me 00% r 1 -03,
finnqrzss at the Whiter fitatzs
Dnlbinolan. 3.6!.
January 29. 2003
The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. DC 20505
Dear Director Tenet:
Asyou know. thefinalreportot‘the.ioint inquirytntntha evensotseptembertl
has been submitted to the intelligence Community for declasslflcation review. We look
forward to early release of the pubrro report so that efiorts at refomts can be
accelerated.
Having been privileged to lead this bipartisan, bimrnerai investigation last year.
we are committed to working in the current Congress to help semre implementation oi
its recommendations. in furtherance of that goal, we are writing to the President and
heads oi departments and agencies about portions of the Joint inquiry‘s
recommendations that may be oi particular concem to them.
Our first recommendatkzn calls for establishmentof a Director of National
intelligence, or DNi, who in addition to being the Presidents principal intelligence
adviser ‘shall have the lull range oi management, budgetary and personnel
responsibilities needed to make the U.5. intelligence Community operate as a coherent
whole.‘ To help promote both strong leadership at the entire intelligence Community
leadership and an attentive CIA. the Joint inquiry also recommended that Congress
provide that the DNI not simultaneously serve as director of the CIA or any other
agency. in uzmsidering this recorrunendation, the Congress will certainly, we believe,
benefit irom ieaming of yourwiews about the strengthening oi the role or head or the
intelligence Community.
A number oi the recommendations that follow address proposed tasks of the
Director of National Intelligence, but as that reform wfll require study and deliberation.
for the Immediate future those further recommendations are directed in the Director at
Central intelligence as the present statutory head of the inlemgenoe Community.
The Joint inquiry found that prior to September 11 neither the U.S. Govemrnent
as a whole nor the intelligence Cornmunlty had a oornprehensive oounterterrorlst
strategy. Oneal‘ our recommendations calls on the National Security Council. in
conlunctlon with key agency and department heads. to prepare such a strategy for the
Presidents approval. The reoomrnendatlcn states that the strategy should be
The Honorable George J‘ Tenet
January 29. 2003
Page 2
"govemment wide.‘ apply both ‘home and abroad.‘ and include ‘the growing tenorism
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated
technologies.‘ The recommendation asks that this strategy identify and iuliy engage the
intelligence as well as foreign policy, economic. military and law enforcement elements
that are ‘critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism.‘
The Director or Central intelllgerices lull participation in this overall process will be
essential. as will the DCl's development of the Intelligence Community component of
the full strategy. The Joint inquiry recommended that the intelligence Communitys
component of the overall strategy include a number of important items. among them
development oi human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks.
To provide to the Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intelligence
estimates on terrorism. the Joint inquiry has recommended establishment on the
National intelligence Council ofthe position oi National intelligence Officer tor
Terrorism. The recommendation suggests that the person holding this position also
assist the intelligence Community in developing a program lor strategic analysis.
Another recommendation addresses the need lor Congress and the
Administration to ensure development within the Department of Homeland Security of
an effective aii~source terrorism information fusion center, as mandated by the
Homeland Security Act oi 2002. The success of that fusion center will depend, as the
recommendation states, on the centers ‘lull and timely access to all counterterrorlsm-
related intelligence inionnatlon. including ‘ray! supporting data as needed.‘ Your action
to ensure full cooperation between the entire intelligence Community (including, of
course. the ciA) and the Department oi Homeland Security will be fundamental to the
success of this vital refom. we applaud the Presidents announcement of the
establishment of a new Terrorist Threat integration Center. which we understand will be
located under the Director or’ Central intelligence. The important challenge. we believe.
is to assure the full and harmonious implementation of both the infomtation fusion
requirement oi’ the Homeland Security Act and the center that the President announced.
The recommendations include a list oi significant retonns that the intelligence
Committees believe are essential for strengthening the FBI‘: domestic intelligence
capability. in regard to these critically needed reforms. the Joint inquiry has
recommended that Congress should direct that the head of the intelligence Community.
together with the Attomey General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should
report to Congress on the FBl‘s progress. The report should include ‘the specific
manner in which e new domestic intelligence service could be established in the United
The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29. 2003
Page 3
States. recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil
liberties.‘
The Committees expressed their strong conviction that ‘the intelligence
Community/s employees remain its greatest resource.’ They recommend that the head
of the Intelligence Community ‘should require that measures be Implemented to greatly
enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and
expertise needed for success in counterterrorlst efforts.‘ Several particular adions are
set forth in the recommendation. One is that Intelligence Community agencies should
expand and Improve countenerrorism training. including about information sharing
among law enforcement and intelligence personnel, the use of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. and wetchlisting. The recommendation includes steps to improve
intelligence Community language capabilities and the utilization of the skills and
experience of retired personnel. It calls on the Intelligence Community to ‘enhance
recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce.‘
A further personnel recommendation proposes. in part, that Congress enact
legislation. modeled on the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, to help Instill the concept of "iointness" throughout the
lntelligence Community and ensure that its components will work more closely together
than has been the rzse. The mechanisms identltled in the recommendation include
such things as loint tours for intelligence and law enforcement personnel as well as
incentives forjoint service throughout the Intelligence Community. In developing these
ideas. Congress would benefit from the Administration’: detailed proposals.
The Joint Inquiry identified several important objectives ccnceming classified
information, including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Intelligence
Community, by state and lowl authorities, and by the American public. To this end. we
recommended that the Dlreaor oi Central intelligence, in consultation with the heads ct
key components of the lntetllgenm Community, including the Attorney General. should
report to the Intelligence Committees on ‘proposals for e new and more realistic
approach to the processes and structures that have govemed the designation of
sensitive and classified inlonnation.‘ The report should also address ‘proposals to
protect against the use of the classification process as a shield to protect agency sett-
interest.’
The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful tor your attention and
response to these and other matters identified in the course of the Joint Inquiry.
Further. we are confident that the Congress will benetit trom other recommendations
The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29. 2003
Page 4
that you might have for legislative or administrative action to impmve the Nation's
anuntartarrorist capabiiliias.
Bob Graham Pariar G
Chairman, Senaie lnieiligence Chairman, House Intelligence
Committee, 101'” Congress Committee, 101" and 105“
Congresses
K .
?’“‘°““
Vice Chairman. Senate iniemgence Ranking Minority Member, House
Commiitaa. 107" Congress Intelligence Committee, 107'“ Congress
and Mamher ex nffido (as Minority
Leader). 108" Congress
Enciosure: As staied
S REPT N0 lO7- 107"‘ CoNcRzass_10S5ss1oN H. Rzvr No. Z07-
JOINT mqumv INTO
IATELLIGENCE coMMLm"rY ACTIVITI 1-1s
BEFORE AND .-\l~'1'ER THE TERRO RIST A'1'T/\CKS or
SEPTE1\lBER11,Z001
REPORT
OF THE
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM ITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND
U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT C()WMlTTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
TOGETHER WITH ADDl'!'1ONAL VIEWS
DECEMBER 200?.
"'1 =1=~“L-i'"~-='-"
PART FOUR—l"IN'DIi\‘C, DISCUSSION AND Ni-\RR_ATl'\'kL REG.~\RDli\'G CERT.»\lN
SENSITIVE l\'.~\Tl0NA1. SECURITY M/\TTl:‘.RS
20. Finding’: \\'mle in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in
euntntt with, and received support ur assistance frolu, individuals \vh\i inn)‘ be cuuuected tn
the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily irnrn l-‘Bl sources, that ut least rwu
Dflllose individuals were alleged by some to he Saudi intelligence uflicers. The Joint
Inquiry’s review cuniirnnzd thnt the intelligence Community ulsn has inlnrmutiun, much of
which has yet tn he independently verified. indicating that individuals associated with inc
Saudi Government in the United States may have other Lies tn ml-Qn’idn and uther terrorist
group» The FBI and CIA have informed the Joint inquiry that, sine: the September ll
attacks, they are treating the Suudi issue seriously, but linth still have only n limited
understanding of the Saudi Government's ties to terrnrist elements. in their testimony,
neither CIA nor FBI witnesaes were uhlc tn identify tleliuitivizl} the extent of Saudi support
for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent tn which sui-h
suppurt, ll‘ it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. The FBI‘; Washington Field
Offici-. created a squad devoted ta
—
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at least in pert due to the Joint Inquiry’s locus on this issue, did the FBI and CIA establish
a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view oi’ the Joint Inquiry, this gap in
ll.S. intelligence cnverng: is unacceptable, given the magnitude and immediacy nlthe
potential risk to 17.5. national security. The intelligence Cnmuninity needs to address this
urea u{ concern Its aggressively and ns quickly as pnssihle.
Disciissmn: One reason for the limited understanding l5 that it wit: only after September
ll tliattlie U.S. Government began in nggmssivcly investignlt; this issue, Friar tn September
l 1”“, the FE! apparently did not focus i.n\".'SY.l§lt§\¢: resuurees on—
— Saudi nationals in the United States due to Saudi }\.‘7\lJlil'S status as an Aniefitzzm
"ally" A reprcs:-iitative oftlie FBI cstmed that, print to
*
September I1, 2001, the FBI received “no reporting from any'mcniber ofthc izitelligcncc
Conunuriitf that there was a_presence in the United States.
Accoriiuig to various FBI d0CUTl'l€Il!$ and at least one CIA memorandum, some of the
Suptezribcr ll hijackers, while in the United States, apparently had contacts with individuals who
may be cemented to the Smith Gnvemnient. While the iDLl'1i.1l'lO_l.lh')' \L!!C0\‘€l't!Li this material
during the course of its review ol'FBI and CIA (i0CLll"l1¢XlB, it did not attempt to investigate and
assess the accuracy and significance of this infortntition iridepcndently, rccngnmng that such a
test: would be beyond the scope oi this Joint inquiry. instead, the Joint inquiry reterred a
detailed eompilnfioti of information tinooverrd by the inquiry in dnetmicrits and interviews to the
FBI and ClA for further investigation by the intelligence Cnmniunity and, if appropriate. law
enfnreernent agencies. .-\ hriefsuinniary oftlie availzihle infomiation regarrimg some of these
individuals is illustrative for purposes oithis report:
Q Omar ail-Bayoumi. The FBI has received :iun'iei'oi.is rcporL< {ruin individuals m the
Mueliin cnrni-rturiity, dating hack to 1999, alleging that al-Bayourni may be a Sandi
intelligence officer. FBL files suggest that al-Bayoumi provided substantial assistance to
hijackers Khalid al-Ivlihdiitir and Natvnftil-I-iazrni after they arrived in San Diego in
l-‘enrtiary 2000. A!-Beyounu met the hijackers at n public plate shortly after his ineeung
with an individual at the Saudi consulate and there are indications ll‘. the files that his
cneauritcr with the hijackers may not ‘nave been accidental, During this same tixr.efraine_
:l'Btiyoi:rni land extensive ‘contact with Sandi Government esiablistiirients Lil the United
States and received financial support irom ii Saudi company afiiliateri with the Saudi
Ministry of Defense. According tn FBI fi!es,_ at the company said that al-
Bayriutni received a monthly salary even though he had been there on only one occasion.
