Chalabi, Iraq Invasion, Bush fascism

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Senate Intelligence Committee, Phase II, 2008

  Plamegate, AIPAC, the Rosen Weissman espionage case, Bush's run-up to the Iraq War. ........    Sibel Edmonds and Valerie Plame discovered Bush / Neocon WMD proliferation.... its just spin that Plame was outed because Joe Wilson opposed Bush.

Did Ahmed Chalibi hijack the neo-con fascist mass manipulation and fear mongering that proceeded the Iraq War?

  Did Ahmad Chalabi trick the neo-cons and open the door to a Shiite-dominated Iraq government to Iran? more below and see Senate report and from Senate Intelligence Committee: Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress  and conclusions and summary below    

Connect the Dots

• Plamegate
• AIPAC (Franklin, Rosen, Weissman indictments)
• Niger forged documents
• Bush 2003 State of the Union Speech lies.
• Iraq Invasion, Iran Regime Change
• Neo-con Middle East failure or design?.

What was Judith Miller / Ahamed Chalabi relationship?  go to: Plamegate Timeline & Slate

 

Slate Ahmad and Me, Christopher Hitchens "new indictment ... Chalabi tricked the U.S. into war, possibly on Iran's befalf, and that he has given national secrets to Iran."

Please help NewsFollowUp and staff continue this work.

search internet: Harold Rhode (above photo, pic, photograph) , Ledeen, Chalabi

The Rule 21 procedure that finally got 

the Senate INC  report out.   

The Nation 11/05  

• Cooperative Research Iraqi National Congress search terms: Nasan Haqib, Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, Entifadh Qanbar, Francis Brooke, Sharif Ali Bin Al Hussein, Ahmad Chalabi.  Chalabi, White House access, wasteful spending, 
• Daily KOS Abramoff, what's next and how can we bring down the GOP.  
• NewsMeat, Jack Abramoff, political campaign contributions: 
• Global Security Senate Intelligence Report, Prewar findings
• Huffington Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All" search James Woolsey.
• MediaTransparency Weyrich Ledeen "In the late 1970s, Paul Weyrich, widely considered as the guru of the modern conservative movement, Terry Dolan, Richard Viguerie, the godfather of conservative direct mail, and Howard Phillips left Christian Voice and tapped televangelist Falwell to head up the Moral Majority. Over the years, as the Reverend became more influential politically, he became a favored guest on cable television's news programs."
• The Nation
• The Nation Rule 21 procedure that finally got this report out  11/05  
• NewsMeat, Jack Abramoff, political campaign contributions: 
• OurFuture War Profiteers Profits Over Patriotism in Iraq
• RealDemocracy a copy of Miller story in the New York Times: AN IRAQI DEFECTOR TELLS OF WORK ON AT LEAST 20 HIDDEN WEAPONS SITES, and all the lies within
• Rolling Stone The Man Who Sold the War, search John Rendon
• TruthOut
• TruthOut Rumsfeld: World Faces New Fascism notes: likened Iraq war critics to those who appeased Nazis in 1930, moral and intellectual confusion, a new type of fascism, spoke at American Legion, withdraw troops, 
• Veterans for Peace, Maine, search James Woolsey
• Wanniski "Woolsey wrote the foreword to the book, authored by Laurie Mylroie, an adjunct fellow at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute, or AEI. Woolsey, who has argued for starting "World War IV" in the Middle East, called the book "brilliant and brave." Judith Miller and Mylroie coauthored: Sadam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf
•  

• About Saddam Hussein ''did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward [Abu Musab al Zarqawi] and his associates.'' Instead, he "attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al Zarqawi."
• AntiPolygraph blog Senate Report Disputes Press Accounts of CIA Polygraph of Iraqi Informant
• FAS and see reports: Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, 
• Rendon Group, search terms: polygraph machine, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, CURVE BALL, Kurdistan, civil engineer, claimed he helped Saddam Hussein's men bury tons of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, illegal arms, buried in subterranean wells, beneath a hospital, polygraph test, Pattaya, failed, fabrication put to good use, set up by CIA, Pentagon, Rendon Group, perception management, Iraqi National Congress, install Chalabi as leader of INC, Zaab Sethna, INC spokesman, employee of Rendon, Francis Brooke, INC man in Washington, overthrow SH, story to Judith Miller, New York Times, Bangkok, Miller story: AN IRAQI DEFECTOR TELLS OF WORK ON AT LEAST 20 HIDDEN WEAPONS SITES, and see Washington Post
• Wikipedia, Rendon Group
• Wikipedia, PSenate Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq" July 9, 2004, Republican majority, Democrat minority, unanimously endorsed its findings, phase II addressed the way senior policymakers used the intelligence, Niger, pressure on analysts, Persian Gulf War 1991, 1998 critical report, UN inspection teams evacuated, inspector Richard Butler, President Bill Clinton, Operation Desert Fox, October 2002 NIE, CIA Director George Tenet published unclassified white paper on Iraq's WMD, joint resolution authorizing the use of force was passed by both houses of Congress.
• Ahmad Chalabi and Colin Powell

• Basicint British American Security Information Council  New York Times reporting, James Risen article: "C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports," and Miller story: "Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to Assert,"
• Booz, Allen Hamilton, see James Woolsey,

• Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, founded by James Woolsey 
• Bush Whitehouse
• Chambliss, Saxby, Sen.(R) "the Committee found no evidence to suggest that the INC deliberately provided fictitious information" 
• CIA Advisory Board, see James Woolsey 
• Defense Policy Board, see James Woolsey
• Director of National Intelligence
• Fox News  Team Bush Ramps Up Rhetoric on iraq and War on Terror, Defeatocrats, In Truman administration, right=wing Republicans accused Dean Acheson of appeasing Communism.
• Global Options, Neil Livingston, provides contacts and consulting services to companies doing business in Iraq.
• Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
• National Terrorism Center
• National Counterterrorism Center
• New York Times "Judy is an intrepid, principled, and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who has provided our readers with thorough and comprehensive reporting throughout her career."
• "The Postwar Findings About Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments"
• Presidents WMD Commission
• Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
• Rendon Group
• Rendon, John
• 
• Below: James Woolsey, Ahmad Chalabi, Judith Miller
• 
• war propagandists and New York Times
• Powerline Blog Phase II
• Roberts, Pat Senator, Phase II
• Slate Ahmad and Me, Christopher Hitchens "new indictment ... Chalabi tricked the U.S. into war, possibly on Iran's behalf, and that he has given national secrets to Iran."
• Slate New York Times, Judith Miller, Mini Culpa The New York Times Finally Concedes Its WMD Errors
• White House, Bush  "Subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation. Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda.  What about Senate Report that says there's no connection between Iraq and al Queda ... is the Senate a conspiracy organization?

summary below    or  go to: Senate report: The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, original report  

