr. Rhode to ask him about this, rather than simply choosing only one of two relevant sentences for inclusion in the report. _ 49

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• _ Amendment 28 Page 31, last partial paragraph - page 32, first partial paragraph - The involvement of a foreign government (Israel) intelligence service and alleged current and former Iranian security service personnel in the Rome meeting was an indicator of Intelligence Community equities in the activity. The DoD 's dependence on Mr. Ledeen to organize the Rome meeting, and failure to research in advance his avenues for arranging the meeting and the background of the participants, however, resulted in the DoD o]j‘icials who decided on how the meeting would be undertaken being unaware of the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and Mr. Ghorbanfar. Once the information was collected, however, the DoD 's immediate response was to limit the ability of DM Director Wilson to evaluate it. He was not allowed to retain the information for evaluation by the DL4 or to run name traces on the Iranian participants, and he was not made aware of foreign government (Israel) involvement and the potential that they were pursuing additional contacts with the Iranians. Amendment 28 — strike the entire section above. Comment- We disagree with many of the claims in this paragraph. How could the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service and former Iranian intelligence individuals have been an indicator of intelligence equities when none of the DoD participants knew there were intelligence people involved before they went? That was the purpose of having an exploratory meeting, to find out more about the individuals, what they knew and what they had to offer. Why should DoD have researched Mr. Ledeen ’s "avenues for arranging the meeting or the background of the participants?" Why does it matter if DoD offrcials were unaware of Ghorbanifar’s involvement or the foreign govermnent’s involvement before they went? Again, the purpose of the meeting was "exploratory." It simply is not true that DIA Director Wilson was not able to run name traces or fully evaluate the information. Initially, he was asked to hold off on doing so, so that DoD could determine how they wanted to proceed with further actions, but the information was passed to DIA in April 2002. DIA had ample opportunity to pursue this information from that time forward and could have done so. In fact, because an individual at the CIA was also assigned to meet with Mr. Ledeen , the CIA also could have pursued the information. lf the Committee thinks the information was valuable and should have been pursued, why did the Committee not interview CIA and DIA offrcials to ask why they chose not to pursue it? _ 50

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• _ Amendment 29 Page 32, first full paragraph - The US. Government never processed the remaining information to determine its potential value or the benefit of continued contact with the Iranians. In April 2002, four months after the Rome meeting, the Defense HUMIN T Service received an “executive referral "from the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . The Defense H UIMINT Service contact memorandum outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , and requested name traces on the two Iranians, but noted that Mr. Ledeen had repeatedly declined to provide details such as specqic names, locations, and contact information until the DoD decided whether or not to pursue the contact. Information provided by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that after the interview of Mr. Ledeen  the Defense HUMINT Service contacted the CIA and learned that Mr. Ledeen regularly approached his US. Government contacts with various proposals he deemed of interest. The Defense HUMINT Service determined that no further contact with Mr. Ledeen was warranted or advisable. Amendment 29 — strike the above paragraph. Comment - The comments in this paragraph are simply not accurate. The U.S. Government did process the information pertaining to the Rome meetings. In April 2002, Mr. Ledeen met with the Defense Intelligence Agency as a referral from the Policy office. A contact memorandum prepared after the meeting shows that Mr. Ledeen provided DIA with the names of the Iranians and the same threat information provided to the participants during the Rome meeting. The contact memorandum also indicated that name traces were requested, as well as further guidance on how to proceed. We do not know what else DIA did to process the name traces or what further guidance was provided in cable traffic because the Committee never asked DIA for this information. _ 51

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• _ Amendment 31 Page 32, second full paragraph - There can be varying 0pini0ns 0n the extent t0 which the R0me and Paris meetings represented intelligence inf0rmati0n c0llecti0n. F 0r example, DOD IG interviews c0nducted during their review 0f the OUSD(P) produced differing 0pini0ns based 0n the interviewee ’s interpretation 0f intelligence c0llecti0n. Even Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode reached differing conclusions 0n what the inf0rmati0n they collected represented. Mr. Rh0de advised the C0mmittee that he viewed the inf0rmati0n received n0t as intelligence, but data to hem understand what was g0ing 0n in Iran. Mr. Franklin stated that he viewed the inf0rmati0n in his meeting summary as "intelligence 0r inf0rmati0n that I th0ught was useful t0 intelligence agencies... " In addition, Mr. Franklin 0pined to Counterintelligence Field Activity pers0nnel that after his return from R0me the situati0n changed from debriefing Iranians t0 them being intelligence sources. Amendment 31 — strike the above paragraph. Comment - Is the Committee really prepared to say to the American people and to the community we oversee that "intelligence collection" is something open to interpretation? It seems irresponsible to suggest that because one of the individuals who went on the Rome meetings thought his information had intelligence value, that it, therefore, was intelligence collection. Every day, information comes to Members of Congress which may be of interest to the intelligence community, but that does not make it intelligence and does not make them intelligence collectors. _ 52