This support increased substantially in April 2000, two inanfiis after the liijziekers arrived
in Sari Diego, decreased slightly in December 2000. and stayed at Lhat same level until
August 2001. Thai company ri'.'p<:\r!edly had tics to Usama Bin Lamri and al-Q:i'id.:1. In
addition, the i-‘Bl detcmtined that at Bayoumi was in contact with several mdividtinls
under FBI investigation and with Lhc I-ioiy mklld Friunilalion. which has been under
investigation 821,3 fundrzising Eroiit for Hamtis;
€£Qm! nits
“ up\_x\ A I-~...Jt.1,
Osama Bassnzm. Bnssnan may have hccn in contact wizh al-Mmclhar and aI~Ha.:mi
during their time in San Dicgo. Bassnan was a closc associate of 2!-Bayomni and Omar
Bakarbashat, zmuthcr on: of the liijuckers' clusc assucratcs. He also livcd across lhc
strcel fiom the hijackers, and made n comnitni in rm FBI asset that hc ciifi mor: than al~
Bayounii did for the hijacl-(cs. According to an FBI doc\:mcnt_ Hasnan told another
indi\'id\luI that he met al-Hazrni througl-i ILI>B3_\'0\.\I‘n‘: :1.-iri ls‘.-=r that 31¢ met rwo of the
hijarkcrs through al-Bayou.-ni. I-In also mold the asset that -11-Bayoumi was arrcsn.-cl
banana: he knew nlrlina-ni and |:1~Mil-.dhur \-cry -'.~:ll. The documcm goes nn to stat: that
Bassnan and 3.I~BEl)'0Ul1iI have been “close to each other for .2 Kong time " Basnan has
many tics to m: Saudi Gov:m.mcni_ including past crnploymcnt by thc Saudi Arabian:
Educaliuu Mission, rcfencd to in FBI documents as
. The FBI alsu rcccivcd rcpons fmrn converted by NewsFollowUp.com Stephen Francis
individuals in ihc Muslim community allcging that Bassnan might bc 2 Saudi inlelligcncc
nfficcr. According to a CIA rncnw, Basman rcponcdly I=C!lV\5Li funding and pussflzly :-
fzkrs passport from Saudi Govcmmcnl nfficials. He and his wife have rec-zivzd finamzial
support Erorn lh: Saudi Arnhassatlnr tu the Unilcti Slzlcs and his wifc A CIA rcpun 115(-
indicatcs that Br=ssn:n-. traveled to Hunslon in 2002 and rn.-:r w-.tIi an indiviciuzi who was
- The report stains that during thai zrlp :\ member of the Saudi Royai Family
provided Bassnau Will) :\ significant zcnoum of cash. FBI infnnnation inclicazmr that
Bassnan is an CXIl'¢1l'\lSIn.l'lLi supponcr 0I'Us:im:i Bin Ladin, rind has 'tn:=::i connmtcd to 111:
Eritrean Islamic Jihad and Iii: Blind Sliaykh;
Shaykh al-Thuinairy. According to FBI documents and a CIA memorandum, al-lluzmi
aid al-Mihtlhar may have been in cuniaciwi1liSnaykh :11-‘l‘hunmiry, an accrcditcd
cliploinat at Lhc Saudi Consulalc in Los Angela: and one Oflltc “£rnmi.\" at the King
Fanad mosque in Culv-.=r City. California Also according to Flil documcnis. thc. mosque
was buili in 1995 from funding provided hy Saudi l\rnbia’s Crown Pmicc Abduluziz.
The mosque is reponcdly ancnded by mcmbtrs of the Saudi Consulate ir. Los Angela:
a.n:i is widcly rccognizcrl for its anti-Wcslnrn views;
~* -*-=~-‘~'=*i--~=~*-" “I
Said: al-Ilussaycrr 1nSeprcmber 2001. Salch :1.|~Huss.1ycn, rcpurredly a Saudi Interior
Ministry cfficial, stayed at the same hora] in Hcmdon, Virginia where: al-Hazmi was
staying. While :\l-I-Iussayen claimed afirr Scplrzmbcr 11 nct to know the hijackers. I-‘B1
agents bdieved hc was being deceptive. Ha was able to depan the United Slates dcsprte
FBI rzffors to locate and re-intcrvizw him; and
Abdullah Sm Ladin. Abdullzth Brn Ladin claims to work for the Saudr Ernbassyin
Was]-ringtcn, D.C. as an m.£n1Zru:tr<::rv: ufficlzr. Hr» rs idcntrfiad by rhc FBI as Usama Din
Ladin‘s halfhrbthcr. Hr: rs a close fr-lend nfMoharnmcd Qrradir-Hanmani, a pustiblr:
zrssnciatc r>fMnlrr-rrnrnod Am and Marwnn at-Shehhi prior to Scptcmbcr 1 l, 2001.
The Joint lrrquiry also found uthcr mdrcatiorrs l1:aiin:ii\'iduuls connected to the Saudi
Government have ties tn terrorist networks, rncluding:
The CLA. and FBI have rdentified the Pan Tzmryah Mrzzcquc in Culver City :5 a sire of
cxtrcmist-related activity. Scvcral subjects of FBI invcstigaircns prior to September H
had close ounnzctions to Lhc mosque and are bclicvud tn have lamrdurcd money through
mis mosque to nan-profit organizatrons overseas afntialed with Usama Brn Lrdin. In an
inicrvicw, an FBI agent said he hclicvcd that Saudi Gavcrnzncnr munuy was bur.-.g
laundered through thc mcsquc;
Another Saudi natiunal with close ri=s to the Saudi Royal Family, is thr:
subject of H31 rzouutcncnonsm invastigations and rcponedly was chucking security at
the United States‘ souinwrst border in 1999 and discussing the passrhility of infilrratrng
individuals into thaUnitct1 Stats;
According to FBI dnctrmnnrs. scvcml ofrha phone: numbers found rn the phone hank of
A'uu Zubaida, a scnior at-Qa‘id: opcrartiv: caprurcd rn Pardsum in March 2002, could be
linked, at least indi:r:cLly, to telephone numbcrs in:hcUr1it.-.d Status. On: crfthuse U.S.
numbers is subscrihcd to by lhc ASPCOL Corparaxion, which is located in Aspcn.
v
~- -’~~--W -'i*"-~-=~ “ ‘“
fli
Colorado. and rnanagcs th: aflairs of the Colorado residence uftlic Saudi Ambassador
Bandar. The FBI noted that ASPCOL has an unlistcd telephone number. A November
I8, 2002 FBI rwponst-.10 tho Joint Inquiry states that “CIA traccs have rcvcaied no diruct
links bcrwccri numbers found in 7_u'naida.'s phone hnok a:ii.I numbcrs in Lhc Urutcd
Slams."
- According ‘.0 an FBI document, the telephom: number ofa bodyguard at the Sfllldi
E-.i-ibassy in Wasliington, DC, who sum: have allcgcd may bi: a—
— wru-. ai.-zn Fnuml in .~\bu Zul::iida‘r. po-:s=| FIOHB; and
- According to an FBI agcn: in Phoenix, tlic FBI suspects Moliammtztl :1-Qudhacein of
heing Al-Qudhaccin wt-to involved in .1 I999 incident aboard
an Arrtcnca W:st flight, which lhi: FLIP» Phoenix nfiicc now suspccts may hnvc been it
“dry run" to test ttiilin: sccitrity. Du:ing thi: iljglit, ul-Qtidliaccin and his associatr. askcd
the flight ancndonts. 4 variety of suspicious quwtiuns, 21-Qt.t'.IIia:r:in than imemptcti to
enter the cockpit on two occasions. AI~QtirIh:tcuin and his associate wcrc flying to
\Va.slti.rtgt0n, D C. to attend a party at thc Saudi Embassy, and boil» claimed that their
tickets wer: paid for by the Saudi Embassy. During tho coursu ofits investigations, the
FBI has disouvcrad that both til-Qudliaeciri and the other indi\'ldD1.\I invnlvcd in this
incident had coruiectinns to tn-rorisir.
Finally, tho Committees arc particularly mnoczncd about tlic Scriutzs iiaturc of allegations
contained in 2 CIA mcmoimdum found by the Joint Inquiry Staffin mt: files nfzhe FBI’: San
Dicgu Field Of§:c That mizrnor-.ndi;in, w‘:\ii.n discuss'.::. zillcgcd finuicial connections bctwcen
tit: September I I hijackers, Satitli Go\'em.'ni:t-it nfiicials, and nicmheri of thr: Séudi Royal
Family, was dmftcd by a CL-‘\ o[fir.cr , rclylng pnmarily oz;
Iflfflflfllfififl from FBI files. The CIA ufficzr S52}! it to the CTC to clctennirm whether CIA had
additional information. II: also provirlcri a copy tn the FBI agent r-aportsibl: for ‘Jr:
!I\\'¢SLig3fiOU of one ufthc individuals discusscd in the meziioramiurii. Dsspitc thc clcar nrttirvnal
implications uftlt: CIA m:mora|idum_ the. FBI agent included Lhr: mzmniandtmi in an tnoit idual
cast: file and did not forward it tc FBI I-Icndqunnurs. FBI Hcadquanzrs, therefore, “I17 \i:iu\\'A=r
W1" =r~'~1<*-1o"~-@~** ‘I9
—~1-wmHi-@=~—
uf statemcttts in the tm:rnut':mdum until th: Joint lnqttiry brought the mcmora:tdtt:tt's
="‘P“"'*°“* ‘° ‘"8 B“*"=“'§ ="="“°"
Pussiltlc Saudi Govarnment Connection: to Tzrrurlsu and Terrorist Gruups
W':1ilc in the Unitctl States, samt: mftltt: Se-prctnbct ll hijackers were in contact with, and
:=:':t:ivcc' suppnn or assistance from, individuals who may bu cnrtnecictl to the Saudi
Gwcnuucrzl. Tltctc is inforzm-.ttt>n, fiuut FBI >utut=>, |.Lul at {zeal {Wu n{rlt~_m: ittntvitiuah nut-
alleged to be Sautlt tnlelligfitrcc olftccrs. The Jomt l.nqutr_v‘s l'B\‘lEWCn1tfi.'tt\¢(l that the
lntclllgcnr-= Cummtmity also has ittfnmtation, much oft-t'ltic'n rctnuins speculative and yct ta be
independently verified, intllcattng that Saudi Government oitlctals nt the United States may ll?.\'C
other ties to ztl-Qa’ida mad other terrorist groups.
