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9/11 Inside Job / Investigation

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Sonnenfeld video, 9/11 smoking gun

Thermite-cut beams

63 Documents

 

Colorado Public Television 911: Explosive Evidence, Experts Speak Out

 

 

Principles of 9/11 named

9/11 Truth Interactive Spreadsheet, 2000 rows, sort & filter ... below

Go to Israel False Flag home page

9/11: Press for Truth.

Barak, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Bush, Olmert   

Cleaning up the 9/11 evidence

PDAS, Planning and Decision Aid System, 9/11 False Flag attack on America, Cheney, Bush 2001

WayneMadsenReport   MORE  & below 

below

9/11 and Zion: What Was Israel’s Role?

Marshall family murderers

9-11

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cheney / plame /libby youtube
 

Planning and Decision Aid System, Cheney, PDAS, false flag attack September 11, 2001     

PROGRESSIVE Reference CONSERVATIVE 1%*
  • 9/11 Citizens Watch  challenging the official story of 9/11
  • 9/11 Independent Commission.org
  • 911caper  9-11 Conspiracy Theorist Hits the Road… Infamous 9-11 conspiracy theorist David Ray Griffin, whose books insist the Bush Administration and not al Qaeda blew up the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, is launching a speaking tour this week to help merge the “9-11 Truth Movement” with “more traditional Peace and Anti-War groups” against the “illegal and immoral war” in Afghanistan.
  • below      
  • Antiwar "Edmonds
  • Reopen911.org petition, books, dvds, news, events
  • 911Review  Expose the deception
  • 911Truth Colorado Public Television to Premiere World Trade Center Documentary 9/11: Explosive Evidence – Experts Speak Out ... Thank you! Richard Gage, AIA, for the Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth team, Fran Shure for the Colorado 9/11 Visibility team.
  • 911 Working Group   The documents confirm assertion by Webster Tarpley in his book 9/11 Synthetic Terror that the White House received a threat that "Angel is Next." (The Air Force One code-name is redacted in the document). See link below: Declassified 9/11 U.S. Secret Service FOIA Records Describing Activity of President Bush & VP Cheney    pdf
  • AboveTopSecret  9/11, which was just a modified version of "Operation Northwoods".
  • AE911Truth  Sept 7, 2012  Architects & Engineers for 911 Truth  (1700+ architects and engineers and 14000+ supporters)   ...   Groundbreaking 9/11 Anniversary Events in New York, California and Maryland, September 8-12   ...  9/11: Explosive Evidence – Experts Speak Out, which has just been uploaded to YouTube!  see NFU Flight 77 Pentagon missile attack.
  • American Free Press The Truth about 9/11, Israel...
  • Bollyn  Olmert, How Ehud Barak pulled off 911, Dov Zakheim, book: Solving 9-11: The Deception that Changed the World,
  • BusinessInsider  Aug 24, 2012  Former FBI Agent Says The CIA Failed To Act Before 9/11 Terrorist Attack  ...   Soufan was working for the FBI in Yemen at the time of the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. He was looking for two of the hijackers in the Middle East but they were already in America, something Soufan claims the CIA knew and failed to report.  
  • CongressCheck
  • Cosiga named CIA and Mossad as masterminds of 911
  • Extrados Israel false flag pdas, planning and decision aid system, Cheney led 911 attacks, How Ehud Barak Pulled Off 9-11
  • Disinfo Jesse Ventura investigates 9/11 Conspiracy Theories
  • Extrados  Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak (L) talks with Minister of Pensioner Affairs Rafi Eitan as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (
  • Global Research  The Pentagon's "Second 911" "Another 9/11] attack could create both a justification and an opportunity to retaliate against some known targets"  by Michel Chossudovsky
  • How911wasdone
  • InformationUnderground, Israel, 911
  • Info-wars  state sponsored terrorism, tearerism
  • Jews Against Zionism is a group for Jews and others opposed to the Zionist movement and ideology, and to its impact on both Palestinians and Jews. This is not a religious group, not a racist hate group, and not a conspiracy-theory group. JAZ is a political group, committed to coexistence between Palestinians and Israeli Jews.
  • Jones, Dr. Steven E. Jones, WTC dust contained super-thermite nano-composite high explosive, thermate, aluminum oxide, iron oxide, large amounts of molten iron found, blue smoke,
  • Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israeli Lobby,  Iraq war initiated by Zionist neo-con Jews,
  • OpEdNews The super-classified network that served as command and control for the 9/11 false flag attack on America
  • Pastore, Dr. Albert D. Pastore, An Independent Ivestigation of the True Culprits Behind 911. 
  • Pilots for 9/11 Truth  Sept 10, 2012  ACARS CONFIRMED - 9/11 AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE LONG AFTER CRASH   Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is a device used to send messages to and from an aircraft.   ...  ACARS Messages have been provided through the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) which demonstrate that the aircraft received messages through ground stations located in Harrisburg, PA, and then later routed through a ground station in Pittsburgh, 20 minutes after the aircraft allegedly impacted the South Tower in New York.  more 
  • PrsonPlanet  Further details on command and control system used to coordinate 9/11 incident
  • Rediscover911  ISRAEL---NOT MUSLIMS---DID 9/11 ! 9/11 WAS A MURDEROUS ISRAELI FALSE FLAG OPERATION, WITH JEWISH AND GENTILE AMERICAN HELPERS (SAYANIM).
  • Republic Broadcast Network, Israel did 9/11  The computerized national-security systems that should have automatically scrambled jets in the event of a national emergency like 9/11 were running on Ptech software.
  • Scholars for 9/11 Truth
  • Smoke and Mirrors Blog .. As long as certain twisted souls feel the need to lie, cheat and murder to achieve their ends some of us need to keep pointing it out...
  • South East Asia News, Israel, Mossad False Flag 9/11  and YouTube five dancing Israelis
  •  Notes: Mousaoui trial directly related ... 9/11 surveillance tapes at Pentagon not made public because of this trial  See Flight77.info for details on FOIA request for those tapes.    black boxes and WMR
  • Ventura, Jesse Ventura
  • War Crimes Complaint, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, evidence beyond a shadow of doubt, false flag bombing by US.
  • WayneMadsenReport  Ergenekon investigation in Turkey now involves U.S. embassy in Ankara and U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul. Ergenekon "deep state" conspiracy linked to United States.
  • WhatReallyHappened dancing Israelis arrested On 9-11, Mossad surveillance team,  New York Times  (see WikiProtest)
  • NOTEs HT248182, Security officer, NECPOC, COREDOC, IED, Central Intelligence Directives, COMSEC, STO, IJSTO JIEDDO STO, Top Secret, access to SCI, review classified documents, STONE, JISTO, emerging technologies, OSD, Joint Staff,
  • Thorn, Victor Thorn, 911 Evil
  • video 911 Missing Links
  • Village Voice
  • Able Danger, Kurt Weldon  Atta, Abramoff, Florida
  • Notes:  We believe that the conflict in Palestine cannot be resolved without a return of Palestinian refugees and dismantlement of the Zionist structure of the state of Israel - and that this is impossible in the context of two states and a re-partition of Palestine. We advocate the only approach which can lead to peace with justice in the region: we call for a unitary, secular and democratic Palestine, the return of Palestinian refugees, and full and equal rights for Palestinians, Israeli Jews, and all other people living in the whole of Palestine.  Jews Against Zionism

 

  •  Page Summary, Cheney, false flag attack, to start Iraq War
  • WMR, The super-classified network that served as command and control for the 9/11 false flag attack on America publication,
  • InformationUnderground, Israel did 911
  • Bollyn  Olmert, Barak pulled off 911, Dov Zakheim,
  • Judge Reggie Walton Watch
  • Global Research Landmark Russian TV Debate on 9/11
  • Veterans Today Alan Sabrosky
  • Wikipedia Operation Cyclone was the code name for the United States Central Intelligence Agency program to arm, train, and finance the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan.  search terms: 1979-1989, Pakistan, Carter, Brzezinski, draw Soviets in Vietnam-like war, Reagan, Chalie Wilson's war, Pillsbury, stinger missiles, ISI, MI6, SAS, F-16 sold to Pakistan, Hekmatyar, Bhutto, Zia, Peter Bergen, Bearden, Michael Portillo,  MORE
  • Flight 77, Pentagon, Norman Mineta, testify

  • 911video.de Appell an den Generalstaatsanwalt Eric Holder; ein unabhängiges Gremium einzusetzen um unmittelbar mit einer Untersuchung der schwerwiegendsten Verbrechen zu beginnen, die von Ex-Präsidenten George W.Bush und Ex-Vizepräsidenten Richard B. Cheney sowie anderen Amtsträgern ihrer Regierung begangen wurden. Sowohl G.W. Bush als auch R.B. Cheney haben zugegeben die Anwendung von Folter autorisiert zu haben

  • Berkowitz Google books  The new face of war: how war will be fought in the 21st century By Bruce D. Berkowitz

  • Chile, False Flag, Pakistani, Mohammed Saif-ur-Rehman Khan, arrested, setup, framed, by neo-Pinochet government of  President Sebastian Pinera,  Judge Carolina Araya,

  • Cosiga, highest ranking statesman to accuse Mossad of false flag.

  • Google Groups 

  • False Flag:  Buenos Aires, 1992, bombings of Israeli Embassy blamed on Iran and Hezbollah, suicide truck driver, Argentine Supreme Court proved they could not have done it.  and 1994, false flag bombing of AMIA Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, killed 85, again blamed on Iran and Hezbollah, but evidence proved otherwise, ATF said no evidence.

  • Guardian comment: While the leader of the Turkish 'Deep State', war criminal, General Yasar Buyukanit, was out of the country visiting London (20th-24th Jan), 33 members of a shadowy, extreme right wing ultra nationalist group, named Ergenekon were rounded up and detained (22nd Jan). They are now awaiting charges of political murder, assassination, provocations and dirty 'Deep State' activities.

  • Katyn Massacre, cover-up, 22,000 Polish nationals mass murdered by Soviet NKVD, 1943, Western and Soviet let world believe it was Hitler, but in 1990 Soviet Union officially acknowledged the perpetration Wikipedia

  • New Jersey News  Erichufschmid.net   Five men detained as suspected conspirators, terms: Bergen County,  Route 3, Rutherford, Liberty State Park, Sheraton, Hackensack River Bridge, Israelis, FBI Newark Field Office, look for white Chevrolet van, men celebrating WTC attack, bomb squad,  Urban Moving Systems, West 50th Street, Manhattan, Dominik Suter,  Carroll, Roberson, confirmed all.

  • Goldstone Report, Barak war crimes,
  • notes: Mohamed Atta, Al Shehhi and Jarrah  flight 11, 175 and 93 , passports obtained through murders, Mossad.  Egypt Air flight 990, dress rehearsal for 911, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, planner, stooge,
  • Palestine Telegraph  Palestine Telegraph revealed the truth behind David Cameron,  Israel jointly developed South Africa’s nuclear weapons:
  • PrisonPlanet Cheney Coordinated 9-11 WTC Terrorism Attack by WAYNE MADSEN How Ehud Barak Pulled Off 9-11 by CHRISTOPHER BOLLYN 9-11 Pentagon Attack Shows Official Monstrous Lie by PR LOG Decoding History:Was 9/11 A Directed Energy Op? by NICO HAUPT 9-11 Conspiracy: Evidence Twin Towers Exploded by YOU TUBE 9-11 Conspiracy:'Coincidences' or Synchronicities? by MICHAEL GOODSPEED (THUNDERBOLTS.INFO) War on Terrorism is a total false flag propaganda machine,

  • Physics911.net

  • SCP Partners with over $800 million under management that is focused on investments in Information and Communications Technology (ICT), Life Sciences, Services, and Defense and Security. With over 200 years of combined investment and operating experience, SCP supports its investment portfolio with a rich base of strategic, operating and financial expertise and an extensive network to access capital, recruit management, and facilitate favorable strategic alliances.
  • Super-thermite, chips discovered 911 New York site, by Dr. Steven E. Jones,  World Trade Center
  • Ariel Sharon canceled his address to ISRAELI support groups in NEW YORK CITY just the day before his scheduled 9-11 address. The 120 Israeli art student spy ring active in the UNITED STATES before 911 had a group living on the same street just 3 blocks form Mohammed Atta
  • False flag notes, keywords, Ottoman Turks conquest of Constantinople, in Jewish quarter, Zionist trickery to get America to join WW!, Balfour Declaration, Jewish homeland in Palestine, Bernays propaganda campaign, dual loyalty, Rothschild and clever trick to start market panic on Napoleon Waterloo win, Jewish bombers dressed in Arab clothes entered the King David Hotel, killed 91, blamed it on the Arabs, Pollard is a hero in Israel, Rosenbergs, Lavon Affair exposed, Israel blamed Egypt for attack on USS Liberty,  FBI could have stopped 1993 WTC bombings, 
  • ShiaChat  comment: AIPAC/pro-Zionist lobby groups are powerful and dictate U.S. Foreign Policy.   The Federal Reserve is a conglomerate group of private banks.   The CIA formed Al Qaeda and funded it against the Soviets. Most of the U.S media is owned by just 5 corporations.  Rupert Murdoch is a Zionist Jew who owns FOX News!
  • Want to Know.info Top Politicians, Economists, Other Leaders State 9/11 Possibly an Inside JobJob list of Former Chief Economist under President Bush, Morgan Reynolds; Assistant Secretary of Treasury under Pres. Reagan, Paul Roberts; Head of Advanced Space Programs, Dept. of Defense, Dr. Robert Bowman; UK Minister of Environment (1997 - 2003), Michael Meacher; U.S. Senator Mark Dayton; U.S. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney; Renowned Theologian Prof. David Ray Griffin; Assistant Secretary of Housing For Pres. Bush, Catherine Austin Fitts; 9/11 statement signed by 100 prominent Americans, 40 9/11 family members
  • Wikio Download Loose Change 9/11: An American Coup (2009) Dylan Avery Full Length movie in DVD, Hi-Def, DivX, iPod, PDA quality!

  • World Architecture News  
  • Dick Cheney
  • 9-11 Justice new & views
  • 911Commission.gov  "9/11 Commission Report which states: "The CVRs and FDRs from American 11 and United 175 were not found."
  • 9/11 Denial National Review, similar to holocaust deniers.
  • Advanced Metallurgical Group, Metallurg Holdings, Wayne, Pennsylvania, Safeguard International, super-thermite used to demolish WTC, atomized aluminum, nano-composites,
  • Amdocs, run by senior officers of Mossad,
  • APFN: 911 - Terror in America
  • American CONSERVATIVE 1% Mag   lawsuits Ergenekon Affair. The word refers to a valley lost deep in the Altai Mountains, supposedly the origin of the Turkish nation, who were miraculously led out by a gray she-wolf. The story was for many years a favorite of secular nationalists seeking to replace Islam with a patriotic founding myth, axis of evil is propaganda,  Obama is perpetuating the Al-queda myth, Al-quida,
  • Baker Botts, Saudi Arabia, 9/11 lawsuits, 
  • BBC, Barak was in London studio spinning 911 attacks, first to call "War on Terror"
  • BBS News  Where TRUE CONSERVATIVE 1% "family values" do not include hidden bigotry or blatant social and environmental ignorance.... Assassination: A Game For All. 
  • Begin, Menachem Begin, Irgun leader, PM of Likud, talked peace planned terror, 1982 invasion of Lebanon,  Moshe Dayan, FM, Mossad chief Isser Harel, started planning 9/11. Wikipedia.
  • Clinton, Hillary, criminal mafia-like boss.
  • DallasBlog, underpants bomber, underware bomber,  Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Christmas Day,  Dennis Blair fired,
  • Department of Defense False Flag operations goto
  • Eastman, Dick Eastman,
  • Eitan, Rafi, leads Gil, former Minister of Pensioner Affairs, see also Eichmann capture by Mossad, vetoed capture of Mengele, Begin advisor, Aman, Shabak, resigned because of Pollard affair, head of Chemicals company, ag projects in Cuba, parents Zionist immigrant from Russia,  moved up Haganah to Palmach, fled Nazis, blew up British radar on Mt. Carmel,  Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister, had post in Shinbet, helped plan attack on Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor, head of Lekem, Thatcher used Eitan in Northern Ireland, GBM Grupo BM, Reesimex, sculptor, Brown Company, Wikipedia
  • Electronic Data Systems, Barak was special advisor in 2001
  • FBO Daily  Contracting Center of Excellence, Army Contracting Agency (ACA), ATTN: Policy and Compliance, 5200 Army Pentagon, Room 1D245, Washington, DC 20310-5200
  • Feinberg, Kenneth Feinberg, wife, Diane Shaff Feinberg, Israelis, 9-11 Victims Compensation fund, no accountability, oversight, stop justice, discovery,
  • Department of Defense,
  • GO TO Bark Olmert Cheney 911 false flag page
  • Guardium, see Goff, military intelligence services,  connect to Ptech,  spin-off of Log-On Software,  Gil Migdan, Israeli marine,  and see Joseph Segev,  and Amit Yoran,  Pentagon software security,  Intrusion Detection Technologies,
  • Global Security  Fiscal Year (FY) 2006/2007 Budget Estimates Submission Procurement, Defense-Wide
  • Greenberg, Maurice,  AIG, access to WTC, demolition charges,
  • Harel, Isser Harel,
  • Haaretz  should have said "Israel helped South Africa develop ten battlefield nuclear bombs" more
  • Hellerstein, Alvin K. Hellerstein: Orthodox Jew and devoted Zionist The same law that created the 9-11 Victims Compensation Fund also stipulated that all 9-11 related lawsuits would go through the U.S. District Court of Manhattan, where Alvin K. Hellerstein, an orthodox Jew and devoted supporter of Israel has prevented any case from going to trial.
  • Huntleigh-USA, handled security at hijacker airports on 9/11,
  • ICTS, parent company of Huntleigh, Altzmon, Olmert colleague,
  • IDF, Barak Chief of Staff,
  • Israeli Intelligence and Central Command
  • Israel Chemicals Corporation
  • Kroll, aiport security, 911, hijackers,  relationship with Silverstein,  see Citizens Budget Commission,  United Jewish Appeal Federation, largest Jewish fund raiser,
  • Netanyahu,   Bibi
  • Odigo, Israeli paging service warned of 911 attacks
  • PNAC, Project for a New American Century, Clean Break, create larger military presence in Mideast,
  • PTech, Michael Goff, Arab, software, to fool  NORAD, FAA,  Amit Yoran, access to code, remote control enabled, target WTC,
  • Security Growth Partners, Elad Yoran, venture capital,  see link between Kroll, brothers Elad Yoran, Amit Yoran,  Kroll reinstalled security in 1993 WTC,
  • Segalovitz, explosives, super-thermite, planted WTC,
  • TehranTimes  PDAS The super-classified network that served as command and control for the 9/11 false flag attack on America
  • Google Joint Staff (TJS) supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in his role as principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense and National Security Council. The Chairman relies on TJS to create and promulgate guidance for
  • Mossad
  • Osama bin Laden, worked for the CIA right up to 9/11.
  • Press TV, Scott Ritter interview
  • SCP Partners, Mossad operated private equity firm, Barak supervised 911 false flag,
  • Sayeret Matkal,  Israeli covert mission force,   
  • ScrewLooseChange
  • Segalovitz, Peer, WTC charges, detonators,
  • Silverstein, leased WTC towers, loaded with asbestos, overinsured them, hired Israeli security firm,
  • Urban Moving Systems, Israeli Art Students, prepared explosives,  radiographic controlled, from WTC7
  • US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Mossad tricks, Palestinian / Arab acts
  • Verint,
  • Washington Post  Sept 5, 2012   (The internet community won't let Charlie Sheen abandon his 9/11 Truth stance ...see NFU/ Charlie Sheen)  and his magic is renewed ... WP Charlie Sheen’s ‘Anger Management’ picked up for 90 more episodes  ... Anger Management” is the highest rated new comedy series on cable this calendar year, averaging 4.5 million viewers 
  • Wikipedia, Olmert, 911 mastermind
  • Wikipedia, Dov Zakheim, 911 mastermind
  • Wikpedia, Barak, 911 mastermind
  • Wikipedia, Lawrence Silverman,  911 Mastermind
  • Wikipedia Rafi Eitan,
  • Wikipedia, Michael Chertoff  911 Mastermind, Israelis arrested near the Holland Tunnel,
  • Zionist criminals,
  • World911Truth  Video List Tenth Book By David Ray Griffin, 9/11 Explosive Evidence, Experts Speak Out, 875,000+ Views for New 9/11 Mini-Documentary on Building 7,  Building 7 Collapse: NIST Reality Check, Support the Troops, Support a New 9/11 Investigation, 75% of New Yorkers Never Saw Footage of WTC Building 7,  9/11: New 15-Minute Documentary You Have To See,  New Poll: 48% of New Yorkers Support a New 9/11 Investigation into Building 7′s Collapse,  “I Knew From Day One This Was a Controlled Event” Controlled Demolition Expert Says, Face to Face with Niels Harrit,  Lawsuit Shows 9-11 Hijacker Was On Boston-Bound Flight Before Attacks, UN Human Rights Official Claims 9-11 Was US Plot,  90 Percent of Germans Do Not Believe Official 9-11 Story,  Congress Passes Aid Package for 9-11 Responders,  9-11 Pentagon Episode: Conspiracy Theory With Jesse Ventura, Iraq’s Secret War Files (WikiLeaks Special), Study shows 92% of Afghans Never Heard of 9-11,  INTERVIEW – UN expert urges full U.S. torture investigation, U.S. Asked to Begin Criminal Investigation Following Bush Publication, “BuildingWhat?” Appears on Geraldo At Large on FOX News,  Rachel Maddow Slams George W. Bush Over 9-11 and Iraq,  Noam Chomsky: No Evidence that Al-Qaeda Carried Out the 9/11 Attacks, Colorado Democratic Party Calls for Grand Jury Investigation of 9-11,  EXPLOSIVE INTERVIEW: Explosives found in World Trade Center Dust,  Interview with Jeff Farrer, Nanothermite Paper Scientist,  CIA hired Karzai brother before 9-11, Woodward says, Military Officer and Former CIA: 9-11 Commission Was a Cover-up,  Witnesses in Defense Dept. Report Suggest Cover-Up of 9-11 Findings,  House Approves Zadroga 9-11 Health Bill,  Americans seek probe into 9-11,  World Trade Center Employee Discusses pre 9-11 Power Downs, AE911Truth Shines 3rd Beam into NYC Skyline for Building 7,  Dennis Kucinich Calls for 9-11 Truth and Reconciliation,  Nine Years After 9-11, 900 First Responders Are Dead,  NEW — U.S. Military Officers for 9/11 Truth, 9/11: 9th Anniversary,  NEW – Actors and Artists for 9/11 Truth, New Book by David Ray Griffin: Cognitive Infiltration,  The Zapruder Film of 9/11 – Daniel Sunjata,  Biden to visit Ground Zero for 9/11 anniversary; Obama to mark attacks at Pentagon,  Documentary Film: September 11 Revisited – Were Explosives Used to Bring Down the Buildings?, Documentary Film: Dust to Dust – The Health Effects of 9/11, Glenn Beck: “I didn’t think I could hate victims faster than the 9-11 victims”,  US Attempts To Extradite 9/11 FEMA Videographer From Argentina, Sandra Bullock and Tom Hanks to star in 9/11 drama,  Grayson slams mosque ‘distraction’: Talk about admin that ‘let’ 9/11 happen instead, Coast to Coast AM 9/11 debate with Richard Gage and Dave Thomas, U.S. Government lied about molten steel found at Ground Zero after 9/11, Obama comes out in favor of 9/11 health bill: Pres. to sign Zadroga bill into law, “Building What?”: La Campagne la plus importante jamais lancée pour la Vérité sur le 11 Septembre,  DEADLINE: 9/11 First Responders Urged To Register For Compensations, Firefighters Run Cross-Country to Commemorate 9/11,  WeAreChange presents: Our Lives Post 9/11 Conference in NYC,  Obama Backs Mosque Near Ground Zero,  It Fell in Silence: The Collapse of World Trade Center 7,  9/11 museum going up in NYC offers raw experience,  “Building What?”: Most Important 9/11 Truth Campaign Ever,  Historic 9/11 Truth Billboard in California - Examine the Evidence, Ex-Malaysian premier says 9/11 inside job - Mahathir Mohamad - 9/11 staged event, Building 7 : Mainstream Media Implodes on 9/11 - NASA engineering executive,  Wake Up the District Attorney With 1,000 Letters: WEEK 4 - Manhattan district attorney, Outfoxed - No End in Sight - Iraq,  Former Utah Congressman Merrill Cook Supports 9/11 Investigation into Building 7 and the FAA - Merril Cook, Former New Hampshire Governor Supports New 9/11 Investigation - Walter R. Peterson, Jr.,  Former CIA Officials Admit To Faking Bin Laden Video, AE911truth petition,  AE911Truth Structural Engineer Dismantles the NIST Analysis of WTC Building 7, Kagan Helped Shield Saudis From 9/11 Lawsuits,  Richard Gage and David Ray Griffin in Montreal: Huge Success!, Toronto Star Letters to the Editor re: Griffin and Gage, Bombshell: Silverstein Wanted To Demolish Building 7 On 9/11,  Montreal 9/11 Conference: David Ray Griffin on McGill University Radio CKUT 90.3 FM, Montreal 9/11 Conference Major Media Breakthrough: Our Response to Journal Métro, Richard Gage and Erik Lawyer to Speak in San Rafael and San Leandro,  Izzy Award Winner Jeremy Scahill: “We’re At a Ground Zero Moment to Save Real Journalism”,  Fabled Enemies - Jason Bermas,  US Town Passes Resolution for New 9/11 Investigation - Richmond New Hampshire, Coleen Rowley: ABC News Reporter Does a Hatchet Job, Twelve New England Towns Demand New 9/11 investigation,  WeAreChange Colorado Interviews KBDI Channel 12′s President/CEO Wick Roland, “Al Qaeda Dead Since 2002″ Says Ex-Head of the French DGSE,  The ‘Jersey Girls’ Support AE911Truth, World911Truth Web Activists,  Congressman Jason Chaffetz Questions 9/11,  Aerospace Engineers Call for a New 9/11 Investigation, Response to Michael Shermer,  WeAreChange delivers Nano-Thermite paper to U.S. Congress representatives,  The 90-Minute Stand Down on 9/11: Why Was the Secret Service’s Early Request for Fighter Jets Ignored?,  German Federal Judge Dieter Deiseroth: Numerous 9/11 Theories Screaming For Investigation,  Engineer Derek Johnson Fires Torpedos at the 9-11 Official Story,  Jesse Ventura’s Conspiracy Theory Show Exposes ‘Found’ Black Boxes, Interview with Former NASA Engineering Executive Dwain Deets,  3rd 9/11 Truth International Conference in Tokyo, Huge Success,  The New American Century (PNAC),  The Fifth Estate: The Unofficial Story of 9/11,  9/11: Pentagon American 77 Hijack Impossible,  Richard Gage on New Zealand National Television,  Confidential 9/11 Pager Messages Disclosed,  Richard Gage Interviews Architect Jan Utzon,  9/11 Debate with Kassovitz and Bigard,   French Journalists Interview Cynthia McKinney and Niels Harrit,  France 2 backs away from real debate, censors Niels Harrit and Éric Laurent,  Top 10 Connections Between NIST and Nanothermite,  Historic 9/11 Debate with Bigard, Laurent, Kassovitz and Harrit on French TV,  NYC CAN: The Turning Point,  WeAreChangeLA questions 2001 Nobel Prize Winner in Physics Carl Wieman,  Dwain Deets,  The Hard Evidence Down Under Tour 2009 – Uncovering the Truth of the 9/11 Attacks, Sibel Edmonds - State Secrets Privilege,  Media Pundits Back Away From 9/11 Debate With Charlie Sheen, Not In Our Son’s Name - Bob Mcllvaine, Loose Change 9/11 An American Coup,  Vers la Vérité, International 9/11 Activists Gathering in Paris,  William Rodriguez: The Last Man Out,  David Ray Griffin on Noam Chomsky,  Losing the Moral High Ground,  AE911Truth Meets Congressman Kevin McCarthy,  Interview with Cindy Sheehan,  9/11 Film Festival – 5th Edition,  South Tower Smoking Guns: A New AE911Truth Video by David Chandler,  Ed Markey,  Laughing at 9/11 with Jean-Marie Bigard,  Major General Albert Stubblebine: Towers Fell Down Because of Explosives,  9/11 FEMA Videographer at Ground Zero Goes Public,  29 Structural & Civil Engineers Cite Evidence for Controlled Demolition in Collapses of WTC Towers on 9/11, 
  • WMR July 14-15, 2011 -- Murdoch intelligence-gathering network extended to U.S. Congress   ...   U.S. Congressional sources have confirmed to WMR that the U.S. Capitol Police and other congressional officials shared sensitive information on members of Congress with Rupert Murdoch's media outlets in Washington, including Fox News, in a manner similar to the situation in the United Kingdom where reporters for Murdoch's now-defunct News of the World bribed British law enforcement officials for sensitive information on public officials and private citizens.     ....   Representative Peter King (R-NY) has already leveled charges that News of the World reporters tried to bribe U.S. law enforcement officials for phone records and transcripts of wiretaps of victims of the 9/11 attack. King did not elaborate on why law enforcement would have found it necessary, in the first place, to wiretap the conversations of 9/11 victims and their surviving next-of-kin.    ...   On March 28, 2007, WMR first reported the relationship between the newly-appointed U.S. Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Terrance Gainer, who was formerly the chief of the U.S. Capitol Police, and Fox News in three highly-publicized incidents involving only Democratic members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. The three incidents involved Fox News receiving information directly from Gainer on incidents involving then-Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), then-Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI), and an aide to Senator Jim Webb (D-VA).    ...   After a highly-publicized scuffle involving McKinney and an aggressive U.S. Capitol Police officer, one in which McKinney was physically assaulted by the officer, Fox News was the first to report the incident. The media hype resulting from the incident resulted in a criminal referral to the US Attorney for the District of Columbia. Shortly after Gainer resigned as chief and his being appointed by Senate Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid, Representative Kennedy was involved in a minor automobile accident on Capitol Hill. Again, Fox News was the first to receive the information about the incident and Gainer stated publicly that Kennedy should have been given a sobriety test by the Capitol cops.    ...   The third incident involved Phillip Thompson, the executive assistant to Virginia Democratic Senator Jim Webb, who was arrested by the Capitol Police at the Russell Senate Office Building for carrying a loaded pistol allegedly given to him by Webb. The Capitol Police enforced a DC law in force at the time that prohibited anyone other than law enforcement officers from carrying weapons in the District. Webb said he has a license to carry a concealed weapon in Virginia and Thompson, an ex-Marine, inadvertently carried the weapon into the building after dropping Webb off at the airport. WMR's March 2007 report stated: "Details of the Thompson] incident were leaked by the cops to Fox News and other neo-con outlets." WMR also reported that the leaks by US Capitol Police and Sergeant-at-Arms staff also occurred in the cases of McKinney and Kennedy.    ...    Gainer is a long-time Republican who unsuccessfully challenged incumbent Richard M. Daley, Jr. as the Republican candidate for Cook County (Illinois) State's Attorney in 1988. Gainer got his start in law enforcement as a rookie Chicago cop in 1968 where he helped put down riots at the Democratic National Convention, a melee that saw Chicago cops clubbing anti-Vietnam War protesters.    ...   As U.S. Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, Gainer is responsible for the installation and maintenance of the Senate's telecommunications networks and computer and other equipment, including those that handle Senators' e-mail, phone calls, faxes, Blackberry tweets, and photocopies of documents.    ...   Some members of Congress have indicated the investigation of Murdoch's News Corporation's information-gathering practices warrant a full-scale investigation in the United States. Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) told CNN, "My bet is we'll find some criminal stuff . . . This is going to be a huge issue." Rockefeller said he may launch his own investigation. Perhaps he might want to start with the Senate's Sergeant-at-Arms and ask Harry Reid why he chose to appoint Gainer, a Republican, to the post after evidence surfaced that tied Gainer to leaks of law enforcement information to Fox News.    ...    In Britain, law enforcement officials, including royal guards, reportedly asked the News of the World for money in exchange for personal information about the Royal family, including Queen Elizabeth II, Prince Philip, Prince Charles, Duchess of Cornwall Camilla, Duchess of Cambridge Catherine, and others. While he was Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister, Gordon Brown was also subjected to private communication surveillance by private detectives who had a close relationship with law enforcement agencies, including Scotland Yard.
  • TheAtlantic Ron Paul is not having the best holiday season. First the media discovered racist, anti-Semitic newsletters that went out under Paul's name in the 1970s, '80s and '90s. Then The New York Times did a story about the support Paul draws from white supremacists and anti-Semites.   ...   Now there's former Paul staffer Eric Dondero purporting to describe the ins and outs of Paul's positions on everything from Israel (it shouldn't exist) to Hitler (we shouldn't have fought him) to 9/11 (U.S. authorities may have known about the attacks) to Afghanistan (we shouldn't have invaded). He calls Paul's foreign policy "sheer lunacy." ...   MORE FROM NATIONAL JOURNAL Gingrich's Consulting Empire Represents Everything CONSERVATIVE 1%s Hate Pink Slips and Drug Tests: Where Congress Left Off Grading No Child Left Behind Or, as the CONSERVATIVE 1% Weekly Standard summarized in its headline: "Ex-Aide Says Ron Paul Is a 9/11 Truther & Isolationist Who Thinks U.S. Shouldn't Have Fought Hitler." ...   In his 2,100-word piece, posted at RightwingNews.com, Dondero says he held several campaign and Capitol Hill posts with Paul over a 15-year period from 1987 to 2003. At his own website, LibertarianRepublican.net, he said he was revealing much of the information for the first time. "Much of what I have to say will not please the liberal media hacks. Though, the Ron Paul diehards will find much objectionable, as well," Dondero wrote.    ...    Paul campaign manager Jesse Benton, in a statement circulated to the media, called Dondero "a disgruntled former staffer who was fired for performance issues. He has zero credibility and should not be taken seriously."    ...   Still, Dondero's bill of particulars was getting wide pickup on Twitter and on CONSERVATIVE 1% sites such as the Weekly Standard, National Review and HotAir.    ...   Dondero goes out of his way to say that Paul is not anti-Semitic or a racist. He said Paul has hired many black and Hispanic employees and "I never heard a racist word expressed towards Blacks or Jews come out of his mouth. Not once." In fact, Paul's current campaign spokesman, Gary Howard, is black.    ...    Still, any way you cut it, the picture Dondero paints isn't pretty. Among his contentions: --Paul is anti-Israel. "His view is that Israel is more trouble than it is worth, specifically to the America taxpayer. He sides with the Palestinians, and supports their calls for the abolishment of the Jewish state, and the return of Israel, all of it, to the Arabs."    ...   --"He is not all bigoted towards homosexuals. He supports their rights to do whatever they please in their private lives. He is however, personally uncomfortable around homosexuals" and refused to use a bathroom in a gay supporter's home.    ...   --"Ron Paul was opposed to the War in Afghanistan, and to any military reaction to the attacks of 9/11." He planned to vote against the invasion despite threats of staff resignations and a constituent uproar, Dondero says; he changed his mind at the last minute.   ...    "If Ron Paul should be slammed for anything, it's not some silly remarks he's made in the past in his Newsletters. It's over his simply outrageously horrendous views on foreign policy, Israel, and national security for the United States. His near No vote on Afghanistan. That is the big scandal," he concludes.    ...    Paul has said he did not know what was in the newsletters. The Times looks at the newsletter issue more broadly, and gets Paul to comment on his less savory supporters. He told the newspaper that he rejects their extremist views but not their backing. 
  • WayneMadsenReport April 26-28, 2010 -- The super-classified network that served as command and control for the 9/11 false flag attack on America publication date: Apr 25, 2010 April 26-28, 2010 -- The super-classified network that served as command and control for the 9/11 false flag attack on America    ....     Multiple U.S. intelligence sources have reported to WMR that a super-classified network with only some 70 terminals in select U.S. government locations handled the parallel command-and-control activities that permitted the 9/11 terrorist attacks to be successful.     ....     The "above top secret" network bears the acronym "PDAS." WMR has not yet discovered what the acronym stands for, however, its is limited to only a few hundred people with Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Special Access Program (SAP) need-to-know access, in addition to the President and Vice President.     ...   On September 11, 2001, PDAS was used to convey the information from the Air Force Chief of Staff to the White House, CIA, and other select agencies that the Air Force had successfully intercepted and downed a target over Pennsylvania. It is believed that the "target" in question was United flight 93, although there is no confirmation that the aircraft was in fact the one downed by Air Force interceptors.    ...    The Air Force Chief of Staff on 9/11 was General John Jumper, who had become the top Air Force commander on September 6, 2001, just five days before the 9/11 attacks.    ...    There is also reason to believe that the PDAS terminal at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) at the White House was used to coordinate the activities related to the aerial attack on the Pentagon. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta claimed Vice President Dick Cheney was present at the PEOC at 9:25 am on the morning of 9/11, before the alleged impact of American Airlines flight 77 on the building.    ...   Mineta testified before the 9/11 Commission that Cheney was aware of special orders concerning a plane heading toward Washington. Mineta said: "During the time that the airplane was coming into the Pentagon, there was a young man who would come in and say to the Vice President…the plane is 50 miles out…the plane is 30 miles out….and when it got down to the plane is 10 miles out, the young man also said to the vice president 'do the orders still stand?' And the Vice President turned and whipped his neck around and said “Of course the orders still stand, have you heard anything to the contrary?"    ...    PDAS terminals are reportedly located at the White House, on board Air Force One, the Pentagon, CIA headquarters, the National Security Agency, the Boeing E-4 Advanced Airborne Command Post that was seen flying over Washington, DC on 9/11 after the attacks, the Defense Intelligence Agency at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC, and the Raven Rock Mountain Complex in Pennsylvania where Cheney hid out after the 9/11 attacks.    ...   Mineta later followed up with reporters and stated "When I overheard something about 'the orders still stand' and so, what I thought of was that they had already made the decision to shoot something down."     ...    It now appears that PDAS was used by Cheney to implement on the morning of 9/11 a new policy issued on June 1, 2001 that provided for a "stand down" protocol that replaced a long-standing shootdown order for hijacked and suspected hijacked planes. The new order transferred the authority to shoot down aircraft from Pentagon and NORAD military commanders to the President, Vice President, or Secretary of Defense.  MORE  keywords: super-classifed, terminals, SCI, Sensitive Compartmented Information, Special Access Program, need-to-know, downed flight 93, Gen. John Jumper, Sept 6,  PEOC, Norman Mineta,, 9:25, 9/11 Commission, 50 miles out, "do the orders still stand", Boeing E-4 Advanced Airborne Command Post, DIA, NORAD, COCOMM, STO, US Central Command, SecDef, IJSTO, assassination, Milosevic, Habyarimana, Ntaryamira, General Wesley Clark, SIPRnet, JWICS, NIPRnet, Canada, Australia, UK, JSSG, SIGINT, IVY Bells, covert technical operations, Balkans, Rwanda, September 11, 2001
  • Extrados  Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak (L) talks with Minister of Pensioner Affairs Rafi Eitan as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (C) waits to start the weekly cabinet meeting May 25, 2008 in Jerusalem. Eitan is wanted by the FBI for his role as the spymaster of Jonathan Pollard. Olmert was in New York City on 9-11. These three men know very well who was behind the terrorism of 9-11.     ...   IT IS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT CERTAIN that 9-11 was a Mossad operation - period. - Dr. Alan Sabrosky, former director of Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College   ....   Ehud Barak, Israel's defense minister, is currently in the United States for a week of meetings and speeches. He is, in my opinion, the key suspect of being the mastermind of the false-flag terror attacks of 9-11. To help understand how Barak pulled off 9-11 I am providing this brief article to explain how I think he did it. It should be noted that Barak was Israel's minister of defense during Israel's assault on the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009. Based on the findings of the U.N. Factfinding Report written by Justice Richard Goldstone, Barak is responsible for a host of war crimes committed during that assault. The United States and other states are obliged to arrest Ehud Barak based on the findings of that report.    ...   Ehud Barak was prime minister of Israel from July 1999 until March 7, 2001, when he was replaced by Ariel Sharon. I attended an event at the Chicago campus of the University of Illinois where both Barak, then prime minister, and Sharon were involved, shortly before the election that brought Sharon to power. The fact that Barak and Sharon had travelled to Chicago together illustrated the utter fakeness of their rivalry.      ...    Previous positions held by Barak include Head of Defense Planning and Budgeting, Head of the Israeli Intelligence Community, Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Minister of the Interior in Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin's cabinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Shimon Peres cabinet, and Labor Party Chairman. If Israel is involved in 9-11, as Dr. Alan Sabrosky says and which the evidence strongly indicates, Barak certainly knows all about it.     ...   When Sharon assumed power in March 2001, Barak came to America. He supposedly came to the United States to work as a special advisor for Electronic Data Systems and as a partner with SCP Partners, a private equity company focused on "security-related" work - but this was only his cover. His real assignment was to oversee the terror attacks of 9-11. As a partner with SCP Partners Barak was well placed to supervise the false-flag terror operation. The complex false-flag terror attacks of 9-11 required that the mastermind of the operation be in the country to oversee the critical details.     ...   One of the key aspects of 9-11 was the production and application of an advanced form of super-thermite, an extremely powerful explosive produced using nano-technology. In 2001, SCP Partners happened to have a suitable company in their portfolio, a private company called Metallurg Holdings, Inc., which has its office in Wayne, Pennsylvania. Today, SCP has another company called Advanced Metallurgical Group, N.V. (AMG) in its portfolio. AMG and Metallurg share the same address at 435 Devon Park Drive in Wayne. AMG has several subsidiaries, one that specializes in the production of atomized aluminum (a crucial component of super-thermite) and others which manufacture specialized coatings of nano-composites. SCP Partners, which included Ehud Barak from 2001 until 2007, clearly owns companies that are well suited to making nano-composite explosives like the super-thermite used to pulverize the World Trade Center on 9-11.    ...    Chips of super-thermite found in the dust of the World Trade Center by Dr. Steven E. Jones     ...    Rafi Eitan, the octogenarian Mossadnik who ran a spy operation against the United States using Jonathan Pollard, fled to Israel after Pollard was caught in 1985. Eitan was then offered the position as head of state-owned Israel Chemicals Corporation, which has production facilities in the United States. In 1978, when Israeli intelligence began planning the false-flag terror operation of 9-11 (according to the comments of senior Mossadnik Isser Harel), Eitan served as Menachem Begin's advisor on terrorism. This is the real reason that Rafi Eitan remained in the Israeli security cabinet until 2009 - he is one of the architects of 9-11.     ...    Raphael Hantman a.k.a. Rafi Eitan     ...    At SCP Partners Barak worked closely with another Mossadnik named Eitan - Yaron I. Eitan. Although Yaron Eitan looks very much like Rafi Eitan, the relationship between the two Eitans is not known. Rafi Eitan was actually born Raphael Hantman and reportedly has three children named Yael, Sharon, and Yuval.     ...    Yaron I. Eitan
  • Fox News An investigation by the Fox News Specials Unit revealed that the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks was likely never told by the FBI about an arrest warrant filed and then dropped against American-born radical Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki – the spiritual guide to at least two of the hijackers. Now, lawmakers on Capitol Hill want details on the handling of the Awlaki case – particularly why information on the possible arrest was never provided to the 9/11 Commission. The New Mexico-born cleric, now working as a recruiter for Al Qaeda in Yemen, is believed to have been a mentor for 9/11 hijackers during his time as an imam at mosques around San Diego and Washington, D.C. Despite his possible role in the attacks and inconsistencies in his passport, a warrant for al-Awlaki’s arrest was dropped on Oct. 10, the same day he returned to the U.S. after a seven-month stay in Yemen. Two senior investigators with the 9/11 Commission told Fox News that they were actively considering whether Awlaki was part of a pre- 9/11 support cell in the U.S. for the hijackers. Asked if documents on the decision by federal authorities to drop the charges should have been shared, one of the investigators said yes, adding the decision to pull the warrant on the same day Awlaki returned in October 2002 demanded further investigation. There is no mention of the Awlaki arrest warrant in the 9/11 Commission report itself. There is a lengthy footnote about the cleric which has one reference to an FBI internal memo that was circulated Oct. 8, 2002 – just two days before the cleric’s return. Fox News sought those documents through a Freedom of Information Act request in 2010. Twenty-seven pages were produced for Fox News’ investigative team, but nearly all the text was redacted – citing an executive order – that the material should remain secret for national security reasons.        ....        On Tuesday, FBI Director Robert Mueller was on Capitol Hill, where he faced tough questions over the documents from Rep. Frank Wolf, R- Va. “I wrote you concerning the Fox News report about the bureau's October 2002 decision to release Anwar Awlaki from custody upon his return to the U.S. despite an outstanding warrant for his arrest at that time, “ Wolf said, adding that commission investigators had also voiced their concern to Fox News. “Could you discuss why the information was not shared with the 9/11 Commission and provide the committee with a detailed accounting in the appropriate setting?” Mueller said he remembered looking at the warrant, which originated out of Denver, Colo., in the summer of 2002 a “couple of years ago,” adding “there was not much more -- not much more and certainly at this time to be done.” The FBI director did not elaborate. “If this was not provided to the 9/11 Commission, it was certainly not by intent,” Mueller said. “It may well have been not in a file, one of the files that we provided to that 9/11 Commission. But I think you will find the 9/11 Commission was appreciative of all the work that we had done to provide them, you know, just about everything that we had in our files.” Mueller said he would get back to the congressman who first wrote to the FBI in the summer of 2010 about Awlaki’s mysterious return to the U.S. after the Fox News Special: The American Terrorist was broadcast. “I would be happy to look into the matter. I can tell you that we tried to provide everything that we had that would be responsive to the interests of the 9/11 Commission at the time.” The Justice Department has maintained that Awlaki’s re-entry to the U.S. was a string of coincidences. The Department told Fox News in a statement last May that there was not enough evidence to keep the warrant against Awlaki active. Two current and former investigators familiar with the case have disputed that claim. New details about the cleric’s American life and his connections to the 9/11 hijackers will be part of an upcoming Fox News special.  and more

    Sonnenfeld video

  • Sonnenfeld video
     

    • Thermite charges set up in the shape of a plane,
    • An Aluminum wing cannot shear off steel beams, period.
    • Thermite shears beams exactly like this.
    • more at War On You
  • Wikipedia   Sayeret Matkal (Hebrew: סיירת מטכ"ל‎, translation: General Staff Reconnaissance Unit) is an elite special forces unit of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Its main roles are counter-terrorism, deep reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, but the unit is first and foremost a field intelligence-gathering unit, used to obtain strategic intelligence behind enemy lines. Sayeret Matkal is also in charge of hostage rescue missions outside Israeli borders. The unit is modeled on the British SAS, 1] and organizationally reports to the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Its IDF nickname is simply "The Unit". Borrowed from the SAS, the unit's motto is "Who Dares Wins."    ...   The unit is best known for Operation Thunderbolt, commonly known as Operation Entebbe, in which it rescued more than 100 Air France airline passengers hijacked and flown to Uganda by PLO militants, 2] and killed 52 enemy combatants while losing only the assault element commander, Yonatan Netanyahu, and three hostages. 3]     ...   Contents hide] 1 History 2 Recruitment and training 3 Notable (former) Sayeret Matkal figures 4 Known operations 5 The 2003 dissidents 6 See also 7 References    ...    History Sayeret Matkal was founded in 1957 by Avraham Arnan (né Herling), a former yeshiva student and Palmach fighter, who served as its first commander. Originally it was part of the Aman Unit 157, but began to operate independently a year later as the General Staff's elite special operations force, 4] modeled after the British Special Air Service. Members of the unit were trained by Bedouin trackers on the finer points of looking and thinking like an Arab. 5] Sayeret Matkal was also formed one year after the IDF's first helicopter squadron became operational and close co-operation between the two allowed Sayeret Matkal to deploy for longer and deeper inside Arab territory than any unit before.      ....     In 1959, a draftee named Ehud Barak was accepted into Sayeret Matkal. He later succeeded the Unit 101 commando Lt. Meir Har-Zion in becoming Israel's most decorated soldier. Whilst with Sayeret Matkal, Ehud Barak participated in many operations, including leading the Operation Isotope (airplane hostage rescue) in 1972 and leading the 1973 Israeli raid on Lebanon. He later progressed in his military career to become the IDF Chief of Staff in 1991 and retired after the end of his tenure in 1995. In 1999 Ehud Barak became the 10th Prime Minister of Israel.     ...    
  • WMR May 2010 Another confirmation of car bombing at State Department on 9/11    ...   Over the past several years, WMR has reported on the mysterious car bombing that took place on the morning of the 9/11 attacks. That morning, a car parked on Virginia Avenue, aside the main State Department building, exploded. The car bombing was also referenced in thousands of text messages from 9/11 that were released last year.    ...   WMR has now learned from a State Department source that residents of the State Plaza Hotel, which lies across the street from the State Department and the location where the car bomb went off on 9/11, were told to remain in their rooms because, as the source put it, a "car exploded across the street."    ...   The car was immediately towed off by security officers after the explosion before forensics teams could examine the car and the surrounding area.  
  • World Architecture News  NIST did not even look for physical evidence of explosives. In fact NIST did not look at the physical evidence at all, apart from a few selected samples of the steel. The rest was destroyed. However, physical evidence did remain: the dust. NIST did not look at the dust, but independent investigators did. They discovered, along with the microspheres, tiny red-grey chips. They examined samples of WTC dust from different parts of Manhattan. All contained the red-gray chips. They found that the red layer consisted of unignited nano-thermite. Ordinary thermite is an incendiary: it can burn through heavy steel in seconds. The tiny particles in nano-thermite (1/1000 the thickness of a human hair) causes a much faster reaction so it can be used as a high explosive. The discovery of nano-thermite in the WTC dust was published in The Open Chemical Physics Journal in April 2009.
CIA Threats of Federal Prosecution Delay 9/11 Documentary,

9/11: Press for Truth.