 SEARCHABLE TEXT   Ahmad Chalabi and Colin Powel

• summary 
• Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress.  September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printed.  Committee members include: Pat Roberts, Kansas, Chairman; John D. Rocefeller IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman; Orrin G. Hatch, Utah; Mike DeWine, Ohio; Christopher S. Bond, Missouri; Trent Lott, Mississippi; Olympia Snowe, Maine; Chuck Hagel, Nebraska; Saxby Chambliss, Georgia; Carl Levin, Michigan; Deanne Feinstein, California; Ron Wyden, Oregon; Evan BAyh, Indianna; Barbara A. Mikulski, Maryland; Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin.  see  Cooperative Research
• Conclusions: (from original report) summarized) by Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com
• Conclusion 1.  "False information from the Iraqi National Congress (INC)-affiliated sources was used to support key Intelligence Community assessments on Iraq and was widely distributed in intelligence products prior to the war."  Information provided by INC-affiliated sources resulted in the production and distribution of a large body of intelligence reports and assessments on Iraq prior to the war (250 from Source One alone), and was used to support key judgments about Iraq's WMD (and alleged Iraq / Al Queda links) programs in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).  
• Conclusion 2.  "The Iraqi National Congress (INC) attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq by providing false information through defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists."   The INC had an aggressive 'publicity campaign' and brought six defectors to the attention of the Congress, media and other U.S. government agencies.  In July 2004 the CIA concluded that Source One (AntiPolygraph blog) reporting was 'questionable' 'demonstrably incorrect'.  Source One (AntiPolygraph blog) appeared deceptive about whether the INC provided him information to give to the U.S. government on suspect facilities.  Source Two fabricated information, which included a claim that in 1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological weapons labs to evade UN inspections.  A DIA debriefer said Source Two was being coached by INC.  In May 2002, the DIA issued a fabrication notice on Source Two.  A foreign intelligence service also believed Source Two information was unreliable.  James Woolsey? MORE Where does he fit in?  see below.   Source Three said that he observed non-Iraqi Arabs training (for hijackings) in an abandoned aircraft shell at he Salman Pak training facility in Iraq in 1994-1995.  In December of 2001, CIA said that Source Three "is under the influence/control of the INC and is not considered to be very credible."  In February 2002, the CIA's Iraq Operations Group concluded that: "Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we have determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably western policy on Iraq)."  Source Four said Iraqi intelligence trained Iraqi soldiers and 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking techniques.  In October 2001 Source Four complained that his earlier accouts to the press about terrorist training camps had been distorted and mistranslated by the INC translator.  The CIA Iraqi Operations Group lost interest in Source Four, citing, in a February 2003 cable, Source Four's past exposure in the media and his employment with the INC.  In the fall of 2002 INC-affiliated defector Source Five claimed to have seen Saddam Hussein meet with Osama bin Laden in the early 1990's and SH's son, Uday, told Source Five that bin Ladin was in Iraq to discuss training some of his people in Iraq.  The DIA would neither confirm or deny his access to SH and his inner circle.  DIA said Source Five's information "may be intended to disinform."  The CIA evaluation of Source Five in October 2002 said the bin Ladin story was perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications.  DIA terminated its relationship with Source Five and said his information may have been intended to influence as well as inform U.S. government decision makers.
• Conclusion 3.  "The Intelligence Community's use in intelligence assessments of information provided by Iraqi National Congress (INC)-affiliated defector Source Two was a serious error. The use of the Source Two information came after three Intelligence Community assessments raised questions about his reliability as a source and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a fabrication notice."  Despite all the warnings that Source Two may have been coached by the INC and fabricated information to his debriefers, the Source Two reporting was cited specifically in three subsequent CIA intelligence assessments issued from July 2002 to November 2002 and the October 2002 NIE, as corroborating other source reporting about Iraq's mobile biological weapons program.  Source Two also was one of the four human intelligence sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary of State Powell's February 2003 UN Security Council speech.  Issuing a  fabrication notice instead of recalling the information left it available for use. Reforms by ODNI were instituted.Ahmad Chalabi and Colin Powell
• Conclusion 4. (redacted) by Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com
• Conclusion 5. "The July 2002 decision by the National Security Council Deputies Committee directing the renewed funding of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) Intelligence Collection Program under Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) management was ill-advised given the counterintelligence concerns of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and warnings of financial mismanagement from the Department of State.  At the time it assumed responsibility for funding and managing the INC's collection effort in October 2002, the DIA cautioned that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services and would use the relationship to promote its own agenda." Beginning in March 2000, the Department of State entered into an agreement with the INC, amended over time, to fund the Intelligence Collection Program (ICP) to collect evidence on SH regime.  An audit found financial management and internal control weaknesses and a potential for fraud.  The State Department began to doubt the value on INC information, and ceased funding the program in May 2002.  On July 25, 2002, the NSC refunded it through the Department of Defense and on Oct 25, 2002 the DIA assumed formal responsibility for funding and managing the INC's collection effort despite warnings from both the CIA, which terminated its relationship with the INC in December 1996, and the DIA that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services, including the Iranians, and that the INC would use the relationship with the Intelligence Community to promote its own agenda.
• Conclusion 6   (redacted)
• Conclusion 7  "The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency were inconsistent in identifying their reporting from INC-affiliated defectors and INC members as opposition-affiliated reporting."  Information sources affiliations and motivations of defectors were carelessly handled in the reports.
• Conclusion 8  "There is insufficient basis to determine whether or not CURVE BALL (Cooperative Research), the Intelligence Community's primary source of intelligence about Iraq's alleged biological weapons program, provided his information at the behest of the Iraqi National Congress (INC)"  Beginning in 2000, CURVE BALL provided information to a foreign liaison intelligence service alleging that Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program.  And this led to the October NIE that "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents."  CURVE BALL provided false information to the Intelligence Community and had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992.  A high-ranking official's statements led to initial suspicion in the CIA that CURVE BALL may have provided false information at the INC's behest.  The CIA has since concluded that the relative's connection to INC was coincidental.  All this open to question and debate.  The CIA also assessed that CURVE BALL's defection did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the IC and did not put him in front of the media.  The IC did not formally collect on the INC so has no information on the INC's processes and procedures for disseminating information, a key element to asses potential deception programs or tactics.   The IC does not understand why CURVE BALL provided false information and only has a superficial understanding of CURVE BALL's contacts with his close relative and other INC officials.  Its an open question whether he provided his information at the behest of the INC.
• Committee Actions
• On August 2, 2006, The Committee inserted text on page 61 concerning the production by CIA analysts of a Memorandum or PDB (Presidential Daily Brief) for the Vice President (Cheney) using an INC-affiliated source's information to support the mobile BW (bio-weapons) program judgment.  As modified, the amendment clarified that the PDB did not include caveats related to the source's reporting. 
• On August 2, 2006, the Committee agreed (by party lines) to an amendment by Senator Wyden that struck from the report a press statement by Brigadier General Brooks, of the U.S. Central Command, regarding information purportedly discovered in April 2003 at the Salman Pak facility.  
• Additional views of Chairman Roberts:  included strong objections to the conclusions of the report ... not supported by the facts and contain numerous errors and omissions.  But also said it should be approved and declassified. 
• Additional Views of Chairman Roberts Joined by Senators Hatch, Dewine, Lott, Chambliss, and Warner:  Includes referrals to 'systematic failures in prewar intelligence on Iraq", reforms...etc.  and that the INC only played a minor role in prewar intelligence.  And referred to HUMINT role, signals intelligence.  They blame the 'media' and media embellishments and  misguided attention to the INC as issues.  Only about 20 intelligence products out of 40,000 had INC related material. The ISG found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14, used the Salman Pak facility to train Iraqi, Palestinian, Syrian,  Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives.  The Republicans pick apart minutia detail of the report and try to cast doubt wherever they can.  But the bottom line is that the report was approved including the conclusions by the committee. It is completely predictable that the Republicans would not like this report.  For more details on Republican rebuttal, see the report.
• Why was Valerie Plame really outed? NFU index

• Republican additional views (conclusion rebuttals):  pages 125, 127, 190, 199 and see
• Democratic additional views pages 158