The Committees are pztmcttlazly conccmcd about the serious nature of allegations
contmned in a CIA meznurantiunt found within the files ofthe FBI‘; San Dtutqn Ftcld Offtue
'I\"n:tt mcmureudunr, which tltscusses alleged financial connectons between the September l l
hijackers, Saudi Government ufficials, atnrl members ofthe Saudi Royal Family, was drafted by A
CM or’r‘1::er , relytttg prtmarlly mt inforrnatinn from FBI files,
tn thetr testinwzty bcl}-arc: the Joint Inquiry, netther the CIA nnr the Fl-ll was nblt-.10
d»:fittitiv|:ly identtfy fat these Curr-mirttzcs tit: extent ut'Sattdi support for turmrist activity
globaily or witlttn the United States and the uxtent to which such suppon, ifit exists, is
intcntiottel :>r itumccrtt in narurc. Butlt the FBI and CIA have indicated ta tltt: Committees that
they arc now aggressively pursutng Saudi-related terrorism issues.
Prior to Scptctnbcr l1"‘, the FBI apparently dud not focus invcstigattvl
Saudi nationals in
the Uniteu States due tn Saudi A:abi2‘s slams as an American "ally".
_. A 1'Bpn:Sii1l£lli\'B offnc Fl3l‘s £:sttl'|cd in closed
l
-t
1 tn .n4\.1\A. u\..m-r ~-J‘
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hearings that, prior to Scptcrnbcr 1 1“. the FBI raccivud "no rcpcning from -my member of thc
lntelligcncc Community" that there is I presence in the Uriitczt States.
lt should be clear that this Joint Inquiry has made no final determinations as tu the
reliability or sufficicnuy clthc intbnnution zcguding thus: issuus that w: found contained in FBI
and CIA docmncnts. It was nut the task of this Joint lnquiry to conduct the kind ufmctensivz
investigation that would bc inquired to dtt:Y‘l‘l\Lt‘|Cd thc tru: signtficzmcc nfany such allcgcd
connccnnns to lilti Saudi C|0Vcm.m:x:t. On the nnc ltttntl. It IS p0;slblc that thes: kinds nf
CUfl!lCCXlOIl> cuuld mggust. ea int1.it:stcJ in 2: dated Jul) 2, 2002.
“incontmvci1iblc cvidcnce that thnre is suppon for tliase tn.-rorisL< \\'it'ziin thc Saudi
Govzarnlntfnl." On the nt‘:i=r hand, it is also p<!S$ibl: that furthnr imcstigatiu.-i ut‘thcs= .:Il=5;muns
could reveal lcgmmate. and innocent, zxplanations for these associations.
Given the serious natiunal security implications of 11:35 inforziation, however, the
leadership of the Joint Inquiry is refcn-L113 thc staff‘ s compilation of relevant infnmiatiun in bath
the F31 and the CU. for invstigativc rcvicw and apyropriatc irtvcstigativc and intclligcnce:
uctinn.
Pussihlc Couucctious Between the Septnmber 11 Hijackers and Saudi GD\'Cl'lllX\l:Dl Officials
in the United Sluts
In reviewing FBI ducumcnts and the CIA mcntorautlum, th: Iumt liiqmry Siaffhas
0X€.t.'T‘|l\'l(1f‘iil1fOft1‘|illiDI‘t suggesting that:
- One imlividu.-l who provided :t:sii::a.-tr: tn N:tw:\t'al Z-Zaumi and l~'_huii:i ml-Mihdinr may
hc cunncicd Lu the Saudi Go\':rt;i1cnt. A sccnnt‘. individual \'-'1'/.1 may havc 11:2: in
contact Wlih al-1 Iazmi and Al~Mihdhar also hits tic-_=, tn the Saucli Government, including
:o.'|n::ctions to the Saudi Antbassadoi Lo the Unjtcd States. [hate is rcportmg in FBI filcs
that parsons |li!\’l‘ allcgad that both ofthssa incividuals may be Saudi int=lhgcncc
officcrs;
—---l-i-=—-— =1=
—ifi$
- Tm: September It htjack:rs may have hccn H1 contact wztb cthcr Saudi Government:
otficials in the Umtett States prior to the September it attacks; an
c.
- Saudi Government offictals in the Unit:d States may have ties tt: Usama. Bin Ladm's
terrorist ncnvcrk.
Omar at-Bayonmi and Osama Bassnan
Two indivtcitzuis known tn the F81 pnot to Scptcrnhcr U, 2001 Y Omar at-Baycumi and
Osama Bussnun — may have providcd zsststanc: or suppurt to it‘;-Hazmi and ul-Mthdltar whit: tht:
two hijacksmto-be werc living in San Diego. While the documentary cvitlznc: that cl-Bnyuumi
providai assistancc to at-Uazmi and at-Mittdhar is solid, the fitcs contain only limitzd avid-mu:
that Osamn Bassnan had contacts with the two individuals.
Wham ztl-Hazmi and at-Mihdhar nmvcd to San Dicgo, ni-Ba;/numi provided than with
oonsidctablc assistance. Before thc i."tt_]IlCi(5X5 m-av-.'d in with the 1ung~\im'; I-‘Bl im'onnan:_ they
stayed at at-Buyourni's apartment for several days uutit ai~Baycu:r.i wet. ttblc to find them an
apartmcnt. .-’*J-Buyuumt than co-stgucd lhfll lcasc and may havc paid their 'I1:s:murtth'_s rcnt and
security deposit.‘ After at-Hazrni and at-Mihdhar moved inta thci: own apartment, abfizyounvi
threw a party to welcome them to the San Diego uommur-.ity He alsa tzusf-zed Mndhar Abduilah,
anoth=.- individual from the lslunic C:t:tt:: of San Dicgu (ICSD). to help them get acctitnzztcd to
the United Stattcs. Abdullah served as their translator, helprd them get tltivcrs' iitcnscs, and
assisted them in locating flight schools.
—
' Th: FBF. nous, LH its Nnvzmbct Id, 1011?. nspomc that "financial rawrds uttttmtc 1 cazh tt:;u:tt at tuc cmr
tuttoum ax thv: czs|tie:‘s :t\e:k tam at-Buymni s hank ucnufll un thc um: day, ».~'m.;;-_ iuggcsig 11-.1: :1-,¢ ‘;|,j;=kr,;
mznhttwod hint" flit Novcmbcr IS Rnmaxue, 3. Haw»-er, another FD! d-acumen; datc-1 Ouzuber H, 2002!.
appears to mach n siightiy di:Tcrent mttctusion This dncumzul stats that "2 rcvizztv c£'IC1:tiid Al-Mihtfiu:-r and
Nawrtf Al-Ham-.i's bank ::cm'd: indicatc thurc is no bank do;-umcntliiun thtt >\:ppa|1z the ::t.-nbulsztnnut :;t'[t'ac
rant money}, at any mtmizs to Omar A1-B2)-oznu {tum at-Hum or A!-Midhat."
i'*v"-=t—_=—=\=1"'~i"==~>’=*7 “'11
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During ihu pus!-Scplcmbcr ll invcsligmion, lhc FBI Iirscovrrrud that 2.!-Bayourni had Far
more cxlcnsivc tics In the Saudi Government rhzm prcvinzlsly rcalizell. Ln fact, according to an
Oclobcr 14, 2002 PBX document, :1!-Bayourni has “extensive has lo lhu Saudi Govc:|uncnl.“ Th:
connccuons identified by lhe Fill me:
- Al-Bayoumi had bccn an :mC0unla.n'. at lb: Saudi Civil Avunion Adnrinisrralior. {mm
l9'Iri w 1993, when he rclocared l0 urc United Slams;
- Accomrng to the F81, alhlaynumi was in n-cquant ;:nnl:\cl wnh rhc Emrr at the Sam:
Ministry ofDcf=r.se, rcspunsibl: for air lraffic conrrol;
- Th: FBI has alsn lucamd recunls, indrcaling that al-Bzyoumi reczivcd $20,000 from
(kc Saudi Minis*:y m'Fi.n:nce at one point;
v When al-Bayourni applied \o schools in llm Unilcd States in U98, hc had :1 letter
from 12:: Saudi Embassy, \v'nich stated that hc was gaming a l'ull schalarship fzmn ‘ire
Govemmcnl of Saudi Anrbra; and
- Wnilc in San Dicgo, ul-Bayuuun was receiving muncy Er-om lh: Saudi Ministry of
Dcfensc rhruugh :1 Saudr company called "Ewan." _ cflhzr company
informed rhs FBI afi.:r September l l, 2001 that. alrhough El~Bl!)'Olll'Ill only showed
up .1! the company on one occmion. he recnivcd a monthly salary and -.\.iluwmc¢:s.
_ slalcd that. at first, hc altcmplcd lo mfuss lu pay al-Bayoumi 2 rnonfiny
salary, but hc was lold that his cnmpan) would low their ncmlraci ifhc did not pay
_ infnrmcr‘. lhn FRI ml 11 lhe limo, hm arlnhrrlvd rm -0 finudi
corruption.