CIA Threats of Federal Prosecution Delay 9/11 Documentary    ...   Wednesday, 14 September 2011, 12:30 pm Press Release: Kyle Hence Recent threats by the CIA prompt two freelance journalists to delay an investigative podcast naming CIA analysts complicit in obstruction of key pre-9/11 intelligence. The podcast will present revelations from former top US government personnel, including Richard Clarke, Pasquale D’Amuro, Bob Baer, and Mark Rossini, who echo concerns of former 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas Kean. ...   Austin, Texas (FF4) September 12, 2011 – On Thursday, the CIA threatened the journalists behind Who Is Rich Blee? with possible federal prosecution if their investigative podcast reveals the names of two CIA analysts at the center of a pattern of obstruction and mishandling of intelligence that many feel would have stopped the 9/11 attacks.    ...   Like FBI agent Ali Soufan and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer before them, the podcast team, including John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, are being subjected to intimidation and censorship by government officials over blowing the whistle on the true story surrounding two alleged 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar.    ...   The podcast originally scheduled for September 11th release presents a narrative of how three CIA analysts working under Richard Blee, the long unknown former head of CIA’s Bin Laden Station, deliberately misled their colleagues and withheld key intelligence from FBI and the White House regarding the presence of two known Al-Qaeda operatives in the U.S.    ...   Four government investigations into CIA handling of pre-911 intelligence included personal details of the two CIA analysts and their actions. Nowosielski and Duffy deduced the identities of the two as yet unnamed CIA employees from internet research based on details provided from these and other open sources. When the producers used their full names in interviews, interviewees offered no correction. The CIA response provided the final confirmation.    ...    In project updates posted at SecrecyKills.com the producers announced the delay of the podcast and posted background of a complicated case that involves dozens of violations of protocol, intimidation, and incidents of obstruction by the CIA, with the two yet named CIA analysts at the center of many of them.    ...   Author and expert on the subject, Kevin Fenton, documents 35 such incidents between January 2000 and September 11th in his book, Disconnecting the Dots: How 9/11 Was Allowed to Happen.    ...    Pulitzer-prize winner Lawrence Wright, interviewed for the podcast, told producers the actions of one of the unnamed CIA analysts still employed at CIA amounts to obstruction of justice in the FBI’s criminal investigation of the deaths of 17 seaman aboard the USS Cole.    ...   The producers are not the first subject to government censorship over this case. Last month The New York Times reported on CIA efforts to censor an autobiography by Ali Soufan, a front-line FBI counter-terrorism special agent. Prior to 9/11, Soufan was interested in Mihdhar and Hazmi because of links to the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. The CIA censored references to a passport photo of Mihdhar the CIA had withheld from Soufan, despite three written requests.    ...   Scott Shane of the New York Times reports today that, "Mr. Soufan accuses C.I.A. officials of deliberately withholding crucial documents and photographs of Qaeda operatives from the F.B.I. before Sept. 11, 2001, despite three written requests, and then later lying about it to the 9/11 Commission."    ...   Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, interviewed for the podcast, was himself intimidated, demoted and smeared by the Pentagon after he came forward to the 9/11 Commission with details of how, on three occasions, unnamed DoD officials prevented his Able Danger operation from meeting with the FBI prior the attacks.    ...    In 2000 the Able Danger data-mining program placed Mohammed Atta in a Brooklyn terrorist cell but had also placed Hazmi and Mihdhar in a San Diego cell, the epicenter of intrigue around Alec Station’s Rich Blee, Tom Wilshere and the two as yet unnamed subordinates who themselves repeatedly withheld intelligence from the FBI. Though Shaffer was interviewed by 9/11 Commission’s Director Philip Zelikow and staffer Dieter Snell, the Commission left any mention of Able Danger from its final report.    ...    In the planned podcast, 9/11 Commission Chair Tom Kean is asked about a scant footnote to Chapter 6 of the 9/11 Report referring to an intelligence cable, seen by 50 at the CIA, but prevented from reaching the FBI. For Kean the incident was not a case of bungling or intel ‘stovepiping’: “Oh, it wasn’t careless oversight. It was purposeful. No question about that in mind. It was purposeful.”    ...   Whereas Kean explains it as a penchant for secrecy, Richard Clarke, the former head of counter-terrorism at the Bush White House, goes farther suggesting malfeasance and the possibility of illegal CIA-led domestic spying activity. Comments by Clarke released in a video in August led to a formal statement from George Tenet, Cofer Black and Richard Blee, and a response from the producers.    ...   “This was perhaps the closest U.S. intelligence got to foiling the 9/11 plot,” explains Nowosielski, “but instead of stopping the attack, the CIA stopped intel on two high-value targets from getting to the right people, repeatedly. And still the CIA protects the individuals responsible by intimidating those who simply want to know the truth behind a shocking and possibly criminal pattern of obstruction”    ...   In an email Thursday the CIA warned Nowosielski he could be subject to prosecution under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, a law intended to apply to government employees who violate their security clearance and never used to convict journalists.    ...   The producer’s online response: “The Society of Professional Journalists' code of ethics states that ‘journalists should be free of obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know’ and should ‘be vigilant and courageous about holding those with power accountable.’ The day that journalists' exposés of wrongdoing within government agencies require the approval of those government agencies before release, that is the day that transparency and accountability are lost.”    ...   John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski, both graduates of Chicago’s Columbia College Film School, produced the critically acclaimed 2006 documentary "9/11: Press for Truth."
 Rove (dirty tricks), Siegelman (political prosecution), Abramoff (Bush emails), Clinton (crime family), US Attorneys fired, (Cheney), AIG (Greenberg Traurig)

& , Abramoff, Palfrey, Atta,  911   

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911 Investigation Research:           =go to NFU pages
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE 1%*
  • Page Summary, Sibel Edmonds
  • Global Research Landmark Russian TV Debate on 9/11
  • A Times Online (a Rupert Murdoch paper) file pic "A WHISTLEBLOWER has made a series of extraordinary claims about how corrupt government officials allowed Pakistan and other states to steal nuclear weapons secrets. ... Sibel Edmonds, a 37-year-old former Turkish language translator for the FBI, listened into hundreds of sensitive intercepted conversations while based at the agency’s Washington field office
  • Antiwar "Edmonds draws a picture of a three-sided alliance consisting of Turkish, Pakistani, and Israeli agents who coordinated efforts to milk U.S. nuclear secrets and technology, funneling the intelligence stream to the black market nuclear network set up by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. The multi-millionaire Pakistani nuclear scientist then turned around and sold his nuclear assets to North Korea, Libya, and Iran
  • WMR August 31, 2005 -- A convergence of investigations: AIPAC and ATC. As reported previously on WMR , federal investigators are poring over wiretap transcripts (Sibel Edmonds) and other intelligence that link the Larry Franklin/Rosen/Weissman AIPAC investigation to the investigation of who in the White House leaked the name of Valerie Plame Wilson and her Brewster Jennings & Associates non-official cover company to journalists, including Robert Novak. 
  • A significant portion of the US population is skeptical of the 'official' 9/11 Commission report and believe that Bush is part of an 'inside' scheme.
  • Cheney's activities on September 11, the war games, Saudi Arabia and Israel need to be to be completely investigated.
  • Flight 77 Pentagon:  Office of Naval Intelligence, entire chain of command  killed on 9/11, ONI, budgets, auditors, monitoring war games, realized were a ruse to attack New York City, exterminated.  Naval operations officers, Navy intelligence, 
  • Important members of the neo-con / Israeli cabal that executed  9/11 have either left the government or are stymied in any further actions. ex. ... the attack on Iran has somehow been stopped.
  • The main stream American press is complicit in the 9/11 cover-up.
  • Will a new 'Democratic' administration tackle a new investigation that gets to the real truth?
  • video
  • Ron Paul names neo-cons video
  • -----------------------------------------
  • Kobi Alexander,  owners / developers, Odigo software, allows Israelis to communicate instantly on 9/11.  "buddy system" communicate to a large group of people that share a trait, Hebrew language,  thousands of Israelis warned,  9/11.
  • 9-11 Justice new & views
  • 911Commission.gov  "9/11 Commission Report which states: "The CVRs and FDRs from American 11 and United 175 were not found."
  • 9/11 Denial National Review, similar to holocaust deniers.
  • APFN: 911 - Terror in America
  • Baker Botts, Saudi Arabia, 9/11 lawsuits, 
  • BBS News  Where TRUE CONSERVATIVE 1% "family values" do not include hidden bigotry or blatant social and environmental ignorance.... Assassination: A Game For All. 
  • Bush, neocons:  Cheney, Rice, Powell, Perle, Wolfowitz, Reagan, Kristol, Encounter, Weekly Standard, PNAC,  AEI, Heritage Foundation, JINSA, Ben Wattenberg and the real majority, Scoop Jackson, Podheretz, Shachtman, Leo Strauss, Trilling, Marxism resembles Straussianism, Kirkpatrick, Elliot Abrams, Negroponte, permanent revolution, use force to redraw map of middle east, imperialism, unconditional support of Israel, 
  • Cheney, plant dirty bomb, suitcase nuke in Houston, Memorial Day, 4th of July
  • China Knew of 9/11 beforehand  offers CIA translation of book
  • Firstwallst Carlyle Group, Leumi bank
  • Justice, Dept of  press releases   .
  • National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States  whitewash similar to British 
  • NewsMax, Robert Wright FBI
  • NTSB, ""No recorders were recovered from the World Trade Center,"
  • Patriot Saints 911 Conspiracy page
  • The Voice News Nonsense about spies
  • TooGood Reports Commentary
  • Believers Zionist Force If Bush blames the Democrats for the Iraq War failure they will lose the 2008 election
  • World Net Daily search, Sibel Edmonds
  • and we also research the 'CONSERVATIVE 1%' view
  • notes: Military lies: Flight 93 was shot down, search terms: NSA CRITIC, cleared users, INTELINK, archive, Flash, Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI), messages: (CRITICS), 9/11, at odds with official account, Tom Ridge, "Two F-16s scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base at likely 1336 Zulu]. Civilian airline hijacked. Over state of Pennsylvania civilian airliner was "intercepted". shot down.  Rumsfeld quote: Christmas, Baghdad: "the people who attacked the United States in New York, shot down the plane over Pennsylvania.' source WMR  more
  • Wikipedia  Paul William Roberts in his Globe and Mail article of Saturday, February 26, 2005 wrote the following: Hunter telephoned me on Feb. 19, the night before his death. He sounded scared. It wasn't always easy to understand what he said, particularly over the phone, he mumbled, yet when there was something he really wanted you to understand, you did. He'd been working on a story about the World Trade Center attacks and had stumbled across what he felt was hard evidence showing the towers had been brought down not by the airplanes that flew into them but by explosive charges set off in their foundations. Now he thought someone was out to stop him publishing it: "They're gonna make it look like suicide," he said. "I know how these bastards think
  • Hunter S. Thompson
  • Global Research Landmark Russian TV Debate on 9/11 Gen. Leonid Ivashov, Thierry Meysan, Giuletto Chiesa join Russian Experts   Washington DC , Sept. 9, 2008 – Thierry Meyssan reports from Moscow that he and other leading international 9/11 truth experts have completed taping a television debate which will be telecast on the first national program of Russian state television this coming Friday, September 12. This no-holds barred, free-wheeling debate, featuring strongly divergent opinions about what really happened on and about September 11, 2001 , will be shown in conjunction with the documentary film Zero, produced and directed by Chiesa and Franco Fracassi of Telemaco Productions in Rome . Russians are thus about to receive an unprecedented evening of 9/11 truth.   ...   The telecast will go out in the middle of prime time. Among the participants, General Leonid Ivashov was the commander of the Russian armed forces on September 11, 2001 , and has been a leading critic of the US official version. A leading strategic thinker for his country, Ivashov is currently a fellow of the Strategic Culture Foundation (fondsk.ru) in Moscow . Giulietto Chiesa is a member of the European Parliament in Brussels , representing the region around Asti in northwest Italy . Chiesa has been the leading spokesman for 9/11 truth issues in the European Parliament, and has been the prime mover behind the documentary film Zero, as well as the collection of essays by the same name which has also attracted much attention in Italy since being published in the late summer of 2007. Thierry Meyssan, the founder and leader of the Voltaire Network in Paris , was one of the first critics of the US official story about 9/11. He is the author of several books, including 9/11: The Big Lie, and Pentagate. He also organized the Axis for Peace conference in Brussels in November 2005.
  • Wikipedia Sibel Edmonds: ".... on July 22, 2002, Edmonds filed suit against the Department of Justice, the FBI, and several high-level officials, alleging that she was wrongfully terminated from the FBI in retaliation for reporting criminal activities committed by government officials and employees. On October 18, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft invoked the State Secrets Privilege in order to prevent disclosure of the nature of Edmonds' work on the grounds that it would endanger national security, and asked that the suit be dismissed. citation needed]  ...   On August 15, 2002, a separate suit, Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment & Dev. Corp., was filed by families of 600 victims of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks against Saudi banks, charity organizations, and companies. citation needed] Edmonds was to file a deposition in this case regarding her claim that FBI had foreknowledge of al-Qaeda's attacks against the World Trade Center. citation needed]   ...   On December 11, 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft, again invoking the State Secrets Privilege, filed a motion calling for Edmonds' deposition to be suppressed and for the entire case to be dismissed. The judge, seeking more information, ordered the government to produce any unclassified material relating to the case. In response, Ashcroft submitted further statements to justify the use of the State Secrets Privilege, and on May 13, 2004, took the unprecedented step of retroactively classifying as Top Secret all of the material and statements that had been provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2002 relating to Edmonds' own lawsuit, as well as the letters that had been sent by the Senators and republished by POGO. citation needed]   Wikipedia National Whistleblowers Coalition
  • Prison Planet Japanese member of Parliament Yukihisa Fujita told the Alex Jones Show yesterday that a potential new investigation of the 9/11 cover-up could be led by global parliamentarians he has been in contact with, or even by the United Nations itself. Fujita, an MP for the Japanese Democratic Party, and a member of the House of Councillors in the Diet (national legislature), presented evidence which contradicted the official 9/11 story during a widely publicized Japanese Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in January of this year.  Following Fujita's presentation in the Japanese Diet, he also took part in a 9/11 truth conference at the EU Parliament in Brussels on February 26th which was hosted by Italian MEP Giullietto Chiesa (both presentations can be viewed at the end of this article).  
  • Online Journal  search Kroll Amec WTC:  Democratic Underground Demopedia reports in Who Killed John O’Neill that at the time of 9/11, AIG, the world’s largest insurance company, and subsidiaries Marsh McLennan, ACE and Kroll, were run by the Greenberg family. With Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) member Maurice “Hank” Greenberg as the AIG godfather, the Familia’s tentacles curled around the heart of the tragedy.  Hank’s son Jeffrey, a CFR member as well, was chairman of Marsh & McLennan, situated on floors throughout the North Tower of the World Trade Center as well as the top floors of the South Tower. Marsh also had ties to the CIA. Son Evan Greenberg, a CFR member, was CEO of ACE Limited, situated in Tower 7, which also contained AIG subsidiary Kroll, closely related to the CIA, also with an office in Tower 7.  Tower 7 also contained offices of the FBI, Department of Defense, IRS (which contained prodigious amounts of corporate tax fraud corporate, including Enron’s), US Secret Service, Securities & Exchange Commission (with more stock fraud records), and Citibank’s Salomon Smith Barney, the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management and many other financial institutions. Greenberg’s cousin, Alan “Ace” Greenberg, was former CEO of Bear Sterns, where the Bush family, Cheney family George Schultz, James Baker, et al, did business. It is the leading brokerage firm of the great and all-powerful Bush Familia.
  • WMR has received documents sent to one of the presidential campaigns from Leonard D. Wallace, a former business associate of former Enron Vice Chairman J. Clifford Baxter, that provides details of Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks being financed through Citigroup / Citibank. The document states that Baxter, who was to appear before a congressional committee to testify on Enron's dubious business practices, died from a reported suicide on January 18, 2002. According to the document received from Baxter's associate, the former Vice Chairman of Enron was planning to expose Citigroup's knowledge of Saudi banks, some of which it had a financial stake, were funding the terrorists who were responsible for carrying out the 9/11 attacks.
  • WayneMadsenReport "BAE Systems part of effort to cook bogus intelligence against Saddam Hussein" search terms: mobile trailers designed to manufacture hydrogen for weather balloons, British Ministry of Defence scientist David Kelly aware of this, 'suicided', Southmoor, 2003,  Norman Baker investigation confirmed, trailers, Kuwait, other equipment moved into Iraq, BAE-Marconi, radar systems, frame-up, laundered thru Ministry of Defense contracts, Abbey Wood, Bristol, England ... phony contract to provide radar trailers to Tanzania, bribery scandal, World Bank, Tony Blair. also Saudi, Al Yamamah BAE Systems arms deal, Riggs Bank, Jonathan J. Bush, former Riggs executive, George W. Bush's uncle, defense contracts grease, campaign contributions to Duncan Hunter, Randy "Duke" Cunningham, US shipped VX nerve gas to Iraq 1988-89, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 598, Iraq / Iran war, Mukhabarat, VX aerial bombs, parachute-born, pre-set height, Bilad, shipped from US, canisters removed from Iraq by the British, Turkey, Valerie Plame, CIA Counter-Proliferation Division, stopped shipment into Iraq, reason for her outing ..." see WMR for connecting details.
  • Operation Gladio, stay-behind operation, Wikipedia terms: Italy, NATO, Christian Democrats, counter Warsaw pact,  CCWU, SHAPE, years of lead, paramilitary, ODESSA ratlines, Rheinhard Gehlen, MSI, internal subversion, Allen Dulles, CIA financing, founded by Aldo Moro, SDRA8, TD BJD, LOK, I&O, ROC, Aginter, P26, AGAG, OWSGV, P2, false flag operations, strategy of tension, carried out Operation Condor, DINA, Ezeiza massacre, Montejurra massacre, Taksim Square massacre, collapse of the Soviet Union, ... Order of the Solar Temple, 
  • July 19,  2008 Indymedia Venezuela: "Maj.Wm. B. Fox, Cpt.Eric H. May - 19.07.2008 07:34 An impressive medley of military officers join Captain Eric H. May in alerting the public to the danger of Bush administration foul play in the upcoming terror drills Noble Resolve and Diablo Bravo. Intro: An impressive medley of military officers join Captain Eric H. May in alerting the public to the danger of Bush administration foul play in the upcoming terror drills Noble Resolve and Diablo Bravo.  SUMMER ALERT!  Lt. Col. Guy S. Razer Maj. William B. Fox Dr. James H. Fetzer Capt. Eric H. May SFC Donald S. Buswell  ....     Neo-cons and their allies are pounding the drums of war against Iran. Just after his White House meeting on June 4, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced that war with Iran was a done deal: "George Bush understands the severity of the Iranian threat and the need to vanquish it, and intends to act on that matter before the end of his term in the White House."   ...  Antiwar   In his July 14 article “Amber Alert! Get Ready for War” Antiwar  Justin Raimondo states “The Israelis have already been using U.S. bases in Iraq to train for the coming attack… Bush] is more determined than ever to leave his lasting mark on the Middle East and the world.” In his July 15 article “A Phony Crisis – And A Real One” Antiwar  Pat Buchanan writes: “Israel and its Fifth Column …seek to stampede us into war with Iran.” In his article, “9/11 and the Neo-Con Agenda” Digg  Dr. James H. Fetzer explained why the Bush Administration needs another (self-inflicted) “false flag” attack to expand the failing war in the Middle East. In “False Flag Prospects, 2008” Lonestar Icon  Captain Eric H. May proved the connection between official terror drills and the U.S. 9/11/2001 and UK 7/7/2005 terror attacks. As experienced military professionals, it is our mission of conscience to publish alerts to the American people whenever the danger of a false flag attack is high. We face that danger now with several suspicious military exercises just ahead of us. On July 22 Virginia will run a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenario at the Richmond International Airport. For two weeks we have tried to gather particulars on the terror drill from the Virginia National Guard. The command has been evasive, refusing us access to personnel involved in the WMD-related activities. July 28-August 1, a wide array of U.S. military, police, and disaster agencies will be running multiple terror and catastrophe drills. The two main terror drills are “Noble Resolve” and “Diablo Bravo.” 
  • PakAlert Warning: We’re in the false-flag red zone for 911-2B  The Ft. Hood probable false-flag attack (see Jerry Mazza’s article) seems to have been timed to coincide with the decision to try (the individual claimed to be) Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 9/11 patsy-in-chief. All of this appears to have been orchestrated to evoke memories of 9/11 and reinforce the official story–a necessary preliminary to any 911-2B. In other words, they may be softening us up for something big.tags: tags: 9/11, 911-2B, Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, America, Bali, Barack Obama, bombshell, CIA, economic collapse, economic crisis, false flag, false flag attack, Fort Hood, George Bush, George W. Bush, India, inside job, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jews, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, London, Madrid, Middle East, Mossad, mumbai, NATO, Neocons, Pakistan, Pentagon, Project 2012, red zone, Taliban, terrorism, United States, USA, war on terror, WARNING, Zionist
Jeff Prager ... Facebook page

Six groups were involved in the attack on the WTC on 911


1. The group that initiated the attack most likely consisted of an international network of financial executives representing primarily the Bank of New York, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Riggs Bank, Deutschebank and the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), and should include representatives from Bank Menatep, Swiss-American Bank, Credit Suisse, Investor AB, and Allianz, and their respective subsidiaries and major investment partners. This decision was meant to stop multiple money laundering investigations which would have traced illegal money laundering operations to accounts that held stolen national treasuries. Only a very few of the individuals in this group would have participated in or been knowledgeable of the decision. With a decision being made in 1998, the attack on the WTC was probably delayed until September 11, 2001, to allow the Bush Family and Russian Mafiya to cover the settlement of the fraudulent Durham/Brady Bonds .
2. The group which probably planned and set-up the attack on the World Trade Center was most likely a mix of Russian/Israeli Mafiya, ex-KGB and Israeli secret service, with the assistance of David Kimche (Mossad agent), Meir Dagan (head of the Israeli Mossad), Adnan Khashoggi and Sheikh Kamal Adham (former head of Saudi Intelligence), Richard Armitage and Richard Secord. Kimche, Armitage and Secord are the only field intelligence operatives identified in the world press as having field management responsibility for Al Qaeda mercenaries. Khashoggi is documented to have coordinated similar types of false “terrorist” attacks in Russia, with the participation of CIA and Israeli agents working with Chechen Mafya (with its strong likages to the Yeltsin Family.)
3. The group that probably arranged for operational cover in the US, and intelligence support the operation required most likely consists of re-united participants in the Iran-Contra dealings of the 1980’s. This group has been working in concert in Central Asia, using Baku, Azerbaijan as a base of operations since the early 1990s. This group of former Iran-Contra conspirators includes:
a) Adnan Khashoggi: whose Azerbaijan banks "played a big part in the formation of terrorist camps and in the opening of laboratories for developing chemical and bacteriological weapons in Nagornyy Karabakh” was a major mover of illegal gold; major investor and founder in Barrick; was a major investor in Oryx (financial backer of Huffman Aviation- the flight school that provided training to eleven 9/11 hijackers); and business partner with General William Lyon – founder of diploma mills which are linked to the access to the US for two hijackers. Khashoggi also is linked to the funding of the “9/11 Truth Movement” in an attempt to monitor and control civilian inquiries into the events surrounding 9/11.
b) Richard Secord: a former U.S. Air Force major general who had been helping to recruit and train the Azerbaijani army as well as regional secret services in conjunction with David Kimche, and was reported to have assisted in the recruitment of Al Qaeda mercenaries and Osama Bin Laden for deployment in Azerbaijan;
c) Richard Armitage: who managed illegal gold funds for George HW Bush during Iran-Contra period; who acted as a consultant to Halliburton and Unocal at the time, and was President of the US-Azerbaijani Chamber of Commerce. Armitage had demonstrated a history of visits to Pakistan and the rest of Central Asia, and was reported to have assisted in the recruitment of Al Qaeda mercenaries and Osama Bin Laden for deployment in Azerbaijan;
d) Farhad Azima, a US arms merchant with Iranian background, a member of the US-Azerbaijani Chamber of Commerce, who assisted Richard Secord in recruiting, transporting and training mujahedin mercenaries. He was owner of the Azerbaijan Airlines, and has a twenty year old relationship with the Iran-Contra syndicate. He is significant co-investor with Wally Hilliard of Huffman Aviation in a small California electronics company (Spatialight Inc).
e) Khalid bin Mahfouz, owner, with the bin Laden family and members of the Saudi royal family of the Saudi oil companies Delta Oil and Nimir Oil. Both are partners with Unocal in Azerbaijan and partners in multiple Bush family enterprises. He is a major investor along with Khashoggi in Barrick and TrizecHahn. (TrizecHahn was the landlord to the corporate headquarters of Halliburton and Enron.)
f) Dick Cheney, as CEO of Halliburton, lobbyist for the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, on US-Azerbaijani Chamber of Commerce; participant in Congressional hearings that let Iran-Contra participants off-the-hook. Dick Cheney’s role in the attack on the WTC is most thoroughly treated in the book Crossing the Rubicon, by Michael C. Ruppert, where Cheney is demonstrated to be fully accountable for the activities of NORAD and FEMA on September 11. John Mann, in Rise of the Vulcans- The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, describes Cheney as “one of the principal defenders of the Reagan administration’s conduct in Iran Contra.”
g) David Kimche, Israeli Mossad agent who brought Israeli agents and mercenaries into Azerbaijan at the request of Secord, and worked with Secord and the regional secret service organizations of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. He was a participant in the October Surprise and Iran-Contra scandal, and consultant to Manuel Noriega.
h) Porter Goss, former CIA agent and Congressman, now Director of the CIA. He met with Mahmoud Ahmad, Director of the Pakistani Secret Service (ISI) shortly before and after 9/11. Mahmoud Ahmad was responsible for providing $100,000 in funding to Mohammed Atta. Goss has not been identified with any Azerbaijani activity, but has been identified with Iran-Contra activity.
i) George Bush Sr., who (according to several eyes witnesses) authorized the Iran-Contra and October Surprise operations (although Congressional investigators concluded he was not involved), initiated the US covert operations in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, authorized the creation of the illegal Durham/Brady Bonds which went secretly to Russia, and authorized the assignment of $10 billion in un-mined gold reserves to Barrick. He later sat on the Advisory Board of Directors for Barrick.
j) Robert Mueller, who as US Attorney headed the Iran-Contra and the BCCI investigations and trial found little fault with Bush Sr., also was responsible for the FBI investigation of 9/11.
4. Members of the US group that arranged for the September 11 cover-up most likely used the attack for multiple purposes related to financial gain and obstruction of justice, and set the timing of the attack to resolve a major financial fraud involving $240 billion in securities backed by illegal gold holdings (Durham/Brady Bonds).
5. The organization that managed the details of the US attack operation was most likely an Israeli secret service unit including Mohammed Atta (who organized the aerial attack), Rudi Dekker (responsible mostly for visas), and Khaled Odtllah (who was responsible for arranging explosives in the WTC);
a) There are seven pieces of information that suggest Mohammed Atta, identified as the leader of the 9/11 hijackers, was probably a Mossad agent:
(1) Comments by his father saying his son was with the Mossad, and alive after 9/11;
(2) A number of clues suggesting he may not have been on the flight, and possibly disappeared out a back door at the Boston airport;
(3) Atta expressed interest in a company specializing in space technology. This company was later acquired by Israel;
(4) His ability to speak Hebrew;
(5)His involvement with German, Pakistani, Saudi and Syrian intelligence and US military and intelligence organizations;
(6) The cover-up of the identity of his German host family by US investigators; and
(7) His dual personality attested to by his friends on two continents.
6. The group that actually was set up to take the blame were Muslim radicals recruited by either Yeslam Bin Laden (brother of Osama Bin Laden) or Richard Secord (CIA) and David Kimche (Mossad) at the probable request of Adnan Khashoggi and Sheikh Kamal Adham (business partners of George Bush Sr.).
a) At least seven of these hijackers used names and other personal information acquired by identity theft. Five of these seven names had affiliations with US military training institutions. Most of the passports used by the hijackers came from the US embassy in Saudi Arabia. Khaled Odtallah (from Jerusalem) was responsible for establishing false American identities for the group inside the World Trade Center. These facts suggest the attackers were organized by intelligence agencies rather than terrorists. These facts lead to the assumption the attack was a joint effort between Israeli and Saudi Intelligence, with US support.
b) Two of the hijackers had records of previous employment by the Saudi Intelligence.
c) The individual that most likely acted as intermediary between Iran-Contra syndicate and the bankers was Edgar Bronfman. Bronfman is a significant owner of Barrick and TrizecHahn, and President of the World Jewish Congress (WJC). Acting in the role of President of the WJC, Bronfman negotiated the terms and conditions of the release of the Holocaust gold from the Swiss banks in 1998. It is hypothesized that as part of his negotiations, he was asked by the bankers to facilitate a termination of multiple US federal and NY investigations into Swiss banks. His negotiations brought an immediate end to US Department of Justice and US Congressional pressure to investigate Marcos gold accounts in the Swiss banks, Swiss holdings of Holocaust gold, and Philippine actions against the Swiss for holding the Marcos gold. An investigation of the Marcos accounts (and tracing the final disposition of the gold) would have exposed a broader money and gold-laundering scheme, which would have resulted in further exposures of crimes by the Russian/Israeli Mafiya (in particular, the “Yeltsin Family”) and the Iran-Contra syndicate.
d) The plan proposed by Bronfman was probably provided to him by David Kimche, one of the initial Israeli intelligence agents that in 1980 proposed the October Surprise plan to prevent the release of US hostages by the Ayatollah Khomeini. That plan subsequently resulted in a series of Iran- Contra deals to covertly fund pro-US revolutionary activity in Iran and Nicaragua. Kimche was actively working with Richard Secord and Richard Armitage (all three were involved in Iran-Contra scandal) in Azerbaijan, with multiple Central Asian Intelligence organizations, at the time the decision to attack the WTC was made.
e) The plan proposed by Bronfman provided for the termination of investigations by various agencies of the US government into various Swiss accounts and Deutschebank transactions involved in money and gold laundering. This plan would require the destruction of the entire World Trade Center, which housed the investigative offices of the FBI, SEC, IRS, Secret Service, Department of Defense, US Customs, and bank records for the Export-Import bank, Deutsche Bank, and the investigative arm of the New York State Tax Department. Bronfman, as a major investor in Barrick, stood to benefit directly from a cessation of these investigations (and in his case, the FBI investigation into gold price fixing). The Bush family, as well as the Russian Mafiya, would benefit as well from the termination of these investigations, all linked. Later, Bush intelligence operatives would add the Pentagon to the list of targets, to destroy the Office of Naval Intelligence which was also engaged in a major investigation of money laundering most likely related to the Bank of New York/Russian Mafiya money laundering scandal.
f) The detailed plan to crash commercial airliners into the World Trade Center was actually created in 1976 by the C-Battery 2/81st Field Artillery, US Seventh Army in Europe. It would have been provided to Kimche, most likely, by Richard Armitage, who worked in the Defense Intelligence Agency from May 1975 to November 1976, and went on to covert CIA operations.
F. There was a diversified group of American, Canadian, Russian, Swiss and German business executives (bankers and traders) and government officials that allowed the attack on the World Trade Center to happen, and prevented the true story of what happened from being told, for the purposes of financial gain and protection from prosecution for complicity in illegal gold laundering activity and the fraudulent sale of gold backed securities. Under Federal law 18 U.S.C. 371 – Conspiracy Statute, they are equally guilty as if they had initiated the decision. This group includes, but is not limited to Adnan Khashoggi; Kamal Adham; George Bush Sr.; Tye Burt- former Chairman of Deutsche Bank Canada and Deutsche Bank Alex Brown Securities Canada; Otto Pohl, former President of the German central bank (Bundesbank) and chief officer of the International Bank of Settlements and IMF; Edgar Bronfman and Mayo Shattuck, who left his position as CEO of Deutschebank America on September 12, 2001 and is financial advisor to Khashoggi and Bronfman. The circumstances leading to this conclusion are:
1. There are between 6,000 and 280,000 tonnes of illegal, stolen gold stored in bullion banks throughout the world. This gold needs to be laundered. This gold has been stolen from the national treasuries of the Philippines, Soviet Union, France, and Czechoslovakia. There are numerous sources that identify George Bush Sr. and Adnan Khashoggi, with Ferdinand Marcos, as extensively involved in the theft of the Philippines treasury.
2. Commodity experts that watch the gold market have made claims that significant, inexplicable amounts of gold were showing up in the market throughout the 1990s. These increases are attributed to ‘gold futures’ sales - in the absence of any other explanation.
3. There has been no known formal investigation into the possible laundering of this gold other than possibly the FBI investigation buried in the World Trade Center. This investigation was linked to the GATA/Howe lawsuit against the bullion banks, including the Deutsche Bank.
4. A significant group of powerful individuals, with demonstrated links to the movement of illegal gold, have been directly involved in the creation of a gold producing company, which was in a court battle over the legality of some of its trades. (It resulted in a sealed agreement in January of 2006.) A significant group of these individuals have a history of connections to money laundering activity. These groups include George Bush Sr., Adnan Khashoggi, Khalid bin Mahfouz and Edgar Bronfman.
5. The success of this company in gold hedging defies expert industry expert comprehension. The company has been extremely successful mining land that industry experts thought was “doubtful” in its potential. These inexplicable conditions could be explained under a hypothesis of gold laundering.
6. Two of the individuals (Khashoggi and Mahfouz) that started, controlled and owned significant portions of this gold company are the same people that started, controlled and owned a company that staged and ‘trained’ eleven of the 9/11 hijackers, who were involved in the destruction of the World Trade Center. This ‘terrorist’ event effectively ended the FBI investigation of global gold trades this company was involved in.
G. German, Swiss, Russian and Saudi financial executives, combined with their U.S. business partners (Carlyle Group) initially requested the attack on the World Trade Center for the purposes of:
1. Stopping a series of on-going FBI and other federal agency investigations which were in the process of exposing multi-billion dollar, illegal, gold and money laundering activities and securities fraud. Tracking transactions into and out of accounts of individuals associated with these investigations would have exposed the
• illegal retention of the national bullion treasuries of the Soviet Union, the Philippines, France, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Angola and more, as well as
• the major participation of the “Bush Family” in the Bank of New York/Russian Mafiya money-laundering scandal, with its ultimate source of funding in the Bardy/Durham bond fraud of September 11, 1991;
2. Destroying potentially incriminating Deutschebank and US Export-Import bank records and investigative reports (FBI, SEC, Secret Service, IRS, US Customs, NY State Tax Auditors) associated with those gold and money laundering and securities fraud activities;
3. Enhancing their competitiveness and short term profitability in the European investment banking market; and
4. Revenge against “United States and its economy” for past economic transgressions against the German banking industry.
H. The pinpointed targets of the 9/11 hijackers were the North Tower (FBI offices on floors 23 and 24 and the Cantor Fitzgerald offices), Building 7 (various Federal investigative agencies), the Pentagon (Office of Naval Investigation), and the South Tower (Eurobrokers and the NY State Tax Investigation Department). Flight 93, delayed for 40 minutes at the gate and downed in Pennsylvania, was probably intended for Building 7. Building 6 (US Customs) was destroyed by an internal explosion. These buildings were targeted because they housed the investigative offices and evidence of multiple investigations into money and gold laundering and securities fraud.
I. There are seven conditions pertinent to the collapse of Building 7 that are not explained by any official explanation of the events at the WTC. These seven conditions are all explained with the theory of ‘targeted destruction.’ This report concludes that within minutes of it being known that Building 7 was not going to be hit by a third plane, it was ordered evacuated by an unknown individual so that incendiary explosions could be ignited without the presence of witnesses. These devices would have targeted federal and bank offices on multiple floors. The 9/11 Commission Report and FEMA have been unable to explain:
1. Source of fires throughout the building;
2. Lack of response by firefighters to those fires;
3. Order for evacuation of the Mayor’s emergency command center on Floor 23 of Building Seven, when no comparable order was given for the WTC command Center in the North Tower. This center was evacuated shortly before the collapse of Tower 1 (10:29), but after the crash of Flight 93 (10:07), when it became clear Flight 93 would not reach its target. No one claims responsibility for the evacuation order;
4. Documented seismic spike just prior to the collapse of the Building 7 in the same magnitude as those preceding the collapse of the North and South Towers;
5. The reason for the tape-recorded “pulling” comment by the building’s owner, who has since refused to explain his comment;
6. Ability to bring down Building Seven with controlled demolitions, when it takes days to place explosives for controlled takedowns;
7. Misleading references to the locations of the fires, which are generally referred to as a couple of lower floors, but occurred throughout the building as documented by photographic evidence;
J. The airline attacks on the World Trade Center were cover-up for explosives placed in the building. There are nine categories of evidence which support the statement that the North and South Towers were subjected to “targeted” demolitions:
1. Numerous eyewitness statements of explosions in and throughout the building;
2. Seismographic recording of the incidents showing massive underground explosions just prior to the collapse of Towers 1, 2 and 7;
3. Analysis of videotape of the collapse of the South Tower which shows the order in which floors are collapsing by exploding windows, demonstrating non-sequential explosions on lower floors;
4. Video tape evidence recorded on-site at the WTC by a rescuing fireman;
5. The pattern of deaths in the North Tower reinforces the theory that there were explosives set at lower levels of the North Tower, especially in the vicinity of floors 23 and 24 of the North Tower (Tower 1), which suffered inexplicable and unusually high death rates;
6. Multiple testimonies from a) small rescue team, 2) trapped workers and 3) people leaving the building which help explain events on the 23rd floor –site of a secretive FBI office which housed investigations into illegal gold-price fixing, gold trades and the Kazakhgate investigation linking Dick Cheney and George Bush Sr. to illegal bribes paid to Kazakhstan officials;
7. An FBI agent in the North Tower Operations Center received a call on his cell phone advising him the North Tower would soon collapse. The timing of this call, approximately 15 minutes before the building collapsed, suggests someone was in control of the primary demolitions in the basement;
8. Investigating government agencies have not been able to explain how fires reached required temperatures to melt steel and thus cause the towers to collapse. An official letter from Underwriter Laboratories to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, explains why the government’s official stance on how/why the buildings collapsed has no merit;
9. Unexplained and forgotten CNN video footage of the explosion inside WTC 6, which housed US Customs Agency, the agency that coordinated multiple federal agency money laundering investigations with its El Dorado task force.
K. The attack on the Pentagon was for the purpose of destroying the Office of Naval Intelligence. This Office was investigating a gold backed securities fraud which might have been perceived as a threat to national security, but would link the Bush family to multiple illegal activities.
L. The attacks of September 11 were timed to coincide with multiple war-games, which included scenarios of airline hijacking and building attacks. This coincidence creates a scenario of ‘plausible deniability’ under which FAA and NORAD officials can argue there was no air response because they were “confused” as to whether the attacks were part of the games or not.
1. These war games were being monitored by Vice President Dick Cheney at the time of the attack, rather than the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
2. The war games which were usually scheduled for October were rescheduled for early September by an unknown decision-maker.
3. The war games probably included an unreported computer simulation of a financial attack on the US economy (as performed during war games in 1997 and 2000 by Cantor Fitzgerald.) It is hypothesized that this simulation computer program was the source of the illegal trades conducted in the minutes preceding the attack, and those illegal trades were meant to cover the settlement of the 10 year Durham/Brady Bonds which came due on September 11.
M. The former heads of at least three Intelligence agencies and a private, commercial intelligence operation, all pro-US organizations - have been linked to funding of the 9/11 hijackers:
1. Mahmoud Ahmad, Head of ISI Pakistani Intelligence (Wired $100,000 to Atta shortly before the attack);
2. Mohamad Majed Said, a former head of Syrian Intelligence (provided employment for Atta in Germany); and
3. Kamal Adham, the former head of Saudi Intelligence (funded Huffman Aviation via Oryx.).
4. Mohammed Atta, while in Germany, was also an employee of, with travel funded by, Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft. This is a joint US-German scholarship program, reportedly controlled on the US side by the US Information Agency (State Department). The German side of this program is administered jointly with Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung, a commercial intelligence operation that studies global trading in weapons and drugs, money-laundering and, coincidentally, anthrax. It has board members from the Deutschebank and Allianz. Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft also has a fellowship funded by Alpha Bank, represented in the U.S. by ex-Bush administrators Lanny Griffith and Ed Rogers. The leadership of these three Muslim countries (Pakistan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) is significantly detached from their mainstream population’s conservative beliefs, and their leadership is generally aligned with US leadership on key financial objectives.
N. There are five indicators that World Trade Center security management (with the top security manager being George Tabeek) were co-conspirators in the attack:
1. The power shut-down during the weekend prior to the attack could not happen without security approval because it involved shutting off a primary building utility and security surveillance;
2. Permits to work in the building on the water system over the weekend could not happen without security approval because it involved shutting off a primary building utility and safety system. The attacking plane hit the floor where the 5000 gallon reserve water tank for the sprinkler system was staged.;
3. Bomb sniffing dogs were removed from service the day before the unexplained “power down”, during which all internal electronic surveillance (cameras, videos) were turned off. Rocky Hammad’ s activity in the T owers occurred during this power down. The person who authorized these activities has not been found. Removal of the bomb sniffing security dogs could not happen without security approval. The dogs were brought back on the day of the attack, probably after any explosives were allowed in the building;
4. A CIA front company known as Stratesec Incorporated, formerly Securacom had a maintenance agreement for ‘access control’ with the WTC. A Director on the Board for this company is Marvin Bush, brother of President George Bush. This company is linked to the aerial attack on government investigative offices in the Pirelli Building in the financial district in Milan, Italy in April of 2002.
5. The New York City Emergency Command Center, located on the 23rd floor of Building 7, was ordered to evacuate hours in advance of the building’s collapse, but within a few minutes after Flight 93 was downed in Pennsylvania. Fires started after the evacuation. In the North and South Towers, there was no order to evacuate, and employees remained until the end.
Read the entire report: http://www.gnosticliberationfront.com/September-11-Commissi…
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  • Bush's Achilles Heal our coverup of Saudi Royal Family involvement....
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  • A Q Khan, Pakistan, nuclear black market, scapegoat for Germans, French, South Africans, 70 countries supply Pakistan nuclear program.
  • notes: "While the Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations claimed that former ISI Pakistani intelligence] director-general Lt-Gen Mahmud Ahmad sought retirement after being superseded on Monday, the truth is more shocking. Top sources confirmed here on Tuesday that the general lost his job because of the "evidence" India produced to show his links to one of the suicide bombers that wrecked the World Trade Center. The U.S. authorities sought his removal after confirming the fact that $100,000 were wired to WTC hijacker Mohammed Atta from Pakistan by Omar Saeed] at the instance of General Mahmud Ahmad]." source:  Global Research  more
  • Global Research  It was almost an afterthought. On March 1, 2003, the War On Terror had finally served up the alleged paymaster of 9/11 - a shadowy Saudi by the name of Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi. Yet his arrest just happened to coincide with the capture of a much bigger fish - the reported 9/11 mastermind himself, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - thus relegating Mustafa Ahmed to the footnote section of the "official" 9/11 Legend. But there was another, more explosive side to this tale. Only seventeen months before, a former London schoolboy by the name of Omar Saeed Sheikh was first exposed as the 9/11 paymaster, acting under the authority of a Pakistani general who was in Washington D.C. on September 11, meeting with the very two lawmakers who would subsequently preside over the "official" 9/11 congressional inquiry. Omar Saeed, as reported back then by CNN, was acting under the alias of...Mustafa Ahmed. So where is Omar now? Sitting in a Pakistani prison, awaiting his execution for the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl - while another man fills the shoes of his pseudonym. What follows is a reconstruction of one of the most extensive disinformation campaigns in history, and the chronicle of a legend that may now shine a devastating spotlight on some of the cliques behind 9/11 - and the FBI Director covering the paper trails.  search terms: Robert Mueller, Osama bin Laden, al-Hazmi, Arabic prayers, London, British prosecutor arrested Raissi, Hanjour, al Quida, setup, to launch Afghanistan war, coverup failed, led to Official Bin Laden Videotape Confession, Saeed attended London School of economics, to Pakistan ISI, pseudonym, Mustafa Ahmad, mentioned in Global Terrorist Executive Order, Saeed trained the hijackers, CNN Maria Ressa, CNN unveiled Saeed, Saeed is Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad, kidnapped Daniel Pearl, CNN quiet then about Saeed 911, Saeed acting under orders of ISI, led to Washington, Ahmad meeting with Goss / Graham on 911 am. ...been there for a week, was Ahmad under US orders? 
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  • Wikipedia, Dov S. Zakheim is a former official of the United States government.  Born December 18, 1948 in Brooklyn, New York, Zakheim earned his bachelor's degree in government from Columbia University in 1970, and his doctorate in economics and politics at St. Antony's College, Oxford University. He has been an adjunct professor at the National War College, Yeshiva University, Columbia University and Trinity College, where he was presidential scholar.    ...   He served in various Department of Defense posts during the Reagan administration, including Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Planning and Resources from 1985 to 1987. As an Orthodox Jew, he gained notoriety for his involvement in ending the Israeli fighter program, the IAI Lavi. He argued that Israeli and U.S. interests would be best served by having Israel purchase F-16 fighters, rather than investing in an entirely new aircraft.    ...   During the 2000 U.S. Presidential election campaign, Zakheim served as a foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush as part of a group led by Condoleezza Rice that called itself The Vulcans.    ...    From 1987-2001, Zakheim was CEO of SPC International, a subsidiary of System Planning Corporation, a high-technology analytical firm. During that period he served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and sat on a number of major DoD panels, including its Task Force on Defense Reform (1997) and the DoD's first Board of Visitors of Overseas Regional Centers (1998-2001). In 2000 Dov Zakheim also co-authored "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century" 1]    ...    Zakheim is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the United States Naval Institute, and a member of the editorial board of the journal The National Interest. He is a three-time recipient of the Department of Defense's highest civilian award, the Distinguished Public Service Medal, as well as other awards for government and community service.    ...   He was an Adjunct Scholar of the Heritage Foundation, a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and published over 200 articles and monographs on defense issues.    ...   He was then appointed to be Undersecretary of Defense and Comptroller from 2001 to 2004 under the George W. Bush administration, and served in this capacity until April 2004. During his term as Comptroller, he was tasked to help track down the Pentagon's 2.6 trillion dollars ($2,600,000,000,000) worth of unaccounted transactions 2]. He initiated a number of processes that led to the reduction of that sum by two-thirds by the time of his departure. It has now been reduced by more than 90 per cent. 3
  • Wikipedia Ehud Olmert (Hebrew: אהוד אולמרט‎, IPA: eˈhud ˈolmeʁt] ( listen), born 30 September 1945) is an Israeli political figure, and former Prime Minister of Israel having served from 2006 to 2009. Olmert was the mayor of Jerusalem from 1993 to 2003. In 2003 he was elected to the Knesset and became a minister and Acting Prime Minister in the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. On 4 January 2006, after Sharon suffered a severe hemorrhagic stroke, Olmert began exercising the powers of the office of Prime Minister. Olmert led Kadima to a victory in the March 2006 elections (just two months after Sharon had suffered his stroke) and continued on as Acting Prime Minister. On 14 April, two weeks after the election, Sharon was declared permanently incapacitated, allowing Olmert to legally become Interim Prime Minister. Less than a month later, on 4 May, Olmert and his new, post-election government were approved by the Knesset, thus Olmert officially became Prime Minister of Israel.    ...    On August 30, 2009 an indictment against former prime minister Ehud Olmert was served at the Jerusalem District Court. The indictment includes the following counts: obtaining by fraud under aggravating circumstances, fraud, breach of trust, falsifying corporate documents and tax evasion. The indictment refers to three out of the four corruption-related cases standing against him: 'Rishontours', 'Talansky' (Also known as 'Money envelopes' affair) and the 'Investment Center' 2].

     

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  • WMR “Former CIA Osama Bin Laden unit chief Michael Scheuer told Italy’s La Repubblica that the kidnaping of Abu Omar was authorized by SISMI chief Nicolo Pollari. A number of SISMI agents and assets have been tied to the group, including Francesco Pazienza, a SISMI agent, and Rocco Martino, who said he was the source of the faked Niger yellowcake uranium documents that were laundered through Rome and used as proof by the Bush White House that Saddam Hussein was shopping for uranium in Niger. That charge prompted the CIA to send Ambasssador Joseph Wilson to Niger resulting in a retaliatory exposure by the White House of the CIA’s covert weapons of mass destruction counter-proliferation network.” (Madsen)
 
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  • MUJCA, Muslim-Jewish-Christian Alliance for 9/11 Truth
  • BeforeItsNews  American journalist and radio host Mark Dankof Almost two weeks have passed since the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, and scholars, journalists and authors are still trying to figure out the hidden realities behind the “most hideous terrorist attacks ever perpetrated in American soil,” as described by Victor Argothy of the University of Delware’s Disaster Research Center.    ...   Israel’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks and the possibility that it might have been a false flag operation with the objective of laying the groundwork to attack Afghanistan, Iraq and other Muslim nations are among the most popular theories which the members of 9/11 Truth Movement have proposed.    ...   Mark Dankof believes that they were the Israelis who masterminded and perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, and believes that there’s abundant evidence confirming this speculation.    ... On the 11th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks, I conducted an in-depth interview with Mark Dankof to examine his viewpoints regarding the events that led to the collapsing of the twin towers of the World Trade Center, the traces of the footsteps of Israel in the attacks and the reasons why the United States and Israel employed these attacks to launch an all-out war against the Muslim world. What follows is the text of this interview.    search terms: Sabrosky is correct, Mossad did 9/11, they had motive, means, opportunity, network, Mark Glen, Ugly Truth, culture wars, Sungenis, Bollyn, Solving 9/11, nineteen muslims still alive, bin Laden .. have never been officially accused, no hard evidence, Cheney said " we never made the case",  Fact: The BBC reported on September 23, 2001 that most of the “nineteen Muslims” are still alive. Rex Tomb, Chief of Investigative Publicity for the FBI noted that the reason bin Laden and the Taliban have never been officially accused by the United States for orchestrating 9/11 is “because the FBI has no hard evidence connecting bin Laden to 9/11.” Dick Cheney stated in an interview with Tony Snow on March 26, 2006 that “We’ve never made the case, or argued the case that somehow Osama bin Laden was directly involved in 9/11. That evidence has never been forthcoming.” Robert Muller of the FBI admitted the same when he stated that, “In our investigation, we have not uncovered a single piece of paper either here in the U. S. or in the treasure trove of information that has turned up in Afghanistan and elsewhere that mentioned any aspect of the September 11th plot.”   Chertoff, Odigo, Jews,  Fact: Steel melts only at 2,777 degrees Fahrenheit. Jet fuel burns no hotter than 1,517 degrees Fahrenheit. There was nothing in the World Trade Center buildings, barring explosives and thermite that could burn hotter than jet fuel. Strong circumstantial evidence suggests that a sophisticated form of super-thermite had been applied to large sections of the World Trade Center.
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Fetzer was Foxed
Fox News Spin Attack Ends With Red-Faced Anchors 9/11 truth scholar Fetzer anticipated slant of Hannity and Colmes spot

Paul Joseph Watson/Prison Planet.com | July 11 2006

Fox News' tactic of mapping out a spin and attack policy for guests whose stance they disagree with was spotlighted and deflated recently by 9/11 truth scholar Jim Fetzer - who left Alan Colmes and Oliver North red-faced after he exposed them and Fox producers for not having done their homework.