• Summarization of original Report   The use by the Intelligence Community (IC) of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress  (summarization by Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com)
• I.  Introduction
• Feb 12, 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence places 'the use by the Intelligence Community (IC) of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in "phase II" of the Iraq Inquiry.  see first phase: Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004.
• The report to focus on "prewar INC intelligence with regard to Iraq" prior to March 19, 2003, start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
• INC was funded for over a year after the war started, and the report does not include a review of the quality or utility of INC information after the war started.
• The report does not focus on INC information in the early and mid 90's.  CIA had a tumultuous relationship with INC and Ahmed Chalabi.  Ultimately the relationship ended.
• INC information was widely distributed, this also was not a focus of the report.
• A general history of the use of INC information is included,  and the transition of information from the CIA to the State Dept to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ... and how it was used in analysis of 'WMD'
• The report distinguishes between INC info and INC-affiliated info. Iran and other sources may have been feeding info to IC.
• II. Background
• 1991, Bush encouraged efforts towards Iraq regime change. Violence was deemed a possibility.
• May 1991, CIA approached Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim, to rally opposition.
• June 1992, more than 200 opposition leaders met in Vienna.  INC then created,  Wikipedia, Rendon Group
• Oct 1992, another conference held in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Chalabi elected INC chairman. Goals: overthrow Sadam Hussein, establish Iraq democracy, Sadam trial.
• CIA had problems with Chalabi, say he didn't provide useful info, and didn't deliver on assurances that disaffected Iraqi military officers wanted to defect to opposition.  Chalabi lobbied Congress which caused friction with the CIA, and he said he was not under control of CIA,
• Oct 1994, the INC provided a steady stream of low-ranking walk-ins from various Iraqi army and Republican Guard units ... but described as a spartan operation.  A lot of squabbling between different opposition groups.  Chalabi awarded for his efforts.
• 1994 see Cooperative Research, 'forgery shop'  and Huffington Post  "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All" search James Woolsey.
• Jan 1995, a KDP / PUK cease fire negotiated, U.S. offered INC funding for INC mediation efforts, U.S. said would cease no-fly zone efforts if KDP / PUK didn't accept cease-fire.
• Feb 1995, CIA learned of new opposition plan to remove Saddam Hussein  (SH) from power. An assault on SH Ujah residence Mar 4 or Mar 5 was planned.
• Mid Feb, KDP / PUK a fragile cease-fire holds, INC mediation and separation forces were funded by U.S.
• Mid Feb, SH assassination plan ongoing, but U.S. not a participant, U.S. wants Iraqis to do it.
• Mid Feb, Feb 17, 1995, overt U.S. diplomatic initiative with Department of State, Chalabi was focusing on detaining SH in Ujah, then wait for Iraqi people to rise up.  The plan needed diversions in Mosul and Kirkuk and uprisings in the Shi'a south.  But KDP / PUK was still fighting,
• Mar 1995, CIA met with SCIRI's (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) Badr Corps and others said they would support early March coup attempt.
• CIA accompanied Chalabi to meetings to support a coup,
• Mar 3, 1995 Chalabi made contact with Iranian intelligence to discuss coup support in southern Iraq, and signaled that U.S. supported the plan. 
• Early Mar 1995, 'a foreign government' provided U.S. info on Iran's view of this meeting. It was indicated that Iran thought that the US was seeking Iranian support for the Iraqi oppositionist uprising against Saddam Hussein planned for early March 1995.  Iranian officials also believed that the U.S. person involved in the matter was a CIA officer.  Indications were that Chalabi "handed" the Iranians a message at the meeting, purportedly from the U.S., that said America would welcome the involvement of  Islamic forces in the operation against Saddam Hussein, on the condition that the independence and unity of Iraq are preserved, ant the Iraqi borders are not changed.
• By now there was a NSC firestorm and calls to the CIA to find out what was happening and why a CIA agent was posing as a member of the NSC and allegedly planning an assassination of SH.  
• Further intelligence about the same meeting indicated that Chalabi told the SCIRI representatives that Americas had promised to prevent any action by the Iraqi army and to target them; to impede Iraqi any tank movements in the cities, not in the marshes, via aerial bombardment, and to prevent Saddam's army from suppressing this initiative, through exploitation of resolutions 688 and 949.
• In early March, and on the day that the operation was to go forward, messages were sent to all opposition members that the operation had been totally compromised, there was a high risk of failure, and that the U.S. government did not use Chalabi to pass any message to Iran.
• Chalabi believed it was too late to stop the operation, so proceeded to initiate it, and called other opposition figures and informed them that U.S. no longer supported the operation.  And concern about perception of US support, blame. Regrouping was necessary, maintain sanctions, erosion of SH power.
• The coup plan never made it to the White House according to ICG.  NSC was surprised by the plan.
• The plan was a complete failure.  Animosity grew between Chalabi and the CIA, and differing opinions about whether Chalabi consulted the CIA before initiating the coup arose and at the same time claiming that the U.S. supported the uprising.
• But other reports said he did not enter the plan unilaterally and he did consult the CIA from the beginning.  
• Chalabi meetings with the Iranians also fueled CIA resentment.  They accused Chalabi of fraudulently acting on behalf of the U.S. when he alleged to Iranian intelligence that Washington was interested in enlisting Tehran's support for operations against SH.  
• Chalabi did work openly with the Iranians, because much of the Iraqi opposition lived in Iran.  
• The CIA reduced contact and support for INC after the failed uprising.  
• August 1996 incursion of Iraqi army into Northern Iraq stopped most INC operations. 
• Chalabi denied fabricating a written communication from the White House (about U.S. support of SH uprising efforts), or any other part of the U.S. government.  He did work with the Iranians as part of his efforts to establish and maintain the INC.
• In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which led to the 1999 INC authorization for federal assistance. The Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) was created and granted $33 million (2000) to fund Iraq propaganda and research on SH war crimes.  Conflicts with INCSF wanting offices inside Iraq delayed funding until Mar 2001 clearing the way for funding the Information Collection Program (ICP) from countries surrounding Iraq. Offices were in Tehran, Damascus, and Cairo.  
•  Huffington Post  "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All" search James Woolsey.  2003  Ahmad Chalabi and Colin Powell
• In an October 2001 report the INCSF provided information on ICP activities and included: "Collect sensitive information that reveal Iraq's link with September 11th aftermath and anthrax exposures in the USA," 
• The State Department still uncomfortable with ICP, and an April 2004 saw INC fraud as a PR threat and still doubted value of ICP information and again cut off funding in May 2002.  But in July 2002, DOD gave it back to DIA. In October of 2002 DIA took over and forbid ICP from publicizing their efforts or work in Iraq.  
• From August of 2002 until early 2004 the CIA voiced concerns about the reliability of the INC information, that it had been penetrated by Iranian and other intelligence services, and that it had its own agenda. 
• In the fall of 2003 the DIA began making plans to terminate its relationship with the INC assuming that it would become a political party in Iraq. 
• On May 12, 2004, and Iraqi Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for a senior INC official on allegations of fraud and other offenses. On May 24th the DIA terminated it relationship with the INC and the DOD terminated its relationship with the ICP.
• Information Provided by the INC In August 2002, the NIC published a memorandum, Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress. (an evaluation of approximately 300 pages of INC materials). Was deemed of little value.
• Source One: (AntiPolygraph blog) an Iraqi who lived and worked in Baghdad, defected to Syria. 
• Source One met with INC representatives who facilitated his travel to Asia and his introduction to the international media. James Woolsey wouldn't rule out involvement with Source One. Woolsey met Chalabi in the late 90's and represented as co-council to eight INC members detained in California on immigration charges.
• CIA preliminary analysis of Source One: (AntiPolygraph blog) "does not  have access to specific programs at various facilities, his knowledge of (facility) details, individual engineers, and personalities could permit subject matter experts t analyze the data and extrapolate broader program information."  He passed a polygraph.  This report created by Steve Francis, the author of NewsFollowUp.com
• January 10, 2002.  The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence information reports from Source One's debriefings, and all sent to the CIA. Source One worked as a contractor at several Iraqi WMD sites of which he reported extensively on including SSO.  Two reports discussed suspect terrorist training sites in Iraq.  The first, dated January 2002, said that from 1997-1998, Afghan, Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained by the Fedayeen Saddam at an Iraqi special forces training facility in Salman Pak, Iraq.  The report said the camp is "rumored to provide al-Qa'ida terrorist teams with training" and added, "many Iraqis believe that Saddam Hussein had made an agreement with Usama bin Ladin in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S.  The second report, dated March 2002, provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist training camps, including one at Salman Pak. ....
• In early 2002, WMD facilities reports appeared in the media drawing attention to other foreign intelligence services. In March 2002, the information was corroborated and vetted. On March 6 2002 the INR had access to the reports and said they were useful.  And in July 2002, in a NIC memo, Source One was described as "the most successful INC referral" ... he had access to as many as 150 conventional or WMD facilities.  ...but he did not have access to more specific information regarding WMD programs.  INR said his claims about WMD work at various facilities are not adequately substantiated. 
• Source One's (AntiPolygraph blog) descriptions of a specific suspect site were wrong on many points.  Despite this Source One's reporting was included in two finished intelligence assessments, the October NIE  Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA assessment Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program. Much of the reporting on a uranium enrichment facility was sexed-up to somewhat match what Source One said.  
• Postwar findings
• According to the DIA, the U.S. 75th Exploitation Task Force and Iraq Survey Group (ISG) visited the suspect facility in the spring and summer of 2003 respectively.  Soil samples were normal and no enriched uranium was found.  No evidence was found to support intelligence assessments that the site may have been involved in nuclear related work.  
• In early February 2004, in order to resolve credibility issues with Source One, the IC elements brought Source One to Iraq.  Source One failed to prove any credibility about the suspect facility, but was able to identify a second facility but the information may have been coached and his WMD knowledge remained highly questionable.  DIA officers may have indeed created (extrapolated) the image that Source One knew more than he did.  The CIA studied this possibility in comparing Iraqi opposition deception efforts to reports prepared by DIA officials.  
• Ultimately, the IC has never deemed Source One (AntiPolygraph blog) to be a fabricator and has not recalled his reporting.