A1-Bayuumi also had frcqucnl coulac-1 wrlh Saudi r.um>lish:nc:ns in the Urlilnd Slates. In
a revrcw of !Cl6p1\OflB ml! rccords, the l-‘BI lcamad that El-3ay:\u.rr1i celled Saudi Gnvermncnl
eslalllishmcnls in lhc United Slams almosl 100 lirnm bctwccn January and May of2000,
Accordmg kl the FBI, all-Baynumi was in corllacl wirh at lcznst lhrc: ir.d1v1du2'Ls 2.: the Saudr
% -11:
-ii
""
:-.n'.'n:1ss_\' if‘. \\':L~1hinj;lo:x. DC; L-'-O i:u.li\iduuls :1: Lhu Saudi .~\'..:hi¢n ('ul'.\;ml .\-fission in
\‘.';>:hingum, DC, and lhrc: indi\'1du:11s at the Saudi C'nnsuIur.: ix". Los .~‘\:1gcIu~. In u .<-:.:rch ui converted by NewsFollowUp.com Stephen Francis
H;|you:ni‘s__, lhcy also di';:-‘m.-red that 11: and U1: phone number for an
zndivudua! at Lhc Snndx C‘or\sn:l;1lz in Landon.
Two fnrwr S:u\ Dingo .a;.z~::~.'s addressed \'nc 15su'.'ul‘\\'hcL?\|:.’ .\1-Bu)uumx ax .15 an
|:;u!I:-__m-m-.' uflicer at the Ocwbcr 9. 3003 c1u=~\i hc;n'in5. Thu funncr can; u§.;\;:\l wim hzmilcfi.
.\I\:p;1u\ icslnfird
[Al-Bayoumi] zn:'.cd like '.\ Sand: mlcliigcncc oificcr, u\n1)'£\pml(\n. Ami ifhc was
mvolvcd with {he hiiacl-zcrs. w!ncl\ it looks hku hu was, ifhc signed \:‘;s5C$, ix'hc pmvidcd
sum: snn of fin;.nci:\-_:_ ur ]1Ll)’Ii1Cl!lUrS'.‘GT!lI sun,l1\un l uould s-1)‘ 1!\.1LLhcrc‘s u cl-zar
possibilily {hm lhere migifl be .1 cannuclmn hcmcen Szaudl 1nlcIli;.;.-ncu and L"‘i_‘.
.~\ 1'r."m-r .-’\ssisum Spcciu! Agcm in Clllkrgu in Sz1\Dicgu lcsuficd lhzu Lhu FBI rccciwd
"m‘.n\'_-m.15, 1 wnuhi say half-.x do/en" r:p0fl5 from |:\d1'~'uJu2!s who b-;h:'.'=:d lhzn al-km}-uun~.i
\\';:s a S.:ud| inu.-Xl:gcnc».- nifircr. Th: FEH's .\'o\'cnfl<:-r H4" rwprvnsc i:~ inconsislcnu .v.<. In \\-ltcrhcr
inc F81 c-:1-~n[‘:y us :i:s|;n.<.‘:v-._: :1-Rzaymxmx us :1 $u5;\l:Ch:J San-ii micllv;--_-11r'.~:1r'T|;L'r 1:" its
:r~;mu\c_ a!.-_- I-Bl nulc.~ ihzu :1-bayu\::-;; unzil .:::c:
S::p?:1:'ixur I I“, but lhc 1-.-spumc .1150 '»':z‘.*:5 {hm "uh-:r-: 1s no r‘-'i:lcr.c-:“ In \3nn2|nd':ll‘-1&1 .11<
E:\;.'r|\m1i IS n Saudi imr:1Eigcncc nfficcr.
Th: FBI had rccci\‘::ircpr.\:1ingfr0n\ 11 rchuhlc source well prmr :0 i-_-pm-m‘>cr X 1, 20"]
H1Clc;l1\r\gl1\;1l :11-H-'\;;o\1n\1n1ig!\lhc.x Saurh |r\;cll|~__'-:nc'.* offircr. .-\l-U;:j-'-:u::|i nus kn:-\\':x tn
‘n;:\'u ;m;c;s lu Jar-__'c umuums ofnxoxwy from Saudi .»\.m'r\iu. dk:1~pih:lh¢ fact Um! I-\c dud not ;m:|¢:zr
'.\.- nuld Ll _m2~ On on-: 0'.'K.'i\510n pnnr lo Supt-:n\bcr H, flu: FD! r'.~::r- cc! 1::r1\r:11;nxun that i|\'
liuyouznx imd :’uL‘c1\'~:d S4U0,()IJH lmm Saudz .-‘\r;{m:n lo help fund zx new nmaquc U1 S:'"i ‘_)h:g<».
I‘|\@- 7""-I wnduclud :1 counlumznomzm |n\':sug.\uun on ul-Bzquunzi m 1‘.-")3 and I99‘), but clu>.cd
the ix\vcsti-gntinn 1:1 that point.
—$i
‘ "‘ "“" "" “ """"" "
T3
Since Scptcmtzcr 11, 2001 FBI invcstigiiticri rcvciihzci that ai-Bayotimi has snmc tics to
icrmiist €|€}'1\€.'l"l!S. Pasquale J4 D'Ani\.t:o. the Excciitive Assistzm! Duccttir for Countcrtcirorism
and Coimtcrintclligencc tcslilicd in the October 9, 200.7‘. hearing that
[w]c'vc been taiking with thc— Govummcnt about cailcct-Lon on an individual
named - who has tics to at-Qa'ida, who has ties to Bayoumi,
In addition, the FBI rcportud the msuibi ofthuir search ut'ul-Bitycurni’-tltatl,
"after an rxhaiistive tmnstations of B:=.youmi’s doctirncnts, it is clear that in Bztyoun-ii‘s
concspniidciico ha is providing guidance to young Miislims and some nfhis writings can 'ri-_-
interpreted as jihadist."
According to information acquired by ihc FBI after Scptcmb-:1 11, 2001, m-Bayoumi also
nntcd uri one tifliis schnul applications that hc worked for a compaizy caiicd “Drmzih/Avcu."
According to the FBI, Ercari is a San Dicgo subconu-.ictcr nfDalla.h/.-\\*t:o. .-\:cording to :1
scpzcatnioctiincrit, Dalhih anti Avcn are under the same: umbrella company, Avcu Dallah
TYAHS Ania, which is 2 subsidiary of.>\1 Barakaait lrivcstmciit and DCVt‘iUpY‘flCt1!C(.\1'Dpan§'. .-‘~.vco
Duliah reportcdiy holds the contacts for cleaning and mnintcnancc at Lhc three miljfif aimuns i:t
Saudi Arabia. The _ document stats that
thc compziny has links to Usaina Latiin FH! 1-Icadquanzrs was infomicd nfth: siffiliation
bctwacn Dalltih/Avcci and A1 Brimkzmt in Fcbruury 1001. but the San Dicgn Ficld Dlticc
nppzircntly ncvcr got this infnnnzitioiz.
Actzortling to FBI docurriciits, ail-Baytiurnfs pay incresctl during m: ZIXIIC that at-Haznii
and at-Mihdhar were ir. tho United St:t:s. According to a r-zcci-it -analysis of tics L~c'.w=:¢x:
thr tcnnnut amt:-1-cw rind elemmts of the Saudi GZVEfl\mBl\l, ‘acibrc at-Hazini and :il»Mihr‘.h:ir
anivcd in thc U.S., at-Bayoumi gcncialiy rcccivcd -ippioximatcly S465 pct month in
":il1ow;inc:s." According tn the. docunzcnt. in Manzh 1000, A month at‘-.cr ul-H:-amt and 2!-
Mihdhtir iinivcd in San Diego, his “al10waiiccs"jiimpcd to ovcr S3700 i-i i-.ion'li and staycii
constant until December 2000, wiicn ai~I-Isrzrii left San Diego. .-\!-B:iyoi;mi's allowances wan:
than r3ccrea==:ii to approximately 53,200 :i month and stayed at that rate until El] Buyaumi left th:
United Stzttcs in August 2001, appioxin-iu:ely one month before the September 11° attacks
@uHm =25
Thu-mcnwrundunx dulcd July Z, Z001, lflC\Jl'|'$\Zi]}' not-zd 1111.1 ul-l1~u}'0un:i's \~""t':.
\vh:lc 1:‘-mg m San I.Iicg,o, was rccci-.'mg S1200 a month from I‘-1n-;¢ss Haziu Hlnl Sultan, {ha
wifc ufP::ncc Bzmdur. lhc Saudi :\mb::ss.\d0.’ is lh: '.'nii=d Slums. Th: 11.5! has ::O\\' conafirzxcd
(ml only Osama B:1ssn::n's wife rccuimd monc) dirculy from Pr-inc: Bzmd.1r's wifc, hm lha: al-
B1youmi's win: flllcnlpltd to dupnsil lhrcz oflhc checks from Prince Bandar's will-. which wcw
payable to B:|ssnan's Mfr. into her own accounts.
The Joint Inquiry also fnund, in F131 filcs. infrrr.-ration sug-=~,\:slm;; 01.11 Os.\m.1 Da::=:~.:n
mufx haw also been m cnmuct v\'il'n ::l-Tdihdhzar and :\!-Hzazmi, |n|:EuL!:n-=1‘
v Bussnun was a vary dose :=smv:m:c~\|'Om::r ui-Buyounwik and \\'u'; in luEcphone
conmcl with :11-Baynuma several um-:5 a day \\'hi\'.- Lhcy “er: bnlh m Sun Diego.