Fetzer called the appearance, "perhaps the most interesting four and a half minutes of my life."  Fetzer described how in a pre-interview a Fox producer has insistently asked him if he taught alternative theories behind 9/11 as a college course. Fetzer was keen to stress that he taught a course on critical thinking but not a course specific to 9/11.  From this exchange Fetzer began to understand the spin that Fox were preparing to put on the interview.

Fetzer was then told that Sean Hannity had been replaced by Colonel Oliver North for the show.  "Because I'm a former Marine Corps officer I thought this was probably a good thing - that the Colonel and I would have a very cordial Marine to Marine conversation," said Fetzer.  "When I said this to my wife she said 'don't kid yourself, they're going to be out to kill you'."

Fetzer was picked up by a Fox limo and only arrived at the studio after the program had started. He insisted that a TV be turned on in the make-up room to gage how they were going to pitch his interview.  "Five minutes before I go on I catch their drift which is they're going to talk about a professor who is using his classroom to teach conspiracy theories about 9/11 to our children."  "During that five minutes it occurred to me that I was going to be able to explode this one way or another - that I would talk about how they had 'Foxed their facts'," Fetzer told a packed house at the L.A. 9/11 Symposium.

"What they were doing was saying I was teaching our children - I was offering a course on 9/11 - and the way they were defining it in terms of children and kids - this had to be a freshman level or equivalent course."  Fetzer was able to prepare to bite back at the attack dogs by exposing the fact that Fox had not done its homework and were simply preparing to savage Fetzer on an aspect of the topic that they had completely dreamt up.  "They were attacking me for a non-existent course, said Fetzer."  "There was no course that satisfied the description they were trying to nail me for having taught."  Fetzer was able to embarrass Colmes and North who cut the interview short because their attack strategy had clearly been ripped out from underneath them.

"The first question out of Colmes mouth was 'is this a required course?' - and I had to explain to him that he had his facts Foxed," said Fetzer.  "The fact is they had defined the parameters - I knew they knew they had made a mistake but I wasn't there to argue their case."  North and Colmes quickly changed their tone after they realized the 'evil professor teaching our children horrible liberal lies' approach had failed.

"When they tried to put me on the spot after they realized they had committed a mistake - when they tried to put me on the spot about the society - I began to explain some of the findings - how the towers had come down by controlled demolition - how the FBI was asserting that they had no hard evidence tying Osama bin Laden to 9/11," said Fetzer.

After Colmes asked if there was any hard evidence tying any Bush administration members to 9/11, Fetzer related the story of Norman Mineta who testified that Cheney's orders were to do nothing as Flight 77 hurtled towards the Pentagon.

"This was when Ollie started getting a little nervous and he asks how many there are in your organization - when he heard there were 300 and 200 with research credentials - 85 actually having academic affiliations - it took so much wind out of their sails that they tried to cut it off as quickly as they could," said Fetzer.  Fetzer said it was interesting how the anchors were more concerned about whether he was teaching the information to his students than inquiring about the evidence behind 9/11 being an inside job.

The interview was quickly canned and - as with the much vaunted Pentagon tape that was heralded to 'shut up 9/11 conspiracy theorists for good' - an expected propaganda coup for Fox turned into a red-faced debacle and a moral victory for the 9/11 truth movement.

Watch Jim Fetzer discuss his Fox appearance and present a high-quality 78 minute illustrated discussion on the collapse of the twin towers and the Pentagon controversy at Prison Planet.tv. Click here to subscribe and enjoy a multitude of exclusive membership benefits.

 

www.americanfreedomnews.com/afn_articles/bushsecrets.htm

President Bush recently signed an executive order to freeze the US financial assets of corporations doing business with Osama bin Laden. He described the order as a "strike on the financial foundation of the global terror network.”  "If you do business with terrorists, if you support or succor them, you will not do business with the United States," said President Bush.  He didn’t say anything about doing business with a terrorist’s brother - or his wealthy financier.

When President George W. Bush froze assets connected to Osama bin Laden, he didn’t tell the American people that the terrorist mastermind’s late brother was an investor in the president’s former oil business in Texas. He also hasn’t leveled with the American public about his financial connections to a host of shady Saudi characters involved in drug cartels, gun smuggling, and terrorist networks.

Doing business with the enemy is nothing new to the Bush family. Much of the Bush family wealth came from supplying needed raw materials and credit to Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich. Several business operations managed by Prescott Bush - the president’s grandfather - were seized by the US government during World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

On October 20, 1942, the federal government seized the Union Banking Corporation in New York City as a front operation for the Nazis. Prescott Bush was a director. Bush, E. Roland Harriman, two Bush associates, and three Nazi executives owned the bank’s shares. Eight days later, the Roosevelt administration seized two other corporations managed by Prescott Bush. The Holland-American Trading Corporation and the Seamless Steel Equipment Corporation, both managed by the Bush-Harriman bank, were accused by the US federal government of being front organizations for Hitler’s Third Reich. Again, on November 8, 1942, the federal government seized Nazi-controlled assets of Silesian-American Corporation, another Bush-Harriman company doing business with Hitler.

Doing business with the bin Laden empire, therefore, is only the latest extension of the Bush family’s financial ties to unsavory individuals and organizations. Now that thousands of American citizens have died in terrorist attacks and the nation is going to war, the American people should know about George W. Bush’s relationship with the family of Osama bin Laden.

Salem bin Laden, Osama’s older brother, was an investor in
Arbusto Energy. - the Texas oil company started by George W. Bush. Arbusto means “Bush” in Spanish. Salem bin Laden died in an airplane crash in Texas in 1988.

Sheik Mohammed bin Laden, the family patriarch and founder of its construction empire, also died in a plane crash. Upon his death in 1968, he left behind 57 sons and daughters - the offspring he sired with 12 wives in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. About a dozen brothers manage Bin Laden Brothers Construction - one of the largest construction firms in the Middle East.

Fresh out of Harvard Business School, young George W. Bush returned to Midland, TX, in the late 1970s to follow his father’s footsteps in the oil business. Beginning in 1978, he set up a series of limited partnerships -
Arbusto ’78, Arbusto ’79, and so on - to drill for oil.

One of President Bush’s earliest financial backers was James Bath, a Houston aircraft broker. Bath served with President Bush in the Texas Air National Guard. Bath has a mysterious connection to the Central Intelligence Agency.

According to a 1976 trust agreement, Salem bin Laden appointed James Bath as his business representative in Houston. Revelation about Bath’s relationship with the bin Laden financial empire and the CIA was made public in 1992 by Bill White, a former real estate business partner with Bath. White informed federal investigators in 1992 that Bath told him that he had assisted the CIA in a liaison role since 1976 - the same year former President George Herbert Walker Bush served as director of the CIA.

During a bitter legal fight between White and Bath, the real estate partner disclosed that Bath managed a portfolio worth millions of dollars for Sheik Khalid bin Mahfouz and other wealthy Saudis. Among the investments made by Bath with Mahfouz’s money was the Houston Gulf Airport.

A powerful banker in Saudi Arabia, Mahfouz was one of the largest stockholders in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. BCCI was a corrupt global banking empire operating in 73 nations and was a major financial and political force in Washington, Paris, Geneva, London, and Hong Kong. Despite the appearance of a normal banking operation, BCCI was actually an international crime syndicate providing “banking services” to the Medellin drug cartel,
Pamama dictator Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein, terrorist mastermind Abu Nidal, and Khun Sa, the heroin kingpin in Asia’s Golden Triangle.

The BCCI scandal implicated some of the biggest political names in Washington - both Democrats and Republicans - during the first Bush White House. The bank was accused of laundering money for drug cartels, smuggling weapons to terrorists, and using Middle Eastern oil money to influence American politicians.

The chief of the Justice Department’s criminal division under former President Bush was Robert Mueller. Because the major players came out of the scandal with slaps on the wrists, many critics accused Mueller of botching the investigation. Mr. Mueller was recently appointed by President George W. Bush as the new Director of the FBI, replacing Louis Freeh who did nothing while William Jefferson Clinton allowed the Red Chinese to loot our national security secrets.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (
FinCEN), a division of the Justice Department, reviewed allegations by Bill White in 1992 that James Bath funneled money from wealthy Middle Eastern businessmen to American companies to influence the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Robert Mueller, the new FBI chief, was in a senior position at the Justice Department at the time of the review.

White told a Texas court in 1992 that Bath and the Justice Department had “blackballed” him professionally and financially because he refused to keep quiet about his knowledge of an Arabic conspiracy to launder Middle Eastern money into the bank accounts of American businesses and politicians.

In sworn depositions, Bath admitted he represented four wealthy Saudi Arabian businessmen as a trustee. He also admitted he used his name on their investments and received, in return, a five- percent stake in their business deals.

Indeed, Texas tax documents revealed that Bath owned five percent of
Arbusto ’79 Ltd., and Arbusto ’80 Ltd. Bush Exploration Company controlled the limited partnerships, the general partnership firm owned by young George W. Bush.

Although George W. Bush’s Texas oil ventures were financial failures, his financial backers recovered their investments through a series of mergers and stock swaps. He changed
Arbusto’s name to Bush Exploration, then merged the new firm into Spectrum 7 Energy Corporation in 1984.

The Bush-controlled oil business eventually ended up being folded into
Harken Energy Corp., a Dallas-based corporation. Mr. Bush joined Harken as a director in 1986 and was given 212,000 shares of Harken stock. Bush used his White House connections to land a lucrative contract for the obscure Harken Energy Corp. with the Middle Eastern government of Bahrain. On June 20, 1990, George W. Bush sold his Harken stock for $848,000 and paid off the loan he took out to buy his small share in the Texas Rangers. The Bahrain deal was brokered by David Edwards, a close pal to Bill Clinton and a former employee of Stephens Inc. Shortly after Bush sold his stock, Harken’s fortunes nose-dived when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Some critics claim young George was tipped off in advance by his father about the soon-coming Gulf War.

George W. Bush, however, worked wonders for
Harken Energy Corp. before the stock collapsed. Using the Bush family name, he managed to bring much-needed capital investment to the struggling firm. George W. Bush traveled to Little Rock, AR, to attend a meeting with Jackson Stephens - a powerful Arkansas tycoon who helped bankroll the state campaigns of young Bill Clinton. He first gained political prominence as a fund-raiser for President Jimmy Carter. Stephens was also deeply involved in the BCCI scandal by helping the corrupt bank take control of First American Bank in Washington, DC.

Jack Stephens didn’t need an introduction to young George W. Bush. Mary Anne Stephens, his wife, managed Vice President George Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign in Arkansas. Stephens Inc., the well connected brokerage firm owned by Jack Stephens, donated $100,000 to a Bush campaign fundraising dinner in 1991. When George W. Bush won the contested Florida election in 2000, Jack Stephens made a substantial contribution to the Bush inauguration. Recently, former President Bush played golf on April 11, 2001, with Jack Stephens at the Jack Stephens Youth Golf Academy in Little Rock. The former president told Stephens, “Jack, we love you and we are very, very grateful for what you have done.”

Perhaps the former president was thanking him for the money Stephens provided young George W. Bush. Stephens arranged for a $25 million investment from the Union des
Banques Suisses. The Swiss Bank held the minority interest in the Banque de Commerce et de Placements, a Geneva-based subsidiary of BCCI.

Both Stephens and Abdullah
Taha Bakhsh, a wealthy and well-connected Saudi real estate investor, signed the financial transaction. The Geneva transaction was paid through a joint venture between the Union Bank of Switzerland and its Geneva branch of BCCI.

The BCCI connection, therefore, linked George W. Bush with Saudi banker
Khaled bin Mahfouz. Known in Arab circles as the “king’s treasurer,” Mahfouz held a 20 percent take in BCCI between 1986 and 1990. Mahfouz is no stranger to the Bush family. He was a big investor in the Carlyle Group, a defense-industry investment group with deep connections to the Republican Party establishment. Former President Bush is a former member of the company’s board of directors. George W. Bush also held shares in Caterair, a Carlyle subsidiary. Sami Baarma, a powerful player in the Mahfouz-owned Prime Commercial Bank of Pakistan, is a member of the Carlyle Group’s international advisory board.

President Bush certainly is aware of that his former Saudi sugar daddy is still financing Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network. USA Today newspaper reported in 1999 that a year after bin Laden’s attacks on US embassies in Africa,
Khaled bin Mahfouz and other wealthy Saudis were funneling tens of millions of dollars each year into bin Laden’s bank accounts. Five top Saudi businessmen ordered the National Commercial Bank to transfer personal funds and $3 million pilfered from a Saudi pension fund to the Capitol Trust Bank in New York City. The money was deposited into the Islamic Relief and Blessed Relief - Islamic charities operating in the US and Great Britain as fronts for Osama bin Laden.

The Capitol Trust Bank is run by Mohammad Hussein al-
Amoudi. His lawyer is Democratic Party bigwig Vernon Jordan, close friend of former President Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky.

Abdullah
Taha Bakhsh, the Arab who cosigned the $25 million cash infusion into George W. Bush’s Harken Energy Corporation, appointed Talat Othman to manage his 17.6 percent share in Harken Energy Corp. Othman, a native Palestinian, is president and CEO of Dearborn Financial Inc. - an investment firm in Arlington Heights, IL.

Bakhsh also bought a 9.6 percent stake in Worthen Banking Corporation, the Arkansas bank controlled by Jack Stephens. Abdullah Bakhsh’s share was the identical percentage as the amount of shares sold by Mochtar Riady, the godfather of the wealthy Indonesian family with close ties to the Chinese communists, Bill Clinton and evangelist Pat Robertson. Bakhsh is represented by Rogers & Wells, a well-connected Republican law firm in New York whose partners include former Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

Independent investigator reporter David Twersky reported in the early 1990s that Othman had a seat on Harken’s board of directors and met three times in the White House with President George Herbert Walker Bush. Organized by Chief of Staff John Sununu, Othman’s first meeting with President Bush at the White House was in August 1990, just days after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

There exist to this day an Arab-Texas connection. Khalid bin Mahfouz, financier of both George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden, still maintains a palatial estate in Houston, TX. Former President George Bush also lives in Houston. James Bath, Texas political confidant of George W. Bush, managed to obtain a $1.4 million loan from Mahfouz in 1990. Bath and Mahfouz, along with former Secretary of Treasury John Connally, were also co-investors in Houston’s Main Bank. Bath was also president of Skyway Aircraft Leasing Ltd, a Texas air charter company registered in the Cayman Islands. According to published reports in the early 1990s, the real owner was bin Mahfouz. When Salem bin Laden, Osama’ brother, died in 1988, his interest in the Houston Gulf Airport was transferred to bin Mahfouz.

Since Osama bin Laden’s bloody attack on America on September 11, the federal government has moved quickly to freeze bank accounts connected to Osama bin Laden, Khalid bin Mahfouz, and a host of Islamic charities.  
Perhaps federal agents should freeze the financial assets of the Bush family too. It would not be the first time Bush-family assets were seized by the US government for trading with the enemy.  Hold on to your hats people. We've probably all seen the "nazi" part before. Now it's time to focus on bin Mahfouz. bin Mahfouz was the owner of the Saudi National Commerce Bank. He still is! The Saudis just happened to close his account this past August, 2003. By all reports, nearly 80% of all "terrorists funds" (please stop saying Al Qaeda) are funneled through this bank and still are. This bank currently owns the Houston Gulf Airport. (See "Gateway to Terror?")

Bush family’s dirty little secret:
President’s oil companies funded by Bin Laden family and wealthy Saudis who financed Osama bin Laden

By Rick Wiles   
Copyright: American Freedom News
September 2001  Original Link: http://www.americanfreedomnews.com/afn_articles/bushsecrets.htm
 
 
WayneMadsenReport  British intelligence report: Mossad ran 9/11 Arab "hijacker" terrorist operation - SPECIAL REPORT.
January 24, 2011 -- SPECIAL REPORT. British intelligence report: Mossad ran 9/11 Arab "hijacker" terrorist operation

British intelligence reported in February 2002 that the Israeli Mossad ran the Arab hijacker cells that were later blamed by the U.S. government's 9/11 Commission for carrying out the aerial attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. WMR has received details of the British intelligence report, which, was suppressed by the government of then-Prime Minister Tony Blair.

A Mossad unit consisting of six Egyptian- and Yemeni-born Jews infiltrated "Al Qaeda" cells in Hamburg (the Atta-Mamoun Darkanzali cell), south Florida, and Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates in the months before 9/11. The Mossad not only infiltrated cells but began to run them and give them specific orders that would eventually culminate in their being on board four regularly-scheduled flights originating in Boston, Washington Dulles, and Newark, New Jersey on 9/11.

The Mossad infiltration team comprised six Israelis, comprising two cells of three agents, who all received special training at a Mossad base in the Negev Desert in their future control and handling of the "Al Qaeda" cells. One Mossad cell traveled to Amsterdam whereb they submitted to the operational control of the Mossad's Europe Station, which operates from the El Al complex at Schiphol International Airport. The three-man Mossad unit then traveled to Hamburg where it made contact with Mohammed Atta, who believed they were sent by Osama Bin Laden. In fact, they were sent by Ephraim Halevy, the chief of Mossad.

The second three-man Mossad team flew to New York and then to southern Florida where they began to direct the "Al Qaeda" cells operating from Hollywood, Miami, Vero Beach, Delray Beach, and West Palm Beach. Israeli "art students," already under investigation by the Drug Enforcement Administration for casing the offices and homes of federal law enforcement officers, had been living among and conducting surveillance of the activities, including flight school training, of the future Arab "hijacker" cells, particularly in Hollywood and Vero Beach.

In August 2001, the first Mossad team flew with Atta and other Hamburg "Al Qaeda" members to Boston. Logan International Airport's security was contracted to Huntleigh USA, a firm owned by an Israeli airport security firm closely connected to Mossad -- International Consultants on Targeted Security - ICTS. ICTS's owners were politically connected to the Likud Party, particularly the Netanyahu faction and then-Jerusalem mayor and future Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. It was Olmert who personally interceded with New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to have released from prison five Urban Moving Systems employees, identified by the CIA and FBI agents, as Mossad agents. The Israelis were the only suspects arrested anywhere in the United States on 9/11 who were thought to have been involved in the 9/11 attacks.

The two Mossad teams sent regular coded reports on the progress of the 9/11 operation to Tel Aviv via the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC. WMR has learned from a Pentagon source that leading Americans tied to the media effort to pin 9/11 on Arab hijackers, Osama Bin Laden, and the Taliban were present in the Israeli embassy on September 10, 2001, to coordinate their media blitz for the subsequent days and weeks following the attacks. It is more than likely that FBI counter-intelligence agents who conduct surveillance of the Israeli embassy have proof on the presence of the Americans present at the embassy on September 10. Some of the Americans are well-known to U.S. cable news television audiences.

In mid-August, the Mossad team running the Hamburg cell in Boston reported to Tel Aviv that the final plans for 9/11 were set. The Florida-based Mossad cell reported that the documented "presence" of the Arab cell members at Florida flight schools had been established.

The two Mossad cells studiously avoided any mention of the World Trade Center or targets in Washington, DC in their coded messages to Tel Aviv. Halevy covered his tracks by reporting to the CIA of a "general threat" by an attack by Arab terrorists on a nuclear plant somewhere on the East Coast of the United States. CIA director George Tenet dismissed the Halevy warning as "too non-specific." The FBI, under soon-to-be-departed director Louis Freeh, received the "non-specific" warning about an attack on a nuclear power plant and sent out the information in its routine bulletins to field agents but no high alert was ordered.

The lack of a paper trail pointing to "Al Qaeda" as the masterminds on 9/11, which could then be linked to Al Qaeda's Mossad handlers, threw off the FBI. On April 19, 2002, FBI director Robert Mueller, in a speech to San Francisco's Commonwealth Club, stated: "In our investigation, we have not uncovered a single piece of paper -- either here in the United States, or in the treasure trove of information that has turned up in Afghanistan and elsewhere -- that mentioned any aspect of the September 11 plot."

The two Mossad "Al Qaeda" infiltration and control teams had also helped set up safe houses for the quick exfiltration of Mossad agents from the United States. Last March, WMR reported: "WMR has learned from two El Al sources who worked for the Israeli airline at New York’s John F. Kennedy airport that on 9/11, hours after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded all civilian domestic and international incoming and outgoing flights to and from the United States, a full El Al Boeing 747 took off from JFK bound for Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport. The two El Al employee sources are not Israeli nationals but legal immigrants from Ecuador who were working in the United States for the airline. The flight departed JFK at 4:11 pm and its departure was, according to the El Al sources, authorized by the direct intervention of the U.S. Department of Defense. U.S. military officials were on the scene at JFK and were personally involved with the airport and air traffic control authorities to clear the flight for take-off. According to the 9/11 Commission report, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta ordered all civilian flights to be grounded at 9:45 am on September 11." WMR has learned from British intelligence sources that the six-man Mossad team was listed on the El Al flight manifest as El Al employees.

WMR previously reported that the Mossad cell operating in the Jersey City-Weehawken area of New Jersey through Urban Moving Systems was suspected by some in the FBI and CIA of being involved in moving explosives into the World Trade Center as well as staging "false flag" demonstrations at at least two locations in north Jersey: Liberty State Park and an apartment complex in Jersey City as the first plane hit the World Trade Center's North Tower. One team of Urban Moving Systems Mossad agents was arrested later on September 11 and jailed for five months at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn. Some of their names turned up in a joint CIA-FBI database as known Mossad agents, along with the owner of Urban Moving Systems, Dominik Suter, whose name also appeared on a "Law Enforcement Sensitive" FBI 9/11 suspects list, along with the names of key "hijackers," including Mohammed Atta and Hani Hanjour, as well as the so-called "20th hijacker," Zacarias Moussaoui.

Suter was allowed to escape the United States after the FBI made initial contact with him at the Urban Moving Systems warehouse in Weehawken, New Jersey, following the 9/11 attacks. Suter was later permitted to return to the United States where he was involved in the aircraft parts supply business in southern Florida, according to an informe3d source who contacted WMR. Suter later filed for bankruptcy in Florida for Urban Moving Systems and other businesses he operated: Suburban Moving & Storage Inc.; Max Movers, Inc.; Invsupport; Woodflooring Warehouse Corp.; One Stop Cleaning LLC; and City Carpet Upholstery, Inc. At the time of the bankruptcy filing in Florida, Suter listed his address as 1867 Fox Court, Wellington, FL 33414, with a phone number of 561 204-2359.

From the list of creditors it can be determined that Suter had been operating in the United States since 1993, the year of the first attack on the World Trade Center. In 1993, Suter began racking up American Express credit card charges totaling $21,913.97. Suter also maintained credit card accounts with HSBC Bank and Orchard Bank c/o HSBC Card Services of Salinas, California, among other banks. Suter also did business with the Jewish Community Center of Greater Palm Beach in Florida and Ryder Trucks in Miami. Miami and southern Florida were major operating areas for cells of Israeli Mossad agents masquerading as "art students," who were living and working near some of the identified future Arab "hijackers" in the months preceding 9/11.

ABC's 20/20 correspondent John Miller ensured that the Israeli connection to "Al Qaeda's" Arab hijackers was buried in an "investigation" of the movers' activities on 9/11. Anchor Barbara Walters helped Miller in putting a lid on the story about the movers and Suter aired on June 21, 2002. Miller then went on to become the FBI public affairs spokesman to ensure that Mueller and other FBI officials kept to the "Al Qaeda" script as determined by the Bush administration and the future 9/11 Commission. But former CIA chief of counter-terrorism Vince Cannistraro let slip to ABC an important clue to the operations of the Mossad movers in New Jersey when he stated that the Mossad agents "set up or exploited for the purpose of launching an intelligence operation against radical Islamists in the area, particularly in the New Jersey-New York area." The "intelligence operation" turned out to have been the actual 9/11 attacks. And it was no coincidence that it was ABC's John Miller who conducted a May 1998 rare interview of Osama Bin Laden at his camp in Afghanistan. Bin Laden played his part well for future scenes in the fictional "made-for-TV" drama known as 9/11.

WMR has also learned from Italian intelligence sources that Mossad's running of "Al Qaeda" operatives did not end with running the "hijacking" teams in the United States and Hamburg. Other Arab "Al Qaeda" operatives, run by Mossad, were infiltrated into Syria but arrested by Syrian intelligence. Syria was unsuccessful in turning them to participate in intelligence operations in Lebanon. Detailed information on Bin Laden's support team was offered to the Bush administration, up to days prior to 9/11, by Gutbi al-Mahdi, the head of the Sudanese Mukhabarat intelligence service. The intelligence was rejected by the Biush White House. It was later reported that Sudanese members of "Al Qaeda's" support network were double agents for Mossad who had also established close contacts with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and operated in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Eritrea, as well as Sudan. The Mossad connection to Al Qaeda in Sudan was likely known by the Sudanese Mukhabarat, a reason for the rejection of its intelligence on "Al Qaeda" by the thoroughly-Mossad penetrated Bush White House. Yemen had also identified "Al Qaeda" members who were also Mossad agents. A former chief of Mossad revealed to this editor in 2002 that Yemeni-born Mossad "deep insertion" commandos spotted Bin Laden in the Hadhramaut region of eastern Yemen after his escape from Tora Bora in Afghanistan, following the U.S. invasion.

French intelligence determined that other Egyptian- and Yemeni-born Jewish Mossad agents were infiltrated into Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates as radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the "Muslim Brotherhood" agents actually were involved in providing covert Israeli funding for "Al Qaeda" activities. On February 21, 2006, WMR reported on the U.S. Treasury Secretary's firing by President Bush over information discovered on the shady "Al Qaeda" accounts in the United Arab Emirates: "Banking insiders in Dubai report that in March 2002, U.S. Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill visited Dubai and asked for documents on a $109,500 money transfer from Dubai to a joint account held by hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi at Sun Trust Bank in Florida. O’Neill also asked UAE authorities to close down accounts used by Al Qaeda . . . . The UAE complained about O’Neill’s demands to the Bush administration. O’Neill’s pressure on the UAE and Saudis contributed to Bush firing him as Treasury Secretary in December 2002 " O'Neill may have also stumbled on the "Muslim Brotherhood" Mossad operatives operating in the emirates who were directing funds to "Al Qaeda."

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Sharjah's ruler, Sultan bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, who survived a palace coup attempt in 1987, opened his potentate to Russian businessmen like Viktor Bout, as well as to financiers of radical Muslim groups, including the Taliban and "Al Qaeda."

Moreover, this Israeli support for "Al Qaeda" was fully known to Saudi intelligence, which approved of it in order to avoid compromising Riyadh. The joint Israeli-Saudi support for "Al Qaeda" was well-known to the Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah-based aviation network of the now-imprisoned Russian, Viktor Bout, jailed in New York on terrorism charges. The presence of Bout in New York, a hotbed of Israeli intelligence control of U.S. federal prosecutors, judges, as well as the news media, is no accident: Bout knows enough about the Mossad activities in Sharjah in support of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, where Bout also had aviation and logistics contracts, to expose Mossad as the actual mastermind behind 9/11. Bout's aviation empire also extended to Miami and Dallas, two areas that were nexuses for the Mossad control operations for the "Al Qaeda" flight training operations of the Arab cell members in the months prior to 9/11.

Bout's path also crossed with "Al Qaeda's" support network at the same bank in Sharjah, HSBC. Mossad's phony Muslim Brotherhood members from Egypt and Yemen controlled financing for "Al Qaeda" through the HSBC accounts in Sharjah. Mossad's Dominik Suter also dealt with HSBC in the United States. The FBI's chief counter-terrorism agent investigating Al Qaeda, John O'Neill, became aware of the "unique" funding mechanisms for Al Qaeda. It was no mistake that O'Neill was given the job as director of security for the World Trade Center on the eve of the attack. O'Neill perished in the collapse of the complex.

Mossad uses a number of Jews born in Arab countries to masquerade as Arabs. They often carry forged or stolen passports from Arab countries or nations in Europe that have large Arab immigrant populations, particularly Germany, France, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

For Mossad, the successful 9/11 terrorist "false flag" operation was a success beyond expectations. The Bush administration, backed by the Blair government, attacked and occupied Iraq, deposing Saddam Hussein, and turned up pressure on Israel's other adversaries, including Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Hamas, and Lebanese Hezbollah. The Israelis also saw the U.S., Britain, and the UN begin to crack down on the Lebanese Shi'a diamond business in Democratic Republic of Congo and West Africa, and with it, the logistics support provided by Bout's aviation companies, which resulted in a free hand for Tel Aviv to move in on Lebanese diamond deals in central and west Africa.

Then-Israeli Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu commented on the 9/11 attacks on U.S. television shortly after they occurred. Netanyahu said: "It is very good!" It now appears that Netanyahu, in his zeal, blew Mossad's cover as the masterminds of 9/11.

 

9/11 Investigation Pages Menu                  Research:

Sibel Edmonds

Judge Reggie Walton  

 

 

 

Planning and Decision Aid System, Cheney, false flag attack on America, September 9, 2001.
 
Global Research Kirk Von Ackerman, whistle blower murdered
A great deal of controversy has arisen about what was known about the movements and location of Osama bin Laden in the wake of his killing by US Special Forces on May 2 in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Questions about what intelligence agencies knew or didn't know about al-Qaeda activities go back some years, most prominently in the controversy over the existence of a joint US Special Forces Command and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data mining effort known as "Able Danger 3]." What hasn't been discussed is a September 2008 Department of Defense (DoD) inspector general (IG) report 4], summarizing an investigation made in response to an accusation by a Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) whistleblower, which indicated that a senior JFIC commander had halted actions tracking Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11. JFIC is tasked with an intelligence mission in support of United States Joint Force Command (USJFCOM).

The report, titled "Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission," was declassified last year, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from Steven Aftergood at the Federation of American Scientists.

The whistleblower, who the IG report identified as a former JFIC employee represented only by his codename "IRON MAN," claimed in letters written to both the DoD inspector general in May 2006 and, lacking any apparent action by the IG, to the Office of the National Director of Intelligence (ODNI) in October 2007, that JFIC had withheld operational information about al-Qaeda when queried in March 2002 about its activities by the DIA and higher command officials on behalf of the 9/11 Commission. The ODNI passed the complaint back to the IG, who then opened an investigation under the auspices of the deputy inspector general for intelligence. 5]

In a November 27, 2007, letter 6] from Edward Maguire at the ODNI to Gen. Claude Kicklighter at the DoD's IG office, Maquire identifies the whistleblower as "a DIA employee in the Defense HUMINT Management Office, Policy and Plans Division," who was "personally involved in JFIC intelligence activities related to al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attacks and had first hand knowledge of circumstances surrounding that alleged false reporting to the Secretary of Defense and Congress."

Maguire also offered to send classified material to the DoD IG that was in possession of the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) inspector general. He also told Kicklighter that the DNI had not performed even a preliminary inquiry on the allegations.

The IG report, which does not explain the 18-month delay in opening an investigation, cleared JFIC of any wrongdoing and declared that the intelligence agency had "provided a timely and accurate reply in response to the 9/11 Commission." In evident response, IRON MAN indicated to the IG investigating staff that "he had never seen the 9/11 Commission questions or JFIC's response, but that Congress should have asked for files concerning the tracking of Osama bin Laden."

According to the IG report, the 9/11 Commission "had not requested the direct submission of any files or requested information regarding the tracking of Osama bin Laden." The report said the commission questions "were very specific," and asked what the JFIC knew about "imminent attack" or "hijackers involved" in the 9/11 terrorist attack.

Tracking Bin Laden had been undertaken by a secret unit within the JFIC, the Asymmetric Threats Division, formed in 1999 "to take a non-traditional approach to analysis." Known by its DoD acronym, DO5, it was tasked with providing "current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff J2]." Almost no public source material exists on DO5 activities, except what is in the IG report.

The IG report does not deny the tracking of Bin Laden, but notes that the JFIC was to provide general and direct intelligence support to USJFCOM and subordinate joint forces commands and that it did not have a mission to track Osama bin Laden or predict imminent targets of terrorism on US soil.

Nevertheless, DO5 was involved in intelligence concerns domestically. It provided assistance to the Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS), which, like DO5, was formed in 1999 and based out of Fort Monroe, Virginia. The JTF-CS was tasked with assisting the DoD response to domestic terror incidents, including 7] "managing the consequences of a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) situation." At one point, DO5 assisted the JTF-CS by "establishing fictional terrorist organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups" that were utilized as part of JTF-CS "exercises."

The obscurity of DO5's mission was summed up by a former JFIC deputy director of intelligence, who told investigators that DO5 had "no theater specific mission." According to the answers the JFIC provided to the 9/11 Commission, the JFIC received over 2,200 messages daily "from other agencies, JFCOM components, or services." It did "not conduct any unilateral collection" of any intelligence domestically.

According to the narrative in the IG report, a previous JFIC deputy director of intelligence said that the JFIC commander, identified elsewhere in the report as Capt. Janice Dundas, US Navy, "directed him to stop tracking Osama bin Laden. The Commanding Officer stated that the tracking of Osama bin Laden did not fall within JFIC's mission." At the same time, JFIC analysis of purported Afghanistan "terrorist training camps" was also curtailed, with an explanation that such activities were outside the agency's Area of Operations and "that the issues where sic] not in JFIC's swim lane."

According to the report, the Asymmetric Threats Division was "realigned" in summer 2001 under the "Intelligence Watch Center." The Intelligence Watch Center may be the Combined Intelligence Watch Center associated 8] with NORAD, which is an "indications and warning center for worldwide threats from space, missile and strategic air activity, as well as geopolitical unrest that could affect North America and US forces/interests abroad." This would be consistent with the work DO5 did with the JTF-CS.

The order to stop tracking Bin Laden, therefore, came sometime between the origin of DO5 in 1999 and its realignment just prior to, or right after 9/11. In 2005, the JFIC itself was renamed the Joint Transformation Command-Intelligence, still subordinate to and serving USJFCOM.

Other Allegations

According to the IG report, IRON MAN claimed that the JFIC had "original material created by DO5 relevant to al-Qa'ida," and that the JFIC had constructed "numerous original reports." But the IG investigators found that interviews with other JFIC personnel and a review of historical DO5 briefings did not support these allegations. They claimed that DO5, which "recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise," merely "monitored and compiled intelligence reporting" from other agencies.

IRON MAN told IG investigators that he believed that his agency, JFIC, would deny the existence of the Asymmetric Threat Division and its analyses. But the IG report authors claimed, "JFIC correctly identified the DO5 in its response to question 8" from the 9/11 Commission and explained, in addition, that the JFIC noted that "D05's emphasis was on force protection for the USJFCOM components."

But in the reply to question 8 reproduced in the IG report, there is no mention of either DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Division. The answer states, "JFIC's Counter-terrorism focus has changed over the years," and that from fall 1999 until September 11, 2001, the JFIC's counterterrorism focus switched to "Asymmetric Threats OCONUS outside the continental US] to include terrorism and CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear] issues," with the aforementioned emphasis on USJFCOM force protection. Nowhere does it indicate the existence of DO5 and there is no reason to believe that 9/11 Commission members were ever aware of its existence. The JFIC was never mentioned in the subsequent 9/11 Commission report.

In addition, IRON MAN's allegations also included charges that the JFIC and specifically DO5, had developed information that the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the most likely domestic targets of an al-Qaeda attack. The IG report disputes this and claims, with less than definitive assurance, "Evidence indicated that the JFIC did not have knowledge regarding imminent domestic targets prior to 9/11 or specific 9/11 hijacker operations."

The IG report indicated that IG investigators spoke with a number of key ranking JFIC personnel, as well as the previous USJFCOM director of intelligence, the JFIC Commanding Officer and personnel from the Asymmetric Threat Division.

Earlier this year, a blogger, Susie Dow, who has been following 9] the story of Kirk von Ackermann , a US Army contractor in Iraq who disappeared on the road between Tikrit and Kirkuk in October 2003, asserted that von Ackermann had earlier belonged to JFIC's Asymmetric Threat Division. Von Ackermann's vehicle was found by the side of the road with a computer and a briefcase containing $40,000 in cash. An Army Criminal Investigative Division investigation later concluded that he was the victim of a probable kidnapping, while rumors persisted that he was possibly going to blow the whistle on DoD corruption.

An associate of von Ackermann, Ryan Manelick, a former Air Force Intelligence officer, was shot and killed outside a US military base near Baghdad two months later. Manelick had earlier told various people that he was in fear for his life. Both von Ackermann and Manelick worked for the contractor Ultra Services, based in Turkey. No particular link between von Ackermann or Manelick and the IRON MAN allegations has ever been proposed.

Dow has written 10] on the two contractors for the website e Pluribus Media. In a May 6 posting at her own web site, "The Missing Man," Dow noted the IG report's conclusion: "The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission."

"Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions," Dow said.

 


follow up, the act of following up. 2. an action or thing that serves to increase the effectiveness of a previous one, as a second or subsequent letter, phone call, or visit. 3. Also called follow. Journalism. a. a news story providing additional information on a story or article previously published. b. Also called sidebar, supplementary story. a minor news story used to supplement a related story of major importance. Compare feature story (def. 1), human-interest story, shirttail. –adjective 4. designed or serving to follow up, esp. to increase the effectiveness of a previous action: a follow-up interview; a follow-up offer. 5. of or pertaining to action that follows an initial treatment, course of study, etc.: follow-up care for mental patients; a follow-up survey. fol·low –verb (used with object) 1. to come after in sequence, order of time, etc.: The speech follows the dinner. 2. to go or come after; move behind in the same direction: Drive ahead, and I'll follow you. 3. to accept as a guide or leader; accept the authority of or give allegiance to: Many Germans followed Hitler. 4. to conform to, comply with, or act in accordance with; obey: to follow orders; to follow advice. 5. to imitate or copy; use as an exemplar: They follow the latest fads. 6. to move forward along (a road, path, etc.): Follow this road for a mile. 7. to come after as a result or consequence; result from: Reprisals often follow victory. 8. to go after or along with (a person) as companion. 9. to go in pursuit of: to follow an enemy. 10. to try for or attain to: to follow an ideal. 11. to engage in or be concerned with as a pursuit: He followed the sea as his true calling. 12. to watch the movements, progress, or course of: to follow a bird in flight. 13. to watch the development of or keep up with: to follow the news. 14. to keep up with and understand (an argument, story, etc.): Do you follow me? –verb (used without object) 15. to come next after something else in sequence, order of time, etc. 16. to happen or occur after something else; come next as an event: After the defeat great disorder followed. 17. to attend or serve. 18. to go or come after a person or thing in motion. 19. to result as an effect; occur as a consequence: It follows then that he must be innocent. –noun 20. the act of following. 21. Billiards, Pool. follow shot (def. 2). 22. follow-up (def. 3). —Verb phrases23. follow out, to carry to a conclusion; execute: They followed out their orders to the letter. 24. follow through, a. to carry out fully, as a stroke of a club in golf, a racket in tennis, etc. b. to continue an effort, plan, proposal, policy, etc., to its completion. 25. follow up, a. to pursue closely and tenaciously. b. to increase the effectiveness of by further action or repetition. c. to pursue to a solution or conclusion. —Idiom26. follow suit. suit (def. 13). fol·low·a·ble, adjective —Synonyms 3. obey. 4. heed, observe. 8. accompany, attend. 9. pursue, chase; trail, track, trace. 19. arise, proceed. Follow, ensue, result, succeed imply coming after something else, in a natural sequence. Follow is the general word: We must wait to see what follows. A detailed account follows. Ensue implies a logical sequence, what might be expected normally to come after a given act, cause, etc.: When the power lines were cut, a paralysis of transportation ensued. Result emphasizes the connection between a cause or event and its effect, consequence, or outcome: The accident resulted in injuries to those involved. Succeed implies coming after in time, particularly coming into a title, office, etc.: Formerly the oldest son succeeded to his father's title. —Antonyms 1. precede. 2, 3. lead. 4. disregard. 9. flee.  news follow up
Doeda  240 billion in covert securities to fund an economic war against the Soviet Union
(The following is an attempt to present in a compact form the claims made by Dick Eastman, Tom Flocco, V.K. Durham, Karl Schwarz and put together in an the article by E.P. Heidner dated 28th June 2008 to the effect that the September 11th attacks were intended to cover-up the clearing of the 1991 issuance of $240 billion in covert securities to fund an economic war against the Soviet Union during which "unknown" western investors bought up much of the Soviet industry. A crime presented by official sources as a "terrorist attack" and used as an excuse to attack Iraq.) SEPTEMBER 11

Initially the official designation of "terrorist attacks" made it difficult to discern a pattern. However if the destruction of the World Trade Centre, a segment of the Pentagon, four commercial aircraft and the loss of 2,993 lives is not considered as a "terrorist attack" but rather as a crime with specific objectives, there is a compelling logic to the pattern of destruction, not only of the buildings but of specific offices within each building.

If the attack on the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Pentagon was not random it is reasonable to assume that the planes that hit the World Trade Centre, and the bombs reported by various witnesses to have been set off inside the buildings 1, 6, 7, the basement of the Towers, the vault in the basement of the World Trade Centre were also deliberately targeted. Why? What was it that linked these targets? The destruction of the contents of the basement of the World Trade Centre - less than a billion in gold, but hundreds of billions of dollars of government securities? In addition why were specific brokers from the major government security brokerages in the Twin Towers eliminated? To create chaos in the government securities market? To create a situation wherein $240 billion dollars of covert securities could be electronically “cleared” without anyone asking questions? Which happened when the Federal Reserve declared an emergency and invoked its “emergency powers” that afternoon.

There were three major securities brokers in the World Trade Center: Cantor Fitzgerald, Eurobrokers and Garbon Inter Capital. On the morning of September 11, Flight 11 hit the North Tower at 8:46 right below the floors on which Cantor Fitzgerald was situated. Cantor Fitzgerald as the largest securities dealer in the US was probably the primary target. Shortly thereafter a massive explosion went off under the FBI offices in the North Tower on the 23rd floor, Garbon Inter Capital on the 25th floor, and in the basement of Tower 1. The explosion caused the 22nd through 25th floors above to collapse into an inferno. Fires were reported on the 22nd floor at 8:47. Shortly, thereafter, at 9:03, Flight 175 hit the South Tower right below the floors on which Euro Brokers was situated. In all three cases, the explosive, fiery destruction consumed the offices in the several floors above. At 9:37 Flight 77 hit the Pentagon, targeting one of the few offices that had been moved in the newly remodeled section of the Pentagon: the Office of Naval Intelligence, which had been investigating the financial transactions linked to the securities being managed by those security dealers in the World Trade Center that were targeted. 41% of the fatalities in the Twin Towers came from two companies that managed U.S. government securities: Cantor Fitzgerald and Eurobrokers. 31% of the 125 fatalities in the Pentagon were from the Naval Command Center that housed the Office of Naval Intelligence. 39 of 40 Office of Naval Intelligence employees died. In the vaults beneath the World Trade Center Towers, any certificates for bonds were destroyed.

Building 7 was evacuated somewhere between 9:00 and 9:30. Fires and explosions spontaneously began at multiple locations inside the building prior to the collapse of either Tower. This observation contradicts the official explanation that the fire started when objects from the collapsing towers caused the fires to ignite. The Building ultimately was destroyed in what many unofficial observers now believe was a controlled demolition. Building Seven housed several agencies critical to investigation of financial crimes.

In the midst of all this, Building 6 was destroyed by explosions from within. Building 6 was home to the U.S. Customs agency and the El Dorado Task force, which was responsible for coordinating all major money-laundering investigations in the U.S. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, these groups would be redirected to investigate terrorist financing.

The Office of Naval Intelligence in the Pentagon, which sustained a direct hit from an airliner that day, was without a doubt, a target pinpointed for destruction. The attacking aircraft went through intricate manoeuvres in order to hit the west side of the Pentagon, The flight path approach shows that the attacking aircraft passed almost directly over the White House, bypassing what should be considered a primary target for a "terrorist attack" instead of a supposedly empty section of the Pentagon. The planes that hit the South Tower also manoeuvered in the last moments to hit their exact target.

On the same day, (September 11) the Securities and Exchange Commission declared a national emergency and for the first time in U.S. history invoked its emergency powers under Securities Exchange Act Section 12(k) and eased regulatory restrictions for clearing and settling security trades for the next 15 days. These changes would allow an estimated $240 billion in covert government securities to be cleared upon maturity (September 12th) without the standard regulatory controls around identification of ownership.

While most media reports defer to the U.S. government contention that Osama Bin Laden was behind these attacks, foreign media provided reports suggesting that the “real power” behind Al Qaeda was unknown. As shall be seen, the financial power behind the attack is the same power that created these securities, and the same power as that which founded Al Qaeda.

THE BACKGROUND

In order to understand why the ongoing Federal investigations into the crimes funded by those securities needed to be ended or disrupted by destroying evidence in Buildings 6, 7 and 1, it is necessary to understand how the $240 billion in covert, and possibly illegal government funding, could have been created in September 1991 and also to know the background of 50 years of history of key financial organizations in the United States, where U.S. Intelligence became a key source of their off-balance sheet accounts.

The covert securities used to accomplish the original national security objective had ended up in the vaults of the brokers in the World Trade Centre, were destroyed on September 11, 2001, the day before they came due for settlement and clearing. Either a key group of senior National Security officials, who had participated in the victory of the economic cold war in 1991, considered the deaths and destruction as ‘collateral" damage to hide the existence of the covert activities or the destruction constituted a cover-up of continued lawlessness by a fraternity or brotherhood of businessmen and criminals that has remained in the shadows ever since.

THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE ATTACK

Most historians track the history of September 11th to 1998 when Osama Bin Laden declared a fatwa or jihad against the U.S., and the terrorist “Hamburg Group” led by Mohammed Atta reportedly “offered” it’s services to Al Qaeda. However, the history which defines the motives for the September 11 attacks goes much further back. The answers to the questions surrounding the cause of the WTC attack will be found in events during the presidency of George H.W. Bush and earlier. Insight into the activities of that period are cloaked by the Executive Order of George H.W. Bush’s son, President George W. Bush, who on November 1, 2001 issued Executive Order 13233. As a result public records which might have shed light on the activities of 1990 and 1991 remain shielded from public access. Consequently the reconstruction of events from the late 1980s and early 1990s is based on news reports, books and articles.

What the public record suggests is that with the beginning of the first Bush Presidency in 1989, George H.W. Bush initiated a programme of covert economic warfare to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. The name of this programme appears to be Project Hammer - a multi-billion dollar covert operation, whose investments remain shielded.

There is reason to believe that the plan was initially formulated by Reagan’s CIA Director, William Casey. Many of the programme operatives were probably engaged through official CIA and National Security channels. However, as a result of the experience gained by the Bush cabinet and its private sector counterparts during the secretive Iran-Contra and Ferdinand Marcos gold operations, the execution of that programme would be accompanied by a new assumption that the use of covert and illegal funding for a policy not approved by Congress would remain acceptable.

THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS

Numerous sources have documented that at the end of World War II, the treasury of the Japanese Empire was discovered in the Philippines by Edward Lansdale a member of the staff of General Charles Willoughby, who was General MacArthur’s chief of Intelligence. Lansdale and Severino Garcia Diaz Santa Romana tortured Major Kojima Kashii, General Yamashita Tomoyuki’s driver, until he revealed the sites of the gold. Then known as the "Golden Lily Treasure", this mass of wealth had been accumulated by the Japanese over fifty years from the pillaging of Southeast Asia and China by its army and had been deposited in the Philippines due to the U.S. submarine blockade of Japan. Reports vary, but documents in the public domain suggest the recovered treasure was in excess of 280,000 metric tonnes of gold.

Lansdale briefed Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy about the findings, and a U.S. Cabinet-level decision was made to confiscate the gold and cover-up its discovery. The gold would be added to the Black Eagle Trust fund which took its name from the Nazi Black Eagle stamped on the gold bars confiscated from the Reich and was the original source of funding for the trust. Over the years, the significance of the Nazi gold would pale in comparison to the confiscated Japanese treasure. As the fund grew, it was distributed in private accounts across the globe in over 100 banks, and administered by General Earle Cocke.

Lansdale and Santa Romana were made responsible for recovery of the treasure. They fabricated a “Communist Revolution” by the Hukbalahak rebels in order to confiscate the land where much of the gold was buried, and proceeded to mine it.

The Yamashita gold would become the cornerstone of the Black Eagle Fund, from which many covert operations of the U.S. intelligence would be funded. Under international law the gold should have been either returned to the countries from which it was stolen (as was done with the Nazi gold), or should have been incorporated into the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. Government’s continued efforts to stifle news on this matter provides prima facie evidence that the confiscation of this gold was illegal.