• Source Two, a former Iraqi major, was referred to DIA on February 8, 2002.  James Woolsey involved in the referral.  The DIA questioned his credibility on Iraqi chemical weapons information.  He may have had some limited knowledge of Iraqi mobile R&D labs in its bio weapons program and VX.  He told debriefers he was involved in procuring dual-use technology in support of Iraq's WMD program.  He was asked not to talk to the media.  And again, his credibility was questioned, and he may have been coached, but passed polygraph tests. 
• In March of 2002, disseminated two intelligence reports based on Source Two's information.  The reports included info on the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and mobile bio research labs (the word weapons not included).  March 18, the CIA told DIA that Source Two was unreliable and fabricated information.  March 20th all contact ceased.  In April, the DIA said that they thought he was being coached by the INC.  In May the DIA issued a fabrication notice, and said that he was coached by INC and said he was a fabricator/provocateur. 
• The DIA did not recall the original reports or reissue them with a warning that Source Two was believed to be a fabricator.  
• Despite all the above actions, Source Two was cited specifically in five CIA intelligence assessments and the October NIE, as corroborating other source reporting about a mobile biological weapons program.
• The five assessments included: WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, Iraq: Expanding BW Capabilities, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, Lessons Learned From Iraq's Past Efforts to Mask Its BW Program,  and the NIE.  These reports used  almost identical descriptions of Source Two's information.  The language in the papers said that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections...according to Source Two, an Iraqi defector associated with the INC.  
• Source Two was slso one of the four HUMINT sources specifically referred to in the par of Secretary Powell's February 2003 speech before the UN Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units.  The DIA Division Chief who attended Powell's speech never connected the fabrication notice and the source mentioned in the speech so didn't raise concerns about it.  The Iraq BW analysts from the CIA, DIA, and State INR all acknowledged that the fabrication notice was available in their message handling systems, but they all said they did not see the notice.  Other analysts involved in Powell's speech said Source Two's reporting on the labs remained plausible and was never cancelled.  As long is it wasn't canceled and was used with appropriate caveats, it could continue to be used in finished intelligence reporting.  Powell's speech contained no caveats.  
• The fabrication notice was issued on the basis that Source Two was coached, he was talking to the media and foreign intelligence concerns.  Source Two has disappeared.
• Source Three Ultimately, Source Three, according to a response from the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, stated "is under the influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible."  Despite this, many reports were disseminated from his reporting and he was described as a "high ranking Iraqi public official with direct access to reported information."
• In late September 2001, James Woolsey  and INC presented another defector who had served as a liaison between Iraqi intelligence and the Fedayeen Saddam from 1998 to 2000 and had information on terrorist training in Iraq.  
• Haydr al Bandor, an INC employee, said Source Three was a former Iraqi lieutenant colonel who conducted training (aircraft hijackings, underwater explosives and booby traps) of 70 Arab terrorists at a special Iraqi training facility at Salman Pak.  The DIA wanted a CIA opinion on debriefings of Source Three.  (Jihaz Mukhabarat al Amma)
• Using the information from al Bandar, the DIA disseminated two reports.  They described the information from Bandar as from "a former Iraqi citizen, who received this information from a subsource. Source and subsource's credibility have not been determined."  The reports did not indicate that the source was a member of the INC or that the subsource was Source Three.
• The second report from Bandar provided only one paragraph of text identifying an Egytian businessman who maintained a relationship with the Iraqi intelligence service.  DIA used the first report in which Source Three was a subsource in a Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM) on September 30, 2001, titled Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps. The DITSUM said Salman Pak was used for hijacking training and Lake Tharthar was used for underwater operations training.  Source Three was instructed by INC to go to the U.S. embassy for an interview.  They thought he had information on an Iraqi officer who had worked as Salman Pak. Source Three only had info on a subsource that could broker a meeting with this officer. The CIA and DIA continued to debrief Source Three about INC coaching. 
• In mid October three more reports were disseminated based on Source Three reporting and described Source Three as a "high ranking Iraqi public official with direct access to reported information."  None of the reports discussed WMD.  The reports discussed Kuwait prisoners, a special unit of the Fedayeen Saddam al-Qarai'a Force and its UAE deployment plans, training at the Salman Pak location.  
• In November 2001, the CIA published an assessment of the Salman Pak facility titled Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility.  Despite reliability warnings said the reports cannot be discounted.
• On December 6, 2001 a foreign intelligence service told the CIA that their Iraqi contacts in (Israel?) said that the CIA was working with Source Three.  
• Source Three, according to a response from the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, stated "is under the influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible." 
• Following debriefings, Source Three's story began to appear in the press that were said to have discrepancies with CIA reports.  This report created by Steve Francis, the author of NewsFollowUp.com
• see New American article and search on "Iraq and al-Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship" and Uhler, IraqNews
• On February 6, 2002, CIA's Iraq Operations Group (IOG) disseminated a cable attempting to summarize the IC various interactions with Source Three.  Conclusions: Although they could verify a few elements of his story, we have determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. policy on Iraq.  
• Mistaken Identity
• On June 7, 2002, another CIA station requested a name trace on former Iraqi military officer.  Confusion seems to exist between the identity of Source Two and Source Three stemming from Source Three fleeing Iraq to Europe and being sought by stations in Europe.  Contact was not advised.
• Intelligence Assessments 