Bassllzm also has close tics lo 2 num'm:r uffllhtr1ndi'.'i\lu:nls c-mncctcd to IE1;
hijackers, including; Omar 8:k:|:bu5h:al. d1scuss~.-d hulow. who xs ruf7:rr:d m H1 FIN
ducumcms as Bussnan's bxolhcnm-lu\\;
o Azrcordlng In an Oc1n'ncr 1n_ I001 FY11 dc-r.z:n1cnL B.L$I§n;.\h :1I!<11m'_‘L\:m;1§S(:1Z|\ul ha
hadn1ulNn\\;!fi4I—H;1!n\i \h.'L\ugh1|\~B:}‘numi H: wen‘. nr. Lu cu} {hm Eu: nmx '.\-\u 05'
the ninclucn !::jacke:rs 1E:rou;h Omar :11-iizsjmzumi. .~\ccnrd::zg in 1!:-_~ FBI Jucnnzm-111, h=:
.'.lsc laid the asscl (hm. al-Bnyuunxi was nrrcsxud ‘humus: hm kn’:-\> 1:1-Humi and :11-
}-lihdhar wry wcil. Thc ducumcnl ;:~:= on lu stat: that Eiussnzm arm! 1|]-Buyuumi
‘ . ..
ha‘-e aeun ‘ cinsu In cuch<\1hcrfm';\lun5l1:\1u
~ Bussnun livuxi m lhc up.mm':nl cm-iplcv. in San Dicg-0 acrass the s:n::\ fr-nn :2! Hm-.~.-.2
and 3!-Mihdhur;
1 Bassuan nude 1 Communi to an FBI _~'o\1r:u ufier 21:: Sup:-.-muur 1! nmcks Sllggéiling
Lhnl hc did more for lhc hi_§:\::k::rs than uH3r=j~'o'.::r.‘ dzd;
_-1,}
-~" -'--'»-~-'i"'~-'=~~- ‘>
|
I Th: FBI is awun: ofcumacl bcrwucn [ll=l1lj8C}(CIS and a clos‘: lhcnd nFBa5s1a:m’5,
Khnlui e.l~K;:ycd, a cammc.-cial mrlinc pilot ané ucrhfizd lligln insnuclnr living m
San Dicgu. Al-Kaycd adlnizicd 10 the Ffil than in May2000_ :1 Milnilla: and al-
Hazmi contacted hin;l about lsaming l0 flyBucingj¢1nirrral':,
FBI ducumznls speculate lhal Osama Bassnan
Thu FBI‘s Novcnabcr IS, 2002 l'v£Sp0:‘l$t cunlennls than 11:3» Was
an uarly investigative lhcory bascd on asaclrcporflng which 1'1: YB] has nm bccn able lo
cotfuborate. However, mcrc is also additional informauon possibly mug B:1ssnanu-
— In 1992, whllc he wu living in Wasinngmn, DC, Bassnm hsleri his employment as
the Saudi Arabian Education Mission FBl dncumcnls slate Ll1al
Brzssnan also has cther tles Lo thu Saudi Govcmmcnf. R2.<sn:m's wit’: rm:-:i\'¢d monthly
stipend from Priuc:-.55 Ilaifn. In arccml saarclz ul'Bz<sn::n's rcsidzncc. the FEE lu;..m:d copies nf
4.»!
n
aslziexs checks totaling S’/31,000, during the period Fzbnlury '31, 199° lo May 30, ZOGZ
These checks wcrc payable IO B€L§$T§Bll'S wlfr. md were dnmn un lb: Riggs Bank nccuum of
Princc Band:l.r's Wife. The LEI has determined ilml1'\cr¢:l1asbe:n :4 sumding urdcr on Pnncuss
l'Zaifu's account since January 1999 to stzc? S2000 a rnu:lL"1 lu Sassnarrs wif: Bassnarfs \v'Ifc
was ullcgcdly rccciving thc f-Jndillg for “raring s:.r\'iC¢$," bul, ¢c<:cn‘ling to the - docurncnl,
men: is no cvidsncc thm Bassnafs wife: provided nursing SC."v":C\5S. —
—
On at lezml one uccnsinn, Eassnzm received :1 check dlrecrly {mm P|'lf‘lCC '-l1lnda:'.=
account. Accordixlg lu the FBI, on May 14, 1998, ':!assn:m Clfihid a chuck fmm Bzmdzr in lb:
l1'llHLl!‘.l ofSlS,000. l!assnan's wife also rzcnivcd at leaslon-1 c's:cl: directly Rom Bandar Shc
alsu rcccivczl one adciinonal check frnm Bmdafs wife. wllich Sh: uashkd on January S, l998, for
$10,000.
4:1
‘~" -"-- ' -o/~~--~~
Li the October 9, Z002 hearing FBI limcutive Assistant Director D‘A:nuro commented
on this funcing: converted by NewsFollowUp.com Stephen Francis
I bzztieve that we do have money going from Banda."s wife, 52,000 1 rnontli up to about
$64,000. What the money was for is what we don‘! know."
*=-*=i~’==<1=
- Sh: mm motto)’ to P-
lot of different groups and people from around the world. We've beoniible to uncover e.
numbcr ofthcsm. .bi.it maybe if we can discover that slit: gives to 20 dificrent mdical
groups, well, ‘gee, maybe there’: 1 ptittem here.
The PI:-ll has also developed additional information clcurly indicating that Bassnan is an
cztmmst and supporter of Usama Bin Ladm. Ln I993, the FBI becanic aware that Bassnan liad
hostcd a party for the Blind Shaykli at his house in Wasl-tington, DC in October I992. Bnssnen
has mails many latidatory remtirlts to FBI assets about Bin Lailin, referring to Bin Ladin as the
official Khalifate and the ruler uftlic Islamic wntld. According to ilfl FBI asset, Bussnan spoke
ut'Din Ladin “as tfhe were a god." Bnssncin also stated to an FR1:isscf that he heard that tie
U.S. Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. Iii: cunsidcri.-.1 such
measures to be insuificient as than: are already enough Muslinis in the United States to destroy
the United States and inal-te it an Islamic state within tim to fifteen years According to "FBI
documens, BJSS!‘li‘.l‘\ also knew Bin Ladirfs family in Saudi !\ri\‘oia and spcaks on his m0bi!e:
ieleplione with mcrnbcrs ofthe t'-amily who are living, in the United States. V
Pliime Numbers Linking Abu Zubaida Lu a Company in the United States and it Snui.li
Diplomat in \‘Vnsliingtoiz
On Marcli Ztl, Z002 U.S. and coalition forces retrieved the telephone book ofAbu
'/.i:bmda, whom the U5. Govcrnrncnt has ideiitified as a senior at-Qa'ida opcratiunal
coordinator According to an FBI ttciciirnzni, “e review ofroll records has lirik-ad several oflhc
numbers found in Ztibai:la’s phonebonk with US. phone numbers “ One ofthc numbers is
unlisted and siibscriberl to by the ASPCOL Corporation in Aspen, Colorado On I-uly I5, 2002,
s
~' ==-*\~io“*='-=/*“' “P-*
* W ow“ in M"
FBI I-lcadquancts sent rt lead to the Denver Field Office rcquestirig that it investigate this
connectiuri. On Septetriber I9, 2002 agents of the Denver Field Office rcspundcil, >1at:ng [hill
they had completed their initial investigation.
Atrcmding to the FB1's Denver Uflice, ASPCOL is the unitirclin corporation that
manages the affairs ofthc Colorado residence of Prince Banctar, the Sandi (LIED?-55ZClO!' to lh:
United States. The facility is protected by Scimitar Security. Agents of the Denver Field Office
noted that neither ASPCOI. nor Scimitar Security is listed in the phone buck or is =.'.tsiEy
locatable. in :Jdilinn_ the Coiorndn Secretary ofStntc’: office hair: no record ct'/XSPCCL The
Denver office ditl riot attempt to make any local mquirics about ASPCOL, es they believed that
any inquiries regrircling ASPCOL would he quickly luiowu by Pnriee llm-id:ir’s employees. Due
to the sensitivity oi this matter, they ttecidctl to hold their investigation of ASPCOL in abcyancc
until they received ndilitioitzil guidance from FBI Headqurztcra.
According ts the FBI, tlie phone number ofan iritli\'idi:al n;imcd— M‘
i\-lcl.e:in_ Virginia was inuzizi within the cffects nl' Ahu Z‘.lb;llti21_ _ is repnrtcdly :i
hodygziml at ili: Saudi Ernhasy in Wiishingtuii, DC. Tlit: it-BI now Sl1bP‘~3€Y.S mnt he may be at
_. In 1 September I7, 2002 ilocument, the FBI note: that the Bureau is
opening an ixivcstigation on- due to the size and value ofms residence and his suspicious
zictivity in appmnclijng U.S. liittzlligence COl'TLD111I1lZy personnel. It also 2pp<i1'S tim-
l\ilS been m contact with ‘ which is located at-
—. -in I\1CL5an, vlfginil. The FBI HHS tii=nii.=i=<i this Et'i.’i.l'C§S == the flddttfifi of
l'nnt;c Bender. .-\ccording to the FBZ,- is OITIICH-tily a drive: (ur the Saudi E:n'na:.sy.
_iuinbcr wu also linked to ASPCOL, Prince Bmidar’s iuribrclla company lncziteti in
Colorado.
It should he noted that the FBl’s Novernber 13, 2002 response status that "CIA traces
have :i;vcalt::‘l nu dii-ecr (cmpiiliis 1dded)lini;s between niti-nbcrs found in Zubaida‘s phone book
and numbers in the United Status,"
I1
W‘ “~~-~*i-**-“'-"" "-°
The U.S. Government also localcd another Vtrginin number at an Usama Hm Larlin
ztfehnuse in Paktslane The number rs subscribed to by nn individual nnmed—
was interviewed by the FBI in June
1002. He could not explain why his number ended up at a safelzouse in Padcsten, but stated lhtx:
he rcgularly provides services to A couple who are personal assistants tr: Prince Bandar This
cuuplc‘s dnver is an mdivldual narncd—, wnu ts assigned to the Saudi
Embassy L1 \Vashi.uglon, DC. According to: regularly callr:d_
business and frequently travels back and furth to Pakistan.
Otlter Saudi Government Officiuls in the United States Whn May Have Been in Cuntmzt
\\ itlt the September 11 Hijackers
Among the tntiivtduztls who may have been usoczatrs oftnc zd-Elazmi and nl-MLl:dlt1r
was Shayilh al-Thuntztiry According to the-memorandttm reviewed by the Joint lrn:_t:iry
Staff, “initial indications arc that al-'l'hur.1airytn:ty have had a physuzal Or finzmctal cozznecttun Eu
al-l-lazrni and :d~Mil1dhar, but we are still looking at this pusstblllty " Al-I humairy ts an
accredited diplomat at the Saurlr Consulate in Lo: Angtlrts and is also consldcrud um-. uftlte
“lmarrts" at the Ktng Fahad Mosque in Culver Cit)‘, Callfnmla.