The men responsible for initiating and executing the confiscation of Nazi and Japanese treasury gold represent the most senior Intelligence officers in the U.S. and Britain at the end of World War II, and the Cabinet of the President of the United States. The financial institutions represented by these individuals would become the major financial banks in the world, along with the Swiss-German banks where they hid their gold.

Lansdale’s operation in the Philippines gave birth to most of the common features of modern covert operations for the U.S.Intelligence and initiated a bond between the US intelligence organizations and the Israeli intelligence. He also set precedents for the Intelligence community to retain the services of organized crime on U.S. soil and to use drug running as a way of financing activities,

The covert operations funded by the Black Eagle Trust in the 1960s and 1970s became visible stains on the global image of the U.S. despite all efforts to keep them under cover. In an effort to clean house, President Jimmy Carter would order the retirement of over 800 covert operatives. Many of these operatives would move into private consulting and security firms and be employed as subcontractors for covert operations. Thus began a loose association of private operatives that would be referred to as “the Enterprise” in the years to come. George H.W. Bush, having been CIA Director, had many acquaintances in this group, and would work with them to restore their influence and control over U.S. foreign policy and the foreign investment opportunities it created for their benefit.

Meantime Ferdinand Marcos, the pro-U.S. dictator of the Philippines, continued to discover even more of the buried treasure. and had started to sell it on the market during the 1970s with the assistance of Adnan Khashoggi. US Intelligence operations had been siphoning off the gold for three decades. However in 1986 Vice President George Bush took over the gold from Marcos and the gold was removed to a series of banks, notably Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, UBS and Banker’s Trust, and held in a depository in Kloten Switzerland. What happened to the Marcos gold after it was confiscated by U.S. agents in 1986 has never been reported, but throughout the early 1990s, the world gold market would be befuddled by the mysterious appearance of thousands of tonnes of gold which appeared to suppress the price of gold.

In South east Asia operations were financed through Nugan Hand Bank in Australia which would be one of the many banks used for transferring the Marcos gold from the Philippines into covert operations. Frank Nugan’s family ran the primary supply shipping operation between the U.S. Navy base in the Philippines and Australia. Frank Nugan's business partner, Peter Abeles, and Henry Keswick, together with Canadian businessman Peter Munk, would link with Adnan Kashoggi, Sheikh Kamal and Edgar Bronfmann in a series of operations which ultimately would evolve into Barrick Gold.

In 1992, George H.W. Bush served on the Advisory Board of Barrick Gold. The Barrick operation would create billions of dollars of paper gold by creating ‘gold derivatives’. A major distribution channel for the sale of Barrick’s gold futures would be Enron. Enron would also become the vehicle by which oil and gas contracts from the former Soviet Union (vehicles for Soviet money-laundering) were processed. Barrick, which has no mining operations in Europe, used two refineries in Switzerland: MKS Finance S.A. and Argor-Heraeus S.A. – both on the Italian border near Milan, a few hours away from the gold depository in Zurich. The question that Barrick and other banks needed to avoid answering is: what gold was Barrick refining in Switzerland, as they have no mines in that region?

Barrick would become a quiet gold producing partner for a number of major banks, and its activities became subject to an FBI investigation into gold-price-fixing. The records on this investigation were kept in the FBI office on the 23rd floor of the North Tower which was destroyed by bomb blasts shortly before the Tower collapsed. The ultimate destination of the "Golden Lily Treasure", and the source of the ‘loaned’ gold that flooded the market for 10 years has never been officially explained.

The records of many of those transactions disappeared when Enron collapsed and the trading operation and all its records were taken over by UBS, another major recipient of Marcos gold. The FBI was reportedly conducting an investigation into those transactions, and the investigation files were kept on the 23rd floor of the North Tower of the WTC. A review of the personal accounts of September 11 now suggests that office was deliberately targeted with explosives prior to the collapse of the WTC.

Another key player in the Marcos gold was Banker’s Trust, which was taken over by Alex Brown & Sons, after Banker’s Trust floundered financially on its Russian loans in the mid 1990s. These Russian loans were facilitated by Enron, starting in August of 1993, and very possibly were part of the Project Hammer takeover of Soviet industry.

Amongst those brought into the picture by the involvement of Alex Brown was J. Carter Beese who was Executive Director of the CIA at the time of September 11. He was appointed by George H.W. Bush to the board of directors of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in 1992. Since 1992, OPIC has provided more than $4.5 billion in finance and insurance to more than 140 projects in Russia. He was also Chairman of Riggs Bank and also President of Riggs Capital Partners. Riggs controlled the famous Riggs-Valmet consultants who set up the international financial apparatus for the Russian oligarchs and rogue KGB allowing them to steal the Soviet treasury and destroy the Russian economy. Carter Beese’s death was reported as a suicide in 2006.

It appears that in September 1991, George H.W. Bush and Alan Greenspan did indeed finance $240 billion in bonds in a buy-out of the Soviet Union as part of a broader programme to attack the economy of the Soviet Union. In addition President George H.W. Bush had initiated a number of related covert operations to take over certain sectors of the Soviet economy,

The covert business dealings with the Iranians and Israelis which originated with Kashoggi and Kimche in July 1980 in Hamburg under the October Surprise arrangement, would provide an opening to the Soviet KGB that would allow the U.S. to fund a coup against Gorbachev in 1991. It would grow into a larger covert operation over the years, and be overshadowed by the larger Iran-Contra operation. Members of Bush’s covert intelligence cadre sold weapons to Iran, an avowed enemy of the U.S., and illegally used the profits to continue funding anti-Communist rebels, the Contras, in Nicaragua.

The entire Iran-Contra operation almost fell apart in 1986 and became public when the Nicaraguan government shot down a U.S. plane carrying weapons to the Contra rebels However the Iran-Contra team continued to violate the law even while being investigated by Congress.

Emboldened by the lack of consequences for subverting the U.S. constitution and breaking international law during the Iran-Contra scandal, the Bush administration group known as “the Vulcans” planned a bigger drive to crush Soviet Russia.

The programme also seems to have lined the pockets of the individuals that executed this policy, at US taxpayer expense. This was done to the tune of the $240 billion dollars in covert and allegedly illegal bonds, which appear to have been replaced with Treasury notes backed by U.S. taxpayers in the aftermath of September 11.

THE VULCAN’S COVERT ECONOMIC WAR ON THE SOVIET UNION

In 1988, Riggs Bank, under the direction of Jonathan Bush and J Carter Beese, would purchase controlling interest in a Swiss company named Valmet. In early 1989, the new subsidiary of Riggs called Riggs-Valmet would initiate contact with a group of KGB officers and their front-men to start setting up an international network for moving money out of the former Soviet block countries.

In the first phase of the economic attack on the Soviet Union, George Bush authorized Leo Wanta and others to destabilize the ruble and facilitate the theft of the Soviet/Russian treasury. This would result in draining the Russian treasury of between 2,000 to 3,000 tonnes of gold bullion, ($35 billion at the time). This step would prevent a monetary defence of the ruble and thus destabilize the currency. The gold was ‘stolen’ in March of 1991, facilitated by Leo Wanta and signed off by Boris Yeltsin’s right hand man. The majority of the leaked reports from the CIA and FBI suggest the theft of the Russian treasury was a KGB and Communist party operation, but what those reports omitted was the extensive involvement of Boris Yeltsin, the U.S. CIA and the U.S. banking industry.

In November 1989 George H.W. Bush appears to have arranged for Alton G. Keel Jr, a minor player in the Iran-Contra scandal to go to work at Riggs Bank, which would become the controlling owner of a small Swiss bank operation known as Valmet. The Riggs-Valmet operation, would become the ‘consultants’ to the World Bank and to several KGB front operations run by future Russian oligarchs Khordokovsky, Konanykhine, Berezovsky and Abromovich. These soon-to-be Russian oligarchs had been set-up as front men by KGB Generals Aleksey (Alexei) Kondaurov; and Fillipp Bobkov, who previously reported to Victor Cherbrikov, who worked with Robert Maxwell, a British financial mogul, an Israeli secret service agent, and a representative of U.S. intelligence interests, who had been introduced to George Bush in 1976 by Senator Tower for the sole purpose of using Maxwell as an intermediary between Bush and the Soviet Intelligence. Maxwell assisted Cherbrikov in selling military weaponry to Iran and the Nicaraguan Contras during the course of the Iran Contra deals, and made hundreds of millions of dollars available to Cherbrikov’s Russian banks. These two would bring a previously unknown politician and construction foreman named Boris Yeltsin from the hinterlands of Russia to the forefront of Russian politics through providing 50% of Yeltsin’s campaign funding.

In the second phase, there were two major operations: the largest was coordinated by Alan Greenspan, Oliver North, and implemented by Leo Wanta. George Soros and a group of Bush appointees who began to destabilize the ruble. They are accused of fronting $240 billion in covert securities to support the various aspects of this plan.These bonds were created (in part or in whole) from a secretive Durham Trust, managed by ex-OSS/CIA officer, Colonel Russell Hermann. This war chest had been created with the Marcos gold.

Shortly before the attempted coup of 1991, Maxwell met Kruchkov on Maxwell’s private yacht. Shortly afterwards, Maxwell died mysteriously on his yacht while Senator Tower died in a plane crash under suspicious circumstances in April of 1991.

In the meantime, Riggs Bank was quickly solidifying banking relations with two of the old Iran-Contra scandal participants: Swiss bankers Bruce Rappaport, and Alfred Hartmann. Through this group George Soros opened a second front assault on the ruble. It is at this stage of the operation that three more groups would be brought into the plan by Rappaport and Hartmann: The Russian Mafiya, the Israeli Mossad, and the Rothschild family interests represented by Jacob Rothschild.

Soros and Rappaport would ensure that the Rothschild financial interests would be the silent backers for a number of the undisclosed deals. The Rothschild interests would also be seen on the board of directors of Barrick Gold.

In the fourth phase of the secret war, the Enterprise worked on several fronts to take over key energy industries. On the Caspian front of this economic war, James Giffen was sent to Kazakhstan to work with President Nazarbayev in various legal and illegal efforts to gain control of what was estimated to be the world’s largest untapped oil reserves - Kazak oil in the Caspian. The illegal flow of money from the various oil companies would reach a number of banks. These same oil interests would engage March Rich and the Israeli Eisenberg Group, owned by one of the Mossad’s key operatives, Shaul Eisenberg, to move the oil. (The Eisenberg Group would at some point own almost 50% of Zim Shipping, which mysteriously and inexplicably moved out of the World Trade Center a few weeks before the September 11 attacks.)

Like the other events linked with Project Hammer, the coup was all about the money. The coup began the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the reign of Boris Yeltsin and his ‘family’ of Russian Mafiya Oligarchs, and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. In the final phase, a series of operatives assigned by President George H.W. Bush would begin the takeover of prized Russian and CIS industrial assets in oil, metals and defence. This was done by financing and managing the money-laundering for the Russian oligarchs through the Bank of New York, AEB and Riggs Bank.

A closer look at other activities leading up to these phases makes it clear that is was a U.S. orchestrated intelligence effort from the beginning. The economic war involved Gerald Corrigan of the NY Federal Reserve Bank, George Soros, an international currency speculator who was responsible for crashing the British pound a few years earlier, former Ambassador to Germany R. Mark Palmer, and Ronald Lauder-financier and heir to the Estee Lauder estate. Palmer and Lauder would lead a group of American investors in an Operation called the Central European Development Corporation, and combine forces with George Soros and the NM Rothschild Continuation Trust. This group ending up controlling Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant, while the Riggs group ended up controlling Yukos, the oil giant. Ownership for both remains largely ‘hidden’ today, while its front men endure the hardships of the Russian wrath by spending time in prison.

Meanwhile, across the Caspian Sea, Bush had assigned a wide array of former Iran-Contra operatives to take a role in Azerbaijan. Initially, he sent in the covert operatives Richard Armitage and Richard Secord who worked with their old colleague from the Mossad, David Kimche, and their old arms running colleagues Adnan Kashoggi and Farhad Azima to hire, transport, and train several thousand Al Qaeda mercenaries to fight on behalf of the Azeri freedom fighters! Osama Bin Laden was reported to have been part of this mercenary force.

THE SEPTEMBER 11TH COVER-UP OF THE BLACK EAGLE TRUST AND PROJECT HAMMER

Ten years later in 2001, these programmes had finally come back to haunt the U.S. policy makers. Most, if not all of these programmes appear to have stepped outside of the boundaries of the law. As a result, investigative agencies from Britain, Switzerland, Russia, Kazakhstan and the Philippines were putting pressure on Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice to open up the accounts in the banks used to finance these covert activities. Pressure was being put on the Swiss banking cartel to open its bullion records to public scrutiny. Full disclosure by these banks during an investigation would have resulted in a major exposure of U.S. Government complicity in some of the greatest financial frauds of the 1980s and early 1990s as well as 50 years of gold bullion theft by numerous U.S. and British government agencies. Moreover, investigation into these accounts would disclose a National Security secret known as the Black Eagle fund, and virtually every covert operation since World War II. Bringing an end to these investigations and preventing this disclosure was the sole objective for the destruction of the WTC and Pentagon.

These investigative and legal pressures began to accumulate in 1997, and in February 1998, Osama Bin Laden declared his fatwa, and Atta started planning the September 11 attacks.

With the bonds out in the market, they had sat for ten years, like a ticking time bomb. At some point, they had to be settled - or cashed in, on September 12, 2001. The two firms in the U.S. most likely to be handling them would be Cantor Fitzgerald and Eurobrokers – the two largest government securities firms in the U.S. The federal agency mostly involved in investigating those transactions was the Office of Naval Intelligence. On September 11 those same three organizations: the two largest government securities brokers and the Office of Naval Intelligence in the US took near direct hits.

What happened inside the buildings of the World Trade on September 11 is difficult, but not impossible to discern. The government has put a seal on the testimony gathered by the investigating 911 Commission, and instructed government employees to not speak on the matter or suffer severe penalties, but there are a number of personal testimonies posted on the internet as to what happened in those buildings that day. Careful reconstruction from those testimonies indicates the deliberate destruction of evidence not only by a targeted assault on the buildings, but also by targeted fires and explosions. In the event that either the hijacking failed, or the buildings were not brought down, the evidence would be destroyed by fires.

Even more revealing would be the actions of the Federal Reserve Bank and the Securities and Exchange Commission on that day, and in the immediate aftermath. As one of many coincidences on September 11, the Federal Reserve Bank was operating its information system from its remote back-up site rather than it’s downtown headquarters. The SEC and Federal Reserve system remained unfazed by the attack on September 11. All of their systems continued to operate. The two major security trading firms had their trade data backed up on remote systems. Nevertheless, the Commission for the first time invoked its emergency powers under Securities Exchange Act Section 12(k) and issued several orders to ease certain regulatory restrictions temporarily.

On the first day of the crisis, the SEC lifted “Rule 15c3-3 -Customer Protection--Reserves and Custody of Securities,” which set trading rules for the certain processes. Simply GSCC was allowed to substitute securities for the physical securities destroyed during the attack.

Subsequent to that ruling, the GSCC issued another memo expanding blind broker settlements. A “blind broker” is a mechanism for inter-dealer transactions that maintains the anonymity of both parties to the trade. The broker serves as the agent to the principals' transactions.

Thus the Federal Reserve and its GSCC had created a settlement environment totally void of controls and reporting – where it could substitute valid, new government securities for the mature, illegal securities, and not have to record where the bad securities came from, or where the new securities went – all because the paper for the primary brokers for US securities had been eliminated.

This act alone, however was inadequate to resolve the problem, because the Federal Reserve did not have enough “takers” of the new 10 year notes. Rather than simply having to match buy and sell orders, which was the essence of resolving the “fail” problem, it appears the Fed was doing more than just matching and balancing – it was pushing new notes on the market with a special auction.

If the Federal Reserve had to cover-up the clearance of $240 Billion in covert securities, they could not let the volume of capital shrink by that much in the time of a monetary crisis. They would have had to push excess liquidity into the market, and then phase it out for a soft landing, which is exactly what appears to have happened. In about two months, the money supply was back to where it was prior to 9/11.

It was the rapid rotation of the securities settlement fails in the aftermath of September 11th that appears to have allowed the Bank of New York and the Federal Reserve to engage in a securities refinancing that resulted in the American taxpayer refinancing the $240 billion originally used for the Great Ruble Scam.

The reports published by the Federal Reserve argue that the Federal Reserve’s actions increasing the monetary supply by over $300 billion were justified to overcome operational difficulties in the financial sector.

What appears to be the case is that the Federal Reserve imbalances reported on three consecutive days in the aftermath were largely concentrated at the Bank of New York, which is reported to represent over 90% of the imbalance, suggesting the Bank had been the recipient of massive fund transfers, and unable to send out transfers.This supposedly was due to major communication and system failures.In fact, none of the Bank of New York's systems failed or went non-operational.

The Wall Street Journal reported:

"There is every reason to believe activities in the Bank of New York in the aftermath of September 11th are worthy of suspicion..... At one point during the week after September 11, the Bank of New York publicly reported to be overdue on $100 billion in payments.” It suggests that certain key unknown figures in the Federal Reserve may have been in collusion with key unknown figures at the Bank of New York to create a situation where $240 billion in off balance sheet securities created in 1991 as part of an official covert operation to overthrow the Soviet Union, could be cleared without publicly acknowledging their existence.These securities, originally managed by Cantor Fitzgerald, were cleared and settled in the aftermath of September 11th through the Bank of New York. The $100 billion account balance bubble reported by the Wall Street Journal as being experienced by the Bank of New York was the tip of a three-day operation, when these securities were moved from off-balance-sheet to the balance sheet.

The above gives an idea of the intricate activities both to perpetrate and then to cover the crime, which was then used under its "terrorist attack" label as an excuse for the attack on Iraq.

 

 
August 3-5, 2012 -- *****10 BELLS***** -- Federal judge's firm trained lead 9/11 hijacker

U.S. Judge for the the Middle District of Alabama Mark Fuller, scheduled to re-sentence former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman on August 3 in Montgomery, was the previous owner of a firm that trained accused 9/11 lead hijacker Mohammed Atta. The information on Fuller's links to the 9/11 attack were uncovered by a former Republican Party campaign aid in Alabama who spoke to WMR on background.

WMR previously reported on Fuller's financial dealings with Doss Aviation, which, among other government business, had the contract to re-fuel Air Force One. Havong had trained Atta, as well as Saudi, Iranian, and other Egyptian pilots to fly aircraft, the Colorado Springs, Colorado-based Doss Aviation was in a position to help carry out threats against Air Force One that were received by the presidential airplane's pilot on 9/11, specifically "Angel is next." Angel was the classified code word used at the time to denote Air Force One.

Ironically, as we reported earlier: "It is also noteworthy that the Doss Aviation active contract web page has a photo of the World Trade Center shaded in the colors of the U.S. flag. Fuller's firm has seen a growth in contracts and profits since the 9/11 attacks and U.S. military action in Iraq and Afghanistan."

On July 25, 2007, WMR reported: "Information culled from Internet web archives of previous Doss Aviation web pages indicate that the firm was involved in training Saudi and Iranian pilots. Both Newsweek and Knight Ridder reported that three to five of the 9/11 hijackers had attended military training courses in the United States. They included Mohamed Atta who attended the International Officers' School at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama." WMR can now report that one of the pilots Doss trained was Atta. The Egyptian-born pilot and accused Al Qaeda terrorist cell leader was often seen at the officer's club at Maxwell Air Force Base, where he was known as "Lieutenant Colonel" or merely "Colonel" Mohammed Atta of the Egyptian Air Force.

In 2002, Air Force Lt. Col Steve Butler, vice chancellor for student affairs at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, stated in a letter to the Monterey County Herald that "Bush knew about the impending attacks." Butler was disciplined by the Air Force for his remarks. However, the Air Force appears to have had a good reason to silence anyone who was in a position to shine the light on Air Force culpability in 9/11 and Siegelman, a former Alabama Attorney General and later governor during the 9/11 attack was worrisome to the 9/11 plotters.

Saeed Alghamdi, one of the Saudi 9/11 hijackers, had reportedly attended classes at DLI. On July 27, 2007, WMR reported, "Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen Feaga, the lead prosecutor in the Siegelman/(former HealthSouth CEO Richard) Scrushy] case, is a colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve and is an assistant to Staff Judge Advocate Brig. Gen. Richard C. Harding at Langley Air Force Base, the principal legal adviser to the Air Combat Staff. Feaga and his boss Harding have jurisdiction over all legal matters at Langley, including contracts awarded to Doss Aviation.

Federal Judge Mark Fuller, who tried and convicted Siegelman and Scrushy, is a current principal of Doss Aviation, a major conflict of interest for a sitting federal judge."

The Justice Department case against Siegelman and Scrushy was not staged out of the Federal building in Montgomery but in a 40,000 square foot building at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base outside of Montgomery. The use of a military base to carry out a civil prosecution, especially against a former governor, was highly unusual and virtually unprecedented and represented an ominous incursion of the military into civilian law enforcement and the justice system.

However, when Fuller's links to Doss and that firm's training of at least one of the accused 9/11 hijackers is considered, the use of Maxwell, Atta's one-time duty station, was not unusual and represented an attempt by Fuller and top Justice Department officials to cover-up the Pentagon's role in 9/11.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Elena Kagan, while Solicitor General under Attorney General Eric Holder, did nothing to vacate or alleviate the politically-motivated charges against Siegelman. In Holder and President Obama kept in place as U.S. Attorney in Montgomery Leura Canary, the wife of Alabama GOP grand mufti Bill Canary, a friend of Karl Rove.

It was only after Fuller's wife, Lisa Boyd Fuller, became aware of an on-going affair between Fuller and one of his deputy clerks, Kelli Gregg, that the judge's links to Doss became a problem. Some five months before Mrs. Fuller filed divorce papers against Fuller on May 10, 2012, Doss Aviation was sold to J.F. Lehman & Company, which is owned by former Navy Secretary and 9/11 Commission member John Lehman. The law firm that worked out the details of the sale was Jones Day, a firm with close ties to the Republican Party and the Central Intelligence Agency. By divesting himself of Doss's assets, Fuller could escape his wife's claims on Doss profits as shared marriage assets. Te sale of Doss to Lehman would also protect the U.S. government's foreknowledge of the events of 9/11.

Siegelman and his lawyers will argue for leniency before Fuller in Montgomery. It is a mark of our corrupt judicial system that it is Siegelman who is on trial and Fuller who is the presiding judge. In a more perfect world and in a more perfect union, it would be Judge Siegelman deciding the fate of Mr. Fuller, a corrupt former Republican Party operative and aider and abettor of terrorism.

WMR  Wife of 9/11 Commission co-chair killed by her own car   ...August 14-15, 2012

On August 11, a month from the 11th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks, Nancy Hamilton, the 82-year old wife of former U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton, the former chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the co-chair of the 9/11 Commission that investigated the attacks, was killed when her own vehicle ran her over in the parking lot of a veterinarian's office.

Mrs. Hamilton, according to Bloomington Police, did not have her vehicle's transmission in park when she exited the car around 4:15 pm to retrieve her pet from the back. When Hamilton went behind the vehicle, a later model Toyota Camry, the car backed up and ran her over. The Monroe County medical examiner reported that Mrs. Hamilton died from massive blunt force to her chest and head. The police said the car knocked over Mrs. Hamilton and then proceeded to roll over her. Mrs. Hamilton was transported from the incident scene on the 4500 block of East Third Street and she died hours later at IU Health-Bloomington Hospital.

It is unusual that the police waited two days to report the seemingly bizarre incident involving Mrs. Hamilton and her death, which was ultimately ruled an accident. The Associated Press, NBC News, and local Indiana newspapers and radio and television stations did not report the death of Mrs. Hamilton for almost two full days. The police also made it known that Mrs. Hamilton was alone at the time of the accident.

Although for over a decade, drivers have not been able to remove the key from the ignition unless the transmission was in park, Mrs. Hamilton exited the vehicle, walked behind it to retrieve her pet from the back, and the vehicle went into reverse and ran her over. The Bloomington police have made it clear that they consider the case closed.

Newspaper and television network web site blogs became inundated not with messages of remorse but a spate of postings that criticized states for allowing the elderly to drive and that Mrs. Hamilton deserved what she got under "Obamacare." Many of the postings appeared to be automatically-generated from government "sock puppet" software used heavily by the intelligence services and military.

Friends of Mrs. Hamilton revealed that despite her 82 years of age, she maintained all her mental faculties, with one stating Mrs. Hamilton was "sharp as a tack."

The method in which Mrs. Hamilton died was not the first such bizarre death involving a driver-less vehicle and someone close to the 9/11 investigation. This editor reported the following on October 10, 2003: October 10 , 2003, 1200 PDT, -- WASHINGTON, At around 9 PM on September 29, Fairfax County, Virginia police responded to a 911 call describing an accident. However, they soon discovered they were not dealing with a routine emergency but the mysterious death of an employee of the 47-year old brother of President George W. Bush, venture capitalist Marvin Bush. Sixty-two year old Bertha Champagne, described as a long time "baby sitter" for Marvin and Margaret Bush's two children, son Walker, 13, and daughter Marshall, 17, was found crushed to death by her own vehicle in a driveway in front of the Bush family home in the Alexandria section of Fairfax County. Champagne reportedly lived at the Bush family home.

Champagne had left the residence to retrieve something from her car, which police say had somehow been "left in gear."

On October 21, 2005, WMR was the first to report on the contents of the police report on the Champagne death, a copy of which we were able to obtain from the Fairfax County Police Department. The police never officially released the report. The report, written by Pfc C. E. Beech, stated: "September 09-29-03 at approximately 2130 hours I was contacted by the on duty PSCC supervisor to respond to 6202 Ft. Hunt Rd. for a single vehicle fatality. While on scene I discovered a black Olds Bravada in the tree line and two small blood pools in the drive way. There was also blood and glass debris in the driveway. The operator of the vehicle was transported by ground to Mt. Vernon Memorial Hospital and identified as Bertha Champagne. Bertha was a maid for Marvin Bush who resides at 6202 Ft. Hunt Rd. By the time I arrived on scene the body was already transported to Mt. Vernon Hospital by ground. During the course of my investigation I interviewed Marvin Bush. Marvin stated that he arrived home at approximately 2045 hours. He advised me that he had a brief conversation with with Bertha in the kitchen. Bertha then tells Marvin that she wants to show him a video tape of her and President Bush. She then leaves the residence to take out the family dogs and retrieve the video tape. There are no witnesses to the crash. There were no signs of any other type of crime involved with this event. The victim had all her money in her wallet and all her personal belongings such as jewelry and a watch in her possession. According to the Medical Examiner, Bertha's injuries were related to this crash. There were no blunt injuries or injuries related to a robbery or a carjacking."

The official police announcement of Champagne's death made no mention of Marvin Bush or a video tape: "A 62-year-old Alexandria area woman died after being pinned between a rolling car and a building. The crash happened on Monday, around 9 pm, near the intersection of Fort Hunt Road and Edgehill Drive. Bertha Champagne had gone outside to get something from a car in a driveway. The car, which was left in gear, began to roll forward. Champagne was pinned between the car and a small building next to the driveway. The car continued to roll down the driveway, crossed Fort Hunt Road, and came to rest in a wooded area. Champagne was taken to Inova Mount Vernon Hospital where she was pronounced dead."

As in the case of Nancy Hamilton's Toyota Camry, Champagne's 2000 Olds Bravada could not have easily slipped out of gear with the keys removed from the ignition. For at least 15 years, most cars' ignitions lock if the car's transmission is not placed in park.

As WMR reported on October 21, 2005: "The police report refers to Marvin Bush's occupation as 'sales.' In fact, Marvin Bush served on the board of Securacom (renamed Stratesec). Just a few weeks prior to Champagne's death, Securacom (which provided security for Dulles International Airport and the World Trade Center on 9-11) filed for bankruptcy. Bush also served on the board of HCC Insurance Holdings, inc. (formerly Houston Casualty Company), one of the re-insurers for the World Trade Center. Marvin Bush is also a co-founder of Winston Partners Group, a financial investment firm, along with A. Scott Andrews, a former chief financial officer (until 1994) for Worldcom. Bush had also served on the board of Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., a Palestinian-owned firm with headquarters in the Cayman Islands and a U.S. office in Coral Gables, Florida. In 2002, Bush left the board after it became the subject of a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation."

Bertha Champagne, as now reported from Bloomington, Indiana, was not the only person with a link to the events of 9/11 to die in a similar manner. Nancy Hamilton's husband, Lee Hamilton, widely criticized for not fully investigating 9/11, later revealed that the commission had been lied to by the CIA, among others. In December 2007, Hamilton said, "Did they the CIA] obstruct our inquiry? The answer is clearly yes." Hamilton also said senior military officers, including those from the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), "misrepresented the facts" to the Commission, and the Commission considered "recommending criminal charges for such false statement."

In their book, Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, Hamilton and fellow 9/11 chair and former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean,wrote that the 9/11 Commission was "set up to fail," reiterating that Pentagon and Federal Aviation Aviation (FAA) officials repeatedly lied and that the commission considered launching a separate investigation into obstruction of justice by the the Bush administration." Lee Hamilton remains a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, a part of the Department of Homeland Security.

With the chairmen of the 9/11 Commission maintaining that the commission was "set up to fail," it is not a leap to consider that two women who were only once removed from two key players in the investigation of 9/11 -- Lee Hamilton and Marvin Bush -- were "set up" to die.

 

WMR Cleaning up the 9/11 evidence and clues in Florida  August 15-16, 2012 --
Venice, FL (WMR) -- It was not long after the 9/11 attacks that federal law enforcement began seizing crime scene evidence in New York; Arlington, Virginia, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Florida, where several of the alleged 9/11 hijackers trained, has been no exception to the "clean-up" operations.

In Venice, where alleged hijackers Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah received flight training, Atta and al-Shehhi at Huffman Aviation and Jarrah at Florida Flight Training Center, both located at Venice Airport, what was once the talk of the town is now hardly mentioned. Venice, which has a population with an average age of 69, is back to being a sleepy retirement community on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. Here, "911" is likely to be a normal evening bedtime rather than a reference to an infamous date in recent U.S. history.

The current residents of the Sandpiper Apartments are, for the most part, unaware that their complex was the focus of an investigation of lead hijacker Mohammed Atta, A local stripper, Amanda Keller, claimed to have lived in an apartment at the complex from March to April 2001. However, Keller later changed her story and moved away from Venice. Keller can be forgiven for changing her story. While the FBI maintains that Atta was only in Venice attending flight school from July to December 2000 at Huffmann Aviation, which is across the Airport Avenue East from the Sandpiper Apartments, residents of Venice saw Atta in the town in the the weeks leading up to 9/11. They recognized his face immediately after it was aired on television following the attacks. From a pharmacist where Atta had prescriptions filled, to a deli counter worker at Publix who made Atta his sandwiches, the description was the same: a rude and arrogant man with a glassy stare that indicated he had, somehow, been in a mental institution or "brainwashed."

The apartment, center, upper floor, where Mohammed Atta is said to have lived with Amanda Kelly in the weeks leading up to 9/11.

Accompanying Atta in the weeks before 9/11 was his father, reportedly a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. One Venice resident also claimed that when she was at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, she and her colleagues saw Mohammed Atta, who was wearing the uniform of an Egyptian Air Force colonel.

How did the FBI react to eyewitness claims? They told them they were mistaken. The man they thought was Atta was some other arrogant and wealthy Arab who just happened to be in a community of 10,000 mostly retired people for some unknown reason.

Local townspeople knew Atta was in their town six weeks before 9/11. He had been seen having dinner with Rudi Dekkers, the shady owner of Huffman Aviation. In 1999, Dekkers and his partner, Wally Hilliard, bought Huffman Aviation. According to a Venice CIA source, the choice of Dekkers to be involved in a U.S. and foreign intelligence operation on the scale of 9/11 was unwise. The source said that using a Dutchman in such an operation was "untidy," referring to Dekkers's criminal past in the Netherlands and the CIA's long history with Dutch operatives, who like to get drunk and start talking.

For the 9/11 plotters, Venice was a weak link that could have exposed the entire criminal conspiracy behind 9/11. Atta's noticeable disagreeable public persona, coupled with Dekkers's "untidiness," threatened to link the Venice flight training operation to Governor Jeb Bush in Tallahassee and all the way to the White House in Washington. Even the Venice police chief posed a problem. He had often said that the police were ordered by the city fathers of Venice never to question or interfere with the operations at the tower-less airport, operations that included Blackhawk helicopters swooping in for only a few seconds, sometimes around 3:00 am, when they would pick up or discharge passengers. The political leadership of Venice was beholden to the man who was heavily invested in the town: Jackson Stephens, the billionaire Little Rock, Arkansas tycoon who had helped bankroll the presidential campaigns of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

Venice Municipal Airport was used by the military during World War II as a base. But it was not just any regular base, it was used by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA, to train Nationalist Chinese pilots to fight against the Japanese. The operation was overseen by General Claire Chennault, to founder of the Flying Tigers that assisted Chiang Kai-shek's forces before and during America's entry into World War II. Chennault was also a founder of the Civil Air Patrol, which is headquartered at Maxwell Air Force Base. Chennault was a supporter of the Louisiana Civil Air Patrol, which once counted James Bath, George W. Bush's Texas Air National Guard friend; Drug Enforcement Administration informant and pilot Barry Seal; alleged John F. Kennedy assassination conspirator David Ferrie; and accused Kennedy assassin Lee Harvey Oswald as members.

Huffman Aviation, once the interest of the FBI, with a new identity: Soncoast Air Center.

Today, Amanda Keller has moved away to start a new life. Huffman Aviation was bought and now the building is called "Suncoast Air Center." Huffman's original corporate records have disappeared into an administrative "black hole." And Venice has returned to a sleepy retirement community.

 

WMR  August 20-21, 2012, Key West, FL (WMR) -- Mohammed Atta's mysterious passport
WMR's investigation of accused 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta's whereabouts prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks strongly indicate that he was sent to Key West, Florida in order to provide a plausible cover story about his passport that would be provided to the media following the attacks.

New York Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik reported to CBS's News's Scott Pelley that "one of the hijackers'" passports was found 3 to 4 blocks away from the debris from the collapsed World Trade Center. It was later reported that the passport was in pristine condition and managed to survive that way in explosive temperatures that incinerated the hijacked American Airlines Boeing 767's "black boxes" and melted steel in the World Trade Center. It was also later reported that the pristine passport belonged to another hijacker, Satam al-Suqumi, and was found by a "pedestrian." It should be kept in mind that for weeks after 9/11, only authorized individuals were permitted near "Ground Zero." Unauthorized persons were not permitted to go south beyond 34th Street.

It was also reported that a "Mohamed Atta" (there are a number of transliterations of Arabic names into English and Mohamed is often interchanged with Mohammed and Muhammad) traveled on a novelty passport issued by the Conch Republic, a fantasy nation that was established as a protest in 1982 by the Florida Keys to the creation of a detached U.S. border station on U.S. Highway 1 in Florida City, just south of Homestead, to check for illegal aliens heading north from the Keys. The people of the Keys decided if they were going to be treated like foreigners, they would secede from the United States. The border check was finally removed but the Conch Republic lived on, not so much as a political protest, but as a humorous symbolic republic that worked in tandem with the Chamber of Commerce of the Keys and the municipal government of Key West to promote tourism and the uniqueness of the Florida Keys. The mayor of Key West also serves as the "prime minister" of the Conch Republic.

But the humor of the Conch Republic and the novelty passports it issues was seemingly lost on some individuals who, in September 2000, began applying for the novelty passports from locations in Pakistan, India, and the United Arab Emirates. The sudden spate of such requests led officials of the Conch Republic to notify the immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Miami of a potential problem with people who might be trying to enter the United States illegally by using the novelty passports. The INS never responded but the Conch Republic drafted a letter for the record that such a report was made to the INS.

In February 2001, Mohamed Atta and his stripper/lingerie model girlfriend, Amanda Keller, were spotted all over Key West. They were seen at the Red Garter, a notorious Key West strip club; the Hard Rock Cafe; and Sloppy Joe's, the name of the haunt where novelist Ernest Hemingway drank and, on occasion, pointed out to his friends the FBI agents who were in the bar watching him.

But while Hemingway drew the interest of the FBI, the bureau had no similar interest in Atta. It was while Atta and Keller were at the Hard Rock Cafe that Atta left to pick up a mysterious German-speaking man who arrived at Key West International Airport. The German-speaking man stayed with Atta and his girlfriend for a few days. After a few days, Atta, Keller, and the German left Key West. There have been some reports that the German man was Wolfgang Bohringer, a Swiss-German who tried to establish a flight school in Kiribati in the South Pacific but was asked to leave by that nation's president. Bohringer has been rumored to be a longtime CIA asset from the shady ranks of the agency that have also reportedly included Rudi Dekkers, the owner of Huffman Aviation, the Venice, Florida flight school where Atta was enrolled.

After 9/11, two FBI agents arrived at the door of the Conch Republic, located in a traditional Key West wood-frame house on Simonton Street, a block away from the tourist shops and bars on Duval Street. It was clear that the agents were there because of what was allegedly "found" in the rubble in New York: a passport issued in September 2000 to a Mohamed Atta, who applied for it using a New York City mailing address. The FBI was told that the Conch Republic was suspicious about some passport requests received the previous year from the Middle East and Indian sub-continent and that the information was conveyed to the INS without a response.

The Conch Republic voluntarily turned over to the FBI agents bankers' boxes containing some 25,000 Conch Republic passport applications, including addresses, telephone numbers, copies of supporting identification documents, and even the DNA from licked envelopes and postage stamps. It was from these files that an application from a "Mohamed Atta" in New York was discovered, but the FBI presumably already knew that from what was found in perfect shape in the debris of the World Trade Center. Instead of keeping the information about Atta secure, the FBI leaked the Conch Republic passport application information to the Miami Herald. The paper dispatched reporter Jennifer Babson to Key West to interview Conch Republic Secretary General Peter Anderson. Babson asked Anderson why Atta "had been using a Conch Republic passport to travel." In fact, there was never any evidence that Atta had personally possessed such a passport, let alone having traveled on one.

The Herald's FBI source or sources were not truthful in what they passed on to the paper, information that was repeated in Babson's October 3, 2001, article: the article states that "Mohamed Atta" signed the Conch Republic's registration book at their Key West headquarters (currently, visits to the headquarters are by appointment and walk-ins are not permitted). However, the Herald reported that agents were unable to find Atta's passport application in the 25,000 files. WMR has been told that there was such an application and it was mailed from New York City, where there was never any record of the alleged hijacker Atta having stayed.

There are strong suspicions by informed parties in Key West that someone else applied for the Conch Republic passport using the name Mohamed Atta and when the time was right, the passport was dropped into the debris on Vesey Street near the Trade Center site. In turn, the passport was handed to Kerik.

Kerik, who is presently serving a prison term after a federal corruption conviction, has never revealed who gave him the passport in question. Sources have told WMR that Kerik expressed fear that he spoke too much about the details of 9/11, he would be placed in the general prison population -- a virtual death sentence for a police officer -- rather than in the minimum security prison where he is now serving out his term.

Atta's only known passport was his Egyptian passport, number 1617066, with a U.S. B1/B2 visa, number 34137932, issued at the U.S. embassy in Berlin on May 18, 2000.

The visit by the two FBI agents, supervisory resident agent Rae Bliss and her deputy Anthony Russo, to the Conch Republic office on suspicion that Atta may have used a novelty passport is not supported by the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission, which stated: "The FBI and CIA have uncovered no evidence that Atta held any fraudulent passports." WMR learned that FBI agent Bliss's husband was, at the time of the investigation, a CIA officer assigned to the Joint Task Force-Key West, a component of the U.S. Southern Command in Miami. Bliss and her husband are now retired.

Mohamed or Mohammed Atta never traveled on this passport, but someone claiming to be him, ordered it and tossed in the debris of the World Trade Center.

Those familiar with Atta's Key West visit in February 2001, said he possessed a number of passports and spoke a number of languages, including Hebrew. In fact, WMR discovered that in 2001, a number of Israel Defense Force reservists, operated many of the small boutique shops in Key West, which sold everything from skin lotions and children's toys to jewelry and kitschy souvenirs. The IDF vendors, according to our sources, periodically flew back and forth to Israel in the months leading up to 9/11.

WMR learned that the Conch Republic passport is valued as more than a "toy" or "souvenir." A number of U.S. military, intelligence agency employees, and State Department personnel have ordered the passport in order to travel to countries where showing a U.S. passport while inside the country could cause problems. Some countries have actually stamped an entry visa in the Conch Republic passport, which amuses Conch Republic officials, since it is a de facto recognition by other governments of the sovereignty of the Conch Republic.

Usually, visas are stamped after an official passport is presented to an immigration officer, bit not all the time. Official visas in Conch Repubic passports have been stamped by immigration officers from Mexico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Bequia, Turks and Caicos Islands, St. Eustatius, St. Maarten, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, British Virgin Islands, and --- the United States.

 