• CIA analysts included Source Three's information in three extensive assessments about Iraq's links to al-Qa'ida, a June 2002 paper, Iraq and al-Qa'ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, and September 2002 and January 2003 versions of Iraqi Support for Terrorism.  All three assessments noted that reporting surged after September 11, 2001 from Iraqi defectors claiming that al-Qa'ida and other non-Iraqi Arabs engaged in special operations training at Salman Pak.  Again the defectors information was suspect and all were associated with INC.  Despite the assertion in Iraqi Support to Terrorism that the "defectors claimed that al-Qa'ida and other non0iraqis" trained at Salman Pak, Committee staff found no reports from these defectors claiming that it was member of al-Qa'ida who received the training.  The IC has no information on the location of Source Three.
• Source Four Ultimately....CIA Headquaters responded that given several concerns referenced in a separate cable, including Source Four's past exposure in the media and his emplyment with th INC, "we do not have any operational interest in further pursuing (the suspected Iraqi intelligence officer) at this time.
• In October 2001, Source Four, a former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam captain, living in the U.S., was referred to the IC by Source Three as someone who could confirm Source Three's story.  A meeting was arranged between him and a U.S. journalist.  INC was involved and provided an INC interpreter.  The CIA received an advance copy of the media article, it said Source Four was a terror school instructor and said that the methods used at the training school were similar to those used by September 11 hijackers.  
• It was determined that Source Four did not have first-hand access to the information he was giving and the other sources embellished or exaggerated their stories on training camps and may have been coached.
• Postwar Information on Salman Pak  Steve Francis
• A November 2003 assessment from DIA noted that postwar exploitation of the Salman Pak facility found it devoid of valuable intelligence.  DIA concluded that "we don't know whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircraft at Salman Pak.  The plane was sold for scrap. In June 2006 DIA said it has "no credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 1991.  It was a well-known facility and a large volume of heresay evidence could be collected.  The Iraqi Survey Group found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14 used Salman Pak for terrorist training.  
• Source Five 
• Ultimately ...An assessment of Source Five after his media appearance in 2002 noted that his reports of a meeting between Sadam Hussen and bin Ladin were not corroborated and other reports of meetings between senior Iraqi officials and al-Qa'ida members provide no indication that SH and bin Ladin met. 
• Source Five was referred to the DIA by the INC through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.  He did not recall making this referral.  According to the DIA, Source Five had been smuggled out of Iraq by the INC.  The DIA debriefed the source in the fall of 2002 and produced sixteen intelligence reports based.   
• Source Five claimed publicly that Osama bin Ladin came to Baghdad.  He passed polygraph tests. In October 2002 his story appeard to be more or less cogent, but was perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications.  The DIA said that his comments may have been intended to influence as well as inform decision makers.  The bin Ladin meeting report was the only terrorism related report from the source.  None other related to WMD.  NewsFollowUp.com
• The Would-Be Defector No reporting resulted from this referral.
• In July 2001, Ahmed Chalabi told an individual in the Department of Defense he had information from an intermediary that a senior Iraqi diplomat in Europe wanted to defect to the U.S.  DIA met with Chalabi to discuss the diplomat's possible defection.  He never defected and neither CIA or DIA officers met with him. No reporting resulted from this referral.
• INC Reporting During DIA's Management of the ICP.  
• DIA officially took over management of the ICP (Iraqi Collection Program) from the State Department in late October 2002.  From that time until the beginning of OIF, the DIA disemminated reporting from fourteen other sources (and four others) who were either members of or were associated with the INC.  DIA is unable to attribute the reporting to any single source within the INC's ICP.  The reports covered a myriad of information, with mixed value similar to HUMINT sources. One report stated that Iraq possessed several thousand chemical weapons shells filled with ebola and anthrax.  DIA thought this was credible and was included in threat briefings.  It was not cited in any written assessments.
• Other reports of which the vast majority were from Iraqi opposition sources.  The reports provided information about SH genealogy, SH key personnel, a report about SH poisoning water supplies with Anthrax, palaces, tribe loyalties, military plans, locations of suspect WMD facilities, medical facilities, leadership residences, regime biographies, smuggling of prohibited materials, SCUD missiles, information on targeting Turkey if U.S. invaded, conventional weapons production facilities, chemical and biological weapons smuggled to Syria, al Qa'ida travel plans outside of Iraq, dual-use materials from Jordan, T-72 tank parts, anti-tank missiles, helicopter engines, and night-vision goggles, rumors of nuclear activity at Tuwaitha and Ameriyah where radiation levels were above acceptable safety standards, daily routine of Uday Hussein, Hussein family residences, Republican Palace, Republican Guard Corp, the Special Security Organization, the Gneeral Security Directorate, Military Intelligence Directorate, business activities of Uday Hussein, oil for food program kickbacks, a subsource report on moving chemical and biological weapons by truck into Samawa, Iraqi Intelligence officers id's, 1989 production of chemical masks, information on Kurdish willingness to support U.S. effors to topple SH in return for money and weapons, a report that Saddam had some units which were dressed as U.S. and British troops and were prepared to "execute chemical-biological warfare" on Iraqi citizens so the world would blame President Bush.
• CIA Debrief of INC walk-in (Source Eighteen) was judged a coached fabricator and IC had no further contact with him
• Alleged INC-Linked Sources (CURVE BALL) 
• In the IC's judgment, CURVE BALL was the crucial source that led the IC to judge in the 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMD capabilities that "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents."  There were three other (insignificant) sources who the IC believed corroborated CURVE BALL's reporting.  He provided more than 100 reports.  
• Uncertainties noted in 2004 of his reliability had been raised but were not disseminated to analysts outside the CIA.  Despite these warnings CURVE BALL was judged to be "credible" or "very credible" in its reporting.  The committee said concerns should have been passed to policymakers.  Ahmad Chalabi and Colin Powell