According to F8! documents, the King Fahad mosque was built in l995 from mnrling
from the Saudi Anbian Crown Prince Abdulaziz. The ttmsque is attended by rnernbcrs of the
Saudi Cnnsulate in Les Angclcs and ts widely known for tts anti-Wustcm \'1c\vs. FBI
documents indicate that Molrdlmr Abdullnh ti-ove al—Il:u:mi and al-Mihdlmr to the King Fzthad
Mosque. before al-Mihdhar rammed to Saudi ."~.n\bta.
Se\'cm| individuals on thr: lies‘. Coast whem the hijackers may have met may also had
connections to the Saudi Govcmrnent. .-Kfler tl-tr: tcrrnrist attacks, L’-ta FBI discuverad that. during
Suptember 1130} , an individual named Sale}: al-l§usst:yen stayed at t'.'t<: snnzc hntel 1r. Hcmdon,
Vtrglzua when: AI‘HB3.'ll was staying ut the time. !\t;2ur;]illgt0 FBl do-;urn=n:s at Ilussaycn is
apparently a “Sautii lnterinr Ministry employee/nffieirrl “ El: claimed nut tn lznnw the ltijackes.
- =->~*~=*h/H‘-~*'"' "*3"
_ _ ' ' '
‘W "*—\—-\~o'--~~~‘-
hut ngciits in the FBI‘: Washington Ficld Oificc bolicvccl he was being dr::cptive_ The il‘.!':l'\'it:\\.'
was rcrminatcd when al»Htissayuri :itli:r passed out or fctgried a scizurt: rcqtiiring mcdicaf
‘trcainienz. H: was i-alcascd G-am zlic hospital scvcral days later and tnartagcd to dcpttit the
United States dcspite litw enforcement ¢l':'n:‘_s to locate and ru-ir.tcrvi::v\' him.
Salch al~Ht:ssa_veri is the ttriclc ufS2.:ni Qn\.‘_\' al-Hussayen. Sami al-Hiissaysn is
connected to the Islamic Assctriliiy o!'Nortli.*\1r|t:rit:a (I/RNA) aittl is tho sulijzct ufati Fl3i
COll2llEl‘i£lTG!‘i§l'l'l investigation. The FBI has also discovered that Sal;-Bi :tl-Hussay-an is a major
cunuihutu: to Ln: IANA, a ti0:t-profit orgat-iization based in M1t;ltig,an Zhm is dedicated to tlt:
spraazl oflslnm worldwide. According tn the FRI, the iA\'A's mission is actually to spread
Islamic fundamctttalism and Salafist rloctrini: 1l'lI'Oll§.".0ll[ the Uiutcd Sl;:\'.:S and the world at
Iargc. Tltt: L/\NA soliciis finds from wcalLhy Saudi bcrmfacttirs. cxtrcntist Islamic Shaylzhs, mi
suspect non-govcnirnmital organizations. According to '1-‘Bl documents‘ 1,*\l\‘A has solicitctl
money from Priuc: Baririur, bit‘. the: tlncumznts arc un:l:;i' 1'. to \\'hct.lac: Bttndar atztually
contnbtitcd inuncy to this orgnmzntiuri.
F131 tlocumaits also indictits that ssvcral Sautl; Naval ofiiccrs vt':i': tn contact witri the
September ll hijackers. Pill documents state that the San Diego liiulti Office opuiicd a
oounttrrtcrtorism nivcstigatitm on an irtdivitiuai named Osama Nuoh, a Saudi Nu:/nl officer, di.tc
tu his usociafion with Natvafal-Haznti zirtd Khalid ll-Mihdlzar. Ln .=.r.‘tdttioti_ [.25 nl Harbi,
anothcr Saudi Naval officer, was in lclepitnrtic conzact with flight 77.liijacl:ers Iilizilid al-Mihdhar
and Tlawafal-liaznti on nine occasions from March ll, 2000 to March 27, 2000.
The Jacksonville FBI Field Ofiicc is conducting an investigation to dctcrminc '.vitt:th:r
Saleli i\.l:nicd Bcdatwi, a Saudi Naval officer \\"it':tiniL1tci:itoi-y"-vas in contact with any nt'tlt<:
‘zmnclnrs.
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Th: FBI has also discovcrcd some mar: ECIHM-uS cnrmcclions iJ!I\V‘;i'Z Saudi Govcmmcm
personnel and the hijackers during ihc course ofihc PENI'l'BOM investigation. Fnr exampic.
according io the FBI, an inmvidua.1na.'ncd Faliaii Abdullah Saluh Bakzilr. was close friends wifln
Szpicmbcr 1 i mjackcrs /*_i*_'ned ai-Ghnmdi rind >1-Iamra ai~Gh:mcii. Baknie previously "\~orkcil
as a piim for Kb: Saudi Royal family, flying Usam: Bin Ladin hciwccu Afghanistan and Saudi
Arabia during UBL's =.\ilc." in addition, an FBI source stated after Seplcmber 1 i thai hdsbe
Was 50% surc Xhai al-Mihdhar was a VISHOF at an aparlmezni in McLean. Virginia thin was
bccupicd in July and Angus: 200! by HaruadAlomibiufd1c Saudi i1mh1<sy.\milarj.' Division.
FBI iucums.-us Asa iioic that Scpicmbe: 11 'ni_~::i-:sr Sacrrd Aighamdi may have alsu vxsaisd ii":
address.
Cwuucciivns Between Saudi Guvcrnuizut Oificiuls in iiu: Unilu! Statu and Olhur Possihlc
Lferrorisl Operatives
The Joint inquiry also reviewed infoi-ma\ion in I-‘Bi 51:5, suggesting nibcr possihic
crmnuciions benvccn Saudi Gavcmmcnl officials and l:i'TDT3Sl uperalivcs
For C)lE\\‘l1p\&, according Iu FBI dncumcnis, then; is cvirlzncc than hijackers Marwun al-
Shchiu and Moiiaimnzd ALLA \v:n: in coniaci wiih Mohammrrd Rafiquc Quadir Har\.\nuni_ 1.1::
subjeci of an FBI counicrierro;-'.::n ixvcstigaiinn since 1999 rid n |l;lJ§5 IL'€SfJCl3lC oi'.»'\.hdulial;
Bin Ludin, who is rnfarrcd lo in FBI documerns as Usaruu Bin Lama’; half brother. Abd-.:|i.=J1
Bin Ladia, wiie is Liv: subject of several FBI invcsugaiions, is currently in :11: Uzmed Slams.
1‘~= =1@'w1§‘@ \"=1'KY<"
'3le Saudi Anbinn Embassy in \Vasmngion_ DC as an administrative afficer. Abduiiah Bin Ladin
has financed O_uudir's company and is listed by Qnndir as Lhe cmcrgency conzmzi Eur Quudirs
chiidrcn. '1'iu:y a:c in Ercqueni email and phon: cuiimci as wail
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According tn the FBI, Abdullah Bin Ladin has ii number ufconnections to l5l'l'Ul'l5l
organizations. Hr: is the President 1nd Director of the World Arab Mitsliin Youth Association
(\VAM'Y) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Scictczi in America Both organtwicus arc
local branches cifnon-gnvenimental organizations (NGOS) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
According tn the FBI, there is reason to believe that W/\M‘\’ is “closely associated with the
funding and financing ct’ intematioiiul terrorist activities and in :hc past has provided logistical
support to individuals wieniing to fight in tlit: Afghan War." Lit i998, the Cl.‘\ published a paper
characterizuig VJAMY aNGO that prc\'idr.s funding, logistical support and training with
possible connections to the Arab Atghans network, Harnas, Algcnari extremists. and Yhilippinc
militants. 1
Also ofpotciitial interest, at least in retrospect, is the 1999 incident ir.t'ri1»'i:ig, Moharrinied
al-Qudhzetcin and Harndan al-Shalawi Al~Qudhaeeii'. and al-S':i:-ilawi were ilyirig from Pitoerzix
to Washington, DC to attend a patty at the Saudi Embassy. Aficr they bnaitied tlic plane in
Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questions about the flight that the
flight attendants found suspicious. When the plane was in flight, al-Quclhueeir. asked where the
hathroorzi was; one ofthe flight attendants pointed hirn to the bask oftlie plane. Nevertheless,
2\l>Q\-ldiiflfliilll went to the front ofthe plue and attcrnptctl on rtvci nccasioiis to enter the cockpit.
The plan: made an emergency landing and the FBI investigated the incident, but decided not to
pursue at prosecution At the ttnic. al-Qutthaecin and al-Slialawi claitncrl that the Saudi Embassy
paid for their airplane tizkets.
After the i-'13] discovered that an individual in Phoenix who was the subject ufa
cmintertetrorism invstigatinn was driving al-Slial:iwi's car, the Bureau opened :1
countetterrorism irivestigation on al-Shalmvi. In Nuvcmbtir 2000, the FBI l'L‘CCl\'Cd reporting
fr-nrn— that al-Siialawi had trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had
received explosives trairitng in perform “iQicbai Towers"-ty_oe attacks. After the September ll.
2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Dffice attached even potentially greater significance to that E999
incident. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory bclmitl this. “Phoenix X-"Bl tiow
I According to ttic FBl's November 18, L002 Xt:S'p(tltSC, although xveral utficials in WAMY support -at-Qa'id:-. and
cthur tueuist groups, the iriieiligmee is insiifficiznt to show whethci the organ-.z:tinn as a wmile and its scniur
lndership support terrortsnt
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believcs both men were specifically attetnptirtg to test the secttrity procedures 01'.-‘tmerica West
Airlines in preparation for and in fttrthermcc of UBTJAI Qztedtt operttliorts."
in testimony before the Joint inqtziry, the agent who clrafted the “Phnertix EC" stated:
In a post 9/ll world, l went back and ionkm at that 115 possibly being some sort ofdry
run. It ts cturcrttly under investigation
Aficr September ll, 2001, :tl-Qutlitaecin
[:1 interviews, 2 Phoenix FBI agent stated that Phoenix
believed that al-Qutihaecin might be—. His ptufiie is Silfllilf to that of
at-Bayourni and Bassnan. He is in the Uniterl States as at sitzdcnt anti does not I-tave at visible
rt‘.t::tn3 uftncome. He is in fieqttent cstttttct with Saudi Govemnicrtt mshlishments in the United
Sutes and appears to be very it‘t\'ol\'ed in the affairs ofthe local Saudi c-:,rt~.rt-t~.tr_ity. llt: runs a
“Saudi Club" trt Phoenix, and assists Saudi stttdutts in the at-ea. The FBI has also develoy-ed
irttormation that 21-Qudhaeein was receiving money Ercrtt the Saudi Gaventmcnt but, as of
August 2002, had not obtained the teicvttnt bunk tecnrds for tevtew. The FBI’: Phoenix Field
Ofttrze has speculated that al-Qutlhnecin arid others may be
There are other indications in FBI files tltzt elements uftlte Saudi G0\'er_tt;tertt may have
prnvideri svippnn tn Inn-cvrist ner.m.trk:. For I.‘.\'I<1mplY3,lhP FBI had idmttifiorl ‘Hr Ih~|T:\n1iyzH
Mosque tn Culver City as rt site ot’cxtt:nt;st-related activity built belure ttnti after Scpteznbet ll.