9/11 Truth Whistleblowers

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • Dr. Alan Sabrosky Wikipedia ... has openly accused Israel of orchestrating the attacks of September 11th, 2001.  Alan Sabrosky (Ph.D., University of Michigan], 1976]) citation needed], is a ten-year US Marine Corps veteran and a 1986 graduate of the U. S. Army War College. He is also a writer and consultant specializing in national and international security affairs. In December 1988, he received the Superior Civilian Service Award after more than five years of service at the U.S. Army War College as Director of Studies, Strategic Studies Institute, and holder of the General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research. Dr. Sabrosky's teaching and research appointments have included the United States Military Academy, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Middlebury College and Catholic University; while in government service, he held concurrent adjunct professorships at Georgetown University and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Dr. Sabrosky has lectured widely on defense and foreign affairs in the United States and abroad.   ...   A representative quote by Dr. Sabrosky is as follows - "What we need to stand up and say is not only did Israel attack the USS Liberty, they did 9/11. They did it. I have had long conversations over the past two weeks with contacts at the Army War College, at it's headquarters, Marine Corps and I made it absolutely clear in both cases that it is 100 percent certain that 9/11 was a Mossad operation. Period." In a later interview he stated: "Americans must understand that they did it. And if they do, Israel is gonna disappear. Israel will flat ass disappear from the face of this earth." citation needed] Sabrosky has not brought any new evidence (and does not consider that any more is necessary or likely to be forthcoming, other than a possible confession from one of the 9-11 organizers), but rather lent his credentials, both of being part Jewish himself, and of being a Professor and former Vietnam Marine veteran, to the critics of the official US government position on 9-11, and its justification for its wars. He has also provided a comprehensive conceptual framework for evaluating 9-11 in “Demystifying 9-11: Israel and the Tactics of Mistake
  • Susan Landauer A 9/11 Truth activist, CIA asset, and whistleblower with extensive experience in the immoral sanctions and illegal invasion of Iraq ... Wikipedia  Lindauer is the daughter of John Howard Lindauer II, the newspaper publisher and former Republican nominee for Governor of Alaska. Her mother was Jackie Lindauer (1932–1992) who died of cancer in 1992. In 1995 her father married Dorothy Oremus, a Chicago attorney who along with other members of her family owned the largest cement company in the Midwest. Lindauer is also a second cousin of former White House Chief of Staff, Andrew Card.  ...  She graduated from Smith College in 1985. She earned a masters degree in public policy from the London School of Economics. She worked as a temporary reporter at the Seattle Post-Intelligencer for 13 weeks in 1987, and as an editorial writer at the The Everett Herald in Everett, Washington in 1989. She then was a reporter and researcher at U.S. News & World Report in 1990 and 1991. She then worked for Representative Peter DeFazio, D-Oregon (1993) and then Representative Ron Wyden, D-Oregon (1994) before joining the office of Senator Carol Moseley Braun, D-Illinois, where she worked as a press secretary and speech writer.  On January 8, 2003, she delivered a letter to Andrew Card. In her letter, she urged Card to intercede with President George W. Bush to not invade Iraq, and offered to act as a back channel in negotiations. Andrew Card is her second cousin. Her first politically-related contact with former Chief of Staff was around 2001. Lindauer was arrested on March 11, 2004 in Takoma Park, Maryland and charged with "acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government". The indictment alleged that she accepted US$10,000 from the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 2002. Lindauer denies receiving the money, but confirms taking a trip to Baghdad, claiming it was on behalf of her work as a U.S. asset. She was released on bond on March 13, 2004, to attend an arraignment the following week.  (She was falsely accused of being mentally unstable, but has a mass of records proving otherwise  see video she is focused and articulate)  OpEdNews
  • Sibel Edmonds JustaCitizen in her new memoir, Sibel Edmonds�the most classified woman in U.S. history takes us on a surreal journey that begins with the secretive FBI and down the dark halls of a feckless Congress to a stonewalling judiciary and finally, to the national security whistleblowers movement she spearheaded. Having lived under Middle East dictatorships, Edmonds knows firsthand what can happen when government is allowed to operate in secret. Hers is a sobering perspective that combines painful experience with a rallying cry for the public's right to know and to hold the lawbreakers accountable. With U.S. citizens increasingly stripped of their rights in a calibrated media blackout, Edmonds story is a wake-up call for all Americans who, willingly or unwillingly, traded liberty for illusive security in the wake of 9/11.
  • Charlie Sheen video  and DailyMail.uk Charlie Sheen has provoked outrage with claims that the U.S. government was behind the September 11 terror attacks. Ahead of today's eighth anniversary of the atrocities that killed 3,000, the Hollywood star has insisted there was a cover-up. And he has appealed to President Barack Obama to hold a new investigation into the attacks on the World Trade Centre towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC. Enlarge Actor Charlie Sheen, shown here with ex-wife Denise Richards in 2005, has demanded Barack Obama open a new investigation into 9/11 Sheen, the highest-paid actor on U.S. TV, argues that 'the official 9/11 story is a fraud' and says the commission set up to investigate was a whitewash. He claims the attacks simply served 'as the pretext for the systematic dismantling of our Constitution and Bill of Rights'.
  • Frank Greg Ford -  was a member of the team that discovered the canisters at the Balad airbase and he has stated a British team arrived to take possession of the evidence and later destroyed it. Ford has filed a law suit against the United States government for the retaliation he experienced for his team's discovery.
  • Greg Palast Wikipedia (born June 26, 1952) is a New York Times-bestselling author and a freelance journalist for the British Broadcasting Corporation as well as the British newspaper The Observer. His work frequently focuses on corporate malfeasance but has also been known to work with labor unions and consumer advocacy groups. Notably, he has claimed to have uncovered evidence that Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris, and Florida Elections Unit Chief Clay Roberts, along with the ChoicePoint corporation, rigged the ballots during the US Presidential Election of 2000 and again in 2004 when, he argued, the problems and machinations from 2000 continued, and that challenger John Kerry actually would have won if not for disproportional "spoilage" of Democratic votes.  9/11 Video
  • Jesse Ventura Wikipedia (born July 15, 1951), better known as Jesse Ventura, is an American politician, actor, author, veteran, and former professional wrestler who served as the 38th Governor of Minnesota from 1999 to 2003. Ventura served as a Navy UDT member during the Vietnam War. He later embarked on an 11-year professional wrestling career from 1975 to 1986, taking up the stage name Jesse "The Body" Ventura. Ventura first entered politics as Mayor of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota from 1991 to 1995. He ran as the Reform Party candidate in the Minnesota gubernatorial election of 1998, .... The campaign was successful, and Ventura served from January 4, 1999, to January 6, 2003, without running for a second term. After leaving office, Ventura became a visiting fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He has also hosted a number of TV shows and has written several political books. Ventura currently lives in both Dellwood, Minnesota and Cabo San Lucas, Mexico.   ...    Ventura became critical of the War in Iraq, arguing that Iraq had no involvement in the 9/11 attacks.   ...   In April and May 2008, Jesse Ventura, in several radio interviews for his new book, Don't Start the Revolution Without Me, began to express concerns about what he described as some of the unanswered questions of the September 11 attacks. His remarks about the possibility that the World Trade Center was demolished with explosives were also repeated in newspaper and television stories following some of the interviews. Ventura was interviewed on the Alex Jones radio show on April 2, 2008 where he said that he felt that many unanswered questions remain, and he believes that World Trade Center Building 7, which was not struck by a plane, collapsed on the afternoon of 9/11 in a manner which resembled a controlled demolition Ventura stated: How could this building just implode into its own footprint five hours later? That's my first question.  The 9/11 Commission didn't even devote one page to that in their big volume of investigation.   ...  Conspiracy Theory with Jesse Ventura Main article: Conspiracy Theory with Jesse Ventura In August 2009, it was announced that Ventura would host TruTV's new show Conspiracy Theory with Jesse Ventura. "Ventura will hunt down answers, plunging viewers into a world of secret meetings, midnight surveillance, shifty characters and dark forces," truTV said in a statement. On the program, which debuted on December 2, 2009, Ventura travels the country, investigating cases and getting input from believers and skeptics before passing judgment on a theory's validity. According to TruTV, the first episode drew 1.6 million viewers, a record for a new series on the network. The second season of the series debuted in October 2010 and aired 8 episodes through December 2010.A third season is in the process of being made and will air sometime in 2012.
  • Michael Springman OpEdNews  How A Visa Bureau Chief In Saudi Arabia Learned To Love Denying Visas To Terrorists  ...  With an employment history of over twenty years with the federal government,1 Springman joined the State Department in 1986 and was assigned to the American Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1987.2 His position was chief of the visa bureau section there.3 Before leaving for Jeddah, Springman was contacted by the American ambassador in Saudi Arabia, Walter Cutler, who passed on to Springman rather ominous forewarnings (or friendly advice not to rock the boat) concerning his new position. Cutler, Springman says, "kept talking about visa problems. And how I should do my best to make sure that everything ran smoothly".4 This conversation with Cutler would prove to be the initiation of a fourteen year odyssey for Springman that culminated on September 11, 2001.    ...   So here we have an interesting scenario of young, out of work, Muslim men with no visible skills traveling from other Muslim countries to Saudi Arabia in order to obtain a visa for entry into America rather than obtaining that visa in their native country? Very curious, to say the least. Then came September 11, 2001.   ...   Several weeks after the 9/11 attacks it was reported in the press that of the nineteen hijackers who commandeered aircraft on the morning of September 11, 2001, fifteen had obtained their visas at the American Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.12 Springman was surprised to read this. He had thought that the CIA operation in Jeddah had been closed down long before the 9/11 attacks, considering he, "had complained to the diplomatic security in Washington"had complained to the General Accounting Office"had complained to the State Department Inspector General's office, and"had complained to the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the State Department."13 It would seem that Langley takes little notice of storm warnings emanating from Foggy Bottom.  more
  • BBC -- The BBC blew the whistle on it own involvement in 9/11 YouTube   BBC Reports Collapse of WTC Building 7 Early-- TWICE   The BBC reported that a number of the 9 11 'hijackers' were still alive after 9 11. (BBC NEWS Middle East Hijack 'suspects' alive and well)
  • NewsWeek  Aangirfan  Newsweek revealed that five of the alleged 9/11 hijackers received training at secure US military bases. (MSNBC) "Terrorists in the September 11 attacks received training at secure US military bases, a Defense Department spokesman admitted in an interview Friday." Three days after the WTC disaster, Newsweek and the Washington Post reported that 3 of the hijackers had listed their address as the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida.
  • Steve Pieczenik 9/11 attacks were a Bush inside job    ....   Steve Pieczenik is a critically acclaimed author of psycho-political thrillers and the co-creator of the best-selling Tom Clancy's Op-Center and Tom Clancy's Net Force paperback series.    Trained in psychiatry at Harvard University and international relations at M.I.T., his novels are based on over twenty years experience resolving international crises and hostage situations for the Department of State for four administrations.   StevePieczenik.com  and ... Recruited by Lawrence Eagleburger as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Management, Pieczenik went on to develop, "the basic tenets for psychological warfare, counter terrorism, strategy and tactics for transcultural negotiations for the US State Department, military and intelligence communities and other agencies of the US Government,” while also developing foundational strategies for hostage rescue that were later employed around the world.    ...   Pieczenik also served as a senior policy planner under Secretaries Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, George Schultz and James Baker and worked on George W. Bush’s election campaign against Al Gore.
  • Tony Shaffer Wikipedia (born 1962) is a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel who gained fame for his claims about mishandled intelligence before the September 11 attacks and for the censoring of his book, Operation Dark Heart. Shaffer enlisted in the Ohio Army National Guard in 1980 and graduated from Officer Candidate School in 1982. He received his B.A. in political science and environmental studies from Wright State University in 1986   ...  Shaffer has alleged that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) failed to properly evaluate intelligence on 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta. Shaffer's allegations subsequently became known as the Able Danger controversy. In October 2003, according to his later statement to Congress, Shaffer told the 9/11 Commission staff director, Dr. Philip D. Zelikow, that in 2000 a DIA data-mining program known as Able Danger had uncovered two of the three terrorist cells eventually implicated in the September 11 attacks. Shaffer reportedly told Zelikow that DIA leadership declined to share this information with the FBI because military lawyers expressed concerns about the legality of doing so. Shaffer also asserted that he briefed Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet on three separate occasions regarding his unit's activities. The 9/11 Commission Report did not mention Shaffer's allegations, but in 2005 and 2006 the Chairman of the House Select Intelligence Committee, Rep. Curt Weldon, publicized Shaffer's allegations in public statements and hearings.
  • Paul Craig Roberts Wikipedia (born April 3, 1939) is an American economist and a columnist for Creators Syndicate. He served as an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan Administration earning fame as a co-founder of Reaganomics. He is a former editor and columnist for the Wall Street Journal, Business Week, and Scripps Howard News Service who has testified before congressional committees on 30 occasions on issues of economic policy. Roberts is a critic of Israel, calling Gaza "the world's largest concentration camp" populated by people who were "driven out of Palestine so that Israel could steal their land." Roberts has been a critic of both Democratic and Republican administrations. Although Roberts praised Ronald Reagan, he has compared supporters of George W. Bush to "brownshirts with the same low intelligence and morals as Hitler's enthusiastic supporters." He has opposed the War on Drugs and the War on Terror stating it has "made widows and orphans of millions of Muslims"  ...  Of the 9/11 Commission Report he wrote in 2006, "One would think that if the report could stand analysis, there would not be a taboo against calling attention to the inadequacy of its explanations." (see Criticisms of the 9/11 Commission Report). He has reported what he says are findings by experts that conclude there is a large energy deficit in the official account of the collapse of the three WTC buildings, and says that this deficit remains unexplained. Roberts comments on the "scientific impossibility" of the official explanation for the events on 9/11 and says those engineers and physicists who accept this theory are wrong. On August 18, 2006, he wrote: I will begin by stating what we know to be a solid incontrovertible scientific fact. We know that it is strictly impossible for any building, much less steel columned buildings, to “pancake” at free fall speed. Therefore, it is a non-controversial fact that the official explanation of the collapse of the WTC buildings is false... Since the damning incontrovertible fact has not been investigated, speculation and “conspiracy theories” have filled the void..
  • Wayne Madsen Wikipedia (born April 25, 1954) is a Washington, D.C.-based investigative journalist, author and columnist specializing in intelligence and international affairs. He is the author of the blog Wayne Madsen Report.  In early 1982 he was stationed at the Coos Head Naval Facility which had an allowance of twelve officers, ninety-five enlisted and 15 civilians. According to Madsen, while Operations Officer at Coos Head he was involved in a sting operation conducted by the FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) which ultimately ended in the arrest of his commanding officer for pedophilia on 11 September 1982 and he was awarded a Navy Achievement Medal for his involvement and assistance in the investigation.  In 1984, Madsen was loaned to the National Security Agency by the Navy.  Between 1985 and 1989 Madsen held a series of jobs, first working for RCA as a government consultant on contracts for the National Security Agency (NSA). Later he worked for the Navy's Naval Data Automation Command as a civilian employee. After this Madsen briefly established his own consulting firm, then worked for the National Bureau of Standards, and later for the State Department. In 1990 Madsen joined Computer Sciences Corporation, working there from 1990 until 1997, 16] when he joined the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) as a senior fellow. In late January 2005 Madsen left EPIC.  In 2005 Madsen began working as a free-lance journalist. He produces a blog called the Wayne Madsen Report. His articles have appeared in publications such as CorpWatch, CounterPunch, CovertAction Quarterly, In These Times, Multinational Monitor, The American Conservative, The Progressive and The Village Voice. His columns have appeared in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Columbus Dispatch, Houston Chronicle, Philadelphia Inquirer, Miami Herald and the Sacramento Bee. He is a regular on WETA-TVs "White House Chronicle".
  • Danny Jowenko  911BloggerDutch demolition expert Danny Jowenko was killed a car accident in the Netherlands. He was reportedly driving from church when he collided head-on with a tree. There was also a dog in the car who survived. Jowenko is best known in the 9/11 truth community for his analysis of Building 7, which he concluded was a professionally-engineered controlled demolition.  911Blogger
  • Colleen Rowley Coleen Rowley  From the time she was eleven years old, Coleen was determined that she would one day become an FBI agent. In January of 1981, she was appointed a Special Agent with the FBI and initially served in the Omaha, Nebraska and Jackson, Mississippi Divisions In 1984, she was assigned to the New York Office where, for more than 6 years, she worked on Italian organized crime and Sicilian heroin drug investigations. She had the opportunity to further her language proficiency in Italian at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. She also served three separate temporary duty assignments in the Paris, France Embassy and the Montreal Consulate.  ...   In 1990, Coleen was transferred to Minneapolis where she assumed the duties of Principal Legal Advisor (which later became "Chief Division Counsel"). Her responsibilities entailed oversight of the Freedom of Information, Forfeiture, Victim-Witness and Community Outreach Programs as well as providing regular legal and ethics training to FBI Agents of the Division and some outside police training.    ...    In May of 2002, Coleen brought some of the pre 9/11 lapses in the investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui to light. The 9/11 Commission subsequently described Moussaoui as an “Al Qaeda mistake and missed opportunity,” the investigation of whom may have led to the center of the Al Qaeda plot if it had been pursued in a timely and effective manner.    ...   In June of 2002, Coleen testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee about some of the endemic problems faced by the FBI and the intelligence community.
  • Kurt Sonnenberg  Ground Zero video of thermite-cut beams  
  • Paul Fetzer  Veterans Today  I am the founder of Scholars for 9/11 Truth, a former Marine Corps officer, a magna cum laude graduate of Princeton and a Ph.D. in the history and the philosophy of science. I have done a great deal of research on the assassination of JFK as well as on 9/11, where I edited the first book from Scholars, THE 9/11 CONSPIRACY (2007), organized and moderated its first conference, “The Science and Politics of 9/11: What’s Controversial, What’s Not”, and produced its first DVD. ... created "The Science and Politics of 9/11" DVD I have participated in hundreds of interviews about 9/11 on radio and television, including a 3.5 hour appearance on television in Athens in December 2006, which was broadcast worldwide by satellite, speaking in New York in 2007 and in 2008, traveling to Buenos Aires for 9/11 presentations in 2008 and 2009, and organizing a London symposium on “Debunking the ‘War on Terror’” in London in 2010.
  • Lee Hamilton Wikipedia  (born April 20, 1931) is a former member of the United States House of Representatives and currently a member of the U.S. Homeland Security Advisory Council. A member of the Democratic Party, Hamilton represented the 9th congressional district of Indiana from 1965 to 1999. Following his departure from Congress he has served on a number of governmental advisory boards, most notably as the vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission.   ...   He was critical of the commission, saying it was "set up to fail" .... On Saturday, August 11, 2012, Hamilton's wife, 82-year-old Nancy Hamilton, died after being run over by her own car, when she arrived at a veterinary clinic where she was taking one of her pets. She had not left the car in park when she got out and walked behind the car to go around to the other side and let her pet out, and it rolled backward and struck her, running her over, causing blunt force trauma  ... suspicious?
  • aagrifan

 


 

 110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008

110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

 
 
Senate Intelligence Report Phase IIa, IIb

  

 below

 

They document Bush lies in run-up to Iraq War.... and Omissions

 

 go back to:   BushWatch      Amdocs    Leakgate / Plamegate    Brewster Jennings        free hit counter javascript  

IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed   
     
page 1this pagepage 3  Searchable text file  IIA, page1this pagepage 2,     page 3    Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf download Phase II A, II B  
report:

110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

together with A ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June _, 2008

 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 110th Congress JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA EVAN BAYH, INDIANA SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MUKULSKI, MARYLAND ORRIN HATCH, UTAH RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN OLYMPIA SNOWE, MAINE SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA HARRY REU), NEVADA, EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO

Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Scope and Methodology 

  • (U) ln February 2004 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revised the terms of reference for its ongoing inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. The new issue areas included "any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy." The Committee pursued this issue area in 2004, but subsequently the Committee’s attention was placed on other aspects of the terms of reference.1 
  • (U) In September 2005, the Committee deferred efforts on the issue of intelligence activities within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy OUSD(P)], when then- Committee Chairman Pat Roberts requested that the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) review whether the OUSD(P)’s Office of Special Plans "at any time conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities." Later in September 2005 Senator Carl Levin, then ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, issued a similar request for the DoD IG to review the activities of the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and Policy Support Office, to determine whether any of their activities were either inappropriate or improper. Senator Levin’s request included a list of ten questions to be answered by the DoD IG. The Intelligence Committee planned to resume its inquiry based on the outcome of the DoD IG’s review. 
  • (U) The DoD IG began the review requested by Senators Roberts and Levin in November 2005. In February 2007, the DoD IG issued the requested report, which was titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. That report concluded: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy OUSD(P)] developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show 1 To date the Committee has published four reports based on its inquiry into pre-war intelligence on Iraq: • July 9, 2004, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, • September 8, 2006, Postwar Findings about Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they Compared with Prewar Assessments, • September 8, 2006, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, • Mayg3 l , 2007, Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq. _ 1

page 1

  • _ the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Committee and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products. This condition occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative analysis.2 
  • (U) The DoD IG review was focused on intelligence activities within the OUSD(P) only with respect to the production and dissemination of intelligence. The DoD IG stated in materials that accompanied the release of the February 2007 report that the "review focused on OUSD(P) assessments provided to the Executive Branch."3 The DoD IG did not include within its report an assessment of whether any of the OUSD(P)’s actions could be considered the collection of intelligence even though the "collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities" falls under the definition of intelligence activities as set forth in the Executive Order on United States Intelligence Activities.4 
  • (U) In February 2004 when the Committee’s terms of reference were updated, the Committee was in the process of looking into issues surrounding a December 2001 meeting in Rome, Italy between DoD officials, including an OUSD(P) representative, and current and former Iranian officials, and a related follow-up meeting in June 2003. The Committee pursued information on these meetings in October 2003 and conducted a number of related interviews in early to mid-2004. The DoD IG touched on these meetings in a separate report, but did not conduct an extensive review. 
  • (U) The Committee’s updated terms of reference called for a review of any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the OUSD(P). The Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was a two person group created in November 2001, after discussions on how to pursue the Rome meeting were already underway in the OUSD(P). No members of that group participated in the meetings that are the subject of this report. The Office of Special Plans was created in October 2002, after the Rome meeting had taken place. One participant in the Rome meeting did join the Office of Special Plans after it was formed, but his activities surrounding the Rome meeting had been completed months before. As noted in the February 2007 DoD IG report, however, " t]he term OSP Office of Special Plans] has become generic terminology for the activities of the OUSD(P), including the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and Policy Support Oflice."5 
  • (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting involved discussions with alleged current and former members of the Iranian security service and a foreign government (Israel) entity which included the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service. While the information obtained was related to Iran instead of Iraq, senior OUSD(P) personnel were directed to conduct the Rome meeting and were 2 2007-0782, February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of theUnder Secretary of Defense for Policy, page 4. 3 2007-0782, Materials accompanying the February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Questions and Answers, Answer to question #5. 4 Executive Order Number 12333, dated December 4, 1981, Part 1, Paragraph 1.4 (a). 5 2007-0782, February 9, 2007, DoD IG report titled Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, pages 1-3. _ 2

page 2

  • _ involved in the decision—making process on how to undertake the meeting, and an OUSD(P) employee attended the meeting. In light of the fact that the DoD IG did not evaluate the propriety of conducting these meetings, Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV directed that the Committee’s review of the December 2001 and June 2003 meetings be completed as part of its pre-war intelligence on Iraq inquiry. This report completes the Committee’s inquiry into the Rome meeting and the issue of whether the OUSD(P) undertook inappropriate intelligence collection activities. 
  • (U) The Comn1ittee’s review is based on interviews with current and former Intelligence Community and DoD officials, briefings, and documentation provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DoD, and State Department. The DoD Office of the Inspector General provided the Committee with additional information collected as part of its February 2007 review of the activities of the OUSD(P). 
Michael Ledeen, Rove's Brain Karl Rove, Bush's Brain   = go to NFU pages 
  • Issues not in this report
  • Forged yellow cake documents. more
  • Rosen Weissman, AIPAC espionage case.
  • Sibel Edmonds FBI wiretap translator, more
  • Role of Judith Miller and the New York Times   Leakgate
  • Project for New American Century, PNAC
  • Valerie Plame, Brewster Jennings & Associates  more
  • Omissions and misstatements in the 911 Commission Report more
  • Israeli Art Students, their addresses tracked the addresses of the 911 hijackers.  more
  • 911 was an inside job (Bush, Israel, neocons) the only people who don't believe this are duped Americans, the rest of the world believes it.   more
  • I The Rome Meeting Introduction · (_) The "Rome meeting" was actually a series of sessions that took place in an apartment building in Rome, Italy Hom December 10, 2001 through December 13, 2001. The DoD IG determined that: The meeting included Larry Franklin (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs), Harold Rhode (Office of Net Assessments), Michael Ledeen (former Office of the Secretary of Defense and National Security Council consultant), Manucher Ghorbanifar (Iranian exile), Iranian am (Iranian exile living in Morocco), Iranian #2] (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Official), and an unidentified employee of a foreign government (Israel)]. Michael Ledeen arranged the meeting with the help of his contacts in Italy and the foreign government (Israel)] who provided the meeting place and other logistical support. 
  • (U) Mr. Franklin joined the OUSD(P) in July 2001 as an Iran desk officer within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Affairs, William Luti. (Mr. Franklin was assigned to the Office of Special Plans within Mr. Luti’s office in late 2002, but retained his responsibilities for Iran.)7 Mr. Luti reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Peter Rodman. Mr. Rodman played a 6 2007-1142, March 6, 2007, DoD IG Report, DOD Involvement with the Rendon Group, page 8. 7 Mr. Franklin is currently awaiting direction from the Department of Justice to report to prison on matters unrelated to those discussed in this report. He was indicted in August 2005 along with two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for conspiring with each other to unlawfully disclose classified national defense information. Mr. Franklin subsequently pled guilty, and was sentenced in January 2006 on three felony counts: conspiracy to communicate national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; conspiracy to communicate classified information to an agent of a foreign government (Israel); and the unlawful retention of national defense information. _ 3

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  • _ significant role in the decision-making process on how DoD would participate in the Rome meeting, and reported to the USD(P), Douglas Feith. 
  • (U) Mr. Rhode was a career civilian employee in the Office of Net Assessment and currently remains employed within the DoD. The Office of Net Assessment is not a part of the OUSD(P). The Director of Net Assessment reports to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and is responsible for providing assessments on the capabilities of the United States (U.S.) military. 
  • (U) Mr. Ledeen is a U.S. citizen employed by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Mr. Ledeen had numerous contacts within the DoD and other elements of the U.S. Government at the time of the Rome meeting, but at no time during preparations for or throughout the Rome meeting did he have a formal relationship (e. g., employee, contractor, or consultant) with the DoD. Without any such affiliation, Mr. Ledeen organized the Rome meeting with the help of the foreign government (Israel). Mr. Ledeen paid his own expenses for the trip and never asked or expected to be reimbursed.8 The DoD’s reliance on Mr. Ledeen to organize the Rome meeting resulted in senior DoD officials, to include Mr. Feith and Mr. Rodman, not being aware of the involvement of Mr. Ghorbanifar and the foreign government (Israel) until after the Rome meeting. 
  • (U) It is not entirely clear how Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode were selected to attend the meeting. Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that during a November 200l discussion with Stephen Hadley, then serving as Deputy National Security Advisor, he was asked who he would recommend sending to a potential meeting with the Iranians. Mr. Ledeen said he offered the names of Harold Rhode and Larry Franklin, due to their expertise and language skills.9 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that he was informed by his immediate supervisor, Mr. Luti, of a potential trip for which the DoD needed an Iran analyst who was conversant in Farsi. Mr. Franklin said he did not know Mr. Ledeen at that time.10 Mr. Rhode could not recall who approached him about the trip due to the passage of time, but said it was probably Mr. Luti. Even though he did not work within the OUSD(P), Mr. Rhode often interacted with that office and knew Mr. Luti. Mr. Rhode stated that he was selected most likely because he had studied in Iran and worked on the issue of how to understand Iranians.  In 2003, Mr. Luti informed the DoD’s Counterintelligence Field Activitys that he selected Mr. Franklin, but did not know who had chosen Mr. Rhode to participate in the meeting.l3 Ultimately, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode traveled to Rome under official U.S. government travel orders. 8 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 12, 14-15. 9 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of lvfr. Ledeen, pages 5-6. 10 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages. 7-8. H 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages. 3-6. NOTE: An attempt was made to reinterview Mr. Rhode to clarify his involvement in a number of the issues raised in this report. Officials within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs informed the Committee that Mr. Rhode declined to be reinterviewed. V 12 As discussed later in this report, the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity conducted a review of DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar in 2003 at the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Interviews conducted by the Counterintelligence Field Activity are referenced throughout this report and were also a primary source for the DoD IG review. 13 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIPA Report, Luti Interview. _ 4

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  • (U) Mr. Ghorbanifar was a long time friend of Mr. Ledeen ’s who lived in France and had offered to arrange a meeting with current and former Iranian officials.14 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the meeting ultimately raised concerns because of his prior history with the Intelligence Community and his participation in the Iran-Contra scandal in 1986. As a result of the CIA’s prior dealings with Mr. Ghorbanifar, the agency in l984 had issued a fabrication notice on Mr. Ghorbanifar to its operational personnel stating that he was regarded as an unreliable source of intelligence. A publicly available Congressional report on the Iran-Contra scandal includes a redacted copy of the notice that states Mr. Ghorbanifar "should be regarded as an intelligence fabricator and a nuisance. Any further approaches by subject or his brother Ali should be reported but not taken seriously."15 The Iran-Contra scandal involved the illegal sale of arms to Iran by the U.S. Government and use of the profits to fund rebels in Nicaragua. Mr. Ghorbanifar had been a middleman in the weapons exchange. Mr. Ledeen was a consultant to the National Security Council at the time of the Iran-Contra scandal and also played a role in the weapons exchange.16 According to Mr. Ledeen , the first Iranian participant in the Rome meeting, , was a former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps member who was subsequently branded a traitor, but was able to escape Iran after more than a year of torture. Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the second Iranian, _ was "a high-ranking officer in the intelligence establishment of Iran."17 The Committee’s attempts to corroborate this information with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were complicated by several factors. The first Iranian has a common name and there are multiple variations of the spelling of both names. The CIA provided information on three versions of the first name, two of which could have been the participant in the Rome meeting. It appears the second Iranian - _ was deemed an "information peddler" based on his attempts to sell information. The information the CIA collected on this individual was sufficient for the Agency 
  • (U) During the Rome meeting the two Iranians provided biographic details on themselves and information on the political and economic conditions in Iran. Specific issues discussed during the meeting included Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq, the growth of anti-regime sentiment in Iran, and the Iranian regime’s attitudes toward the U.S.19 14 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 15 Declassified July 25, 1984 CIA Cable Director 023056, Subject: Fabricator Notice — Manuchehr Gorbanifar 16 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 3. 17 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 17-18. 18 2007-4174, October 22, 2007 & November 28, 2007 CIA responses to Questions for the Record 19 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 7, Mr. Franklins notes on the Iranian interviews. Two versions, one undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a typo). _ 5

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New York Times  "SISMI sent the CIA and U.S. and British officials information that it knew was forged"

Niger Forged Yellowcake Documents more

Michael Ledeen has denied any involvement in the Niger forged documents, but this Senate Report places him on the scene.

  • Origins of the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) The December 2001 Rome meeting was initiated by Mr. Ledeen . According to Mr. Ledeen , soon after September 11, 2001, probably in the October 2001 timeframe, Mr. Ghorbanifar contacted him about "people in Iran who were willing to come out and meet with officials of the American government to provide accurate information about what was going on inside the country, Iranian support of terrorist organizations and plans to kill Americans in Afghanistan."20 This discussion prompted Mr. Ledeen to contact U.S. Government officials. 
  • (U) Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Ledeen had contacted him at some point and suggested that DoD officials meet with the Iranian contacts, but Mr. Rodman had deferred at that time. The tasking later came back to him through senior DoD channels as a request from Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley for the DoD to pursue the meeting with the Iranians.21 Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that he had contacted Mr. Hadley, who he described as an "old fiiend,"22 and subsequently met with Mr. Hadley and another National Security Council official to present Mr. Ghorbanifar’s offer to arrange meetings with Iranian officials. Mr. Ledeen advised the Committee that he did not endorse Mr. Ghorbanifar’s information, but felt obliged to convey the offer to the U.S. Government. Mr. Ledeen indicated that he was certain that the Intelligence Community would not be interested in pursuing the information due to their distrust of Mr. Ghorbanifar.23 
  • (U) According to an April 16, 2004, letter to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, "in November 2001, the Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, called the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, and reported that Iranians with inside knowledge of Iranian security and intelligence operations, including involvement in terrorism and threats to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, wished to defect." The letter also indicated that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA and that Mr. Hadley asked Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to have the DoD handle the contact. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz agreed to do so and subsequently informed the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.24 
  • (U) A February 2004 draft chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Committee in April 2004 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs indicates that the call from Mr. Hadley to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz occurred on November 7, 2001.25 The request from Mr. Hadley prompted Mr. Rodman to ask the DoD Office of General Counsel to review whether contact with potential defectors could take place without CIA involvement.26 In mid-November 2001, Mr. Rodman learned from Mr. 20 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 21 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 22 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staii Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 4. 23 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staif Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 5. 24 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, pages 1-2. 25 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 26 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD office of General Counsel, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. _ 6

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  • _ Ledeen that the Iranians did not want to defect, but merely wanted to pass on information.27 The DoD chronology indicated this newfound knowledge prompted Mr. Rodman to inform Mr. Hadley that the DoD could make the initial contact and Mr. Hadley proceeded to obtain approval for this course of action from the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice.28 A memorandum dated November 16, 2001, from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz indicated that the Deputy Secretary authorized this course of action,29 and a subsequent action memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld dated July 19, 2002, stated that Mr. Hadley "strongly encouraged the meeting."3 
  • (U) According to the April 2004 letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley coordinated the proposed DoD contact with Iranian officials with the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, and they did not object to the DoD’s making the contact. 31 Deputy Secretary Armitage and DCI Tenet were not provided with significant details regarding the proposed meeting. A 2004 State Department response to Committee questions indicated that Deputy Secretary Armitage recalled Mr. Hadley contacting him in the November/December 2001 timeframe and advising that the DoD wished to debrief some Iranians with information on Iraq. The State Department response further indicated that Deputy Secretary Armitage voiced no objections, but was provided no details on who would attend the meeting or its location. 32 
Roland Carnaby displayed a signed copy of Tenet's book  Roland Carnaby, Southwest Region CIA station chief
   
  • (U) Director Tenet’s 2007 book titled At the Center of the Storm states that in early December 2001 Mr. Hadley mentioned only "that DoD might meet with some Iranians in Europe who had terrorist threat information." Director Tenet notes that there was no mention of the involvement of Mr. Ledeen or Mr. Ghorbanifar. He also indicates that the discussion made him uncomfortable and that he did not understand why the CIA was not being asked to get involved. He adds, however, that "if there was information available about a threat to U.S. interests, I wasn’t going to let bureaucratic reasons stand in the way of our getting the details."33 In March 2008, DCI Tenet provided the Committee with his recollections of his conversation with Mr. Hadley. He recalled being provided no details on the proposed meeting other than it involved access to terrorist threat information. He reiterated that he had concerns about the information provided by Mr. Hadley, but he was not going to stand in the way of collecting threat information so soon after September 11, 2001. Former Director Tenet also stated his view that Mr. Hadley’s call was not intended to gain his permission. For these reasons he did not pursue further details at that time.34 27 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology, and Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo Bom Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. Z8 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 29 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter &om the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 4, November 16, 2001 Memo from Mr. Rodman to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz., 30 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 31 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2. 32 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #7. 33 At the Center of theStorm, George Tenet, Page 312. 34 March 10, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page 1. _ 7

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  • _ -) According to Mr. Ledeen , once he received concurrence from the DoD he directly contacted the foreign government (Israel) official, who he described as an old friend, and told him the background on the proposed meeting. Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that the foreign government (Israel) made any necessary arrangements for the Iranian participants, and provided a secure location and full time intepreter for the meeting.33 ® It is not clear at what point senior DoD officials knew the foreign government (Israel) and foreign government (Israel) intelligence service would play a role in facilitating and attending the meeting. When Mr. Rhode was asked if he knew before the meeting whether the foreign government (Israel) would be involved, he stated "I think so."37 Mr. Franklin told the Committee that Mr. Ledeen advised him on the first morning of the Rome meeting that "the _ foreign government (Israel)] was involved and had helped out a great deal in setting up the place of the meeting and that they would be present at the meeting." 8 A February 2004 chronology prepared by staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated DoD awareness that the foreign government (Israel) arranged for the meeting site, but it is not stated when this became known.39 In a September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman, advised the Committee that DoD officials knew the foreign government (Israel) was involved, but they did not know the full extent of that involvement, to include the intelligence service, in advance. 0 
  • (U) Regarding Mr. Ghorbanifar’s attendance at the Rome meeting, Mr. Ledeen told the Committee that he had made it clear to Mr. Hadley that it was Mr. Ghorbanifar who had the ability to organize the Rome meeting. Mr. Ledeen did not indicate that he made Mr. Hadley aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar would attend the meeting.4l Correspondence to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in 2004 stated “ n] one of the senior DoD officials involved in this matter — Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Feith, Mr. Rodman, and Mr. Luti — anticipated that the Iranian security officials would be joined by Ghorbanifar, nor, I am informed, did Mr. Had1ey."42 Mr. Rodman conhrmed to the Committee in September 2007 that he did not know in advance that Mr. Ghorbanifar was going to be at the meeting.43 A memorandum prepared by counsel representing Mr. Feith included the following statement: "Before the Rome meeting occurred, neither Hadley, Wolfowitz nor Feith knew that Ghorbanifar was involved."44 None of the three DoD-provided documents that were written during preparations for the Rome meeting contain a reference to Mr. Ghorbanifar. 35 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 9-10. 36 2003-4209, Cable, 11 February 2002. 37 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 15 and 20-21. 3 3 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 18. 39 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2 and Tab 1, Februa.ry 2004 Chronology. 40 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007 Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 41 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 6, and October 24, 2007, staff` interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 2. 42 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, page 2. 43 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 44 2007-1561, July 13, 2006, Memorandum from Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. _ 8

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  • _ (U) The only DoD official who indicated an awareness that Mr. Ghorbanifar would attend the Rome meeting was Mr. Rhode. Mr. Rhode informed the Committee in April 2004 that prior to departing for the trip he was aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar would be involved in the meeting. When Committee staff asked Mr. Rhode if he was certain that he was aware Mr. Ghorbanifar would be attending the Rome meeting before the meeting, Mr. Rhode said, "yes."45 Material provided to the Committee by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that Mr. Rhode does not now recall whether or not he knew in advance of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s involvement. The material also states that Mr. Rhode can no longer recall anything he told the Committee on this point in 2004.46 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he did not know that Mr. Ghorbanifar was involved until he was informed by Mr. Ledeen on the morning of the first day of the Rome meeting.47 
download To check accuracy of this document
Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf  Phase IIA,     Senate Intelligence Committee, pdf    II B  
  •  
  • Authority to Conduct the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) The U.S. Government officials involved in approving the Rome meeting had the authority to do so, even if it was considered an intelligence activity. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council (through the Committee on Foreign Intelligence) is given broad authority to identify intelligence needs, establish priorities to meet those intelligence needs, and establish policies relating to the conduct of intelligence activities of the United States, "including appropriate roles and missions for the elements of the intelligence community and appropriate targets of intelligence collection activities."48 These specified authorities are in addition to "performing such other functions as the President may direct."49 
  • (U) Thus, Mr. Hadley, who received concurrence from National Security Advisor Rice, had the authority to request Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, who coordinated with Secretary Rumsfeld, to dispatch two DoD employees to Rome to meet with Iranians who may have been able to provide information related to the national security. 
  • Coordination of the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) While the DoD had the authority to conduct the meeting in Rome, there was limited advance coordination of the activity outside of the Department. Mr. Rodman informed the Committee that Mr. Hadley had advised the DoD to pursue the matter on a close-hold basis due to its unusual nature and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had reiterated that guidance. Mr. Rodman continued by saying that had the National Security Council or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz not requested that it be close-hold the meeting would have been handled through normal channels. · But, since that request had been made, it was decided that the first meeting would not involve any element of the Intelligence Community.5O 45 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, StaH Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 4 and 9-10. 46 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #4. 47 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, StaH Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 7-8 and 19-20. 48 National Security Act of 1947, NewsFollowUp.com § 101(h). 49id.,§101(b). 50 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman , pages 2 and 5. _ 9

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  • (U) Hand written notes prepared by Mr. Rodman on November 7, 2001 indicated that in a discussion with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary conveyed that the Iranians’ mistrust of the CIA had prompted Mr. Hadley to refer the matter to the DoD.5 I The draft chronology prepared by the Department in February 2004 specifically stated that Mr. Ledeen , "who was facilitating the contact, stressed the Iranians’ mistrust of CIA officials."52 In his September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman reiterated that Mr. Ledeen was adamant about not having any CIA involvement, citing the Iranian’s paranoia about the CIA.53 (U) The Committee received testimony from Mssrs. Ledeen , Franklin, and Rhode that calls into question the willingness of the Iranians who were met in Rome to deal with the CIA. When Mr. Ledeen was asked whether he had suggested that the Iranians would not meet with the CIA he replied that he did not think so. Mr. Ledeen stated that Iranians to be met in subsequent meetings had made it clear they would not meet with the CIA, but he reiterated that the two Iranians at the Rome meeting had expressed no qualms about dealing with the CIA. 54 Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that neither of the Iranians he met in Rome expressed concerns about who in the U.S. Government they were meeting with. When asked if there had been an indication beforehand that there were limitations on whom the Iranians would talk to, Mr Franklin responded "no."55 When asked whether it had been conveyed to him during the meeting that the Iranians did not want to deal with the CIA, Mr. Rhode also responded "no."56 (I) The perceived intention of the Iranians was also a factor in the decision about whether to coordinate the Rome meeting outside of the DoD. According to the April 2004 letter to the Committee from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, when Mr. Hadley first approached Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Hadley indicated that the Iranians wished to defect. 7 This prompted Mr. Rodman to seek guidance from the DoD Office of General Counsel and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) about whether contact with potential defectors required coordination with the CIA. Mr. Rodman received a memo, dated November 15, 2001, from the DoD Deputy General Counsel (Intelligence) indicating that Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 4/ 158 required each Intelligence Community component to "report promptly _ the identity of any walk-in or other disaffected person who may be of interest together with all available and pertinent information."59 He further advised that the "DIA may initiate an intelligence collection operation with a foreign 51 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 2, November 7, 2001, Handwritten notes of Mr. Rodman. 52 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 53 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 1. 54 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 7-8. 55 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 31-32. 56 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 26. 57 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Page 1. 58 A DCID was a directive issued by the Director of Central Intelligence providing guidance to the Intelligence Community on a specific topic of interest. With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, DCIDs are being replaced by Intelligence Community Directives. 59 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD office of General Counsel. _ 10

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  • _ military member subject to internal DoD regulations and DCID 5/1 coordination."6° Directive 5/1 stated that "the CIA is primarily responsible for the conduct and coordination of espionage to meet the national security intelligence needs of the U.S. Government. . ." The Directive allows that the DoD may conduct such activities in response to tasking from the DCI or "as required for the execution of the Secretary of Defense’s responsibilities."61 The DIA Director, Admiral Thomas Wilson, provided Mr. Rodman similar advice, noting that an individual could defect to a DoD employee, but further handling would be the legal responsibility of the CIA.62 (U) The General Counsel’s memo was written under the assumption that the Iranians wished to defect. Their true purpose, however, became known to Mr. Rodman about the same time the memo was written. Once it was detemined that the Iranians did not want to defect, but merely wanted to pass on information, DoD personnel did not advise CIA personnel of the pending meeting, and DIA officials were not included in further planning for the meeting. In a September 2003 written response to the Committee’s Vice Chairman, the CIA Director of Congressional Affairs stated on behalf of the DCI that "DoD officials did not coordinate their contacts with CIA, and CIA subsequently raised objections and questions about such contacts." The response further stated that the CIA was not in a position to conclude whether DCID 5/1 requirements were applicable to the Rome meeting, but noted that official trips to a country would routinely be cleared through the ambassador.63 Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he was unaware of the content of DCIDs 4/1 and 5/1, while Mr. Franklin expressed some awareness, but assumed any required action had been taken by his chain of command.64 (I) Materials prepared by counsel on behalf of Under Secretary of Defense Feith expressed the view that " a]lthough the U.S. ambassador to Italy and the CIA - - complained that they were not informed about the meeting, it was not the responsibility of the Defense Department to inform them." The material noted that the Deputy National Security Advisor had consulted with the Deputy Secretary of State and the DCI in advance. 65 This response fails to consider that the DCI and Deputy Secretary were not provided enough information to know who to inform of the pending activity. (U) In a September 2007 interview, Mr. Rodman summarized the issue of coordinating the Rome meeting by stating that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had wanted to keep this meeting "close-hold" until the DoD could determine if there was any value to the contact and how it should be pursued further. He added that if there had been an attempt to go through normal channels, the State Department and CIA would have never wanted to speak with the Iranians.66 A National Security Council legal advisor informed the Counterintelligence Field Activity in 2003 that Mr. Hadley had been surprised to learn there had been no coordination with the 60 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Hom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 3, November 15, 2001, Memo from the DoD oiiice of General Counsel. 61 DCID 5/1, , effective December 19, 1984, Section 3. 62 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. 63 2003-41 16, September 23, 2003 letter from CIA, Director of Congressional Affairs. 64 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 18, and 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 10-11. 65 2007-1561, July 13, 2006, Memorandum Hom Patton Boggs LLP to the DoD IG, page 21. 66 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 5.

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  • _ ambassador and CIA.67 DCI Tenet’s 2007 book notes that after the Rome meeting Mr. Hadley asked him if Mr. Wolfowitz had previously called him to explain the situation and DCI Tenet had responded "no."66 In March 2008, DCI Tenet informed the Committee that at no time prior to or after the Rome meeting did Mr. Wolfowitz contact him to discuss the Rome meeting.6 
  • (U) The limited awareness of the Rome meeting within the CIA and the State Department, as well as the involvement of the foreign government (Israel) and Mr. Ghorbanifar, would have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of this activity. 
Wayne Madsen Report Mario Scaramella
Dec. 25-26, 2006 -- "The enigmatic Italian self-described environmental "security" expert and alleged weapons smuggler and colleague of various right-wing European operatives Mario Scaramella was arrested ....  As previously reported by WMR, Scaramella's links to various right-wing "intelligence" groups in Italy and abroad have also placed him in the middle of an attempt by former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his Russian-Israeli Mafia friends to tarnish current Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi as a "KGB agent." Russian President Vladimir Putin was a collateral target of Russian-Israeli mobster Boris Berezovsky.  ....  The activities of Scaramella and his colleagues are now under a criminal investigation by the Rome prosecutor's office.  ...   With Scaramella now under arrest in Italy and all investigative roads -- the forged Niger documents, the kidnapping and rendition by U.S. and Italian agents of an Egyptian Imam in Milan, dirty tricks against Prodi, the Pentagon's pre-war connections to Rome-based Iranian Mossad asset Manucher Ghorbanifar, and the U.S. assassination of SISMI deputy chief Nicola Calipari in Baghdad -- now leading to Rome, Italy may hold the key to much more than Scaramella's dubious business dealings. That key may unlock the door of the identities of the actual perpetrators of the 9/11 and other terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Beslan, Istanbul, and Casablanca." full article
  • Country Clearance through the Ambassador 
  • (U) Most U.S. Government employees are required to receive country clearance from the appropriate U.S. ambassador prior to foreign travel on official business. The U.S. ambassador and the CIA were under the impression that DoD employees traveling to Rome on official business would be required to clear their travel through the embassy. According to the State Department, no one from the office of the Secretary of Defense or the foreign government (Israel) notified the Rome embassy about the meeting.76 
  • (U) Clearing DoD personnel travel through the ambassador is addressed in a series of DoD guidance. Mr. Rhode had a blanket travel order issued through the Office of Net Assessment that was valid through September 30, 2002. Such a travel order removes the administrative burden of obtaining a new travel order for each trip and is generally only provided to frequent travelers. Mr. Rhode’s blanket travel order specified that the " c]learance requirements of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed." Mr. Franklin’s travel order was issued through the OUSD(P) and made no reference to country clearance regulations.71
  • (U) The subject of DoD Directive 4500.54 is Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad. The text applicable to Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode stated that all travelers other than DoD civilian officials appointed by the President "must obtain a ‘theater clearance’ from the Unified Commander and/or ‘country clearance’ from the U.S. Embassy."72 The Directive notes that the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide outlines the procedures for obtaining these clearances. The Directive indicates, however, that in some cases "country or theater clearance may not be required," and again refers to the Foreign Clearance Guide. If the Foreign Clearance Guide is not clear on this requirement the reader is referred to the applicable embassy U.S. Defense Attaché Officer or Office of Defense Cooperation for additional information.76 (I) A review of the Foreign Clearance Guide in effect for Italy at the time of the Rome meeting would indicate that in the specific instance of Mssrs Franklin and Rhode, country clearance was not required because they were not of sufficient rank and did not visit the U.S. 67 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #6, CIFA Report, Bellinger Interview. 68 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page 312. 69 March 10, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page 1. 76 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #1. 71 The term country clearance refers to the process of notifying a U.S. embassy or mission of the pending travel of a U.S. Government employee to that facility and requesting the appropriate approval for that visit. 72 DoDD 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.2 73 DoDD 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, Paragraph 5.4 

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  • _ embassy or a consulate. A country clearance would have been required to visit an Italian government, military, or industry organization; however, prior to their departure the DoD officials involved were unaware of the involvement of so, it is not clear whether the Rome meeting took place in an actual . C) There is no evidence that the DoD officials involved in planning for or attending the Rome meeting researched the general requirement for country clearance. Despite the fact that his travel order said that the clearance requirements of DoD Directive 4500.54 must be observed, Mr. Rhode seemed to be unaware of these requirements and noted that he was given no guidance to contact the embassy.75 The 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity report on DoD contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar stated that Mr. "Franklin assumed that all the necessary coordination had been done at a higher level and that there was no ‘coordination problem’ since the DEPSECDEF Deputy Secretary of Defense] and the were involved in this matter."76 Mr. Franklin gave a similar explanation to the Committee in 2004, noting that he had been told it had been approved up the chain of command and therefore he did not think it was his responsibility to check in at the embassy.77 Mr. Rodman informed the Committee in 2007 that he was puzzled by all of the interest in whether a country clearance was obtained for the Rome meeting. He reiterated that the whole process was directed by Mr. Hadley to be "close-hold" and by the very definition of the term a lot of people would not be told about the trip. He pointed out again that Mr. Hadley had told both DCI Tenet and Deputy Secretary Armitage about the trip in advance.78 
  •  
  • Content of the Rome Meeting 
  • (U) During the Rome meeting, Mr. Rhode took contemporaneous notes on a laptop computer, while Mr. Franklin took handwritten notes. These notes were provided to the Committee by the DoD. Based on a review of the notes, the specific issues discussed during the meeting included the following:79 . • Iranian "hit teams" targeting U.S. personnel and facilities in Afghanistan; • Iran’s long standing relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization; • Tunnel complexes in Iran for weapons storage or exfiltration of regime leaders; • Iran’s perception on Saddam Hussein’s grip on Iraq; • The growth of anti—regime sentiment in Iran; • Iranian regime attitudes toward the U.S.; and • Internal rivalries among Iran’s intelligence agencies. 74 December 10, 2001, DoD Foreign Clearance Guide, Europe, Italy, Section H A. 1. 75 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 17. 76 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. 77 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 10. 78 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, September 27, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Rodman, page 2. 79 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 7, Mr. Franklin’s notes on the Iranian interviews. Two versions, one undated and one dated January 21, 2001 (presumed to be a typo). _ 13

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  • _ (U) When the Rome meeting ended on December 13, 2001, Mr. Franklin returned to the Pentagon and began preparing a summary of the information provided by the Iranians. It appears there were multiple versions of the summary as a result of the editing process. Mr. Franklin’s summary was completed in early January 2002. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that he considered the information provided by the two Iranians to be "good".80 The information on Iranian hit teams targeting U.S. interests in Afghanistan was particularly interesting to him because prior to the Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin had traveled to Afghanistan and been in contact with U.S. Special Operations Forces. When the issue was raised by the second Iranian at the Rome meeting, Mr. Franklin requested details on the hit team in a particular part of Afghanistan and the Iranian provided names and a photograph of a team member. 
  • (U) While preparing his summary, Mr. Franklin attempted to corroborate the hit team information with some of his contacts at the DIA. He could not recall the content of his discussion with a former colleague in the Defense HUMINT Service beyond going over the general details of the meeting, but Mr. Franklin provided the Committee details of his discussion with a DIA analyst. Mr. Franklin understood that the analyst had been able to corroborate that one of the names associated with the hit team in Afghanistan was a current member of the Iranian intelligence structure.81 During a 2007 Committee interview the DIA analyst recalled that he found no information in the DIA database that specifically corroborated the name and ur1it data provided by Mr. Franklin. The analyst stated, however, that the information provided by Mr. Franklin had sounded plausible and credible because he had other information indicating that Iranian forces were involved in covert activities in Afghanistan.82 
  • (U) Based on his exchange with the DIA analyst, Mr. Franklin contacted a Special Forces Commander in Afghanistan and relayed the hit team information via secure telephone. Mr. Franklin indicated that this exchange would have taken place not long after he returned from the Rome meeting while he was writing his summary report.83 That Commander subsequently invited Mr. Franklin to attend a briefing he was giving to Secretary Rumsfeld upon his return to the Pentagon. Mr. Franklin believed that he was invited because his information had proved valuable. He stated that the Commander had advised him that the information had allowed them to turn "the tables on these Iranians" and offered as an example the fact that they had been able to take pictures of the Iranians loading weapons into a van registered to a warlord. Based on his discussions with the Commander, Mr. Franklin concluded that some of the information provided by the Iranians had "saved American 1ives."84 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin upon his return informed the Committee that it genuinely seemed to be Mr. Franklin’s perception that the information saved American lives, but added that he could not speculate on whether it was truly useful.85 Mr. Franklin’s notion that the Iranian information "saved American lives" would 80 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 27. Note also that on page l of the September 25, 2003 Counterintelligence Field Activity interview with Mr. Rhode, he indicated that the information was "very good." 81 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 27 and 38-41. 82 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with DIA Analyst #1], pages 1-2. 83 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 24-25 and 32-33. 84 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. See also 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 24-25. 85 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with DIA Analyst 1], page 2. _ 14

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  • _ become widely used by DoD officials and Mr. Ledeen to describe the utility of attending the Rome meeting. 
  • (U) After the memo was completed, Mr. Franklin went back to his regular duties with almost no role in the decision on whether to continue contact with the Iranians. He remained in contact with Mr. Ledeen , and for a number of weeks after the trip received phone calls and faxes from Mr. Ghorbanifar. Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he returned the calls for a while to be polite on the chance that Mr. Ghorbanifar could facilitate future access, however the faxes offered no new information and he eventually discontinued the contact.86 Mr. Franklin retained the faxed material for a period of time, but it appears it was destroyed prior to the Counterintelligence Field Activity’s 2003 review.87 
  • (U) Mr. Rhode advised the Committee that he passed his Rome meeting notes to Mr. Luti. He subsequently played no further role in the follow up to the Rome meeting.88 Mr. Ghorbanifar’s Plan 
  • (U) While in Rome, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode became involved in discussions that went beyond obtaining information from the Iranian sources. Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that during the trip to Rome Mr. Ghorbanifar pressed his own agenda for regime change in Iran.89 Mr. Franklin stated that late one night during a discussion in a bar Mr. Ghorbanifar laid out his plan on a napkin. The plan involved the simultaneous disruption of traffic at key intersections leading to Tehran that would create anxiety, work stoppages and other disruptive measures. Mr. Franklin recalled that Mr. Ghorbanifar asked for $5 million in seed money to facilitate this activity. He added that Mr. Ghorbanifar indicated that if the iirst action was successful additional money may be needed later on, but Mr. Franklin could not recall speciiic amounts being discussed beyond the $5 million.90 Mr. Rhode recalled Mr. Ghorbanifar discussing a plan to set up a network that could lead to the overthrow of the regime, but could not recall a speciiic dollar amount.91 Mr. Ledeen provided the Committee similar recollections, noting that Mr. Ghorbanifar offered a variety of different schemes for regime change in Iran dating to the time the two had iirst met. Mr. Ledeen added that he believed the U.S. Government should be supporting Iranians who want to overthrow the regime. He stated that he had passed the notion of the plan on to Mr. Hadley, Mr. Luti and Mr. Rodman upon returning from the ’ Rome meeting.92 (I) The proposed funding for, and foreign involvement in, Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change were never fully understood. When the DoD began receiving questions on this topic in early 2002, several summaries were produced. A synopsis of the discussions in Rome on Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan, prepared by Mr. Rodman in mid—February 2002 with input from Mr. 86 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 29, 37 and 48-49. 87 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #3, CIFA Report, Franklin Interview. 88 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 33-34. 89 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 26. 90 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 26-27 and 63-65. 91 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, page 27. 92 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, pages 21-22, and 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, October 24, 2007, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen, page 2. _ 15
  • _ Franklin, stated that Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar advised Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode of "the ign government] support for this information collection opportunity and financing by foreign] corporate enterprises midway through the interviews .... ." The summary goes on to indicate the costs would be in the millions and entailed "extrication /reentry of numerous sources, granting visas, and eventual resettlement outside of Iran. . ." A later version of this summary dated February 12, 2002 referenced contracts "that would assure oil and gas sales in the event of regime change."93 An action memo prepared by Mr. Rodman in July 2002 referred to " m]ultimillion-dollar business deals that the h foreign government (Israel)] arranged for the two Iranian interlocutors."94 Despite the changing descriptions of foreign involvement, there was no attempt by the DoD, or any other entity of the U.S. Governrnent, to determine the true intentions of the foreign government (Israel) with regard to interacting with the Iranians or Mr. Ghorbanifar. (U) The confusion within DoD channels over Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and foreign involvement partially reflects that Messrs. Franklin and Rhode had focused on the assigned task of listening to the information provided by the Iranians. Officials from the DoD were consistent in stating that the DoD participants had been instructed prior to the meeting that their sole purpose in attending was to listen and bring back any useful information provided by the Iranians.95 Mr. Franklin and Mr. Rhode were also consistent in stating that they viewed the information gathering with the two Iranians and Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan to weaken the Iranian regime as two entirely separate issues. Mr. Franklin indicated that upon his return he made it clear to those in the OUSD(P) that there should be no follow up on Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He added that at no time during the follow-on contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar did he offer encouragement for the p1an.96 Ambassador and CIA Inquire About the Rome Meeting (U) Upon the return of Mssrs. Franklin and Rhode, and the completion of the Rome meeting summary, two series of events began to unfold. First, State Department and CIA officials attempted to determine what Mr. Ledeen and the DoD representatives had done in Rome, and second, DoD officials debated the next course of action. These deliberations eventually became intertwined, but the decision to limit coordination prior to the meeting, and concerns about Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan for regime change, essentially eliminated the potential for further contact with Iranian officials via Mr. Ledeen and Mr. Ghorbanifar. The two series of events are outlined below. 
  • (U) The U.S. ambassador to Italy at the time of the Rome meeting was Melvin Sembler. Ambassador Sembler had been sworn in on November 16, 2001. On December 12, 2001, during 93 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tabs 21, February 12, 2002, Note on foreign government (Israel) Support, and 22, February 12, 2002, Rome Meeting: References to Financin . 94 2004- F675, April 16, 2004, letter nom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo from Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 95 2004-0797, Transcript of April 20, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Rhode, pages 27 and 58, 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, page 13, and 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter Bom the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 1, February 2004 Chronology. 96 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 37 and 48-49. _ 16
Wayne Madsen Report  Ambassador Sembler
The Post's deputy foreign editor Peter Eisner has just co-written a book, "The Italian Letter," about the forged Niger documents that were used to lead the U.S. to war in Iraq. In the book, Eisner gives a virtual free pass to arch-neocon Michael Ledeen and his dealings with Iranian con man Manucher Ghorbanifar in helping to cook up the scheme. Eisner also suggests that the U.S. ambassador to Italy at the time, Mel Sembler , was out of the loop on the Ledeen-Ghorbanifar meetings. In fact, Sembler , as much a neocon as Ledeen , was not only aware of the meetings, according to our sources, but helped set them up. Eisner quotes an unnamed U.S. embassy source in Rome as stating that Sembler "blew a gasket" when he found out about Ledeen meetings in Rome. Sembler more likely blew a gasket when the details of the Niger forgeries and the role played by the neocon cabal in the Bush administration, a grouping that includes Ledeen , the Pentagon's Harold Rhode, and Sembler as charter members, became public. full article