• In the summer and fall of 2003, the Iraq Survey Group investigated whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program.  It was to investigate sites identified by CURVE BALL and later, CURVE BALL himself.  None of the sixty individuals debriefed provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a mobile BW program.  The CIA assessment on May 26, 2004 states he lied about the program and issued a congressional notification in June 2004 and that his reporting had been recalled.  
• CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992, for at least some time in a senior position.  They believed he was also coached by the INC.  The CIA believes that CURVE BALL's close relative's connection to the INC is coincidental, and is not an explanation for his fabrications.  In 2003, a CIA analyst told the Committee that CURVE BALL was located when he sought asylum in a European country, when officials reviewed his asylum paperwork, noticed that he was an Iraqi chemical engineer, and approached him to be interviewed.  
• Source Nineteen  Ultimately....he was unable to provide basic organizational information on the IIS that would show familiarity with the organization.
• On February 27, 2002 Source Nineteen and Iraqi defector walked in to a third country embassy in the Middle East.  Officers from both the CIA and the third country's intelligence serve debriefed him four times.  Source Nineteen  claimed to have worked as a civilian employee in the IIS from 1988 to 2001, initially as a driver.  He claimed that he was aware of four trucks in Iraq that carried biological and nuclear materal and that in 1995 al-Qa'ida sent some of its members to receive training at a Baghdad intelligence school.  He also provided the names of individuals he sad were Iraq intelligence agents posted abroad.  ....he was unable to provide basic organizational information on the IIS that would show familiarity with the organization.  Other details about Source Nineteen reveal trivial details and lend support to his just being another fabricator/provacateur.  Some of his reports were included in one official IC product.
• go to Conclusions