Several subjects 0fSan Diego investigation prior to September ll hurl clrtse cot-mcctiorts to the
mosque. Based on interviews and review of FBI files, Sim Diego FBI agents believed at the ttmc
thttt these subjees were laundering money through this mosque first to Samali non-profit
organizations and then to other entities affittztted with Usurnz Bin Latiir.
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In approximately l998. the FBI became aware of millions ofdollms in wire transfers
from the Somali community in San Diego to A1 Barakaat Trading Company and other businesses
affiliated with Usarna Bin Ladin. At the time, the fitndiug appeared to be originating fiwn the
local Somali community in the form of donations to various Somali non-profits However, the
FBI now believes that the some of the funding actually originated £1-om Saudi Arabia and that
both the Dan Tamiyah Mosque in Lo: Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego were
involved in laundering the money‘
Anmrding Io the former FBI agent in San Diego who was involved in this investigation,
this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide nl~Qa‘ida with funding through covert
or indirect means. in his Ootohm 9, 2002 testimony the forrner agent eomrnented on the possible
money laundering:
My guess Saudi-it’: connected somehow widt the Saudis And knowing that probably
70-80 percent of the population of Sandi Arabia support Usarna Bin ladin, it might be an
indication.
There are also indications of Saudi govemmental sttppon for terrorist activity through
charitable organizations. '1‘he_Saudi<l.\usod Urnrn al-Qnra Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is
an lslamic non-govenimental organization linked to terrorist support activities. Aocording to a
May 2002 Defense lntelligmce'1'en-or-ism Surnxriary, the UQ‘s activities in support of terrorism
include: suspicions money transfers, document forgery, providing jobs to wantui terrorist
suspects, and financing travel for youths to attentljihad training. The Defense commttnicatioti
notes that since September 2001, UQ couriers have transported over $330,000 in cash, most of
which they received from Saudi Embassies in the For East ln January 2002, UQ administrator
Yassir El-Sayid Muhammed traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately $200,000 Erom the
Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early Novanber 200], the personal assistant to the UQ
administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpnr for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He
returned with lens oi‘ thousands of dollars, according to the Department o(Dcl'cnse.
CIA. Treasury, and l'B1ot'ficials have all expressed their concern about the al-Haramain
Foundation's ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity According to the FBI‘:
%&memr 435
Nu\'e:nl.ver t8, 2002 response, the al-Haramaio Islamic Foiuitlation ("l-IEF) has clear ties to the
Saudi Govcrtztrnent, and intelligence reporting suggests it is providing financial and logistical
support to al-Qa'ida. In 1993, HI}-‘ cstzthiished its U.S.~ba_sed uffiee in Aslilantl, Oregon, and that
office has since received i|')pl'OX.\Il’l?-I¢l_V $700,000 from the parent offices in Saudi Arabia. The
FBI has apending investigation ofl~[IF rind the netivities nfthe Ponlarid H.lF Office. As
discussed above. the FBI has located correspondence between ul-Bayourrti and the HE‘. From
the documents, it is clear t.hatIl]17 was intitrestc-ll in Bppfltnting the imam of the mosque in Cajort
California, that al~Bayourni managed
The Treasury Gencrttl Counsel testified about his agency‘: concern ahent the f0Ul'ldfliEDl'II
3/Ht. AU!-'H.AUSER: Second, and this is important pt)it1l, it also rises out ofR.iel:'s
zcstimuny, on al-Harm-nain. the two branch officcs that we took ti public and joint action
against, al-I-laramaio really does represent a significant issue for the PCC and for terrorist
financing and for the United Stats poiicy. It rs, of course, the largest, I think the largest
lslarnic charity in thcworli lts name is synonymous with charity in the Islamic world.
Its direct uvcrseers are members of the Royal Family; sigriificant contributors are
rnembors ofthe Royal Family. We don‘! have at great deal nfintelligenee on the
headquarters, about whether they are knowingly assisting peopie in a.1~Qa'ida and others;
but in significant branch ufiices yet lo he designated tint] under current investigation, we
have ample evidence that large cash amounts are being ccuriered to those bunch offices,
that large wire transfers of money are being sent tu those olticcs. that a great rteal of the
money is being dissipated through rnisspending. ttnaccounted for, and finally, that thus:
ofliees have significant contacts with extremists, Islamic extreznlsts.
CIA officials rccently testified zhat they are tnal-ting progress on their in\'r:sr.igatioi\s of al-
Hnrarnain:
A year ago we had a lot ofreporting suggesting branch offices were tied to ak
Qa‘ida...Over the last year we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement
information and we prepued a paper about a tttrmllt, six weeks agu which assembled all
ol'th:it...'l'l:at paper gave us the first clear indication that the ‘ti:-ad nfthe central affice is
complicit in supporting terrorism, and li also raised questions about Prince Nayef.
Finally, _, the subject of Phoenix and Portland I-‘Bl cnuntcrterrorism
investigations, also has close ties to a member of the Sautii royal family. - no longer
residts in the United States, ‘nut is still the subject of an PB] investigation. The FBI uperted an
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invcstigaliou of_ an cmplcyec cfSaudi Arabian Airlines, in 1999 after receiving
int_0nnation t1'iat Elm Ladin hautenanl Aha Zitbaitia l':acl hem
in contact with rt tclcphoue nurnbcr associated with_ in Portland. in May 2001, two
individuals were arrested in Bahrain and later admitted they \var<: on thair way to blow up U5
facilities in Saudi Arabia. Oztc ofthcrn lint! a passport that had bcxzn lS5lJt!d to on: of-
-Fne FBl's Phoenix liicld Offiu: also received source reporting in 1999 that n
was chcclcizig szcurity at thu Southwest horcict and discussing the possibility ofinfilttating
individuals into the United Stat-es.
The FBI has dcvclopcd iriiomiation tiiat_ has clnsc tics wiih ou: ofthc Saudi
princes and zccompariics him on many Ltips, inclutiirig travul to thc United Statcsi According to
the FBI,— was recently intertogntcri at the dctuntion facility at
Guantanamo Bay. Tie informed the FBI t.ha\- got the jab at Saudi Arabian Airlines L't1.\'t)ugb
his contacts. H: sud did not :aru much mcncy in this-job, but that he “had anotl-.:r
source of incorn: through a Saudi prince" named Khalid al-Elantiari Accnrding Lu _
_ performed misccllancous tasks for thc l’rinc<:, such as handling real estatc murtzrs
and assisting the Prince's grandmother. - travclsd manyplaccs with this Prince, including
Europe, and nficn to tlic Unitcd Arab Erriirat:s.— made thr: cryptic cornmcnt
that nnbody “krisw everything abuut_“ Although his nan: was on the Stair:
Dt:partrrtctit‘s \\'atchlist,_ was apparently ablu tu Cll'CllZ1!VC1lI the Customs Scivicc
and the Immigration and Nafuraiization Scrvicc because he was ttavcling with the Saudi pnncc.
The I-‘Bl only lcarncd ofthc trip aflcr the fact Agcnts in the l‘Bi's Portland Ficid Oftic:
cxpresscd their concern t.hat— and others were using their status as Saudi Arabian
.'\lIllTltlS ernpluysus as rt cover to cnabl: them to transport weapons in and nu: ofthc United
States.
Lack ul'Suudi Cooperation in Cuuntcrtcrrorisrn ltrvt:S!‘lg€!t.ious
Zri tcstinmny and intcrvicws, a nurnbcr of FBl agents and CIA officcrs complaincd ta the
Joint Inquiry about a incl: ur'Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations hofh bcforu and aticr
tht: Scptcmbcr l l attacks. For cxaniplc, at vt:te:tnr\ Now York Ffil agutit statcd that, from his
L\IL -..-...,.a.......,.. 437
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point of view, the Saudis have been useless and obsmuzticnist for years. In this agent‘; opinion,
the Saudis will only act when it is in their self-interest.
When a higtx-levcl- omm was asked lww the September l 1 attacks might have been
prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation. pointing to an example from the summe ot‘ 2001 ,
when thc U.S. Government rcqucstcd Saudi assistance, with no success In May 2001, the U.S.
Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Ahu Zubaidu
and was must likely aware ofan upcoming al-Qa'idn operahort The U5. Government pressured
t':.\c Saudi G0val-nment to locate him. The Saudi: informed the U.$. Govommunt thu: they
required additional information to do so. Th: US Government agency that had originally
learned of this i.ndividu.nI's lmowlcdge rcfuscd to provide the Saudis with additional information
because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tried to
pressure thc Saudis, but thc Saudis would not cooperate without the additional irtformntiori.
Awarding to some FBl personnel, this rypc ofresptmse is typical from the Saudis. For
example, one FBl agent described one invntigatiun afier September 1 l in which he provided the
Saudi Government with copies ofthc subjects’ Saudi passports. The Saudi Government
maintained that they had no record of the subjects.
According to the former Chief of Alec Station, the unit in the DCI's Countcrtcrrorisl
Center established in l996 to focus specifically on Usama Bin Latlin. it was clear from about
l996 that the Saudi Government would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating
to Usm-nu Bin Ladin. There is a May I996 n-.e:no firoz.-1 the DCl's Countenermrist Center-
. stating that the Saudis had stopped providing background infonnution or other asistanoe cm
Hm Ladin because Bin Laclin had “too much infonnation about ofllcial Saudi dealings with
Islamic cxtreniists in the l980s for Riyadh to deliver him into U.S. hands." In a lune 1997
memo to the DCL Alec Station remiphasizcrl the lack o{Snudi coopmttion and stated that thm:
was little pruspeet of fitturc cooperation regarding Bin Ladin Thc [dimer Chief of Ale: Station
thought that the U.S. Guvemment‘s hope of eventually obtaining Sandi cooperation was
unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the US. Government on this matter was contrary to Saudi
national interests.