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  • _ the course of the Rome meeting, Ambassador Sembler had breakfast with Mr. Ledeen . A February 2002 State Department cable indicated that Mr. Ledeen informed Ambassador Sembler that he was in Italy "under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense and that two DoD employees were with him. Their project was to make contact with high-level officials of the Iranian Intelligence Service."97 In Mr. Ledeen ’s 2004 testimony to the Committee he added that he had told the ambassador they were going to have conversations with Iranians who were promising to be helpful with terrorism, and that he had informed the ambassador as a courtesy and requested that he keep it to himself.98 In an August 2004 response to questions for the record, the State Department indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen offered the ambassador no explanation for his wish to keep it confidential. The response further stated that Ambassador Sembler speculated that it derived from the involvement of the foreign government (Israel).99 The February 2002 State Department cable further indicated that l\/Ir. Ledeen told that ambassador that he would provide additional information after the Rome meeting. Later on December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had dinner with the foreign government (Israel) official and his wife, and l\/Ir. Ledeen. The Rome meeting was not discussed over dinner.lOO 
  • (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, following the events of December 12, 2001, Ambassador Sembler asked a senior official at the embassy whether U.S. officials were required to seek country clearance to travel to Rome on official business. The ambassador also expressed awareness that 1\/Ir. Ledeen was not a U.S. Government employee and a lack of comfort with his activities. The senior official at the embassy denied any knowledge of Mr. Ledeen’s activities and confirmed the need for country clearance. The senior official at the embassy agreed to check with the embassy’s Defense Attaché for any further information.1O1 The Defense Attaché was unable to find anyone requesting such a clearance who matched the information provided by the senior official at the Embassy.]O2 
  • (U) According to the February 2002 State Department cable, on December 23, 2001, Ambassador Sembler had dinner with Mr. Ledeen and his family at the ambassador’s residence. The cable stated that in a private conversation with the ambassador Mr. Ledeen indicated that he had made contact with the Iranian officials and there was a "sizeable financial involvement to secure their cooperation." During the conversation Mr. Ledeen also expressed his belief that it was a deal the U.S. should take.1 3 The ambassador did not focus on the matter again until a call from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, on February 1, 2002, which the ambassador and his deputy were under the impression was prompted by the Under Secretary becoming aware of a summary of the Rome meeting prepared by 1\/Ir. Ledeen for Mr. Hadley.1°4‘ During that call the ambassador was provided what were believed to be the names of the DoD participants in the Rome meeting. Unbeknownst to the ambassador, one of the names was wrong, but after the call he contacted his deputy and the senior official at the embassy to 97 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). gg 2004-1853, Transcript of April 21, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Ledeen , pages 11-12. 99 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #4. 100 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). ml 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘°2 2003-4209, came, February 1, 2002. 103 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). 104 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #3. _ 17

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  • _ discuss the matter. Neither of them recognized the correct name of Mr. Rhode}05 The ambassador would memorialize his recollections of his prior discussions with Mr. Ledeen in a February 8, 2002 cable to Under Secretary Grossman, and defer further action on the matter to hjmlros (_) As noted above, in early December 200l Mr. Hadley had mentioned to DCI Tenet that the DoD might meet with Iranians in Europe to discuss terrorist threat information. The DCI had no details, however, on the location of the meeting or its participants.l°7 For that reason, during a January 14, 2002, meeting in the DCI’s office that 01010000 S0¤i0r CLA officials, the CIA participants were surprised when the foreign government (Israel) intelligence service asked if they were aware of DoD officials "coming to Italy to talk about Iran."1°8 The conversation was cut short and was not pursued at that time. When approached by the ambassador after his February 1, 2002, call from Under Secretary Grossman, however, - _ question durin the meeting at CIA headquarters with the activities of Mr. Ledeen . the ambassador had indicated that the DoD participants "were talking about 25 million U.S. dollars] for some k.ind of Iran program." - noted that the ambassador speculated that "perhaps it was for some sort of opposition sup ort."1°9 . he DCI was in contact with Mr. Hadley about the matter. The DDO also expressed a number of concerns:110 First, I was not advised, the DCI was not advised, and you were not advised of DoD’s apparent use of- foreign government (Israel)] to facilitate some sort of dialogue with the Iranian government. We were not asked to trace the names of the Iranians. We were not asked to comment on the substance of the alleged Iranian offer. 0n F¢bf¤¤1"y 7. 2002. indicated that the ambassador had clarified that it was the Iranians who had told the DoD officials that for $25 million they could provide “certain unspecified information and services."m He noted that the ambassador planned to inform Under Secretary Grossman that "given the discussion of money for services, this effort may be crossing into the area of covert action, for which he is not aware of any residential authorization."u2 - “" ibid 106 2003-4617, Rome 00628, 8 February 2002 (State Department Cable). 107 At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet, page 312, and March l0, 2008, Staff Telephone Conversation with George Tenet, page l. ‘°" 2003-4209, cebre, February 1, 2002. ‘°’ ibid “° 2003-4209, cebre, February s, 2002. ‘“ 2003-4209, cebre, February 7, 2002. *12 ibid _ 18

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  • _ Defense Department Decision on VVhether to Continue Contact 
  • (U) Mr. Franklin’s summary of the Rome meeting had been passed up his chain of command via Mr. Luti to Mr. Rodman. On January 7, 2002, Mr. Rodman drafted a letter for Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to send to DIA Director Wilson with a copy to Mr. Hadley. The draft letter reminded the Director of their previous interaction on the matter, advised that the meeting had taken place once it became known the Iranians merely intended to provide information and not defect, and requested that the Director review the attached summary to determine whether the DoD should pursue the matter further through DIA channels. This letter was never sent.115 Instead, a meeting was arranged between Mr. Rodman and Director Wilson for February 2, 2002. In a January 31, 2002, handwritten memo to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Rodman advised that the meeting was set, that a new version of the summary had been prepared, and reminded the Deputy Secretary that he had previously instructed him not to hand the summary over.116 Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz responded with a note indicating that the DoD needed to insulate the activity "from the appearance of being a policy channel, but it might be possible to include Rhode or Franklin as part of a DIA team." Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s response also reiterated the requirement that Director Wilson be allowed read the summary, but not ma.ke a copy, and observed that this would underscore that the Director was not to discuss the matter with anyone else until further authorized. The response also instructed Mr. Rodman to ask Director Wilson his opinion on the intelligence value of proceeding with further contact and how he would handle it if given the assignment.] 17
  • (U) Mr. Rodman met with Director Wilson on February 2, 2002, and later that day prepared a memorandum to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz summarizing the meeting. The memo noted that Director Wilson had been shown a copy of the summary, but it had not been left with him, and stated that the Director had found the information to be "mildly interesting." H8 Mr. H3 2003-4209, came, February 11, 2002. U4 2003-4209, came, March 21, 2002. 115 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 11, January 7, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Iranian Debrief 116 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 14, January 31, 2002, Handwritten note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Iranian Matter. 117 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 15, February 1, 2002, Handwritten notes from Mr. Wolfowitz to Mr. Rodman on DIA Director Meeting. Us 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17, February 2, 2002, Memo Hom Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting with the DIA Director. NOTE: Admiral Wilson was DIA Director Hom July 1999 to July 2002. Committee staff interviewed Admiral Wilson via telephone on June 10, 2004. Admiral Wilson could not recall many of the events relating to the Rome meeting beyond advising Mr. Rodman that DIA could handle any further contacts with the Iranians and that they should be coordinated with the CIA. He could not recall reading the Rome meeting summary or referring to the information as _ 19

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  • _ Rodman’s memo also indicated that Director Wilson had offered several different ways to pursue the matter ranging from continued debriefings to full recruitment. Director Wilson had noted that the DIA was capable of handling any of the options, but a clandestine recruitment would require coordination with the CIA, although DIA could perhaps do a one-time interview without informing the CIA in advance. Director Wilson wrote down the names of the Iranians and offered to conduct name traces, but was told to hold off until it was authorized at higher levels. Mr. Rodman reminded him to discuss the matter with no one else without author·ization.u9
  • (U) On February 5, 2002, Mr. Rodman prepared handwritten notes for a memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld outlining the potential options for moving forward with the Iranians. The options offered were to drop the matter, continue in non- intelligence channels, or to do it through the DIA without telling the CIA who the sources were.l2° An undated draft memo from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld that expanded on the material in the handwritten notes offered the same choices, but included the option to seek Presidential authority to override the DCID requirement for CIA coordination. The overall recommendation in the draft memo was to "put it into regular intelligence channels," but the memo noted the conflict between the alleged reluctance of the Iranians to deal with the CIA and the requirement to coordinate future contact with that agency. 121
  • (U) Handwritten notes from Mr. Rodman, dated February 9, 2002, indicate his awareness that the Rome meeting issue had become known to the CIA, Under Secretary Grossman, and the U.S. embassy in Rome. The notes indicate that because of Mr. Ghorbanifar the "whole world is involved," and contain the reference "$25 m illion] ??" with no further explanation.122 The notes also state that Mr. Ledeen played a role in raising that awareness and that Mr. Rodman contacted him at his home that day.l 3 According to a draft chronology prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, on February 9, 2002, the State Department and CIA indicated their opposition to further contact and as a result the DoD dropped the matter.124 (U) When the DoD decided to drop the matter in early February 2002, the information provided by the two Iranian sources had not been fully evaluated or vetted with other known information by the Intelligence Community, beyond Mr. Franklin passing a portion of the information collected to Special Forces in Afghanistan. Mr. Franklin told the Committee that mildly interesting. When interviewed in 2003 by the Counterintelligence Field Activity Admiral Wilson provided a similar response. 119 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 17, February 2, 2002, Memo from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz on the Meeting with the DIA Director. 120 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 18, February 5, 2002, Handwritten Note from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz. 121 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 19, Draft Memo from Mr. Wolfowitz to Secretary Rumsfeld on Iranian Sources. 122 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tabs 21, rcbmapy 12, 2002, Nm.-; pp _ Support, and 22, Febmapy 12, 2002, Rome Muang; References to Financing, and 2004-4231 indicate that on February 12, 2002 Mr. Rodman researched the financial proposals discussed at the Rome meeting. To the best of Mr. Rodman’s recollection, Mr. Franklin assisted in drafting a memo on the subject dated February 12, 2002. 123 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 20, February 9, 2002, Handwritten Notes from Mr. Rodman to Mr. Wolfowitz. 124 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events. _ 20

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  • _ Mr. Rodman informed him that he had handed the Rome meeting summary to DIA Director Wilson and that "since it was given to the Director I knew that he would pass it down to desk analysts." However, he also stated that he was unaware of: any intelligence reports that were generated from the information; it being passed to another element of the Intelligence Community; or any actions that Director Wilson may have taken with his summary. He added that no one ever called him and asked for input.125 The Defense HUMINT Service representative that Mr. Franklin contacted after his return from the meeting told the Committee that beyond the verbal briefing from Mr. Franklin he never saw any intelligence reports or requests for further follow-up.126 The DIA analyst contacted by Mr. Franklin informed the Committee that to his knowledge there was no subsequent entry of the information provided by Mr. Franklin into DIA databases and it was not used in any DIA analytic products.12 As noted above, Director Wilson had not been allowed to retain a copy of the summary.
  • (U) In April 2002, the Defense HUMINT Service received an "executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . A Defense HUMINT Service contact memorandum describing the meeting indicated that the tasking resulted from a briefing on the Rome meeting from Mr. Ledeen to representatives in Mr. Rodman’s office. The Defense HUMINT Service document outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , and noted that Mr. Ledeen repeatedly declined to provide details that the interviewer deemed necessary to assess the validity of Mr. Ledeen ’s contacts such as specific names, locations, and contact information. The document indicated Mr. Ledeen promised more details once the DoD expressed real interest in pursuing further contact.1 8 (-) Information provided by the DoD in March 2008 indicates that after the interview of Mr. Ledeen , the Defense HUMINT Service held discussions with several <>¤mr¤¤¤¢¤tS Of the CTA, During the meeting, the Defense HUMINT Service learned that Mr. "Ledeen had a history of approaching his USG U.S. Government] contacts with various ‘schemes’ to gain USG interest and/or support for various issues normally related to Hizbollah, Iran, and or Terrorism." The Service also became aware that some of Mr. Ledeen ’s contacts were considered "nefarious and unreliable." The Defense HUMINT Service determined that no further contact with Mr. Ledeen was warranted or advisable.129 The Ongoing Actions of Mr. Ledeen 
  • (U) After the Rome meeting, Mr. Ledeen continued to press for continued contact with the Iranians through his variety of contacts inside the U.S. Government. In mid-January 2002, 125 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 35-36 and 39. 126 2004-2735, Transcript of June 8, 2004, Staff Interview of DIA Employee #1], pages 4-6. As noted later in this report, in April 2002, the Defense HU`M]NT Service received an "executive referral" from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to meet with Mr. Ledeen . A Defense HUMINT Service contact memorandum outlined the Rome meeting as recalled by Mr. Ledeen , but noted that Mr. Ledeen repeatedly declined to provide details such as specific names, locations, and contact information. 127 2008-0836, Memorandum for the Record, December 19, 2007, Staff Interview with DIA Analyst #1], page 2. 128 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #4, Undated DIA Contact Memorandum on Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Referral, pages 1-2. 129 2008-1182, March 12, 2008 DoD Response to Questions for the Record, Question #14. _ 21

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  • _ Mr. Ledeen held discussions with Mr. Rodman on how best to continue the exchange, and had scheduled a meeting with Mr. Hadley for January 16, 2002, to discuss the matter.13 Mr. Franklin advised the Committee that he became aware of Mr. Ledeen ’s efforts to push for other elements of the U.S. Government to hear Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan. He recalled being approached by an official from the Office of the Vice President in early 2002 requesting his opinion of Mr. Ghorbanifar’s plan and his judgments of its prospects for success. Mr. Franklin stated that he recommended that it not be pursued. 131
  • (U) According to a draft chronology prepared for the Secretary of Defense by Mr. Rodman in August 2003, a memorandum that Mr. Ledeen had been circulating was sent from former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to Secretary Rumsfeld in June 2002. The memorandum expressed concern about the failure to continue contact with Iranian officials who had provided valuable information in the past.132 The DoD provided the Committee with a copy of the memorandum with an explanatory note stating that while a stamp on the memorandum indicated the Secretary saw it on June 27, 2002, it merely reflected that the memorandum had "passed through" the Secretary’s office. The use of that stamp had since been discontinued.133
  • (U) According to a July 18, 2002 cable from Ambassador Sembler to Under Secretary Grossman, on July 4, 2002, Mr. Ledeen contacted Ambassador Sembler and at the end of a social conversation informed him that he would be returning to Rome in early August to "resume that program." The ambassador advised the Under Secretary that he presumed this to be a reference to the December meeting with Iranian officials and noted that these activities had undermined the credibility of the U.S. Government. The ambassador also indicated that Mr. Ledeen had only provided him with a small amount of information on the subject and went on to state that "I am increasingly concerned that his activity borders on, or has already entered, an area which would require explicit Presidential authorization and notification of the Chief of Mission."134 There was no response to the cable. The DDO added that CIA leadership had been informed and he had asked that the National Security Council be queried immediately. 136 According to handwritten notes prepared by Mr. Rodman and dated July 13, 2002, a special assistant to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, DoD Employee #2, had advised him that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had spoken with DCI Tenet and determined that the DCI now supported further contacts with the Iranians. In addition, Assistant 130 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 12, January 16, 2002, Note from DoD Employee #1] to Mr. Rodman. m 2004-1809, Transcript of April 23, 2004, Staff Interview of Mr. Franklin, pages 43-44. 132 2007-1561, DoD IG Rome Meeting Review Source Document #1, August 2003 Chronology of Events, page 2. 133 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 23, May 10, 2002 fax to Secretary Rumsfeld, and attached explanatory note. 134 2003-4617, Rome 03565, 18 July 2002 (State Department Cable). ‘” 2003-4209, came, July 15, 2002. 126 2003-4209, came, July 16, 2002. _ 22

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  • _ Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, Charles Allen, had been selected to coordinate on the matter.137
  • (U) On July 19, 2002, Mr. Rodman prepared an action memo for Secretary Rumsfeld in response to the Secretary’s request about what the DoD should do with respect to contacts with Iran, as described in the memo forwarded to him by former Speaker Gingrich. The action memo described the origins of the Rome meeting, and outlined complications due to the involvement of Mr. Ghorbanifar and the previous objections of DCI Tenet and Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The memo concluded with the recommendation that the "DoD be prepared to continue the contact, through regular DHS Defense HUMINT Service] channels and with CIA coordination." The memo was reviewed by Under Secretary Feith, on July 25, 2002.13 8 <j> in 0 July 25, 2002, according to the ambassador, Under Secretary Grossman had raised the issue with Secretary Powell, who had proceeded to pursue it with Secretary Rumsfeld and the National Security Council. h at each step, Secretary Powell was advised that Mr. Ledeen ’s desire to continue the program at the planned August meeting was not authorized.139 An August 8, 2002 the CIA had been told by a National Security Council legal advisor that Mr. Hadley had personally chastised Mr. Ledeen for continuing to pursue the matter even though he had been told to desist in December 2001, and advised Mr. Ledeen in strong terms to "cease his activity on the issue." At that point, the DDO - concluded the matter was behind them.140 No such meeting organized by Mr. Ledeen occurred in the August 2002 timeframe.
  • (U) Ambassador Sembler traveled to Washington, D.C. for a series of meetings on September 4, 2002. During this visit the ambassador met with National Security Advisor Rice and Mr. Hadley and was advised that Mr. Ledeen ’s activities would not continue. He received a similar response from Deputy Secretary Armitage in a separate meeting.141
  •  
  • Other Related Activities
  • (U) The only other event related to the Rome meeting that occurred in 2002 involved a chance meeting between Mr. Rhode and one of the Iranians he and Mr. Franklin had met in Rome. According to a September 2003 interview of Mr. Rhode by the Counterintelligence Field Activity, in December 2002 Mr. Rhode attended a U.S. Government endorsed Iraqi opposition conference in London, England. According to Mr. Rhode a number of DoD and State Department personnel attended the conference. At the conference he unexpectedly encountered one of the Iranians he had met at the Rome meeting. The Iranian asked Mr. Rhode about U.S. views on regime change in Iran and Mr. Rhode indicated that those types of decisions were made 137 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative AEairs, Tab 24, July 13, 2002, Handwritten Notes of Mr. Rodman on a Discussion with DoD Employee #2] , and 2007-1561 DoD IG source document #1, Draft 8/11/03 chronology, page 2. 138 2004-1675, April 16, 2004, letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Tab 25, July 19, 2002, Action Memo Hom Mr. Rodman to Secretary Rumsfeld. 139 2003-4209, Cable, July 25, 2002. "° 2003-4209, cubic, August 8, 2002. 141 2004-3535, State Department August 24, 2004 Response to Questions for the Record, Question #5. _ 23

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continued

 
  • the Al Husseir1, with an estimated range of 630 km, and "possibly" the Al Abbas, with an estimated range of 900 km. 
  • (U) The intelligence community also assessed that Iraq was working to develop new ballistic missiles with a range of 750-3000 km, which would be greater than its presumed "Scud-type force", but available intelligence indicated that Iraq was still at the early stages of development on this project  President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States."H2 
  • (U) As noted above, the IC assessed at that time that Iraq had a small force of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant missiles, with a likely range of 630-900 kilometers, or roughly 400-560 miles. The IC also assessed that Iraq was in the final stages of development of new short-range ballistic missiles, but estimated that the range of these missiles was 150-300 km, or under 200 miles. These judgments were contained in several assessments, including the October 1, 2002 NIE.m 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq was developing and flight-testing small-to-medium sized UAVs, and had a UAV development program that was "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent". The majority of the IC also believed that at least one of these UAVs was close to being ready for operational use. The intelligence branch of the US Air Force disagreed with this part of the analysis of the UAV program, however. Air Force intelligence noted in the NIE that "CBW chemical and biological weapons] delivery is an inherent capability" of UAVs, but judged that "the small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance."H4 110 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile Proliferation Activity, March 1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel, December 2002. U1 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H2 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. U3 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; DIA, Iraq Missile Proliferation Activity, March 1, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; DIA, Military Threats to Israel, December 2002; and National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Committee staff were also permitted to view a one-page summary of the NIE, which was prepared for the President. This one-page summary included two sentences on delivery systems, which stated "Baghdad has some SRBMs that exceed UN range limits of 150 km. It has UAVs, probably fgrrcéegvery of biological weapons and less likely for chemical weapons agents? 1 . 53
  • (U) Despite the fabrication notice, the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE cited four sources (not three as was included in the President’s speech the following January) of the mobile biological lab intelligence, including al-Assaf by name. 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE said, "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war." The NIE also said, "an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the IC said seven mobile BW production units were constructed and that one began production as early as l997."57 
  • (U) Prior to the President’s address, some CIA operations officers had doubts about the credibility of CURVE BALL and debated the point at high levels within the Directorate of Operations. Additionally, on December 20, 2002, the Chief of the relevant station cabled CIA headquarters to describe a meeting that day with the head of the foreign intelligence service handling CURVE BALL. The cable summarized the meeting and noted that the head of the service wrote a letter to the DCI to the effect that CURVEBALL’s reporting on mobile facilities "has not been verified." The CIA station did not send the actual letter from the head of the foreign intelligence service to CIA headquarters until February 5, 2003. On January 27, 2003, the same Chief of Station cautioned CIA headquarters in another cable to "take the most serious consideration" before using CURVEBALL’s information publicly. The Committee has found no evidence that then-Director Tenet or policymakers were informed of the doubts that some Intelligence Community officers had about CURVEBALL’s reliability or about concerns with using CURVEBALL’s information publicly. Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) Secretary Powell’s presentation delved into greater detail on Iraq’s biological weapons program and capabilities. He said there "can be no doubt" that Iraq possessed biological weapons and discussed their means for delivery. He stated that rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent were dispersed to various locations, many of them hidden in large groves of palm trees, and moved every one to four weeks to escape detection. 
  • (U) Secretary Powell described the mobile labs in great detail. He cited sources with "iirst-hand descriptions" of the factories, and described four human sources in terms of their professions and access to the information. Powell stated that the labs — "at least seven" in number — on truck and rail cars "can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War." 
  • (U) Secretary Powell specified that the mobile labs can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin, and that overall, "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox." 57 The National Intelligence Council subsequently notified recipients of the NIE that the term "several days" was an error and should be replaced with "three to six months." 

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  • (U) Finally, Powell referenced human sources that told the intelligence community that Iraq had experimented with biological weapons on human beings. (U) In addition to the intelligence assessments described above, reports relevant to whether specific claims in the February 5 speech were substantiated by the intelligence are described below. 
  • (U) The DIA issued a report in February 2003, Iraq: Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, "palm and date tree groves. . .," but this report was issued after Secretary Powe11’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There was operational intelligence traffic on this issue prior to the Secretary’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical assessments. 
  • (U) The number of mobile labs — "at least seven" — was included in, among other reports, the December 2000 ICA and October 2002 NIE as described above. Multiple reports described seven mobile production facilities and provided schematic details on two- or three-railcar systems. 
  • (U) Secretary Powell stated that Iraq has investigated dozens of biological agents, and named eight specifically. All eight were included, along with 13 others, in a list in the October 2002 NIE entitled, "BW Agents that Iraq has researched." A report produced by CIA WINPAC on November 13, 2002 said that "Iraq probably possesses at least 20 to 25 different microbes or toxins for possible BW use."58 The same report had noted that Iraq ‘°has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of smallpox] for use in various delivery systems."59 Numerous other intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s capability to produce smallpox and other biological agents. 
  • (U) On the topic of human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing-—probably to the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim." Additional Statements • "So, we know that he has stored the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and I deliver them. — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 58 November 13, 2002 CIA WINPAC assessment, Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose Growing Threat to US Interests (CIAWINPAC IA 2002-060CX). 59 ibid. _  

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  • "But I can say obviously that they have had an enormous appetite for weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. They’ve taken these capabilities and weaponized them. They are continuing to do so today. They are looking not only at a variety of biological capabilities, but at a variety of ways of dispensing or weaponizing them so that they have a range of choices with respect to it." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "His regime has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulinim toxin and possibly smallpox. — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • "They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and possibly smallpox." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 - • " The Iraqi declaration has] no information about Iraq’s mobile biological-weapons production facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq has not accounted for some two tons of anthrax growth media." — Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Address to Council on Foreign Relations, January 1, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq has no ongoing WMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include ...tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "Where is the evidence that Iraq has destroyed the tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum we know it had before it expelled the previous inspectors? This isn’t an American determination. This is the determination of previous inspectors... What happened to the three metric tons of growth material that Iraq imported which can be used for producing early, in very rapid fashion, deadly biological agents? Where the mobile vans that are nothing more than biological laboratories on wheels?" — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 -• Firsthand witnesses have informed us that Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of biological agents -— equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade discovery. — President Bush, February 8, 2003, Radio address 
  • (U) These statements were consistent with the intelligence described above. 
  •  
  •  

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  • Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments from the late l990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Postwar Intelligence 
  • (U) The postwar review by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) determined that Iraq was not conducting biological weapons production on research after 1996.60 The ISG determined that depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to months of a decision to do so, but found no indications that Iraq was pursuing this option.61 
  • (U) The ISG found "no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."62 
  • (U) The Committee’s report, "Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments" described the postwar findings on CURVE BALL. It noted that the ISG "harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility." The CIA and DIA issued a joint congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project and that his reporting had been recalled.63 ET Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Biological Section, p. l. Ibid, p.2. 62 rnd. 63 CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs Notification, June 7, 2004

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  • IV. Chemical Weapons • "The lraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "United Nations’ inspections also revealed that lraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, ` mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on lran, and on more than forty villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September the 11th." — President George W. Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The lraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. lt possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that lraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite intemational sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make more." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of (sic) all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons — not 

page 29

  • economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities. " — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them." — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up sixteen of them — despite Iraq’s recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq’s procurement efforts include: equipment that can filter and separate A microorganisms and toxins involved in biological weapons; equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent; growth media that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin; sterilization equipment for laboratories; glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents; and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again — against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn’t be passing out the orders if he didn’t 

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  • _ have the weapons or the intent to use them." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We also have sources who tell us that since the 1980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee Mugust 26, 2002) 
  • (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that Iraq has been "busy enhancing its capabilities in the iield of chemical" agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to husband his resources and] to invest in his ongoing chemical" weapons program. 
  • (U) The Committee reviewed prewar intelligence assessments in its July 2004 report, US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. That report described a December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, which represented the iirst comprehensive, coordinated report on all aspects of Iraq’s WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors departed Iraq.
  • (U) The ICA stated that "Iraq’s expansion of its chemical industry is intended to support CW production" but that "we have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged in large-scale production of CW agents, but we cannot rule out that small-scale production has occurred." 
  • (U) The ICA judged that "We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and iilled munitions that are still militarily useful." And that " w]e assess the size of the CW agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent and condition of Iraq’s stockpile, although we believe mustard agent- and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX — and related munitions probably are key components." The ICA noted that the available intelligence "suggests that a small portion of Iraq’s prewar stockpile of iilled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical agents." - The intelligence produced between the December 2000 ICA and the Vice President’s August 2002 speech tended to reiterate and confirm the ICA views. For example, a December 14, 2001 DIA assessment stated that "Saddam Hussein will continue to pursue a chemical weapons (CW) program to help ensure his personal survival and the survival of his regime, and to increase respect for Iraq as a regional power." It also stated that "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions."64 The same assessment noted that DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq is currently producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish a large—scale CW production capability. However, "we assess that Iraq has plans to re-establish such a capability." And "DL°1 judges that 64 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December 14, 2001 (DI-1650-57-Ol). 

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  • Nearly 80% of Christian Fundamentalists voted for Bush in 2000, 2004, 2006...and now he has a less than 30% approval rating?
Without the Christian right, Bush would not have been elected, and consequently would not have been able to launch the Iraq War.

 

=go to NFU pages

Better than abstinence?

 
  • Saddam Husayn’s goal is to re-establish a robust chemical weapons (CW) progra1n." Also in December, the CIA wrote a Senior Executive Memorandum which stated that "_ - Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual-use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plans.66 
  • (U) A January 2002 Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-I I September, stated "DIA cannot confirm with conidence that Iraq has successfully restarted an offensive CW program. However, if it has, Iraq probably can produce mustard, sarin or GF, and VX, though mustard may be the only agent it can produce without external resources."66 The assessment also commented on the possibility of using dual use facilities to produce chemical weapons agent, noting that "DIA cannot state with confidence the composition or total output of chemical products at (Iraq’s suspected CW) facilities, but production lines are currently operational. .. Currently, DIA cannot identify where the CW center of gravity exists, but it could be hidden in dual-use and industrial facilities." _ The question of Iraq’s production capabilities was also addressed in a May 16, 2002 CIA report, Iraq: Seeking To Expand CWProduction Capability. This report assessed that "Iraq in the past three years has sought foreign equipment and chemicals that would give it the capability to roduce chemical warfare (CW) agents for a limited strategic stockpile, according to reporting." The report went on to state that "Small-scale chemical agent production, probably of mustard, sarin, GF, and VX, could be hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry. Baghdad has the equipment and the expertise to match its pre-Gulf war production of nerve and blister agents, but Iraq’s inability to produce key precursors could limit nerve agent production."67 
  • (U) On August l, 2002, the CIA prepared another assessment which said, "Iraq probably has rebuilt a covert CW production capability by expanding its chemical industry. It is rebuilding former CW facilities, developing new chemical plants, and trying to procure CW-related items covertly. We judge it has the capability to produce mustard blister agent and the nerve agents sarin, GF, and VX. Iraq’s CW agent production capability probably is more limited than it was at the time of the Gulf war.68 (U) Thus while the intelligence community believed that the Iraqi regime had retained some chemical weapons and had worked to develop the capability to produce new chemical weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure. The Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions on whether Iraq had actually begun production of chemical weapons. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 65 
  • CIA, SPWR, The Iraqi Threat, December 15, 2001 (SPWRl2l50l-07). 66 DIA, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs.· Post-!] September, January 2002 (DI- l 600-50Q-02-SCI). 67 CIA SEIB, Iraq: Seeking T 0 Expand C WPr0ducti0n Capability, May I6, 2002 (PASS SEIB 02-l l4 CHX). 68 CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Post Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 32

page 32

  • (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that UN inspections "revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents." This statement was consistent with the statements and intelligence above. 
  • (U) The President’s statement that Iraq was "rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of "` producing chemical weapons" suggests more coincedence in Iraq’s progress than the intelligence assessments at the time. Ir1 addition to the reports described earlier, a July 22, 2002 CIA assessment noted that "Iraq has rebuilt destroyed CW-related and civilian facilities while building a number of new, ostensibly civilian chemical production facilities. Although CIA does not know the function of these new facilities, chemical precursors and, in some cases, agent production could be conducted at dual-use chemical facilities.69 An April 2002 CIA paper noted that "Iraq has obtained technical and logistical support to rehabilitate its industrial chemical industry and potentially to rebuild its CW program. Most ... assistance has involved the reconstruction of the chlorine facility at Al Tareq. Al Tareq probably is still connected to Iraq’s CW program and could be converted quickly to CW precursor production."70 
  • (U) The September DIA report had written on this topic that "Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of G—series nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key chemical precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production facilities during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM inspections. In the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely experience difficulties in producing nerve agents at the rate executed before Operation Desert Storm" and that "Baghdad is rebuilding part of its chemical production infrastructure under the guise of a civilian need for pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical products, giving Iraq the potential for a small ‘breakout’ production capability."71 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
  • (U) The President discussed chemical weapons in greater detail at his Cincinnati speech of October 2002. He stated that "we know" that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas" and that Iraq has used chemical weapons before. The President stated that the Iraqi regime "possesses and produces chernical" weapons. He cited "surveillance photos" of rebuilding at facilities that had previously been used to produce chemical weapons. 
  • (U) A September 2002 DIA report stated that "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has —-or will--establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities." The same report, however, also said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq’s effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) program."72 69 Iraq: Ensuring CBW Survivability, July 22, 2002, p.2. 70 Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers, April 2002, p. l. 71 The DIA included similar language in a November 2002 report described later in this report. 72 DIA, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An Operational Support Study 2900-51 l-02, September 2002. 33
  •  

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  • (U) Intelligence community products clearly stated that Iraq had produced large volumes of chemical agents in the past, during and after its war with Iran. The intelligence community also agreed that Iraq had used chemical weapons before, against Iran in the 1980s and against Iraqi Kurds. As stated above, intelligence products prior to this speech but before the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons - 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions. Director Tenet’s testimony to Senate Committees in September 2002 stated that "We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent" but did not state an upper end for the estimate.7 
  • (U) Between the President’s September speech to the UN and the October speech in Cincirmati, the intelligence community had produced and disseminated its October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In most respects, the NIE’s judgments were more assertive than previous intelligence judgments, stating that "We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX." 
  • (U) On the question of chemical weapons stockpile, the NIE updated the previous assessment- 100 tons or less — to an assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year." A footnote in the body of the report added that the 100 ton figure was a "conservative estimate" and that the "500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds .... " In saying that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons" of agent, the President did not give the time frame for this production or say that Iraq had this volume of agent stockpiled. The intelligence at the time did not suggest that Iraq had produced — or was producing such quantities at the time of the speech, though Iraq had produced such quantities since the inception of its chemical weapons program. The NIE didn’t specifically state how much chemical agent Iraq could produce. It did state that "Iraq’s CW capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent shelf life probably have been improved." - the intelligence community had produced reports on construction and activity at suspected chemical weapons facilities, in particular the Fallujah plants. These plants also had legitimate dual-use purposes for producing chlorine, but the intelligence community assessed that plants were producing more chemicals than were needed for civilian purposes. The NIE noted that Iraq’s legitimate needs were being met through authorized imports and other chlorine plants in the country, and listed other reasons to be skeptical that the plant was being used for legitimate purposes.74 President ’s State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) 73 Testimony of Director George Tenet to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 17, 2002. 74 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. The other reasons were: a concern about the plant’s cover story, shallow burial of equipment for denial and deception purposes, Iraq’s use of its procurement network to obtain chemical weapons precursors, and that personnel identified with the previous weapons program were linked to the facility. 

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  •  
 
  • The moral majority, perverts, child abusers.
  • Power and pedophilia, sexual deviants.

 

The worst President ever.

 
  • (U) In the President’s State of the Union Address in January 2003, he said nothing has restrained Saddam Hussein from his pursuit of chemical weapons (along with other WMD). He cited intelligence estimates that Hussein "had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent" and a former stockpile of "upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents” that had not been accounted for. A _ 
  • (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq had, as an upper limit, 500 tons on chemical agent and that Iraq had renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX. 
  • (U) A November 2002 DIA report had stated that "Baghdad probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents -- much of it added in the last year.” That same report also contrasted with the NIE’s judgment that "Baghdad has begtm renewed production” of certain CW agents, saying that "No reliable information indicates whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where the country has — or will — establish its chemical agent production facilities." The report also stated, however, that "Iraq probably has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but no conclusive proof is available because of the effective national-level denial and deception program.”75 
  • (U) The Intelligence Community regularly reported that Iraq had not accounted for its previous chemical weapons or precursor stockpiles and that Iraq retained a large number of munitions capable of delivering chemical weapons. The NIE stated that "Iraq provided little verifiable evidence that it unilaterally destroyed 15,000 artillery rockets after the Gulf war." 
  • (U) The reference to 30,000 (empty) chemical agent munitions was based on UNSCOM reporting. The Intelligence Community had provided assessments to policymakers in December 2002 and January 2003 on Iraq’s WMD declarations. One assessment stated that " The declaration] fails to address unaccounted chemical munitions disputed by the UN, including 550 155mm mustard filled artillery shells or 30,000 empty CW munitions."76 Another, provided by the CIA in advance of Secretary Powell’s speech, stated that, "Baghdad did not account for 30,000 empty prewar munitions, which leaves us concerned that Iraq retained a supply for later filling with CW agents."77 Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U) Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech repeated many of the statements addressed above. He stated that ‘%zve know Iraq has embedded key portions" of a chemical weapons program into its civilian industry and reconstituted facilities associated with its past weapons program. Secretary Powell addressed the intelligence on Iraq’s stockpile as had been done in speeches described above, saying that " o]ur conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent." 75 DLA, Iraq’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapon and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities DI-1569-44-02, November 2002. 76 US Analysis of Iraq’s Declaration, 7 December 2002. 77 CIA input for Powell speech, provided to the White House in mid-January 2003. 

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  • (U) Also described in this statement but not the others previously addressed, Secretary Powell referenced human sources who said that Saddam Hussein had authorized field commanders to use chemical weapons. He also referred to sources claims that Saddam Hussein’s regime had experimented on human beings as part of its chemical weapons program. 
  • (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE assessed that 100 tons of chemical weapons agent was a "conservative estimate" and that Iraq could possess "possibly as much as 500 MT." A footnote to the NIE elaborated that the Intelligence Community believed that "the Iraqis are capable of producing significantly larger quantities of CQ agent in some scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds, such as Iraq’s limited delivery options, and approximates Iraq’s stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm."78 According to the Committee’s first report, analysts believed that the 500 ton figure was meant as an upper bound, and not as an estimate of Iraq’s stockpile.79 
  • (U) In two places, the October 2002 NIE states that Saddam Hussein had delegated the authority to use chemical weapons to "corps-level commanders" at the end of the Iran-Iraq war or shortly aferwards. 
  • (U) On the topic of human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing—probably to the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim.”80 Other Statements • There’s no doubt that he has chemical weapon stocks. We destroyed some after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there’s no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical weapon stocks and he has the capacity to produce more chemical weapons. — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002. • "So, we know that he has stored the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and deliver them. — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 7* me at 28. 79 SSCI report at 206. 80 Additional reporting on human experimentation was in a CIA SPWR (Senior Publish When Ready), Possible Experimentation on Prisoners, December 30, 2002, which reported that "Baghdad is experimenting on prisoners with toxic substances" and that Iraq had used prisoners for biological and chemical agent testing in the 1980s and 1990s.

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  • • “His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • “He’s got chemical weapons; he needs to get rid of them, all of them." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002. • "They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and possibly smallpox. They have amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX and sarin and mustard gas. His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 • "His regime has large, unaccounted for stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons - including VX, sarin, mustard gas, anthrax, botulism, and possibly smallpox - and he has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks to ROA, January 20, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq has no ongoing VVMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include: 550 artillery munitions filled with mustard agent; tons of unaccounted for chemical weapons precursors; 30,000 empty chemical munitions; tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "What happened to nearly 30,000 munitions capable of carrying chemical agents? Saddam should tell the truth, and tell the truth now. The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 (U) These statements were consistent with the intelligence described above. 
  •  
  • Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 3: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of chemical weapons were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments, including the December 2000 ICA stated that Iraq had retained up to 100 metric tons of its chemical weapons stockpile. The October 2002 NIE provided a range of 100 to 500 metric tons of chemical weapons.

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  • (U`) Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing. 
  • Postwar Findings 
  • (U`) The Committee reported on postwar findings on Iraq’s chemical weapons program in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. The Committee found the following. 
  • (U`) Following the war, the Iraq Survey Group conducted its review of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and found that there "were no caches of CW munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions." Additionally, "the ISG has high confidence that there are no CW present in the Iraqi inventory."8l Some pre-1991 chemical weapons munitions have been found since the end of the combat operations. 
  • (U`) The ISG found no credible evidence indicating Iraq resumed its chemical weapons program after 1991, but said that "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable."82 
  • (U`) The ISG investigated whether Iraq had intended to produce chemical weapons through its civilian chemical industry. It found that Iraq had an inherent capability to use its civilian industry for sulfur mustard CW agents, but did not find any production units that had been configured to produce CW agents or key chemical precursors. The ISG found that Iraq did not have a capability to produce nerve agents.83 gl Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. 123. 82 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. land 97. 83 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. 25. _ 38

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  •  
  • V. Weapons of Mass Destruction • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently stated: ‘The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action."’ - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a - nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "If we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today — and we do- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?" - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of death and destruction." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials fiom the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 • "Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003

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  • "Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from being found by inspectors." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "VVe also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State all stated that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction. In later speeches, both the President and the Secretary of State said that the Iraqi government was engaged in a large- scale deception effort to conceal weapons of mass destruction programs from United Nations inspectors. 
  • (U) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (or ‘WMD’) is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and this is the official Department of Defense definition.84 No official definition existed for the intelligence community at the time of the speeches being examined, and different intelligence products have used different definitions. A substantial number of policymaker statements regarding Iraq referred generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction"‘, without specifying whether the weapons in question were nuclear, biological, chemical, or some combination thereof. This section examines statements that refer generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and compares them to intelligence regarding these three types of weapons. Statements regarding specific types of weapons are discussed in the other, corresponding sections of this report. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
  • (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction," and that "there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing "the imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" with regard to Iraq, and "the huge dangers it involves", as evidence that preemptive action was necessary.85 
  • (U) As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq 84 Discussions of WMD frequently include references to ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery systems, but delivery systems by themselves are specifically excluded from the official Department of Defense definition. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms dennes "weapons of mass destruction" as "Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon." 85 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention, August 26, 2002. 40
  • possessed nuclear weapons, but reached different conclusions about chemical and biological weapons.86 
  • (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s the intelligence community had consistently assessed that Iraq possessed remnants from its previous biological weapons stockpile. Some reporting also assessed that Iraq had an active biological weapons program, and that production of biological weapons was ongoing.87 
  • (U) During this same time frame, intelligence assessments noted that Iraq maintained a small stockpile of pre-Gulf War chemical weapons. Some assessments stated that Iraq had developed the capability to produce new chemical weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure, while other assessments were not conclusive on this point. The Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions about whether Iraq had actually begun production of chemical weapons.88 
  • (U) The intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraqi possession and production of chemical and biological weapons remained consistent until the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s September 2002 address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a "grave and gathering danger", and "continues to develop weapons of mass destruction." He did not state that Iraq possessed or produced weapons of mass destruction at that time.89 
  • (U) Several intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s development of "weapons of mass destruction" generally. While not from a iinished intelligence product, a briefing book prepared by the CIA in May 2002 for the Prirrcipals’ Committee of the National Security Council said that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement? As of September 2002, intelligence community assessments stated that Iraq had worked to rebuild a chemical weapons production capacity within its civilian industry but did not state that production was ongoing. The intelligence community also assessed that Iraq maintained the capability to produce biological weapons, and the CIA assessed that production was ongoing.9° 86 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding nuclear weapons and Iraq can be found in the Nuclear Weapons section of this report. 87 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding biological weapons and Iraq can be found in the Biological Weapons section of this report. 88 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding chemical weapons and Iraq can be found in the Chemical Weapons section of this report. 89 White House Transcript, President ’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. 90 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; CIA Iraq Seeking To Expand C WProduction Capacity, May 16, 2002; DIA Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook. _ 41

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  • (U) The intelligence community did not publish a coordinated community judgment that Iraq had begun to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program until October 2002. I However, as discussed in the Nuclear Weapons section of this report, by September 2002 both the CIA and the DIA concluded that reconstitution had begun.92 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October Z 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that "we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today" and that "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of death and destruction." He also implied that Saddam was likely to develop "even more dangerous weapons."93 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed with high levels of confidence that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons and was continuing with active production programs. This represented a shift from previous intelligence community assessments, which concluded that Iraq probably possessed a small stockpile of chemical weapons and biological weapons. Previous community assessments did not judge that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons, and had lower confidence that biological weapons production was ongoing. Intelligence agencies did not agree on the question of whether Baghdad was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program, but the majority view of the NIE (which all agencies except State/INR supported) concluded that reconstitution had begun, and that Iraq would probably be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the next five to seven years.94 President’s State of the Union Address (January 29, 2003) 
  • (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that "thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites, and monitoring the inspectors themselves."95 
  • (U) As of January 2003, the intelligence community had not produced a coordinated assessment regarding the Iraqi government’s response to the ongoing UNMOVIC inspections. However, both the CIA and the DIA had produced multiple reports suggesting that active deception efforts were underway, and that these efforts ir1cluded sanitizing weapons facilities as well as concealing 91 The 2002 NIE represented the first collective intelligence community assessment on this topic since the December 2001 NIE, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. The December 2001 NIE was consistent with previous assessments that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. 92 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Defense Intelligence Assessment Iraq 's Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002; CIA Iraq: Expanding WILID Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 93 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 94 Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 95 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union ", January 28, 2003. 

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  • documents and other evidence. The reports generally did not describe the number of Iraqis involved in these apparent efforts with any speciiicity.96 Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 5, 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he said that the Iraqi regime was actively concealing "efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." He stated that numerous hrunan sources had reported that Iraqis were concealing "not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction" from UN inspectors. He said that satellite photos "indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities."9' 
  • (U) A coordinated Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) from February 2003, entitled Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities judged that Iraq successfully employed a number of denial and deception techniques against UN inspectors and US intelligence agencies. The ICA stated that these techniques included moving prohibited materials and evidence among multiple "hide sites", and that this conclusion was based on reporting from human sources and "defector testimony". The ICA also included recent satellite imagery of a storage facility that "showed the removal of possible chemical munitions from this site, almost certainly to thwart the UNMOVIC inspections conducted there."98 Additional Statements • "Every world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." —President George W Bush, Press Conkrence, March I3, 2002 • "And Saddam Hussein] is a man who refuses to allow us to determine whether or not he still has weapons of mass destruction, which leads me to believe he does. He is a dangerous man who possesses the world’s most dangerous weapons". — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 22, 2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that 96Iraq.· Bolstering Ejjbrts to Deceive Inspectors, November 30, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Moving C WInto Underground Facilities, December 17, 2002; DIA Executive Highlight, Iraq: Reports of Iraq concealing experts on weapons of mass destruction increased notably during the past week January 6, 2003; CIA, Iraq: Undermining WMD Inspections, January 6, 2003; DIA Executive Highlight, Iraq: The Iraqi Intelligence Service has taken on an increased role in concealment of Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction experts, January 9, 2003. 97 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 98 Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities, February 2003.

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  • will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth. ... In the face of such a threat, we must proceed with care, deliberation and in consultation with our allies. ...What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give in to wishful thinking or to willful blindness.’ — Vice President Dick Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio, Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "l’m deeply concerned about a leader who has ignored all -- who ignored the United Nations for all these years, has refused to conform to resolution after resolution after resolution; who has weapons of mass destruction. And the battlefield has now shifted to America, so there’s a different dynamic than we’ve ever faced before." - President George W Bush, Remarks at the Afghanistan Embassy, September 10, 2002 • "l would respond this way. lf failure to comply with weapons of mass destruction inspections is a casus belli, the UN already has it." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "... I]t’s clear from the Iraqi regime’s eleven years of defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary, contair1ment is breaking dowr1." — Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 r • "And Saddam Hussein] has biological and chemical weapons. And he is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The region knows that." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • " Saddam Hussein] has in place an elaborate organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts. ...We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, that they’re pursuing nuclear weapons, that they’ve a proven willingness to use those weapons... ...We do know that Saddam Hussein has been actively and persistently pursuing nuclear weapons for more than 20 years, but we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 • " T]his is a man who has weapons of mass destruction and says he doesn’t. He poses a serious threat to the American people." — President George W Bush, Remarks at OHS Complex, September 19, 2002 • "We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and of mid- and long-range missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for twelve long years." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 _ 44

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  • • "These four years have been more than enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspectors that were subject to Sadda.m’s cheat and retreat program from 1991 to 1998." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 • ". . . N]o one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator’s intentions have not changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as clearly as he wants to remain in power." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September 19, 2002 • "The point is this: we know Iraq possesses biological weapons, and chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit as much concern as Iraq’s potential nuclear capability." — Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Testimony before SASC, September 19, 2002 • "For eleven years he’s claimed he has had no weapons and, yet, we know he has." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Trenton, New Jersey, September 23, 2002 • "We know they the Iraqi regime] have weapons of mass destruction. We know they have active programs. There isn’t any debate about it." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Press Conference, September 26, 2002 • " Saddam Hussein’s] got chemical weapons; he needs to get rid of them, all of them. He’s got biological weapons; he needs to destroy all of them. There’s no doubt in my mind he wants to have a nuclear weapon, and he’s got some capacity. I’m not saying he’s got one yet, but he’s developing the capacity, as we learned right after Desert Storm...The burden of proof is on Saddam Hussein." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002 • "We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile, we can have debates about how long it will take him to reach this level of readiness or that level of readiness with respect to these weapons, but no one can doubt two things: One, they are in violation of these resolutions. There’s no debate about that. And secondly, they have not lost the intent to develop these weapons of mass destruction, whether they are one day, five days, one year, or seven years away from any particular weapon, whether their stockpile is small, medium or large, what has not been lost is the intent to have such weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 26, 2002 • "The danger to our country is grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons." — President George W Bush, Statement in the Rose Garden, September 26, 2002 • "The man who said he would get rid of weapons of mass destruction still has them. And we need to fear the fact that he has weapons of mass destruction. He’s used them before.