search internet: Woolsey, Chalabi, Miller

However according to Cannistaro "…When we're talking about acquiring information on Iraq. It isn't that anyone had a good source on Iraq - there weren't any good sources. The Italian intelligence service, the military intelligence service, was acquiring information that was really being hand-fed to them by very dubious sources. The Niger documents, for example, which apparently were produced in the United States, yet were funneled through the Italians."

When the former CIA head of counter-terrorism was asked if a Michael Ledeen had been the one who produced the Iraq documents he said "You'd be very close."  This is consistent with the theory that the documents are the work of Iraqi dissidents associated with Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress.  The documents would have flowed from Chalabi to Ledeen to SISME, and thus would have been laundered to make them appear as legitimate products discovered by a legitimate intelligence agency.

This sophistication in the use of foreign intelligence agencies appears to be part of the modus operandi of the neocons, and may derive from the particular expertise of Ledeen and Richard Perle, developed in various shenanigans going back to the 1970's in particular the Iran-Contra affair.  Intelligence agencies in Britain, France, and Germany were also used in the same campaigns of lies which led to the attack on Iraq. One of the strategies was to feed some nonsense to one intelligence agency, and then have that nonsense distributed to other intelligence agencies. Then the claim would be that the information must be true, as it came from multiple sources.

In an interview with the former CIA head of counterterrorism operations and intelligence director at the National Security Council under Ronald Reagan, Vincent Cannistaro, he was asked if the documents on Iraq's purchase of uranium from Niger came from Italian intelligence to which he answered in the affirmative.  However according to Cannistaro "…When we're talking about acquiring information on Iraq. It isn't that anyone had a good source on Iraq - there weren't any good sources. The Italian intelligence service, the military intelligence service, was acquiring information that was really being hand-fed to them by very dubious sources. The Niger documents, for example, which apparently were produced in the United States, yet were funneled through the Italians."

When the former CIA head of counter-terrorism was asked if a Michael Ledeen had been the one who produced the Iraq documents he said "You'd be very close."  This is consistent with the theory that the documents are the work of Iraqi dissidents associated with Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress.  The documents would have flowed from Chalabi to Ledeen to SISME, and thus would have been laundered to make them appear as legitimate products discovered by a legitimate intelligence agency.

This sophistication in the use of foreign intelligence agencies appears to be part of the modus operandi of the neocons, and may derive from the particular expertise of Ledeen and Richard Perle, developed in various shenanigans going back to the 1970's in particular the Iran-Contra affair.

Intelligence agencies in Britain, France, and Germany were also used in the same campaigns of lies which led to the attack on Iraq. One of the strategies was to feed some nonsense to one intelligence agency, and then have that nonsense distributed to other intelligence agencies. Then the claim would be that the information must be true, as it came from multiple sources.

The handling of the source of the main lies used to justify the attack, the aptly named 'Curveball', also displays the same sophistication in technique. Curveball was too obviously undependable to be sent directly to the CIA. As Joseph Cannon writes:

". . . the [Office of Special Plans] could feed lies directly into the Oval Office - but they needed more. They needed to find a way to make the CIA bestow its imprimatur onto this silliness. Thus, the neo-cons somehow arranged for Curveball to be routed through German intelligence - we don't yet know how it happened, but it happened. Why give this alky German minders? If the CIA had dealt with Curveball directly, they would have seen through his deceptions rather easily.

But since the information came by way of the BND, the CIA tended to trust it. By the time the agency decided to take a closer look at the sourcing, war was already a done deal.  Furthermore, this little scheme offered a bonus: Since Tenet and McLaughlin had bought into the BND's information if it all went haywire responsibility could be laid to rest at the feet of the CIA. Not the OSP, not the INC, not the BND, not Mossad, not the neocon ideologues.

Once again, we see use of a bold tactic: The use of a foreign spy shop as a go-between, in order to legitimise and circulate bogus (but ideologically useful) data within the U.S. intelligence community."  If you feed Curveball's shoddy information through German intelligence, with no CIA experts allowed to see him, and ignore the German protestations that he could not be trusted, you can have the lies fed into the American system without any caveats about reliability. The added bonus is that by using the CIA to convey the information, you can then blame the CIA when trouble erupts.

The common thread in the forged Niger documents, the use of Curveball, and the British intelligence manipulations which ended up getting David Kelly killed, is a very clever use of multiple intelligence agencies to disguise the source of a collection of rather obvious lies which were used to justify the attack on Iraq.

Whoever was behind this had to have had a long history of involvement in American government and involvement with multiple foreign intelligence agencies. There aren't that many people with that kind of experience. Who was: 1) a neocon in favor of an attack on Iraq; with 2) connections to Feith's Office of Special Plans; and with 3) ties to Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress; and with 4) long-standing documented relationships with foreign intelligence agencies, particularly SISME?