~= =*-\-=-="h'=~°'-" 433
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2002:
On the issue ofal-Qa‘ida and Saudi intelligence. that goes back la our emms to interact
with the Sandi to get them to help us on investigating al-Qa'ida...for the most pan it was
a very tmublm relationship where the: Saudis were not providing us quickly or vzry
vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn't lt was just
very slow in coming
Both I-"Bl and CIA pcrsmincl cited an individual named Madani al-Tayyib as a specific
case in which the$attdis wens uncooperative. The CIA and the FBI bad been pressuring the
Saudis for years for permission to talk to al-Tayyib. According to thc former bead of ALEC
Station, ai-Tayyib managed all of Bin Lndirfs finances when Bin Lulin was in Sudan, and any
expense ow: $1,000 land to he approved by al-Tayyib. Al-Tayyib moved to London in l996 to
work with Khalid a.l-Fnwwaz, another important al~Qa‘ida figurc who has since bccn arrested ln
the summer of 1996, al-Tayyab returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continuously refused the
l-'B!'s and the ClA‘s roqursts to talk to al-Tayyib, stating, in the words of an FBI agent, that al-
Tayyfla was “just a poor min who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything."
The former chicfof Alec Station also cited the example o*.'Mohamm:d Jamal Khalifa.
Khalifa is Bin Ladin's brothrr-in-law and an important figure in al-Qa'ida. The U.S.
Government arrested Khalifa in the United States in 1994. Khalifa had been sentonced tn death
in absentin by tlu: Jordanian Government for his role in a bombing in Jordan. As a result, the
us. agreed to entxadile him to Jordan. The Inrdtmians than remtned him to Saudi mi.-at In the
opinion at’ the CIA ofliccr, the Saudis “bought oil" the Jordanians for the return of Khalifa.
According to the CIA oflicct, when Khalifa subsequently anivcd in Sandi A.-abia, he was met by
at least one important government nfficial. Khalifa nnw works fur A Riyarlhhaserl NGO and
travels and opmtes frcclyl
Th: Gfl1:mlC0un$t:l nl’ the U.S. Treasury Department testified at the July 23, 2002
hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation with the U.S.:
1.
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Tl::rc is an 2lm:1stir:(nitivc scnsc, iwwwcr, that things arc no; being vnlur\‘.ecr=::i. So l
wani to fully mfo:-m you about IL Lhm wc hav-:10 dSk and we have to sack md w: iuwc '0
>u-ivc. l will givc you on:-and-;a-lial.’cxsunplss. Tb: Fusl is, aflci sum: pciiwd. llic Saudis
have agreed 10 llic designation ofa man named lulziydin, who is notoriously inv0Ivec' in
all of this; zmd his dcsigrzation Will he public within the ncxi l0 days. They came §\:»r.v;:rd
in us Z wccks ago and said, okay, we think wc. should gs forward with (nu dz-signulmu
and a freeze nrdcr against Mr. Iulziydin. We asked, whni do you have on him? Because
they cenainly know what we have on him. because W: shared n 5.5 we: irled in convince
Lhem that lhcy oughi to join us. Thu answer back was, nothing new.
MR. BEREUTER: Do you believ: -.hal'='
MR AUFHAUSER. No, 1 think that taxes crcdulily, or lhcrz is anmhcr monvu we Lin: not
being told.
Status of Lhc l.I.S. Intelligence Communilys Investigations iuln Connections B::L\v:v.:u
Terrorism and Saudi Government Officinls
Bozh the FBI and the CIA have infonncd zhrz Comniiuccs Liza‘. ll-.¢y are ireming ihe Saudi
issue ssnuusly. According lo lhc Novnnber 18, Z002 FBl response, Lhc FBI and ClA have
established I! \vorki.ng group to look inio the Saudi issue. The FBl fumed a squad at 111'.-
Waslunglon Field Offic: no ll'\‘lC5lig?llfi mas issuu and-
‘ \lL AJL\l\J‘4 A H-...mu* 440
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Hn\vcvt'.r_ both the FBI and Eh: CIA sttll hav: only :1 hmitzd urtdcrstznding nfthe Saudi
Gcvcrttn-tcnt'n tEu> ta l::mrIst clcrncnts. In thc October 9, 2002 closed txcaring. Dirsctur Mucllcr
stated:
Ifl have one prziirrtinary not: ufcautinn, it is that at tlfiis point time are max qucstions
thin; answcrs, and 1 would caution ugaznstjuntping to cnnclustrsns bctnrc we know a lot
ZTIOTC,
A document located by the Jnint Inquiry Staffconfirms that the FBI’: \\'a.:hington Field
Officc is still in Lb: early stagcs of focusing on thcs: invcstigutionsr In an .-\ugu.~:t I5, Z002,
cammunicalion, a field affice agent statcd that‘
E
that same document, the Washington Field Offic: ukcd
—— “@*m°\\"@¢g@d1“*\“
!:s1tmonythmt'm- understanding nfthis tssuu is limited as well
With rcgnrd to Lhn spscific qnsstxon of have we seen the Saudi tmeiligurzce servtucs
supporting turror gmups, I think the record is not clear at :11! un that,
Bod: tn: FBI and CIA recognized the possibility that tndivuiuals cunncttcd to the Saudt
Government may be providing support to tcrronsu.
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So thcrc is ccr'.a£n!y :1 good, good chance that thcrc an: s)'n1pa:Eu7.c:s ur cXtTt::r:tSt5,
syznpathizcrs possibly for al-Qzflida witrun the sccunty services.
— also notcd that
Ab‘: Zubayduh said ha‘; confident that aI~Qa'ida mus: have contact ucrtainly wtth Saudis
m I-he United States and that -.t1-Qa‘ida and Usama Hin Lariin arc pamcutarly» they
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invest significant energy in cttl’.t'.'zting what .-Kbu Zubaydah called gout! relationships
with Saudis of m‘l strmding.. .He said bin Lztdin ts very pleased when Saudis in the
rnilttary, those sttrcessful in bwinegs and thus: close to the toyzl family to tend active
support to his cause. He said bit: Ladm actively seeks out such tslatioztships
Other CLA and FBI officiats calmed these remarks in tmcnt Cungrcsstonal testintutty.
I _ m*=¢
What we find troubling about the cases that we learned about (mm FBI. hath the Lns
Angela: cases ac:tl sum: ofthe cases '.'n:tt the Washingtun Field Office has lucked at, in
which you're seeing Saudi money going to people, is that it fits scrt ofa pattern that
we've seen in tmns ufdirect payments tirottt the Saudis, tht: Saudi Gnvernrnenfs
lottgsianding support fur very ftutdamtmttslist Wahabi ant! Salafi charities arid movements
around the world, which in asensc you see the money is t_:utng tn fundtmtuutalists and
you would be very surprised ifsomt: of it rlr|t:sn’t bleed aver intc terrunst
supp<=rt...We‘ve had a tut ofsuspiciom hcfute Septzmhur 11 wtuch we ducurnt.-ttted in n
number ofdiffercn: papers, and again it's at let ufsmoke and the issues that com: up 2::
who kztaws about the pttymmts, on whose behalfztre the pttymettts htztng made, are they
being mad: on behalf of tht: central gnvcttuncnt at are 11lt:)'l7E:i\'tt;1 ntrtdc by a local official
or a person. Du the people who art: making tltc payments knt;v- \'-'l1:t’s happening to tho
rnunuy? If they do know what’: happening, why are they making the p2)‘tnt-t‘tL§? Is ll u
form of blackmail? Do they recognize the terrorist support’? There's the issue ofarc they
regulating tltemscivcs as well as arc they doing the due diligence that they ought tn.
FBI Executive Assistant Director 1‘asqt.tale D‘Amuru testified :21 1:74“ sum-: hearing:
To date It1a.n'l sit here and tell you that those tics go buck, that wt: ctut prov: that the
Saudi toyal fitntily is sponsoring terrorism. But L'nt:rt:’s cnouglt smoke that wt: an:
conducting s=:ver:tl investigations to try to determine what other ittfurmrttion is nut tltctc.
What :s clear is that the FBI did not treat the Saudis as a countcrtcrrunsm.
_ tttrcat pnor to September ll, 2001.
i — ,-
1"-"-‘P-~--=1h/=1~~*'“' “*1
Michael Rolince, the former head of the International Tetrotism 0p::-ttions Section at
I-Bl teszitied:
the answer to l there were not any significant praliminary
inquiry or Iull [cw exccptions, conducted by the Fl3l
m not going to stud
‘H1: former Assistant Spsnial Agent in Charge in San Diego conflnued this in his
testimony:
B===i°="> - T"~‘I"
' -.\'crc not a country identified by the Stat: Dsparunzzttt as at stat: spunsor oftcrmrisrn.
And the themc or lb: common modus Optfdndl t.'r.:it w: saw in Sm Dizgu was that i1't.l\cr::
wcrc— thcre, tlnzxr primary Qi'7je':ii\'e was tn monitor ciissidsnts in th:
intcrsst ofptctccting (lit: royal family. So tli-cy wcrc not vicwcd as an ittirnical threat to
national sccurtty.
In the Octobcr 9, 2002 closed ltcring, Direztor Mu:li-:r acl-:n:-w',e:lg:d that he bcczu-u¢
aware ofsomc nftbc facts rcgarding t':tc Saudi issut: only as at rcsztlt cfthc investigative work of
ill: Jvint Inquiry Staff:
l‘m saying the sequence oi events here, l thin}: lhr: staff pmbed :_nd_ as at rcsuit oftiv:
probing, some facts cam: to light hcrc and to ma, 5':tn'<ly, that had net some to light
before, and perhaps tvuuld not havc comm to light had thc staffnot probe-.1. 'l":.at's what
I'm telling you. S0 I'm rtgrccing with you that the staffprtibing hrouglit out fans that
may not hav: com: tn this Ccmrr.ittc.:f'
Senator Dcwinc: But what you're aisu saying, though. is that that prubing than brought
has to your zincntiott
Director Mueller Yes. converted by NewsFollowUp.com
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