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  • He’s used them on his own people before. He’s invaded two countries. He’s lied and deceived the world." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Denver, Colorado, September 27, 2002 • "We know Saddam’s] got chemical weapons, probably has biological weapons." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, November 1, 2002 • "Well, we know that Saddam Hussein has chemical and biological weapons. And we know he has an active program for the development of nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Dejense Donald Rumsfeld, CBS Radio, November 14, 2002 • "In short, we have not seen anything that indicates that the Iraqi regime has made a strategic decision to disarm. On the contrary, we believe that Iraq is actively working to disrupt, deny and defeat inspectors." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "So far, however, there are no signs that the regime has taken the decision to make a strategic shift in its approach and to give up its WMD. Indeed, there are many troubling and serious signs that it has no intention to disarm at all." — President Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2003, January 20, 2003 • "Even more serious is Iraq’s response to UNSCR 1441 ’s requirement that Iraq make a "currently accurate, full and complete" declaration of its weapons of mass destruction activities. Iraq’s declaration was incomplete and inaccurate." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • " Saddam Hussein] has been told to disarm for eleven long years. He’s not disarming." — President George W Bush, remarks with economists, January 2], 2003 • " Saddam Hussein] has weapons of mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which pose a direct threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends and a1lies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists, January 2], 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has actively and secretly attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons." —— President George Bush, Press Conference, February 6, 2003 • "In this case, we’re dealing with a country, a regime that has chemical weapons, biological weapons and a nuclear program, and has used chemical weapons against its neighbors and its own people." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference, February 7, 2003.

page 46

  • "So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the leadership of Baghdad? I think our judgment has to be clearly not." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, United Nations Security Council, March 7, 2003 • "But we also have to address the question of where might these terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons? And Saddam Hussein becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his past track record and because we know he has, in fact, developed these kinds of capabilities, chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s used chemical weapons. We know he’s reconstituted these programs since the Gulf War. We know he’s out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons and we know that he has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda organization." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 • "lntelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised." — President George W Bush, Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003 • "The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons." — President Bush, Report in Connection w/ Presidential Determination under PL 107-244, March 19, 2003 
  • (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. The statements below differ in significant ways, either by making different assertions or addressing different topics. • "They now have massive tunneling systems. . .They’ve got all kinds of things that have happened in the period when the inspectors have been out. So the problem is greater today. And the regime that exists today in the U.N. is one that has far fewer teeth than the one you are describing." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have difficulty getting at all of Saddam Hussein’s] weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile; they can be hidden from inspectors no matter how intrusive. He has vast underground networks and facilities and sophisticated denial and deception techniques." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • " W]e simply do not know where all or even a large portion of Iraq’s WMD facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. . . O]f the facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. A good many are underground and deeply buried. Others are purposely located near population centers —— schools, hospitals, mosques — where an air strike could kill a large number of innocent people. The Iraq problem cannot be solved by air strikes alone." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 

page 47

  • • "Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors. In some cases, these materials have been moved to different locations every l2 to 24 hours, or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods." — President George W Bush, National Press Conference, March 6, 2003 • "He claims to have no chemical or biological weapons, yet we know he continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as l2 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference, March I 1, 2003 
  • (U) In testimony before Congress on September 18 and l9, 2002, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Iraqi regime had developed extensive underground facilities and elaborate deception techniques to conceal WMD prograrns.99 
  • (U) Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, intelligence agencies consistently assessed that the Iraqi regime engaged in aggressive denial and deception tactics, particularly with regard to weapons programs}0 - The Iraqi regime was known to have constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency claimed to know the location of any active underground WMD facilities, and none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that "elements of the regime’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs robably are located in underground facilities", but noted that "neither _ ¤<>r i¤t¢11ig¢¤<>¢ S<>¤r<>¢S have confirmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground facilities." An August 2002 DIA report noted that "Iraq has reportedly rebuilt its full offensive BW program in well- concealed, underground, mobile or difficult-to-locate facilities" but went on to state that "no biological weapons (BW)-related underground facilities are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq".1°1 
  • (U) In November 2002, the National Intelligence Council prepared an assessment on underground facilities in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense. This report stated that Iraq had an extensive network of underground facilities "consisting primarily of earth- bunkered aboveground structures, basement bunkers, and shallow-buried facilities." It went on 99 Department of Defense Transcript, Testimony as Delivered before the House Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq, September 18, 2002; Department of Defense Transcript, Testimony as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald Rums eld be ore the Senate Armed Services Committee re ardin Ira , Se tember 19, 2002. M mA. mq.- 1r¤qiDe¤i¤1 and Deception: Countertargeting Methods, February 28, 1998; CIA, Iraq: Status of the Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook, May 2002. wl DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December 14, 2001; DLA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook August 2002. Both of these assessments noted that Iraq had stored some biological and chemical munitions underground during the Gulf War.

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  • to say that "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried UGFs, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we have not been able to locate any of these. . .A1l the military and regime-associated UGFs underground facilities] we have identified thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision- guided, penetrating munitions because they are not deeply cd>»·lO2 • "Iraq must be disarmed of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, weapons production capabilities, and the means to deliver these weapons. This will be a complex, dangerous, and expensive task -- one for which detailed planning is underway. Third, we must also eliminate Iraq’s terrorist infrastructure." — Mr. Stephan Hadley, Remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, February I2, 2003 
  • (U) In a speech in February 2003, the Deputy National Security Advisor stated that Iraq needed to be disarmed of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, production capabilities and delivery systems. The October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, but the intelligence community did not assess that Iraq had nuclear weapons.1°3 _ The assertion in the final two statements about movement of materials matched a February 2003 CIA assessment, reporting a "mid-ranking Iraqi security officer involved in the surveillance of United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) activities in Iraq" who said Iraqi authorities had "decided that prohibited materials would never remain in any one location for more than 12 hours or 24 hours at the most and only under specifc circumstances."1°4 A second report sourced to an "Iraqi Security Officia1" said that Iraq’s WIWD "had begun being moved to new locations every 12 hours."1°6 Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made 102 National Intelligence Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security, November 2002. '°3 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs or Weapons 0 Mass Destruction, October 2002. IM CIA assessment, DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, Feb 12, 2003. CIA DO Memorandum Intelligence Report, Q Fcbm 12, 2002. CIA 2003.

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  •  regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction. 
  • (U) Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional air strikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground WMD facilities had been positively identified. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from conventional air strikes. Postwar Findings 
  • (U) Postwar findings regarding weapons of mass destruction can be found in the nuclear, biological, and chemical sections of this report. 50

page 50

  • VI. Delivery • "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can sic] inflict mass death throughout the region." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles. . .We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets." - ` Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "1n 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "What 1 want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for over a decade." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "According to Iraq’s December 7m declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 

page 51

  • kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries, including the United States." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) In major policy speeches the President and the Secretary of State described Iraq as possessing and developing advanced weapon systems, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles and longer-range ballistic missiles. Both the President and the Secretary of State suggested that these weapon systems could be used for long-range biological or chemical attacks. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can sic] inflict mass death throughout the region."l°7 This statement included two separate assertions: that Iraq possessed missiles with greater-than-permitted range, and that Iraq was building more long-range missiles and increasing the size of its missile force. This statement also implied that these missiles could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction, but this was not specifically stated. 
  • (U) Iraq’s ballistic missile force, as viewed by US intelligence analysts in 2002, can be broken into three fairly distinct categories: 1) older Scud-type missiles with ranges of 625-900 km, remaining from its pre-Gulf War missile force, 2) newer A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles with estimated ranges of 150-300 km, and 3) future medium-range missiles with ranges of 750- 3000 km (which were assessed in 2002 to still be in the development stage). The maximum range permitted by UN sanctions was 150 km. 
  • (U) The CIA and DIA both assessed that Iraq was in the process of deploying the A1-Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range missiles. Estimates of these missiles’ range varied between 150 and 300 km.‘°8 
  • (U) At this time the intelligence community also assessed that Iraq possessed a small number of pre-Gulf War Scud-variant short-range ballistic missiles. Estimates varied as to the size of this force, but a May 2002 assessment from State INR stated that "the highest estimates are on the order of 25-30 missiles."In March 2002 the DIA assessed that this force "probably" included 107 White House Transcript, President 's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September l2, 2002. 108 CIA, Iraq: Al Samoud Program Advancing Toward Deployment, February 13, 2001; DIA, Proly’eration of Ballistic Missiles, January 9, 2002; DIA, Iraq Missile Proly’eration Activity (TS-9l, 650-02) March l, 2002; CIA, Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 109 State/INR, Iraq: WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs, May 8, 2002. _ 52

 

AIPAC, Rosen Weissman Timeline excerpt .... go to page 4 of Timeline
  • Aug 27, 2004 the FBI raided (first of two raids) the office of AIPAC director Steve Rosen, copied his hard drive. 
  • Aug 27, 2004 CBS  Investigator said they want AIPAC information on contacts between Franklin, Feith and Wolfowitz.  An Israeli spokesperson denied everything.  CBS 
  • Wolfowitz and Feith
  • Dan Rather, CBS issue, check dates? smokescreen? Rathergate.
  • National Review by Michael Ledeen on "my pal' Larry Franklin, ho hum. Aug 31 04
  • August 29, 2004 United Jersalem "Allegations of Israel spying Usually go away"  see indictment
  • August 29, 2004"..... Feith has been a target of criticism from Democrats who claim that two offices in his branch -- the Office of Special Plans, headed by Luti, and the Counterterrorism Evaluation Group -- sought to manipulate intelligence to improve the Bush administration's case for war against Iraq. House and Senate intelligence committee investigators found no evidence for allegations that the Pentagon offices tried to bypass the CIA or had a major impact on the prewar debate. But in the Senate panel's report on prewar intelligence" Washington Postfile
  • Sept  2004,  Franklin probe went dark?
  • Sept 1,  2004 "FBI SEIZES COMPUTER FROM AIPAC OFFICES By Janine Zacharia The Jerusalem Post September 1, 2004 NEW YORK — FBI agents on Friday copied the computer hard drive of a senior staffer at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee who has been questioned in relation to the case of a Pentagon official suspected of turning over a classified document either directly to Israel, or via the pro-Israel lobby group".  Shalom Center
  • Sept 1, 2004 article search terms: Office of Special Plans, David Wurmser (see Cheney), 'A Clean Break' Netanyahu, Likud, Road Map,  Counterpunch
  • Larry Franklin, Defense Intelligence Agency, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, reports to William Luti
  • Sept 6, 2004MSNBC story: "In the Pentagon, a suspected spy allegedly passes secrets about Iran to Israel".  Larry Franklin turns up while FBI monitoring lunch conversation.  Was there an Abu Ghraib smokescreen story?  Newsweek  interviews Ledeen on the story and he says Franklin charges are "nonsensical".  and Newsweek tries to spin Franklin as a loner in the case and supports view that Israel no longer spies on U.S.  Linked Franklin to Luti, Gingrich, Feith and Likud.  and also Washington Monthly  Franklin, Rhode were involved in contacts with Manucher Ghorbanifar and other Iranian exiles ....all in waring administration camps on 'regime change' in Iran versus a more cautious approach. Ledeen / Iran Sep 01   Sep 03Sep 04  Latest Entries

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  • (U) The NIE also described an older UAV program that used larger aircraft. Analysts assessed that this program involved "as many as ten L-29 1960s vintage Czech-built trainers" which had been converted into UAVs as of 2000, and noted that these planes’ operational status was unknown. The NIE noted that the US Air Force assessed that "no flyable L-29 airframes remain", and included a footnote pointing out that "the Military Intelligence Community assesses that the role of the L-29 UAV-modified aircraft is largely historical and that concentrating on it distracts from other more viable delivery mechanisms for CBW".ll5 
  • (U) The NIE went on to state that Iraq had "at least one small UAV that could be employed eovertly against the continental United States", and that this UAV "might be available for operational use within months". The NIE also described an incident in which an Iraqi procurement network "attempted to procure commercially available route planning software and an associated topographic database that would] provide coverage of the ‘50 states"’. The NIE concluded that this information suggested that "Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States".u6 
  • (U) Intelligence assessments regarding UAVs shifted after the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, published in January 2003, did not describe Iraq’s UAV program as "probably intended" for biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that "Iraq may be modifying UAVs" for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted that Iraqi UAVs could reach the United States, if they were transported (in some unspecified manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers."m 
  • (U) The January 2003 NIE also discussed Iraqi attempts to procure mapping software, but stated only that this software "could support programming of a UAV autopilot for operation in the United States."H8 
  • (U) The Air Force continued to dissent hom even these less conclusive judgments. Joined by the DIA and the Army intelligence branch, the Air Force stated that, while most UAVs were capable of being used to deliver biological weapons, evidence that Iraqis were modifying UAVs for this purpose was "unconfirmed, and is not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so." These services further noted that they believed that "the purpose of the Iraqi request for route planning software and topographic database was to acquire a generic mapping capability — a goal that is not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the U.S. Homeland."1 9 
  • (U) The President did not mention Iraqi missiles or UAVs in the 2003 State of the Union Address.12° *15 md. “‘ mid. t lljlbagional Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland, January 2003. 1 . “° mid. 120 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union", January 28, 2003.

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  • Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) The Secretary of State made several mentions of prohibited missiles and UAV capabilities in his February 2003 address to the UN Security Council. He asserted that "Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets", and that "In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG- 21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons."l2 
  • (U) Both of these statements were substantiated by intelligence assessments, however both referred to pre-Gulf War programs - The Secretary made two central assertions regarding prohibited missiles, first stating that "numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers."m This assertion was included in the earlier NIE and a number of other intelligence reports. However, the NIE did not r ort any direct evidence of this Scud-variant force and stated that this assessment was basedch _”" His other key assertion regarding missiles was that "Ira has no arms that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers."125 These programs were also referenced in the earlier NIE, which noted that they were in an earlier stage of development than shorter-range missile pro grams.126 
  • (U) Regarding UAVs, the Secretary made four major statements, including "Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for over a decade."m Intelligence assessments had indicated the existence of the pre-Gulf War MiG UAV program, as well as the L-29 program mentioned in the NIE. Reporting on Iraq’s smaller UAV program was more recent, and appears to have begun in 2001. The Committee is also aware of intelligence provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which also substantiated this statement.128 m White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. m DIA, Iraq ’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May 2000. 123 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 124 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 125 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 126 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 127 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 128 DIA, Iraq ’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities (DI-156, 9-27-00) May 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Shopping for UA V Equipment, September 14, 2001. _ 55

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  • (U`) The Secretary went on to say that "we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here."129 The January 2003 NIE described this flight data, and stated that the UAVs autonomous flight range was at least 500 kilometers.]3° 
  • (U`) The Secretary drew a connection between the apparent UAV program and biological weapons, stating that "There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs." Finally, he argued that "Iraq could use these small UAVs, which have a wingspan of only a few meters, to deliver biological agents to its neighbors, or if transported, to other countries, including the United States."13l 
  • (U) Iraq’s pre-Gulf War program to fit Mirage jets with aerosol spray tanks was mentioned in numerous intelligence assessments, as well as Iraqi declarations to the UN.132 As noted above, the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may be modifying UAVs to deliver CBW agents, according to numerous sources." The Air Force/Army/DIA dissent to this NIE agreed that biological weapons delivery is an inherent capability of most UAVs," but concluded that "a reconnaissance mission for the UAV program is more likely."133 
  • (U) The January 2003 NIE stated that "UAVs could strike the homeland if transported to within a few hundred kilometers." It noted that "Iraq has at least one small UAV" with a range of "at least 500 krn," or roughly 300 miles.134 Additional Statements • "And let there be no doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles and is working to extend their range in violation of U.N. restriction." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "His regime is pursuing pilotless aircraft as a means of delivering chemical and biological weapons." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 129 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 130 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Tltreats to the US Homeland, January 2003. 131 White House Transcript, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N Security Council, February 5, 2003. 132 CIA, Iraq: Iraq’s Biological Warfare Program: Well Positioned for the Future, April 14, 1997; CIA, Iraq’s L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces, July 12, 2001; DIA, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post September lim, January 1, 2002; DIA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 133 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland, January 2003. 13* rpm. _ 56

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  • • "The Iraqi regime has acquired and tested the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. All the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank modified to spray biological agents over wide areas. Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicles with ranges far beyond what is permitted by the Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland." — President George W Bush, Statement in the Roosevelt Room, February 6, 2003 
  • (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five major policy speeches analyzed. The statement below differs from these speeches. • The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more, and according to the British government, Iraq] could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as forty-five minutes after the order is given." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, September 28, 2002 - On September 28, 2002, the President cited the British government as the source of a statement that the Iraqi government was capable of launching chemical or biological attacks with forty-five minutes of warning. A report from _ that same month had cited an intelligence source who said that the Iraqi government possessed chemical and biological munitions that could be deployed (apparently against neighboring countries) with a forty-five minute response time. Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 7: Statements in the major speeches and additional statements analyzed regarding Iraqi ballistic missiles were generally substantiated by available intelligence. The intelligence community was consistent in its judgments that the Iraqi military possessed a small number of Scud-type missiles left over from the Gulf War era (although the October 2002 NIE noted that these judgments were based on accounting gaps rather than direct evidence), and that Iraq was developing short-range missiles whose range exceeded the range permitted under UN sanctions by as much as 150 km, or 93 miles. The corrnnunity also judged that Iraq was pursuing the capability to build longer-range missiles, but assessed that this project was still at the early stages of development. 
  • (U) Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UAV program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UAV was probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq "may" be modifying UAVs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence 57
  • Agency argued that the evidence for this was "not sufficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so." 
  • (U) Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and said that this suggested that the Iraqi governmentwas considering using UAVs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Postwar Findings A 
  • (U) Postwar findings confirm that Iraq was developing the Al-Samoud and Al-Fat’h (formerly Ababil-100) missiles, and that both had ranges that exceeded 150 km. In early February 2003 the intelligence community revised it’s assessment of the al-Samoud’s maximum range down iiom 300 km to 170 km, which was consistent with postwar iindings.135 In late February 2003 Saddam agreed to UN demands that his Al-Samoud inventory be destroyed. Postwar findings indicate that the Iraqi government unilaterally destroyed its remaining Scud-type ballistic missiles in 1991
  • (U) Postwar findings confirmed that Iraq’s UAV development program was primarily intended for reconnaissance. Postwar investigations did not find any evidence that Iraq had conducted any research to develop a chemical or biological weapons capability for its developmental UAV program, or that Iraq had intended to use its UAVs for missions targeting the United States.136 135 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, February 2003. 136 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 58

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  • VH. Links to Terrorism • "Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq’s government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • " The Iraqi regime] has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Over the years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American passenger. And we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide them to a terror network. " - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.” — President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modem methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al—Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 59

page 59 see NewsFollowUp.com FEMA Concentration Camp, Beech Grove, Indiana YouTube are these meant for US citizens?  Sounds ridiculous until you watch the video.

  • • "Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northem Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Zarqawi’s activities are not confined to this small comer of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These al- Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money, and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al- Qaida. Going back to the early and rnid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that al- Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 60

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  • • "The support that this detainee describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) The Committee addressed the pre-war intelligence linking Iraq and terrorist organizations in its first Iraq report, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments 0n Iraq, in July 2004. The Committee reviewed the accuracy of the prewar intelligence in its report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links t0 Terrorism and How They Compare · with Prewar Assessments, in September 2006. 
  • (U) Scope Note: This section addresses statements that referenced past or present Iraqi links to terrorism. Statements regarding possible future links or cooperation between the Iraqi regime and terrorism are discussed in the Intent section. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
  • (U) The Vice President made no reference to links between Iraq and al Qaeda or any other terrorist group in his August 2002 speech. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In this speech, the President stated that "Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations" in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1372, and that "al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq." 
  • (U) The intelligence community believed that Iraq had long supported, through safeharbor, financial support, and training various regional terrorist organizations such as Abu Nidal and Palestinian groups. For example, Director Tenet testified before the Committee on February 6, 2002 that, "Iraq provides safe haven, financial support, and low-level training to a number of terrorist groups——including the Palestine Liberation Front, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the Mojaheddin al Kha1q." 137 (U) The February 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), International Terrorist Threats t0 US Interests, included a section on Iraq under the heading of state sponsors of terrorism. The NIE stated that "Saddam will continue contacts with several terrorist groups and will weigh carefully the risks and possible beneifits of supporting their operations." It continued that "As Iraq strengthens ties to other countries and sends its intelligence officers abroad, under official or commercial cover, its ability to conduct or sponsor terrorism will increase." 137 See also CIA, SEM, The Terrorist Threat jrom Iraq, December 15, 2001, "Baghdad continues to provide safehaven, financial support, and low-level terrorist training to a number of terrorist groups. Iraq continues to support to varying degrees the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abu Ibrahim of the 15 May Organization, the Arab Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal Organization, which appears to be rebuilding with help from Iraq." _ 61

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  • _ A CIA r ort in June 2002 discussed al Qaeda operatives moving from Afghanistan to Iraq, saying ‘ reporting show that unknown numbers of al Qaeda associates fleeing Afghanistan since December have used Iraq—including the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, Baghdad, and other regions—as a safehaven and transit area." The paper continued, "We lack positive indications that Baghdad is complicit in this activity, but the persistence of an al Qaeda presence and the operatives’ silence about any harassment from Iraqi authorities, who closely monitor the population, may indicate Baghdad is acquiescent or finds their presence useful."l38 _ A June 24, 2002 c1A··se¤rer, Pubirsh VVhen Reeayr (sewn) repea, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to Al-Qa 'ida, stated that ‘ reporting indicate some al Qaeda operatives and fighters, including most notably senior al- Qa’ida operative Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, have fled to Baghdad as well as to the Kurdish regions since the Taliban collapsed. 1 intelligence gives no indication of Iraqi regime complicity but also reveals no concern about possible arrest or scrutiny by Iraqi security services."1 9 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
Chalabi, and John McCain support of Chalabi
  • Think Progress  "Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi was one of the most sordid figures in the run-up to the Iraq war. Paid by the Bush administration to muster pre-war intelligence, Chalabi drummed up claims that Saddam Hussein had WMD, helping lead the United States into war. More recently, he promoted the “surge” to the Iraqi government. A new book by Aram Roston reveals that Chalabi supported John McCain (R-AZ) for president in 2000, believing that the senator would be the most receptive to his agenda. Muckraked reports:

    One of his key backers has been John McCain, who was one of the first patrons of Chalabi’s grand-sounding International Committee for a Free Iraq when it was founded in 1991. McCain was Chalabi’s favored candidate in the 2000 election since Chalabi knew that he would be able to free up the $97 million in military aid plus millions pushed through in Congress and earmarked for Chalabi’s exile group, the Iraqi National Congress, but held up by the Clinton State Department.

    Indeed, McCain was a Chalabi backer long before President Bush took power. In 1997, he tried to pressure the Clinton administration into setting up an Iraqi government in exile. Despite opposition from the Pentagon and the State Department, the next fall, McCain co-sponsored the Iraq Liberation Act, committing the United States to overthrowing Saddam and funding opposition groups. According to a 2006 article by John Judis: McCain welcomed Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), to Washington and pressured the administration to give him money. When General Anthony Zinni cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the Iraqi opposition, McCain rebuked him at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

    In 2003, McCain joined four other Republican senators and asked Bush to “personally clear the bureaucratic roadblocks within the State Department” that blocked increased funding for the Chalabi’s group. Also that year, McCain said of Chalabi, “He’s a patriot who has the best interests of his country at heart.”

  •    
  • Iraqi National Congress research
  • YouTube
  •  
  • (U) This speech made a number of distinct claims about Iraq and terrorism. The President reiterated his earlier statement about Iraq providing shelter and support to terrorism, specifically citing safe haven for Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas and financing of terrorist groups undermining Middle East peace. 
  • (U) The President stated that "We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade." He referenced al Qaeda leaders fleeing Afghanistan for Iraq, noting in particular Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as having "received medical treatment in Baghdad." The President added that "We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." 
  • (U) Finally, the President stated that Saddam Hussein was "harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction." While this statement was not specific to any group, the placement in the speech and the context suggests that the President was stating that Hussein was harboring al Qaeda. The statement appeared two paragraphs after statements that ". . .Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy," that some "al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq," and that "Iraq has trained a1 Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." (These statements are discussed elsewhere in this report.) The President’s statement came in the same paragraph as the statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror." 
  • (U) The President’s statement on contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda did not elaborate on the nature of these contacts or whether they reflected a substantive relationship between the two 138 Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq and al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2l, 2002, 9. Other reports on al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq include CIA, SEIB, Sep l0, 2002, al Qaeda Determined to Strike Soon; and May 24, 2002 State Department INR document entitled, Iraq terrorists Al-Qaida Operatives Moving into Baghdad. 139 CIA SPWR, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida, (SPWRO62402-Ol). 62

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  •  
  • _ sides. The intelligence community reported numerous times on interactions between elements in the Iraqi regime and members of al Qaeda and, through direct contacts with Saddam Hussein as well as with various high-level Iraq regime officials. (U) DCI Tenet’s statement to the Committee on February 6, 2002 underscored the duration of the contacts but provided additional analysis on the nature of those contacts. He wrote that "Baghdad’s connections to al Qaeda are tenuous, but they appear to have maintained a mutually wary relationship for nearly a decade. Intelligence reports indicate that Iraq has maintained a liaison relationship with Bin Laden. At the same time, we assess that their divergent ideologies make it difficult for Baghdad and al Qaeda to forge the kind of cooperation that Baghdad has with terrorist groups such as the PLF, AN O, and the MEK." (U) A CIA paper from June 7, 2002 noted that intelligence reporting "of varying reliability indicates that the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda have had mutually wary contacts for the last decade. It is possible that the two have forged ties that could have resulted in cooperation on specific terrorist operations, but the available reporting does not point to such a relationship."l 0 (U) In part of an intelligence summary that dismissed a claim that Saddam and bin Laden met in Iraq in 2000, the DLA assessed that "an alliance between the two individuals is unlikely as Saddam views Bin Laden’s brand of Islam as a threat to his regime and Bin Laden is opposed to those Muslim states that do not follow his version of Islam."m This theme was repeated in a June 24, 2002 CIA paper, which assessed that "interaction between Saddam and Bin Laden appears to be more akin to activity between rival intelligence services, each trying to use the relationship to its own advantage."142 (U) The same report also noted that "contacts between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appear to reach back over the past l0 years and possibly strengthened around 1998. CIA analysts agree al- Qa’ida gained some tangible benefits from these contacts but do not agree on Sadda1n’s agenda. Some think he is concerned principally with penetrating and monitoring al Qaeda, while others see more collusion."143 (U) Another CIA report in June 2002 said, "intelligence reporting highlights more than a decade of contacts between the Iraqi Government and al Qaeda based on shared anti-US goals and Bin Laden’s interest in unconventional weapons and safehaven."144 This report was "purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw cormections, on the assumption that any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States." Nonetheless, the report assessed that the "pattern of contacts and cooperation reflects wariness coupled with recognition of potential mutual benefit. In contrast to the traditional patron-client relationship Iraq enjoys with radical secular Palestinian groups, the ties between 140 CIA SPWR dated June 7, 2002 titled, Possible Meeting Between Bin Laden and Iraqi Ojicials in Sudan. H1 AFebruary 6, 2002, and a February 7, 2002 DITSUM (No. 031-02 and No. 032-02). 142 - A June 24, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Sizing Up Connections to AZ-Qa ’ida (SPWR062402-0 l). Later, the report states "_ reporting indicates that Bin Laden, while in Sudan in 1993, reached an ‘understanding’ with Saddam under which Bin Laden’s followers would not undertake actions against the Iraqi leader. The report indicated the two also agreed to cooperate, although no details were provided." 1 . 144 CIA, Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 21, 2002. _ 63

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  • Saddam and Bin Laden appear to be much like those between rival intelligence services, with each side trying to exploit the other for its own benefit." 
  • (U) The intelligence on the contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda appears to have grown by Fall of 2002. A CIA paper from September 13, 2002, stated that "We have identified about 12 meetings between Iraqi officials and senior al-Qa` ida leaders from a review of reporting we assess to have at least some credibility. Ten of these reports mention specific discussions involving top al- Qa’ida operatives."]45 _ DCI Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the Committee elaborated on these contacts, saying that "there is solid evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda have had sporadic contacts over the past decade. Intelligence reports point to various Iraq-al Qaeda meetings through high-level and third-party intermediaries. 
  • (U) Tenet also described in his testimony "credible reporting of about a dozen direct meetings between senior Iraqi intelligence officials and top al Qaeda operatives from the early 1990s to the present." He noted that the intelligence sources on the contacts "do not describe Iraqi complicity in, control over, or authorization of specific terrorist attacks carried out by al Qaeda. Taken together, the mass of reporting outlines a relationship in which both sides probably were determining how best to take advantage of the other.”]46 
  • (U) On the topic of Iraqi providing harbor for al Qaeda members, Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony began by saying that "most of the reporting on this involves Kurdish-inhabited northern Iraq, which Baghdad has not controlled since 1991. Intelligence confirms that al- Qa’ida fighters have relocated to the north, where they are hosted by a local Kurdish extremist group called Ansar al Islam. The relocations have increased since the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan began late last year. We estimate there are about 100 to 200 al-Qa’ ida members and associates in the area." _ Tenet added that "an unknown number of al Qaeda associates have fled during the past six months to or through other parts of Iraq .... 1 intelligence in May 2002 indicated that several militants associated with al Qaeda were checking into hotels in Baghdad and were using the Iraqi capital as a base for financial transactions and other activities.” Tenet concluded these statements, however, by saying that "we do not know to what extent Baghdad may be actively complicit in this use of its territory for safe haven and transit. The operatives have not mentioned Iraq’s security presence, but their conversations often are cryptic, sprinkled with code words, and short on specifics. Given the pervasive presence of Iraq’s security apparatus, it would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-terrn presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or without at least their acquiescence." 145 SPWR dated September 13, 2002 titled, Terrorism: Contacts Between al-Qu 'idrz Ojjicials and Iraqi Intelligence O cers. l4gSeptember 17, 2002 testimony by DCI Tenet to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. _ 64

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  • (U) The President’s next statement in the Cincinnati speech was that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "received medical treatment in Baghdad.” Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony noted this point specifically, saying that, "Of particular interest is senior al Qaeda planner Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who was in Baghdad under an assumed identity in late May, possibly seeking medical treatment. We do not know his current location, but his close associates remain active in Baghdad, leaving open the possibility that he could be elsewhere in Iraq." The issue of Zarqawi’s medical treatment was also discussed in reports by the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the DLA.147 
  • (U) The President’s final terrorism statement in the speech was " w]e’ve learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases .” The intelligence community had produced assessments on the topic of bomb making. The intelligence reports on chemical and biological weapons training came primarily from the interrogation of al Qaeda detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. 
  • (U) The September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was coordinated with the DLA, stated that al-Libi said Iraq had "provided" unspecified CBW training for two al-Qa’ ida associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi "did not know the results of the training."148 In the June 2002 paper, Iraq and al Qa ’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationshqr, the CIA also stated that al-Libi claimed Iraq had "provided" unspecified CBW training for two al Qaeda associates in 2000.149 
  • (U) Director Tenet testified in September 2002 that, " t]here is evidence that Iraq provided al- Qa’ida with various kinds of training—combat, bomb-making, and CBRN. Although Saddam did not endorse al Qaeda’s overall agenda and was suspicious of Islamist movements in general, he was apparently not averse, under certain circumstances, to enhancing Bin Laden’s operational capabilities. 
  • (U) The October 2002 WMD National Intelligence Estimated stated that "Detainee Ibn al- Shaykh al-Libi—who had significant responsibility for training—has told us that Iraq provided unspecified chemical or biological weapons training for two al Qaeda members beginning in December 2000."150 
 
  • Christian Science Monitor "J Street," a new lobby which describes itself as pro-Israel. It's directed by Jeremy Ben-Ami, a former Clinton official whose father fought alongside Menachem Begin for Israel's independence. J Street (a play on the K Street address of many lobbyists), seeks a less hard-line US policy in the Middle East and wants to create an environment in which politicians can confidently discuss such a change without fear of political punishment or being labeled anti-Semitic. Several US groups share J Street's views but they don't have much political muscle. J Street wants to build clout by using the Internet to raise money from small donors, and to contribute to congressional campaigns. ... Next week, it will endorse several candidates who support a major US push for a negotiated, two-state solution to the Palestinian crisis. J Street also favors dialogue with Israel's enemies, including Hamas and Iran; an Israeli-Syrian peace deal; and US withdrawal from Iraq.
  • (U) Months prior to the speech and the latter intelligence products cited above, questions were raised in iinished intelligence about al-Libi’s credibility. A February 22, 2002 DLA Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary noted that Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi] "lacks specific details on the Iraqi’s involvement, the CBRN materials associated with the assistance, and the location where the training occurred. It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers. Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest. Saddarn’s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary 147 State INR, Iraq/Terrorism: Al-Qaida Operatives Moving into Baghdad, May 24, 2002; DIA, Transnational/Iraq; Senior al-Qaida Operative Reportedly in Iraq, May 28, 2002 DIA. 148 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002, p. I2 (SSCI # 2005-5178). 149 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa ’ida.· Interpreting a Murky Relationship, July 2002, p. 6 (SSCI# 2002-3005). 150 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, 68. _ 65
  • movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control."m 
  • (U) DIA reiterated some of these points in additional reports. On August 7, 2002, the CIA reported on al-Libi’s credibility. The summary of the report stated that "questions persist about al-Libi’s] forthrightness and truthfulness" and later elaborating, "In some instances, however, he seems to have fabricated information. Perhaps in an attempt to exaggerate his own importance, Ibn al-Shaykh claims to be a member of al Qaeda’s Shura Council, a claim not corroborated by other intelligence reporting"l52 President’s State of the Union Address (January 28, 2003) 
  • (U) President Bush stated that "Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda." He also reiterated the concern that Iraq could secretly provide weapons to terrorists or help them develop their own. The intelligence relating to these claims was described above. 
  • (U) The November 2002 NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007 repeated much of the intelligence cited above on the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda.l53 The NIE said that "the relationship between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda appears more to be two sides trying to feel one another out or exploit each other." The NIE cited "solid reporting" that "Iraq and al-Qa’ ida have had senior-level contacts going back to the rise of Usarna Bin Laden. Intelligence reportirrg-albeit fragmentary and at times corrtlicting-indicates a series of contacts over nearly a decade between the Iraqi Government and al Qaeda .... "l54 
  • (U) The NIE also stated that " w]e have credible reporting that al Qaeda leaders sought help from Baghdad in acquiring WMD capabilities and that Iraq provided training in bomb-making and, according to one detainee, in the area of chemical and biological agents," and that " w]e have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members including some that have been in Baghdadrm Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) Secretary Powell’s statements repeated and amplified those previously mentioned. His stated that Iraq "harbors a deadly terrorist network" headed by Zarqawi; that an Iraqi agent "offered al-Qaida safe haven" in the northern Kurdish regions; and that "al-Qaida affiliates in Baghdad now ... have been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months." 151 DIA DITSUM 044-02 of February 22, 2002. 152 CIA, Terrorism: Credibility of Ibn al-Shaykh al—Libi and the Information He Has Provided While in Custody (SPWR080702—05), August 7, 2002. I 153 This NIE was not published until I anuary 2003. 154 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats to the US Homeland Through 2007, NIE 2002-15HJ, November 2002, 16-17. *55 ibid, 17. _ 66

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  • (U) Secretary Powell referred to "secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida" that resulted in an understanding between Hussein and bin Laden that al—Qa’ida would not to support terrorist activities against Baghdad. Powell cited "at least eight meetings] at very senior levels since the early 1990s." He cited "a foreign security service as providing information on meetings between bin Laden and an Iraqi intelligence offrcer in 1996 and the head of the Iraqi intelligence service afterwards. Powell laid out cooperation between Iraq and al-Qa’ ida, including Iraq’s provision of assistance in document forgery, bombmaking, and chemical and biological weapons training. 
  • (U) Many of these statements are consistent with ones made in speeches previously described. Additional intelligence relating to Secretary Powell’s statements is below. 
  • (U) On January 31, 2003, the State Department Undersecretary for INR, Carl Ford, wrote a memo to Secretary Powell laying out the intelligence on Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda. He wrote that "Our evidence suggests that Baghdad is strengthening a relationship with al-Qaida that dates back to the mid-1990s, when senior Iraqi Intelligence officers established contact with the network in several countries." Ford added that "we have some evidence that Iraqi Intelligence has been in contact with elements in the northeastern area. And the al-Qaida operatives there are in regular contact with other operatives located in Baghdad. The Iraqi governmenthas also received information from other sources alerting it to the presence of al-Qaida operatives in Baghdad." 
  • (U) Ford wrote that Zarqawi "has had a good relationship with Iraqi intelligence officials" and that "we have hard evidence that al-Qaida is operating in several locations in Iraq with the knowledge and acquiescence of Saddam’s regime." Ford wrote that intelligence "revealed the presence of safehouse facilities in the city as well as the clear intent to remain in Baghdad. Also, foreign NGO workers outside of Iraq who we believe provide support to al-Qaida have also expressed their intent to set up shop in Baghdad." 
  • (U) Secretary Powell stated that the Zarqawi network had freedom of movement in Baghdad the ability to command and control terrorist elements throughout Iraq. As discussed previously, several intelligence reports noted Zarqawi’s presence in Baghdad, including a September 2002 CIA assessment which said "Although most al Qaeda operatives in Iraq are adjacent to the Kurdish safehaven in northern Iraq, an unknown number of individuals have used Baghdad and other regions of the country as bases to orchestrate operations."156 - Director Tenet testifred to the Committee on Se tember 17, 2002 that "In Jaw , an sl- aids assssists brsggsd that the situation in W was ood, that Baghdad could be transited quickly formally or informally, ." 
  • (U) A CIA SPWR dated December 21, 2002 titled, Iraq: Extremists in Baghdad Aid Al-Zarqawi Operations, relayed that " Reporting] indicates more than a dozen al Qaeda affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad beginning in May and have since been coordinating the movement of people, money, and supplies into Baghdad and northeastern Iraq. Veteran Egyptian Islamic Jihad 156 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002, p. iv. _ 67

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  • (EIJ) operative Yusif al-Dardiri a.rrived in Baghdad in mid-May—about the time Abu Mus’ab al- Zarqawi went there for medical treatrnent-and signed a one-year house lease for his associates." The CIA reported again on al-Dardiri in a January 2003 report, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, stating that he was in Baghdad and facilitating Zarqawi’s operations. 
  • (U) Secretary Powell described the group Ansar al-Islam in northern Iraq, and area that Powell said was outside of Saddam’s control. He that an Iraqi agent that was in a senior position in Ansar al-Islam had offered al-Qaida safe haven in the north. The intelligence community agreed that al Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam had a relationship and that terrorist training and plotting was ongoing in northern Iraq. 
  • (U) A February 2003 CIA report noted that "In an August 2000 meeting, al Qaeda officials met with three Kurdish Islamist leaders, now all senior AI officials, who agreed to provide al Qaeda a safehaven if the group lost Afghanistan as a sanctuary, according to a PUK detainee."157 A separate CIA report noted that "Abu Wa’il, whose role as a senior AI official and close al Qaeda associate allows him to know the full scope of activities in northeastern Iraq and in Baghdad, was identified as an IIS associate by three detainees in PUK custody."158 
  • (U) The link between Baghdad and Ansar al-Islam was, however, questioned in intelligence channels. An August 15, 2002 State Department INR assessment, Terrorism: Al-Qaida ’s Presence in Iraq—An Update, stated that "We still have not seen definitive evidence of cooperation between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaida, but the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) almost certainly is aware al-Qaida operatives are present in Iraq." Director Tenet’s September 17, 2002 testimony to the Committee included that "Baghdad reportedly has had contacts with Ansar al-Islam that include IIS penetrations of the organization, but we ca.nnot determine their frequency or purpose." 
  • (U) Secretary Powell’s UN speech repeated previous Administration statements about the length and number of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. This issue is addressed above. Secretary Powell did reference "an understanding that al-Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad." 
  • (U) A May I4, 2002, CIA paper Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities, noted that "In 1993, Bin Laden reached an ‘understanding’ with Saddam under which al Qaeda forbade operations against the Iraqi leader, according to sensitive reporting that was released in US court documents during the Aiiica Embassy trial." The September 13, 2002, CIA paper Terrorism: Contacts Between al-Qa ’ida Officials and Iraqi Intelligence Officers included a comment that "Sensitive reporting indicates that Bin Laden reached an ‘understanding’ with Baghdad in 1993 that al Qaeda would not support any anti-Saddarn activities. We have no information about how such an agreement might have been reached." Additional Statements 157 CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Terrorism: Ansar al Islam’s Threat to the US (SEIB 03-028CHX) February 4, 2003. 158 Abu Wa’il was one of the three AI officials in the February 2003 CIA report. 68

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Wayne Madsen Report                                     
  • January 18-20, 2008 - Plame and Edmonds were looking at the same covert network

    WMR has learned that former CIA covert agent Valerie Plame Wilson, whose covert status was leaked by the Bush White House, and former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds, who was focused on a major covert network involving Turkish, Israeli, and key members of the Bush administration and Republican Party and weapons and drug smuggling, were essentially looking at the same network.

    The nexus of Turkey with both the covert CIA Brewster Jennings and Associates operations and the Turkish-Israeli network of influence active within the Defense and State Departments, is the key factor in understanding the complicated counter-espionage operation conducted by both the FBI and CIA.

    The congressional investigation by Senators Pat Leahy and Charles Grassley in support of Edmonds' revelations and congressional and judicial efforts to obtain White House emails on the leak of Plame's identity have been stymied by a powerful array of top Bush administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Bush adviser Karl Rove, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, convicted Cheney Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, former Deputy Defense Secretary for Policy and Plans Douglas Feith, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman.  full article

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  • • "There is certainly evidence that al Qaeda people have been in Iraq. There is certainly evidence that Saddam Hussein cavorts with terrorists. 1 think that if you asked, do we know that he had a role in 9/11, no, we do not know that he had a role in 9/11. But I think that this is the test that sets a bar that is far too high." — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002. • "He plays host to terrorist networks,’assassinates his opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate a former president of the United States." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • " Since we began after September 11th,] we do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical and biological agent training. And when I say contacts, I mean between Iraq and al Qaeda. The reports of these contacts have been increasing since 1998. We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal nonaggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We do have -- I believe it’s one report indicating that Iraq provided unspeciied training relating to chemical and/or biological matters for al Qaeda members. There is, I’m told, also some other information of varying degrees of reliability that supports that conclusion of their cooperation." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumskzld, Press briefing, September 26, 2002. ‘ • "We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network, headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. The network runs a poison and explosive training center in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad." - President George W Bush, Press conference, February 6, 2003. 
  • (U) These statements are consistent with those described above. • "We know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S. President" — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002. • ". .. it’s been pretty well confirmed that Mohammed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack. Now, what the purpose of that was, what transpired between them, we simply don’t know at this point, but that’s clearly an avenue that we want to pursue." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, December 9, 2001. 69

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  •  
  • • ". .. We’ve seen in connection with the hijackers, of course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead hijacker, did apparently travel to Prague on a number of occasions. And on at least one occasion, we have reporting that places him in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center. The debates about, you know, was he there or wasn’t he there, again, it’s the intelligence business. Tim Russert: What does the CIA say about that? Is it credible?] It’s credible. But, you know, I think a way to put it would be it’ s unconfirmed at this point." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, September 8, 2002. 
  • (U) Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community produced reports of a meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official. A September 17, 2001 CIA report, Iraq: Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks, noted "a foreign government service last Thursday reported that the local Iraqi Intelligence Service chief met in mid-April with suspected American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta.159 Shortly thereafter, the CIA reported that Saddam Hussein was trying to "avert a US strike by asking other Arab governments to convey to Washington that Baghdad is not complicit in the ll September attacks."16O 
  • (U) There were several intelligence reports between September 2001 and September 2002 that both repeated the initial claims that Atta met with Iraqi officials and stated that the claims could not be corroborated or verified. Some of the reports stated that the only confirmed trip by Atta to Prague was in 2000, most reports stated that a 2001 visit could not be confirmed. A 
  • (U) On November 1, 2001, a CIA report relayed the Czech Government’s public confirmation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence official and cited a "foreign government service" as saying the meeting occurred. The CIA stated that the agency "cannot corroborate Atta’s travel to Prague in April through travel or financial records but he could have traveled under an alias" and that CIA has no new information on the substance of the alleged meetings."161 A follow-up CIA report on March 19, 2002, said that the CIA was "pursuing conflicting leads and repeated that it was "trying to confirm a report that American Airlines Flight 11 hijacker Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April of last year."l62 The report stated that "Neither the Czechs nor we have been able to verify Atta’s alleged trip to Prague in April of last year." (U) A May 14, 2002 CIA report again cited the foreign government service reporting from September 2001 and said that "Fragmentary intelligence reporting points to indirect ties between Baghdad and the 11 September hijackers but offers no conclusive indication of Iraqi complicity 159 Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq: Indications of Possible Iraqi Links to Attacks, September 17, 2001. 160 Central Intelligence Agency SEIB, Iraq: Using Back Channels To Refute Terrorist Allegations, September 28, 200 1. 161 - Central Intelli ence A enc , SPWR titled, Terrorism: Muhammed Atta 's travels to Prague - November 1, 2001. CIA, SPWR dated March 19, 2002, T errorism: Reporting on Muhammad Atta in Prague. 70

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  • or foreknowledge. Foreign government service sensitive reporting in September. indicated that Muhammad Atta met with an IIS officer in Prague in April of 2001. There is contradictory reporting on this trip and we have not been able to verify Atta’s reported trip through other channels."463 A DIA report on July 31, 2002 stated that "There are significant informationgaps in this reporting that render the issue impossible to prove or disprove with available information."4 4 Conclusions (U) Conclusion 10: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s support for terrorist groups other than al Qaeda were substantiated by intelligence information. The intelligence community reported regularly on Iraq’s safe harbor and financial support for Palestinian rejectionist groups, the Abu Nidal Organization, and others. The February 2002 NIE fully supported the claim that Iraq had, and would continue, to support terrorist groups. 
  • (U) Conclusion 11: Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al Qaeda-related terrorist members were substantiated by the intelligence assessments. Intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally believed that Iraqi intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least tolerated, Zarqawi’s presence in the country. 
  • (U) Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence. Intelligence assessments, including multiple CIA reports and the November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al Qaeda were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned by DIA, and later by the CIA. The Committee repeats its conclusion from a prior report that "assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al Qaeda."465 
  • (U) Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s contacts with al Qaeda were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al Qaeda. M3 CIA, SPWR dated May 14, 2002 titled, Iraq: Strengthening Its Terrorist Capabilities. 464 DIA, July 31, 2002 DIA Special Analysis, Iraq ’s Inconclusive Ties to al-Qaida. 165 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. 71

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  • (U) Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. Postwar Findings 
  • (U) The Committee issued a number of conclusions in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, relating to the pre-war links between Iraq and terrorism. The Committee found the following. 
  • (U) Iraq and al Qaeda did not have a cooperative relationship. Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al Qaeda and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al Qaeda to provide material or operational support. 
  • (U) Most of the contacts cited between Iraq and al Qaeda before the war by the intelligence community and policymakers have been determined not to have occurred. One of the reported contacts has been confirmed, and two other meetings have since been identified. 
  • (U) Postwar information supports prewar assessments and statements that Abu Musab al- Zarqawi was in Baghdad and that al Qaeda was present in northern Iraq. 
  • (U) No postwar information has been found that indicates Iraq provided chemical and biological weapons training to al Qaeda. The detainee who provided the key prewar reporting about this training recanted his claims after the war. In 2004, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted his earlier statements about biological and chemical weapons training. Al-Libi told debriefers that he had fabricated information while in US custody to receive better treatment and in response to threats of being transferred to a foreign intelligence service which he believed would torture him. He also said that later, while he was being debriefed by a foreign intelligence service, he fabricated more information in response to physical abuse and threats of torture. The Committee’s prior report on post-war findings cited a CIA officer who explained that while CIA believes that al- Libi fabricated information, the CIA cannot determine whether, or what portions of, the original statements or the later recants are true or fa1se.166 
  • (U) Intelligence gathered after the war has led analysts to doubt that Mohamed Atta had ` meetings with Iraq officials in the Czech Republic. According to the Committee’s prior report, "Postwar findings support CIA’s January 2003 assessment, which judged that ‘the most reliable reporting casts doubt’ on one of the leads, an alleged meeting between Muhammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague, and confirm that no such meeting occurred."l67 M6 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006, 108. 167 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 2003, as quoted and described in Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 72

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  • VIII. Intent • "And containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will frnd a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we frnd all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to con’rront." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7 2002 • "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaida. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." - President George W Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "Some believe, some claim these contacts do not add up to much. They say Saddam Hussein’s secular tyranny and al-Qaida’s religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida _ 73