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• I _ Amendment 32 Page 33, Erst full paragraph - In sum, the Rome meeting represented information gathering on Iran by DoD policy personnel with an intent to determine its potential intelligence value a]€‘er the fact. This determination was never made. Iran is a denied area where the Intelligence Community has limited sources of information. Greater inclusion of the Intelligence Community might have resulted in a direct attempt by the Community to pursue further information from the Iranians, or an attempt to determine y' the foreign government (Israel) was developing a conduit to potentially valuable Iranian sources. While some DoD officials lament the failure to pursue this avenue of information further, their decision-making upon the return of the DoD personnel from Rome was a contributing factor. Amendment 32 — strike the above paragraph. Comment - This paragraph also contains incorrect information. The purpose of the Rome meetings was never to determine "intelligence value," it was to determine its value. Value and intelligence value are not the same. Furthermore, there is no evidence that greater inclusion of the intelligence community "might" have led to a direct attempt to pursue the information further by the IC. Information in the report, indicating that when DIA tried to do this it was discouraged from doing so by the CIA, belies this claim. There is no evidence that decision making in the DoD before or after contributed in any way to the unwillingness of the CIA to pursue this information. The CIA did not want to engage with Mr. Ghorbanifar before the Rome meetings and the agency did not want to afterwards. More disturbing is that the majority seems to believe that the information obtained during the Rome meeting might have been worth pursuing further, but gives the intelligence community a pass in not doing so because the bureaucrats at the CIA and State Department felt slighted by the way the information was handled. We should have no part in a report that encourages such parochialism and stove—piping. _ 53

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• Amendment 33 Pages 33-34, Conclusions Amendment 33 — Strike all of the report’s conclusions and insert Conclusion l: The Committee found that no U.S. government officials involved in these meetings conducted y ille al unauthorized or inapropriate activities. Conclusion 2: The Committee found that according to DoD relations in place at the time the particip ants in the Rome meetings were not required to obtain a country clearance for travel to Rome. Comment- After all of the allegations of potentially unlawful conduct surrounding the OUSDP, it is irresponsible that the report’s conclusion that all of these activities were conducted in a lawful and authorized manner is buried in a summary paragraph and not one of the highlighted conclusions. What can be more important than highlighting the conclusion that there were no illegal activities conducted during these meetings? There should also be a conclusion stating that the Rome meeting participants were not required to obtain country clearances for travel to Rome. We note that an earlier report draft had a conclusion stating that these individuals did need country clearances, until the minority staff proved that, according to the DoD regulations outlined in the report, this conclusion was incorrect. The conclusion was withdrawn, but no conclusion was put in its place saying that country clearances were not required. Why is this no longer considered an important enough issue for a conclusion? In addition, the conclusion which states that DoD officials "would not allow" the information to be placed into intelligence channels is wrong. The policy office specifically referred Mr. Ledeen to the DIA so that DIA could follow up on his information and put the information into intelligence channels if need be. Because the Rome report conclusions are not accurate, they should all be deleted. _ 54

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• _ Amendment 34 I Page 34, Recommendations — Recommendation #2.· (For the Director of National Intelligence) Direct the National Counterintelligence Executive, in coordination with other appropriate Intelligence Community entities, to prepare a report on the US. Government ’s policies and procedures for identifying and countering attempts by foreign agents or entities to directly or indirectly influence or access US. Government officials. Such a report should cover the procedures for US. Government employees to report foreign contacts, the utilization and effectiveness of those procedures, the steps taken to analyze the information collected, and the actions resulting ]9·om that analysis to counter future attempts to influence the US. Government. This report should be provided to the appropriate Congressional oversight committees no later than September 30, 2008. (footnote 194 reads as follows “Note that the Committee’s review did not evaluate the requirement for Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode to report their contact with the Iranians because, like the requirement for country clearance, they believed that issue had been addressed by the involvement of senior U.S. Govemment officials.") Amendment 34 — strike Recommendation #2. Comment- We do not understand the point of this recommendation. What is the purpose of such a report? What is the problem identified in the report that this recommendation is seeking to fix? We also do not understand the footnote. There is no reason that Messrs. Franklin and Rhode would need to report foreign contacts that their employer asked them to make. Reporting of foreign contacts is something required for contacts outside the course of one’s duties, not for contacts made in the course of official duties. _ 55

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• Amendment 35 Page 7, second full paragraph - In March 2008, DCI Tenet provided the Committee with his recollections of his conversation with Mr. Hadley. He recalled being provided no details on the proposed meeting other than it involved access to terrorist threat information. He reiterated that _ he had concerns about the information provided by Mr. Hadley, but he was not going to stand in the way of collecting threat information so soon after September 11, 200]. Former Director Tenet also stated his view that Mr. Hadley ’s call was not intended to gain his permission. For these reasons he did not pursue further details at that time. Page ll, last partial paragraph — page l2 first partial paragraph — In March 2008, DCI Tenet informed the Committee that at no time prior to or ayier the Rome meeting did Mr. Wolfowitz contact him to discuss the Rome meeting. Amendment 35 — strike the above sentences. Comment - Despite the request from the minority for this interview and despite the specific notice that minority staff would need to be included in this interview, the interview was conducted by only one member of the majority staff with no minority staff present. The information cannot be verified and the necessary follow up questions were not asked of the interviewee. This information was included in the report after the amendment filing deadline and without the consent of the minority. It should be deleted until the interviewee can be interviewed with minority staff present. _ 56

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