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  • together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al Queda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond‘?" - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 
  • (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State all discussed Iraq’s intentions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Both the President and the Vice President indicated that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) 
  • (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he discussed "the case of Saddam Hussein", and indicated that Saddam was "prepared to share weapons of mass destruction] with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States."166 
  • (U) At the time of the Vice President’s speech, the intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein was prepared to share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists. The intelligence community had previously assessed that Saddam was interested in acquiring WMD to counter his neighbors’ capabilities, deter hostile foreign powers (including Israel, Iran, and the US—led Coalition) and as a means of achieving "regional preemir1ence." 
  • (U) The intelligence community had also assessed that Saddam was unlikely to take actions that he believed would threaten the survival of his regime, and that he believed hostile actions such as a re-invasion of Kuwait would in fact threaten his regime’s sru·vival. 
  • (U) There were few recent coordinated intelligence assessments regarding Saddam Hussein’s intentions at the time of the Vice President’s speech. In 1998 the intelligence community had assessed that "Saddam has three primary, and interrelated, goals: maintaining power, having sanctions lifted as soon as possible, and, over the long term, reasserting Iraq’s regional dominance. . .Saddam is committee to seeing Iraq reemerge as the dominant power in the region: He is determined to retain elements of his WMD programs so that he will be able to intimidate Iraq’s neighbors and deter potential adversaries, such as Iran, Israel, and the United States".169 166 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103'6 National Convention, August 26, 2002. 169 Intelligence Community Brief, Iraq: Prospects for Confrontation, July 17, 1998. _ 74

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  • (U) In 1999 the intelligence community produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, which discussed Saddam’s likely perceptions and intentions. In 2004, the National Intelligence Council informed the SSCI that the views expressed in the 1999 NIE were "generally held by the IC until well into 2002 with some views carried over into" an October 2002 NIE on Saddam’s military intentions and capabilities.17° 
  • (U) Specifically, the 1999 NIE noted that: (U) Reading Saddam’s intentions is difficult. He can be impulsive and deceptive; critical factors in shaping his behavior are largely hidden from us. . .But there are two fundamental guideposts that drive our calculus of his actions. First, we judge that Saddam would be careful not to place his regime’s survival at risk. Second, he probably believes that a re-invasion of Kuwait would provoke a Coalition response that could threaten to destroy his regime. ` 
  • (U) ...We judge that Saddam continues to believe that Iraq needs WMD and long-range missiles to: 1) counter Israeli and Iranian capabilities. . .; 2) deter military attacks, including by Coalition forces; 3) achieve regional preeminence.171 
  • (U) A separate CIA memorandum on this topic, published in December 2001, stated that "Saddam sees himself as a pan-Arab leader and views his regime as the most glorious chapter in Iraqi history. . .His decision-making is guided by opportunism, distrust for others, a personal need for power, and the sense that he is an historic figure who must take bold risks to advance Iraq’s interests. He views state power primarily in military terms — twice launching wars against his neighbors — and his strategic aim is to establish Iraq as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf" President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 
  • (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein was a "grave and gathering danger", and that to assume Saddam’s good faith would be tantamount to betting "the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble." 
  • (U) The President also implied that the Iraqi regime was dangerous because it might provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists ("And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers .... ").m 
  • (U) The intelligence community did not assess that Saddam Hussein dealt with other countries in good faith, and assessments regarding the potential use of WMD were not based on 170 Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. m National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, 1999. 172 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002. _ 75

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  • assumptions of good faith. The 1999 NIE on Iraqi military capabilities noted that it was difficult to gauge Saddam’s intentions, but judged that he would be careful not to put his regime’s survival at risk.173 
  • (U) At the time of the President’s UN speech, the October 2002 NIE was still being prepared, and was two weeks away from release. While the document itself was not available at this time, its consistency with the 1999 NIE, and the lack of contradictory assessments in the intervening four year period, illustrate the continuity of the intelligence community’s judgments on this topic. 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed that "Saddam’s past actions suggest that a decision to use WMD probably would come when he feels his personal survival is at stake even after he has exhausted all political, military and diplomatic options". It noted that the US would be unlikely to know when Saddam felt that he had no other options for self-preservation, but pointed out that "Iraq’s methodical conventional defensive preparations also suggest Saddam thinks an attack is not immmcmr-."* 
  • (U) Additionally, the NIE pointed out that "Iraq’s historical use of CW against Iran and its decision not to use WMD against Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates that an opponent’s retaliatory capability is a critical factor in Saddam’s decisionmal<ing."l75 
  • (U) The NIE also examined a variety of ways in which Iraq might conceivably use WMD, and noted that overall "we have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD."l76 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) 
  • (U) The President spoke further on Iraqi intentions during his speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, where he said that "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." In discussing Iraq’s alleged nuclear program, he stated that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." Finally, he concluded that "we could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence."m 
  • (U) While the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, it judged that Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. According to the NIE, "Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger case for making war."m 173 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraqi Military Capabilities through 2003, 1999. 1;; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. H6 iii 177 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 178 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 76
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  • Harold Rhode

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  • (U) The NIE concluded that Iraq would be more likely to conduct a terrorist-style attack on the US if Saddam perceived that the US could not be deterred from invading Iraq and destroying his regime. It assessed that if he made such a decision, Saddam would be most likely to rely on Iraqi intelligence officers under his command. It considered the possibility of Saddam employing an outside terrorist group to assist in such an attack, and concluded that this "extreme step" was conceivable if Saddam were "sufticiently desperate" and seeking a "last chance to exact vengeance." The NIE also noted that "although Saddam has not endorsed al-Qaida’s overall agenda and has been suspicious of Islamist movements in general, apparently he has not been averse to some contacts with the organization." The NIE stated that the intelligence community had low confidence in its own ability to assess when Saddam might use WMD and whether he would engage in clandestine attacks on the US homeland}79 
  • (U) As discussed elsewhere in this report, in October 2002 most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. The State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) believed that Saddam Hussein wanted to possess nuclear weapons, and was maintaining some capabilities with dual uses, but judged that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution."18° President’s State of the Union Address (January 29, 2003) 
  • (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he said that Saddam Hussein "could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own." He also stated that Saddam had "ambitions of conquest in the Middle East" that he could resume if he had "nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons".l8l 
  • (U) As discussed, the October 2002 NIE judged that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time. More generally, it suggested that Saddam would probably decide to use WMD only if he felt he had no other options for survival and that "an opponent’s retaliatory capability" would be a key factor in making this decision}82 
  • (U) A November 2002 NIE on nontraditional threats restated the October NIE’s assessment about Saddam’s willingness, if "suff1ciently desperate" to employ an outside terrorist group to conduct an attack on the US as his "last chance for vengeance." This NIE included the caveats U *79 mid. 180 Ibid. As discussed in a previous Committee report (Senate Report 109-331) the Director of Central Intelligence also released a public statement regarding the President’s speech. This statement did not specifically address the possibility of Saddam providing WMD to terrorists, but said "There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam’s growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in his speech. Although we think the chances of Saddam initializing a WMD attack are low — in part because it would constitute an admission that the sic] possesses WMD — there is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD against the United States or our allies in the region grows as his arsenal continues to build." I; E/hiite House Transcript, President Delivers "State of the Union ", January 28, 2003. 1 . _ 77

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  • that the intelligence community had low confidence in these assessments, and that "IN`R believes that the intelligence community has no reporting to support this assertion."183 
  • (U) The October 2002 NIE’s conclusions were essentially repeated again in a January 2003 Intelligence Community Assessment which said that "Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities for fear of providing Washington with justification to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, he might deal the first blow, especially if he perceives that an attack intended to end his regime is ' inent."184 
  • (U) Neither of these reports specifically focused on what Saddam might do if he had nuclear weapons or a "full arsenal" of chemical and biological weapons, possibly because the intelligence community believed that Iraq was still years away from possessing either of these. Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) 
  • (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he stated that "arnbition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together", and that "al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction."185 
  • (U) The intelligence community did not assess that Iraq and al Qaida had a cooperative relationship. In June 2002 the CIA wrote that "in contrast to the traditional patron—client relationship Iraq enjoys with secular Palestinian groups, the ties between Saddam and bin Laden appear much like those between rival intelligence services, with each trying to exploit the other for its own benefit."186 While there was evidence of limited contacts throughout the 1990s, the CIA did not assess that these contacts added up to an established, cooperative relationship. In a January 2003 report the CIA noted that the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida shared mutual enemies, and that several reports of varying reliability mentioned "the involvement of Iraq or Iraqi nationals in al-Qaida’s efforts to obtain CBW chemical and biological weapons] training. However, the same report also assessed that "Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural partners", and stated that while there was little specific intelligence about Saddam’s opinion of al-Qaida, "his record suggests that any such ties would be rooted in deep suspicion."187 
  • (U) The Committee is also aware of intelligence provided directly to the Secretary by the CIA which echoed these assessments. 
  • (U) As discussed, the October 2002 NIE assessed that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups at that time, because he did not want to put his 183 National Intelligence Estimate, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland Through 2007, November 2002 H4 Intelligence Community Assessment, Key Warnings for 2003, January 2003. 185 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 186 CIA, Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 21, 2002. H7 CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 29, 2003. The Iraqi regime’s possible links to terrorist groups are discussed in the Terrorism section of this report. _ 78

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  • regime’s survival at risk. It noted that information on possible training of terrorists was "second hand, or from sources of varying reliability."188 Additional Statements • "And as I have said repeatedly, Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind." — President George W Bush, Remarks with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, January 31, 2003 • "Every world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 13, 2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Statement before the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio, Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "But we should be just as concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons. Iraq has these weapons. They’re simpler to deliver and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without Iraq’s fingerprints." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the HASC September 18, 2002 • "There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction -- Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "We do know that the Iraqi regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and we do know they’re currently pursuing nuclear weapons, that they have a proven willingness to use those weapons at their disposal and that they’ve proven an aspiration to seize the territory of and threaten their neighbors, proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 188 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 79

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  • _ • "He’s hostile to our country. Because we have denied him the ability he has fought to impose his will on his neighbors, he has said in no uncertain terms that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has at this moment stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the 1:L4SC, September 18, 2002 • "There are ways Iraq can easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. For example, they could give biological weapons to terrorist networks to attack the United States from within and then deny any knowledge. Suicide bombers are not deterrable." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to terrorists would be an effective way of doing so." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 • "We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons of mass destruction, could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, September 19, 2002 • "Every month that goes by, his WMD programs are progressing and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the capability to strike our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage to blackmail." - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Prepared Testimony before the SASCZ September 19, 2002 • "Al Qa’ ida hides, Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al Qa’ida becomes an extension of Sadda1n’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world... Y]ou can’t distinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Columbian President Uribe, September 25, 2002 • "Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX -- nerve gas -- or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally." —- President George W Bush, Remarks in the Rose Garden with Congressional Leaders, September 26, 2002 • "We know that the Iraqi regime is led by a dangerous and brutal man. We know he is actively seeking the destructive technologies to match his hatred. And we know that he must be stopped. The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and year to year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them -— and when they have fully materialized, it may be too late to protect ourselves and our allies. By then, the Iraqi dictator will have had the means to terrorize and dominate the region, and each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or 80

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  • _ someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, September 28, 2002 • "The danger to America from the Iraqi regime is grave and growing. The regime is guilty of beginning two wars. It has a horrible history of striking without warning. In deiiance of pledges to the United Nations, Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons. Saddam Hussein has used these weapons of death against innocent Iraqi people, and we have every reason to believe he will use them again. Iraq has longstanding ties to terrorist groups which are capable of, and willing to, deliver weapons of mass death." — President George W Bush, Radio Address, October 5, 2002 • "Indeed, the more time passes the more time Saddam Hussein has to develop his deadly weapor1s and to acquire more. The more time he has to plant sleeper agents in the United States and other friendly countries or to supply deadly weapons to terrorists he can then disown, the greater the danger. The notion that we can wait until the threat is imminent assumes that we will know when it is imminent." — Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Remarks at Fletcher Conference, October 16, 2002 • "After September the llth, we’ve entered into a new era and a new war. This is a man that we know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qa’ida as a forward anny." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Dearborn, Michigan, October 14, 2002 • "His regime has had high-level contacts with al Qa’ida going back a decade and has provided training to al Qa’ida terrorists. And as the President has said, ‘Iraq could decide on any given day to provide biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group or to individual terrorists’ -- which is why the war on terror will not be won till Iraq is completely and verifiably deprived of weapons of mass destruction." — Woe President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the Air National Guard Conference, December 2, 2002 • "He has weapons of mass destruction, the world’s deadliest weapons, which pose a direct threat to the United States, our citizens and our friends and allies." — President George W Bush, Remarks with Economists, January 21, 2003 • "The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26 2003 • "Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave danger —· not only to his neighbors, but also to the United States. His regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qa’ida. He could decide secretly to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against us. And as the President said on Tuesday night, it would take just one vial, one canister, one crate to bring a day of horror to our 81

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  • nation unlike any we have ever known." — Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks to the Conservative PAC January 30, 2003 • "I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to the American people. I believe he’s a threat to the neighborhood in which he lives. And I’ve got a good evidence to believe that. He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has used weapons of mass destruction in his neighborhood and on his own people. He’s invaded countries in his neighborhood. He tortures his own people. He’s a murderer. He has trained and financed A1 Qaida-type organizations before -- A1 Qaida and other terrorist organizations." — President George W Bush, News Confrence, March 6, 2003 • " The Iraqi regime] has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And Iraq] has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qa’ida. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other." — President George W Bush, Address to the Nation, March 1 7, 2003 
  • (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. Conclusions (
  • (U) Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks the US using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part because he feared that doing so would give the US a stronger case for war with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by both earlier and later intelligence community assessments. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam’s intentions was quite difficult, and most suggested that he would be more likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a US invasion was imminent. Postwar Findings (U) Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qaida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, and refused all requests from al-Qaida to provide material or operational support. No postwar information indicates that Saddam ever considered using any terrorist group to attack the United States. (U) In 2004, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Saddam had aspired to rebuild weapons of mass destruction capabilities if and when international sanctions ended, but that the Iraqi regime had no strategy or plan for the eventual revival of such capabilities. _ 82

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  • (U) The Iraq Survey Group also concluded that Saddam and his advisors had judged that a US invasion was the greatest potential threat to regime survival, but that Saddam believed that such an invasion was very unlikely. According to the Survey Group’s findings, Saddam’s military policies were based primarily on his desire to deter neighboring countries — particularly Iran — from taking direct military action against him.           189 189 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How Hey Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 83

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  • _ IX. Post-War Iraq • "Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab ‘street,’ the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.’ - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited potential for a peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected. In that troubled land all who seek justice, and dignity, and the chance to live their own lives, can know they have a friend and ally in the United States of America." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "The lives of Iraqi citizens would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein were no longer in power, just as the lives of Afghanistan’s citizens improved after the Taliban." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Iraq is a land rich in culture, resources, and talent. Free from the weight of oppression, Iraq’s people will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time. If military action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.” - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 Intelligence 
  • (U) The Committee summarized and analyzed the intelligence products written between April 19, 1999 and the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003 in its previous report, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq. 190 The Committee received dozens of all- source intelligence reports as part of this review. As described in that report, two Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) provided the best snapshots of the IC’s views on postwar Iraq. Both were produced in January 2003, and thus are not applicable in determining whether statements made in August and October of 2002 were substantiated by the intelligence information. 
  • (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced two briefing presentations in April 2002 that discussed the challenges that could arise for US military and coalition forces in the Phase IV post-combat phase of the war plan for Iraq.l9l The Erst DIA briefing assessed that the Iraqi 190 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq, May 31, 2007. An unclassified copy of this report can be found at http://intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf 191 DIA, Knowledge of Iraqi Society: Policymaker Need for Insight and Looking at Post-Saddam Iraq, April 2002. 84

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  • _ Baath Party "will attempt to return by any means necessa.ry" that "large portions of the population will remain intirnidated," and that the "Iraqi populace will adopt an ambivalent attitude toward liberation." The briefing also assessed that "Significant force protection threats will emerge from the Baathists, the Jihadists and Arab nationalists who oppose any US occupation of Iraq."192 
  • (U) The second DIA briefing noted that "managing rivalries will be a major challenge to the new regime." DIA assessed that most seams and fissures will remain, but should be manageable and noted that most rivalries are intra-communal, not between ethnic or religious groups." It also outlined that potential post-war challenges that included, "preventing Kurdish separation, eradicating terrorists in Ansar area, managing inter-ethnic/tribal violence, gaining control of the regime’s geographic power base, and accounting for WMD."193 
  • (U) In August 2002, the CIA produced a report, Can Iraq Ever Become A Democracy? , at the request of the National Security Council. In the report’s scope note, the CIA stated that: "This assessment fully accepts that traditional Iraqi political culture has been inhospitable to democracy. Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to explore, in a necessarily initial and speculative fashion, to what extent post-Saddam Iraq might possess some democratic building blocks, and under what circumstances these blocks might be used to construct a democratic government in post-Saddarn Iraq."194 
  • (U) The report stated that, "On the surface, Iraq currently appears to lack both the socio- economic and politico—cultural prerequisites that political scientists generally regard as necessary to nurture democracy. Nevertheless, we believe that Iraq has several advantages that, if buttressed by the West, could foster democracy in post-Saddam Iraq."195 The advantages cited I by the report included the return of exiled elites, a weak tradition of political Islam, near- universal revulsion against Saddarn’s dictatorship, and economic resources. The report emphasized that "None of these factors should be seen as minimizing the obstacles to democratization in Iraq after Saddam."196 
  • (U) The CIA also pointed to Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential model for democratic development in the rest of Iraq. The report noted, for example, that "Iraqi Kurdistan has become one of the more democratic regions in the Middle East. In 1991 it was as badly off—both economically and from the viewpoint of political culture and history—as the rest of Iraq would likely be should Saddam be defeated."197 
  • (U) The report noted such "words of caution" as "we are uncertain how rapidly Iraq. .. can recover from the massive socio-economic and political damage inflicted by Saddam, especially since 1991 ." The report assessed that without "long-term, active US/Western military, political, *9* ibid *99 ibid 194 CIA, Can Iraq Ever Become a Dem0cracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv. *99 1b1d,p. *99 1b1d,p. 111 *9* ibid, p. 1 85

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  • and economic involvement with the country" the chance of achieving even "the partial democratic successes of, for example, Iraqi Kurdistan to be poor." 19 
  • (U) The report assessed that, "In theory, Iraq should be better placed than its current dire economic statistics and dictatorial government suggest to recuperate lost ground and forge a more modern society once Saddam is toppled. It is also possible, however, that Saddam’s rule has damaged the Iraqi body politic and set back Iraqi socio-economic development in more severe ways that will require many more years to overcome. We simply cannot know until the dictator is gone." 199 
  • (U) The CIA wrote a second August 2002 intelligence assessment in response to tasking by the National Security Council. This report, The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq, was intended to set forth worst—case scenarios that might emerge from US-led regime change in Iraq. The scope note stated that the "spirit of the paper reaches beyond what we normally would assess as plausible" and that the report was intended to "look at a number of situations that, when taken separately or together, could complicate US efforts in a campaign against Iraq." The negative consequences highlighted in the paper were: anarchy and territorial breakup in Iraq; instability in key Arab states; a surge of global terrorism and deepening Islamic antipathy toward the United States; major oil supply disruptions; and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance. 
  • (U) In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council published a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), entitled Saddam ’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities.2°° While not the central focus of the NIE, it did note that ". . .US and Coalition forces will face enormous requirements to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians. If Saddam adopted a scorched earth policy — and some intelligence reporting suggests he will- advancing forces will be confronted with large-scale destruction of oil and power facilities, the contamination of food supplies and other potential environmental devastation."2°1 Additional Statements • "Now, I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • MR. RUSSERT: If your analysis is not correct, and we’re not treated as liberators, but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: Well, I don’t think it’s likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators. - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. 198 Ibid, pp. i - iv. 199 CIA, Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i- iv. 200 NIC, Saddam ’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities, October 2002, p i 201 NIC, Saddam ’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities, October 2002, p i _ 86

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  • • MR. RUSSERT: Every analysis said this war itself would cost about $80 billion, recovery of Baghdad, perhaps of Iraq, about $10 billion per year. We should expect as American citizens that this would cost at least $100 billion for a two-year involvement. VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: I can’t say that, Tim. There are estimates out there. It’s important, though, to recognize that we’ve got a different set of circumstances than we’ve had in Afghanistan. . .. In Iraq you’ve got a nation that’s got the second-largest oil reserves in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia. It will generate billions of dollars a year in cash flow if they get back to their production of roughly three million barrels of oil a day, in the relatively near future. - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • ". .. The point is this is not a nation without resources, and when it comes time to rebuild and to make the kinds of investments that are going to be required to give them a shot at achieving a truly representative government, a successful government, a government that can defend itself and protect its territorial integrity and look to the interests of its people, Iraq starts with significant advantages. It’s got a well-trained middle class, a highly literate work force, a high degree of technical sophistication. This is a country that I think, but for the rule of Saddam Hussein and his brutality and his diversion of the nation’s resources and his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, can be one of the leading, perhaps the leading state in that part of the world in terms of developing a modem state and the kind of lifestyle that its people are entitled to." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • MR. RUSSERT: And you are convinced the Kurds, the Sunnis, the Shiites will come together in a democracy? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: They have so far. One of the things that many people forget is that the Kurds in the north have been operating now for over 10 years under a sort of U.S.—provided umbrella with respect to the no-ily zone, and they have established a very strong, viable society with elements of democracy and important part of it. . .. - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. • ". .. I think the prospects of being able to achieve this kind of success, if you will, from a political standpoint, are better than they would be for virtually any other country in under similar circumstances in that part of the world." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March I 6, 2003. 
  • (U) These statements were made roughly five months later than the statements in the major I speeches described above, and the intelligence community had written several intelligence products in the intervening period. In particular, the National Intelligence Council had produced two coordinated Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) in January 2003 as described above. A redacted copy of both reports can be found as appendices in the Committee’s report, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq. 
  • (U) In the first ICA, entitled Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, the Intelligence Community analyzed the "most important political, economic, and social consequences of _ 87

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  • regime change in Iraq .... "202 The second ICA, Principal Challenges in P0st—Saddam Iraq, examined "the internal dynamics of Iraq that will frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Hussein."203 
  • (U) The two lCA’s did not directly assess whether U.S. personnel would be "greeted as liberators," but did address underlying factors that would likely shape Iraqi’s views. The Committee’s May 2007 summarized the assessments in the two January 2003 reports. These prewar assessments were that: • Establishing a stable democratic government in postwar Iraq would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent challenge. • Iraq was a deeply divided society that likely would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power prevented it. • The Iraqi government would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam’s police, security, and intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce nationwide peace. • Iraq’s large petroleum resources would make economic reconstruction a less difficult challenge than political transformation, but that postwar Iraq would nonetheless face significant economic challenges. • The new Iraqi government would require significant outside assistance to rebuild Iraq’s water and sanitation infrastructure. Conclusions 
  • (U) Conclusion 16: Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products. There were relatively few intelligence products on this subject prior to January 2003, and senior policymakers did not request them. The Committee recognizes that there were many other sources of information available to policymakers that would inform their views about post-war Iraq. The Committee did not explore these other sources as it is beyond the scope of this report. 202 National Intelligence Council, Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, January 2003. 203 National Intelligence Council, Princzpal Challenges in P0st-Saddam Iraq, January 2003. 88

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  • ADDITIONAL Views or Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV On April 1, 2008, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved on a bipartisan vote of l0-5 the remaining two reports of its investigation into pre-war intelligence on Iraq and related matters. The first Committee report evaluates whether the public statements of senior United States government officials leading up to the war were substantiated by underlying intelligence information. The second report, building on previous work done by the Committee and the Department of Defense (DoD) inspector General, further details the intelligence activities of Defense Department policy officials conducted outside the Intelligence Community. These two reports are part of a second phase of the Iraq investigation authorized unanimously by the Committee on February 12, 2004. in undertaking these additional lines of inquiry, the Committee acted to tell the complete story of how intelligence was not only collected and analyzed prior to the Iraq invasion but how it was publicly used in authoritative statements made by the highest officials of the Bush Administration in furtherance of its policy to overthrow Saddam Hussein. For three years, the Committee’s investigative mandate foundered. Under the direction of the then-majority, the Committee failed to show the same disciplined and objective oversight it demonstrated in producing its July 2004 report on the Intelligence Community’s pre-war intelligence assessments on Iraq. Committee Chairman Pat Roberts halted the investigation on the intelligence activities of the Defense Department officials and farmed out the work to the DoD inspector General in November 2005. The public statements section of the investigation was slow-walked and a draii report was never presented to the Committee membership prior to the change in the Senate majority in 2007, evidently a task too politically sensitive to handle. Upon assuming the Committee chairmanship, I directed that work be restarted on the remaining sections of the investigation (another report on pre-war assessments on post-war Iraq was approved by the Committee and released in May 2007). Soon thereafter, on February 9, 2007, the DoD inspector General issued its own report reviewing the activities of DoD policy officials prior to the war. The Inspector General’s report, based on extensive interviews and a thorough review of documents, concluded that the policy office in the Pentagon had expanded its role and mission from formulating policy and had inappropriately disseminated an alternative analysis drawing a link between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorists who carried out the attacks on September llth that the Intelligence Community was unable to substantiate. The Committee uncovered this attempt by DoD policy officials to shape and politicize intelligence in order to bolster the Administration’s policy of invasion in its July 2004 report. After the release of the February 2007 DoD inspector General report, Vice Chairman Christopher "Kit" Bond wrote me urging that the Committee not finish the investigation of the Pentagon policy office it officially authorized three years earlier. As a concession to the Vice Chairman’s request, I agreed to not revisit the same events examined in the inspector General 89

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  •  report, but rather to restart a portion of the Committee’s suspended Pentagon investigation unexamined by the Inspector General: clandestine meetings in Rome and Paris between DoD policy officials and Iranians in 2001 and 2003, facilitated by Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian exile and fabricator implicated in the 1986 Iran—Contra scandal, in which intelligence was collected but kept from the Intelligence Community. The Committee began examining the circumstances surrounding these meetings in 2003 based on an agreement between Chairman Roberts and me (serving then as Vice Chairman) pursuant to the original terms of reference of the Committee’s investigation. We agreed at the time that while these meetings concerned Iran and not Iraq, it was important nevertheless to fully understand how the meetings came to be, what was discussed and proffered at them, and why they were not handled in normal diplomatic or intelligence channels. These were matters of fundamental, statutorily-mandated congressional oversight that the Committee was not at liberty to ignore. The resulting report is based on interviews of numerous Administration officials, including those Pentagon officials attending the Rome and Paris meetings, and a careful examination of hundreds of pages of documentation, including cable traffic, meeting notes, and an internal DoD review concerning the propriety of the meetings. Whereas the Committee’s 2004 report presented evidence that the DoD policy office attempted to shape the CIA’s terrorism analysis in late 2002 and, when it failed, prepared an altemative intelligence analysis denigrating the CIA for not embracing a link between Iraq and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the most recent report shows that the rogue actions of the office were not isolated. The Committee’s findings paint a disturbing picture of Pentagon policy officials who were distrustful of the Intelligence Community and undertook the collection of sensitive intelligence without coordinating their activities or reporting the information they collected through proper channels. The actions of DoD officials to blindly disregard the red flags over the role played by Mr. Ghorbanifar in these meetings and to wall—off the Intelligence Community from its activities and the information it obtained were improper and demonstrated a fundamental disdain for the Intelligence Community’s role in vetting sensitive sources. In preparing its report on public statements made by U.S. government officials prior to the war, the Committee decided to concentrate its analysis on those statements that were central to the debate in 2002-2003 over the decision to go to war. The Committee identified five major policy speeches made by President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell during this period as the most significant expressions of how the Bush Administration communicated intelligence judgments to the American people, the United States Congress, and the international community. Additional statements made by senior Administration officials during this time frame containing assertions not included in the five major policy speeches were examined as well. _ 90

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  • The Committee decided not to consider public statements made prior to the summer of 2002 in its review or those made by lower level Executive Branch officials. They were not deemed to be as central to the lead-up to war in Iraq. Statements made by members of Congress also were not evaluated. A bipartisan majority of the Committee agreed that these statements do not carry the same weight of authority as statements made by the President and others in the Executive Branch who are charged with representing the views of the U.S. government in a State of the Union Address viewed by 50 million Americans or in a speech before the United Nations. In addition, members of Congress did not have the same ready access to intelligence as senior Executive Branch policymakers. As the Committee’s 2004 Iraq report highlights, it took requests by members of the Committee to the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in September 2002 for the Intelligence Community to produce its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The hastily produced NIE was not published until October 2002, mere days before Congress was scheduled to vote on the resolution to authorize the use of force in Iraq. By this time, the Administration had made repeated public assertions regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism as a predicate for the pre-emptive use of military force that would soon follow. The Committee carefully examined these public statements against the intelligence products distributed by the Intelligence Community at the time of the statement. The report’s conclusions highlight which statements were substantiated by the intelligence reporting and which statements were not. The Committee’s findings are fair and objective. In those instances where a statement is not substantiated by the intelligence, the Committee renders no judgment as to why. As the report details, Administration statements prior to the war often reflected the reporting of the Intelligence Community, even when the judgments underlying the reporting were based on flawed analysis or false information. However, senior Administration officials repeatedly spoke in declarative and unequivocal terms about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and support for terrorists. These declarative statements were not substantiated. In the push to rally public support for the invasion of Iraq, Administration officials often failed to accurately portray what was known, what was not known, and what was suspected about Iraq and the threat it represented to our national security. The report documents significant instances in which the Administration went beyond what the Intelligence Community knew or believed in making public claims, most notably on the V false assertion that Iraq and al-Qaeda had an operational partnership and joint involvement in carrying out the attacks of September llth. The President and his advisors undertook a relentless public campaign in the aftermath of the attacks to use the war against al-Qaida as a justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Representing to the American people that the two had an operational partnership and posed a single, indistinguishable threat was fundamentally misleading and led the Nation to war on false premises. The Committee also found instances where a public statement selectively used that intelligence information which supported a particular policy viewpoint while ignoring 91

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  •  contradictory information that weakened the position. While on its face, a statement may have been accurate, it nevertheless presented a slanted picture to those who were unaware of the hidden intelligence. The Administration’s misuse of intelligence prior to the war was aided by the selective declassification of intelligence reporting. The Executive Branch historically exercises the prerogative to classify information in order to protect national security and, unlike Congress, it can declassify information unilaterally and with ease. The Administration exploited this declassification authority in the lead up to the war and disclosed intelligence at a time and in a manner of its choosing with impunity, knowing that others attempting to disclose additional details that might provide balance or improve accuracy would be prevented from doing so under the threat of prosecution. This unlevel playing field allowed senior officials to disclose and discuss sensitive intelligence reports when it supported the Administration’s policy objectives and keep out of the public discourse information which did not. The canon of the Committee’s Iraq investigation - a series of six reports issued over a four-year period — demonstrates why congressional oversight is essential in evaluating America’s intelligence collection and analytic activities. During the course of its investigation, the Committee uncovered that the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction was based on stale, fragmentary, and speculative intelligence reports and replete with unsupported judgments. Troubling incidents were reported in which internal dissent and warnings about the veracity of intelligence on Iraq were ignored in the rush to war. The Committee’s investigation also revealed how the Administration policymakers applied pressure on intelligence analysts prior to the war to support a link between Iraq and those terrorists responsible for the attacks of September llth that did not exist. Our investigation detailed how the Iraqi National Congress attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq by providing false information through defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists, and how this false information was embraced despite warnings of fabrication. The Committee’s investigation also documented for the public how the Administration ignored the pre-war judgments of the Intelligence Community that the invasion of Iraq would destabilize security in-country and provide al-Qaida with an opportunity to exploit the situation and increase attacks against United States forces during and after the war. After tive years and the loss of over 4,000 American lives, these ignored judgments were tragically prescient. Overall, the findings and conclusions of the Committee’s Iraq investigation were an important catalyst in bringing about subsequent legislative and administrative reforms of the Intelligence Community designed to learn from these painful lessons of the past. Finally, I am disappointed that Vice Chairman Bond was unable to support the issuance of these two remaining reports. From when the initial drafts of both reports were presented to 92

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  • Committee members on January 15, 2008, to their adoption two and a half months later, every effort was made to accommodate changes proposed by all members. In the end, the Vice Chairman was the only Committee member to file amendments seeking further revision to the report. Of the over 170 amendments he filed, the Committee was able to accept or resolve more than half. By the time the reports were adopted on April lst, they reflected over 300 changes made at the request of the Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman’s remaining amendments were requested changes that would have gutted the reports’ conclusions, changed the factual underpinnings of the investigation, and significantly delayed completion of the long-overdue reports. When the Vice Chairman repeatedly refused my request at the April lst meeting that he call up those remaining amendments he wanted considered and voted on, the Committee, on a bipartisan basis, voted 10-5 to approve and release the final installments of the Committee’s investigation. _ Conmacrion Sunrvnrrian BY CHAIRMAN J orm D. ROCKEFELLER IV _ An error appears on page 8 of the report on public statements. An additional sentence should be included in the paragraph discussing the views of the National Ground Intelligence Center, so that it reads: "A later memo from State/INR said that ‘the IAEA and - pertinent technical expert has concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq’s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings. . .’ The memo also stated that ‘l-Iigh-grade aluminum is used for tactical rockets by a number of countries. Examples identified by DOE. . .include the United States, Russia (905 x 80mm rockets), and apparently Switzerland and Italy, whose 81rmn rocket design is assessed to have been reverse- engineered for the Nasser MLR system’, with the note that ‘DOE and DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets."’ (U) This correction was not made in the body of the report due to an objection by the Vice Chairman. J orm D. ROCKEFELLER IV _ 93
  • ADDITIONAL Vnzws or Senator Dianne Feinstein I applaud the completion of the Committee’s Phase II investigations. Since the Committee’s first report in July 2004, we have known that the prewar intelligence on Iraq was both bad and wrong — it was the result of flawed tradecraft and produced the inaccurate belief that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. It has been four years since the Committee began the second phase of its review. The results are now in. Even though the intelligence before the war supported inaccurate statements, this Administration distorted the intelligence in order to build its case to go to war. The Executive Branch released only those findings that supported the argument, did not relay uncertainties, and at times made statements beyond what the intelligence supported. I am pleased that these reports have been completed and released for the public’s review. We can now tum our full attention to the present and the future, and making sure the mistakes of the past are not repeated. DLANN12 FE1Nsr121N _ 94

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  • _ ADDITIONAL Vmws or Senator FEINGOLD The Administration, and particularly President Bush and Vice President Cheney, made repeated assertions about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein that were not supported by the intelligence available at the time. Those assertions overstated the nature and urgency of the threat, as described in the intelligence, ignored ongoing disagreements and uncertainty within the Intelligence Community, and, at times, outright contradicted intelligence assessments. Together, the statements sought to make the case for a war in Iraq by convincing the American people, first, that Saddam had, might have, or was on the verge of obtaining a nuclear weapon, and, second, that Saddam had a relationship with Al Qaeda and would provide Al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of attacking the United States. Even the deeply flawed October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) did not support the claims made by the President and the Vice President regarding an Iraqi nuclear program. That NIE assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that without sufficient fissile material acquired from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 or 2009. Yet the President made the following statements: " Saddarn] possesses the world’s most dangerous weapons" (March 22, 2002); " w]e don’t know whether or not Saddam] has a nuclear weapon" (December 31, 2002); and, of course, " i]acing clear evidence of peril, we carmot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the forrn of a mushroom cloud" (October 7, 2002). Meanwhile, Vice President Cheney insisted that assessments related to Iraq’s nuclear program that were disputed within the Intelligence Community were known "with absolute certainty" (September 8, 2002) and through "irrefutable evidence" (September 20, 2002). And, on the eve of war, after the IAEA had reported that its inspectors had found "no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq, the Vice President asserted, " w]e believe Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons" (March 16, 2003). Administration ofl·icials’ claims of a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda were even more outlandish. Before the war, the Central Intelligence Agency assessed that "Saddam has viewed Islamic extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat," that "Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden are far from being natural paitners," and that assessments about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rested on "a body of fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of varying reliabi1ity." Moreover, the Intelligence Commiuiity consistently assessed that Saddam’s use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States rested on his being "sufficiently desperate" in the face of a U.S. attack and his possible desire for a "last chance at vengeance." Yet the President not only repeatedly suggested an operational relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, but asserted that Saddam would provide weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda for an unprovoked attack against the United States: "you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror" (September 25, 2002); " e]ach passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX — nerve gas — or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally" (September 26, 2002); " Saddarn] is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army" (October 14, 2002); " Saddam] is a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda. .. A] true threat facing our country is that an al Qaeda-type network trained and armed by Saddam could attack American and not leave one ’ringerprint" (November 7, 2002); and " t]he danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help _ 95

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  • of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other" (March 17, 2002). Yet, as the Committee report has concluded, " s]tatements by the President and Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information." Further, " s]tatements and implications by the President and the Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence." Even statements that Saddam harbored al Qaeda, such as the President’s assertion that he "aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda" (January 28, 2003) were not supported by the intelligence available at the time. As the CIA acknowledged, "we lack positive indications that Baghdad is complicit" in the presence of operatives associated with al Qaeda in Iraq in 2002. These and other assertions that were contradicted by the available intelligence, including predictions of a smooth transition to a stable democracy, were intended to drive the country into a war that has cost thousands of American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, visited untold misery on the Iraqi people, and severely damaged our national security. Administration officials used the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to justify a war that has not only been waged in a country that had no connection to the attacks, but has seriously damaged our ability to fight al Qaeda. In that respect, the President’s statement, on October 2, 2002, that "the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency" was perhaps most inaccurate of all. In October 2002, and still today, the threat of unique urgency facing the United States does not come from Iraq, but from the Afghanistan/Pakistan safe haven and global capabilities of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Russsu. D. FEINGOLD 96

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  • _ ADDITIONAL Vmws or SENATORS HAGEL AND SNowE On February 12, 2004, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a joint statement regarding the Committee’s Review of Pre-War Intelligence in Iraq. Specifically, the Chairman and Vice Chairman announced that the Committee had "unanimously agreed to refine the terms of reference of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into pre war intelligence with regard to Iraq." The Chairman expressly stated that the "resolution adopted unanimously today illustrates the commitment of all members to a thorough review, to learning the necessary lessons from our experience with Iraq, and to ensuring that our armed forces and policymakers benefit from the best and most reliable intelligence that can be collected. I believe that the report which we are currently reviewing will have a profound impact on the future of our intelligence Community." We concurred completely. We also believe that the process by which the Committee drafted and approved the reports could have been significantly improved. The Committee took more than four years to review information of great import. The process was marked by partisan quarrels; however, we believe that every member had sufficient time to review and comment on the respective reports. In fact, of the 165 amendments filed to these reports, over 50% were resolved or withdrawn. Unfortunately, members never had an opportunity to vote up or down on the remaining amendments. We endorse the reports as the final chapter of the Committee’s inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. However, given the opportunity to vote, we also would have likely supported some of the amendments that had been filed, which would have improved the final product. On balance, these reports contain critical information that should unequivocally be publicly released, enabling the public to formulate their own conclusions. These reports in no way preclude the committee from undertaking additional inquiries ir1to the prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. These reports simply bring closure to the Committee’s review. Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy The February l2, 2004 terms of reference of the Com1nittee’s inquiry mandated that the Committee review "any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy," (OUSDP) as well as "other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee’s review." The Committee began its review of intelligence activities by the offices reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 2004, but the effort was suspended in September 2005, when the Committee requested the Department of Defense Inspector General (`DoD IG) to review whether the Office of Special Plans, which reported to the OUSDP, "at any time, conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities." _ 97

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  • The DoD IG reviewed whether personnel assigned to the PCTEG, OSP or OUSDP had conducted unauthorized, unlawful or inappropriate intelligence activities from September 2001 through June 2003, completing its report in February 2007. The IG report concluded that "the Offrce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were. . .inappropriate. . . .] This condition occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Ofiice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from policy formulation to altemative intelligence analysis and dissemination. As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide "the most accurate analysis of intelligence" to senior decision makers." We endorse the DoD IG’s iinding that the OUSDP personnel’s actions were inappropriate, and, given the thorough work completed by the DoD IG on this issue, we do not believe it would serve the public interest to go over the same ground again. Based on the results of the DoD IG’s review, the Committee decided to examine intelligence collection activities within the OUSDP, which had not been included in the DoD IG report. Both reviews demonstrate that intelligence activities undertaken by the United States Government should rely on the professional Intelligence Community. We believe it is important for the American public to be aware of the results of this inquiry. Whether Public Statements regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information The Committee unanimously agreed to evaluate "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information." According to the Committee report, the "Committee decided to concentrate its analysis on the statements that were central to the nation’s decision to go to war," and "specifically, the committee chose to review {ive major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of Iraq." No amendments were iiled to either strike or revise this language. The Committee report continued stating that the "speeches are the best representations of how the Bush Administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the American people, and the international community" and that the speeches "are also fairly comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular statement in a speech was substantiated can be extrapolated to cover similar statements made at similar times." In order to conduct this review "the Committee assembled hundreds of intelligence reports produced prior to March 19, 2003 in an effort to understand the state of intelligence analysis at the time of various speeches and statements." _ 98

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Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories
Millions Worldwide Believe 9/11 Conspiracy Theories Monday, 27 Sep 2010 01:21 PM Article Font Size By: Arnaud De Borchgrave

No sooner did Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggest from the rostrum of the U.N. General Assembly that most of the world believes the U.S. government was involved in a 9/11 conspiracy, than 32 nations followed the U.S. delegation as it walked out.

These were members of NATO, the European Union (21 countries are members of both), Australia, New Zealand, and Costa Rica.

More importantly, 167 nations didn't budge and went on listening to the Iranian's incendiary speech.

We keep forgetting that countless millions in the world, including millions of Americans, have swallowed the monumental canard that the United States and Israel were part of a conspiracy designed to legitimize the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

The first to finger the United States and Israel was Hamid Gul, two weeks after 9/11, in an interview with this reporter in Islamabad.

Gul, a former head of Pakistani intelligence and notorious anti-American, added the U.S. Air Force to the conspiracy mix. The "evidence" he provided was that no U.S. fighter aircraft were scrambled on 9/11 to intercept the passenger planes that had abandoned their flight plans.

Gul, a friend of Osama bin Laden dating to the days when they were allies against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, has yet to explain what he was doing in Kabul with his Taliban friends for two weeks immediately preceding 9/11.

More recently, in Cairo, two former Egyptian ambassadors to the United States told me they believed there was a Mossad-CIA plot designed to keep Israel and America in lockstep in a war on terror. They pointed out that when President George W. Bush declared Global War in Terror, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was the first to sign up.

For the two Egyptians, that validated their suspicions.

There were also bestselling books about the "fact certain conspiracy" written in both French and German, by different authors, that each sold a million copies in both countries.

For Gordon Duff, a Vietnam veteran and senior editor of "Veterans Today" and frequent "self-hating American" guest on radio and TV stations the world over, there is no doubt he is to the conspiracy theory born.

"In America," he wrote last week, "groups have been popping up for years, not 'fringe' types but military and professional organizations, architects, engineers, pilots, intelligence officers. There is a vast underground that is never reported, never spoken of in the news and continually threatened. The FBI and Homeland Security have infiltrated these groups, illegal surveillance has been on a massive scale and, as the groups have grown and their reach has touched millions of Americans, the government, in the usual whispers, is talking about mass arrests, 'unplugging' the Internet, all those things the militia movements of the '90s said would happen."

Outside of the United States, Duff adds, not in the Middle East, but Canada, Europe, Latin America, and the Far East, "finding people who accept the Bush and Obama administration's 'party line' about 'box cutters and hijackers' is difficult. No one wants to risk the public scorn of seeming like an imbecile."   more

 

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IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed   
 
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  • Then, importantly, the report acknowledges that the "Committee is fully aware that officials may have had multiple credible sources of information upon to which to base statements, but has not attempted to document or analyze source materials other than intelligence, so that is beyond the scope of this report.” The report focuses on major coordinated inter-agency intelligence reports and assessments. The Committee deemed that these reports were the most "authoritative” and represented the "full Intelligence Community position.” The Committee elected to not include "less formal communications between intelligence agencies and other parts of the Executive Branch” or reports "from the field.” Although we have repeatedly advocated for releasing as much information to the public as possible, we agreed that in this context, basing the report on major coordinated interagency intelligence reports and assessments, which represent the collective informed views of the Intelligence Community, was appropriate. Although we would have likely supported amendments expanding the scope if afforded the opportunity to vote, the scope and methodology was consistent with the unanimously agreed to charter, and, therefore, we supported it. In the event that assessments were referenced in the report and not included or cited, we would have clearly supported their inclusion. However, these assessments arguably would not have had a profound impact on the report or significantly affected the overall conclusions; they would have only provided context. The report accomplished its primary objective, unanimously agreed to by the committee: to evaluate "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.” CHUCK HAGEL OLYMPIA J. SNowE 

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  • _ MINORITY Views or Vrcn CnA1mv1AN BOND AND SENATORS CHAMBLISS, Hxrcn, AND BURR* This majority-only written report by the Senate Intelligence Committee is a great disappointment to us and an unfortunate commentary on the political nature of intelligence oversight in the Congress today. We regret that at a time when the Committee should be focusing its full attention on improving our intelligence community, closing the gaps in critical intelligence, and making our country safer, that the Committee Ends itself again consumed with political gamesmanship. Although we asked from the beginning of this investigation to be included in it, we were cut out; although we asked that the Members of the Committee produce the conclusions on this report, two majority staff were assigned to the task; and although we had over 50 amendments on the table at our Committee meeting on this report, we were not allowed to offer any of them. We have rarely seen such a poorly handled congressional investigation, and we believe the facts detailed below speak for themselves. Early History In late 2003 the Democrats first proposed that the Committee expand its inquiry of intelligence on Iraq into how administration policymakers "used" intelligence, frankly, we were not sure what they meant. At the time, it was already becoming clear to the Committee that the intelligence community’s performance in its estimate of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities had been a serious failure. Having heard many of the statements those policymakers had made, it seemed obvious to us that they "used" the intelligence on Iraq the same way policymakers in Congress at the time and policymakers in previous administrations had: they read it, made decisions based on what they read (as well as other available information), and they spoke to the American public about their policies and decisions. Once the Committee’s inquiry began to reveal that analysts were not "pressured" by the administration to assess that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that, in fact, the intelligence itself was wrong, it appeared that the Democrats wanted to add a more subjective element into the investigation—how policymakers "used" intelligence. The reason for this initiative became clear in November 2003 when the press exposed a memo which outlined the "plan" by Committee Democrats to explore "vague notions of use" in order to make the greatest political gain from the Committee’s Iraq investigation. They intended to "pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead to new disclosures regarding improper or questionable conduct by administration officials." The memo said that "we don’t know what we will End but our prospects for getting access we seek is far greater when we have the backing of the majority." The memo also noted that "we can verbally mention some of the intriguing leads we are pursuing"——presumably to the press and in violation of the Committee rules. . In spite of this disturbing revelation that the Democrats were seeking to politicize deliberately the national security oversight function of the Congress, in an effort toward bipartisan compromise, in February 2004 the Committee agreed to examine "whether public * I concur with the Vice Chairman’s views on the substance of the report as well as the Minority’s amendments. I am unable to comment on any Phase I or Phase H activities that preceded my membership on this Committee. 000

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  • _ statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information” as part of a second phase of the Iraq inquiry. Given what we had already learned, we warned that this could quickly devolve into an unfortunate use of the Committee’s time and resources, but we were willing to agree to the compromise nonetheless, confident that any fair inquiry would show clearly that the statements of administration officials were substantiated by the intelligence available to them at the time, intelligence that, as described in the Committee’s unanimous Phase I report, was flawed. Unfortunately, the report released today confirmed our early suspicions. The Phase II effort has indeed resulted in a partisan exercise and requests made by the Democrats of the then- Republican Committee leadership from 2004 to 2006 for the inquiry itself and for unnecessary interviews and documents were clearly intended as roadblocks to prevent the inquiry’s completion and to allow bogus charges of "obstruction” intended to help the Democrats’ political goals. Ironically, but not surprisingly, even when the Democrats gained control of the Committee and were in a position to take their best shot at fashioning a purely partisan inquiry— specifically by instructing only two majority staffers to conduct the review, cutting out the minority entirely, twisting the statements of the policymakers they reviewed, and cherry picking the intelligence that helped best make their case—the reports essentially validate what we have been saying all along: that policymakers’ statements were substantiated by the intelligence. As the Committee’s Phase I report showed, it was the intelligence that was faulty. In the cases in which the majority concluded that statements were not substantiated by intelligence or did not convey fully the intelligence community’s analysis, it is clear that either the words of the policymakers in question or the body of intelligence available at the time were distorted in order to make these false charges. We have addressed each of those cases in the attached amendments in Appendix A (see amendments 42, 68, 85, 86, 96, 119, 120, and 136) With the partisan elements of this inquiry now fully exposed, we hope that others will see why we are so disappointed that Committee time and resources have been wasted at this critical juncture in our nation’s history. We have not had an Intelligence Authorization Bill become law in this Congress or the last Congress, we have not had a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) reform bill become law in this Congress—two badly needed bil1s—both to improve the functioning of the intelligence community and protect the nation. Yet, we have been forced to waste countless man-hours to show what we and the American people already knew four years ago, that policymakers’ statements turned out to be wrong after the war because the statements were based on flawed intelligence. The Committee’s Phase I report, which investigated that intelligence failure and explained how it happened, was a judicious and valuable act of intelligence oversight. Distorting intelligence and misleading the public, as the current majority report does, is not. We are also disappointed that in a zealous, but ultimately failed, attempt to expose alleged "distortions" by the administration, the majority chose to cover up and distort information themselves. Specifically, the majority report excludes from consideration all of the statements made by Members of Congress and the previous administration that were submitted wl
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  • _ for review by the Republican Members. It also excludes relevant intelligence information requested for inclusion by Republican Members including instances ir1 which the Committee knew that specific policymakers’ statements were fact-checked and approved by intelligence community agencies. It treats policymakers unfairly by distorting their words and refusing those individuals the opportunity to respond to what has been alleged about their statements. Because these issues are our most serious concerns about this flawed majority report, we address each in more detail below. Cover-up for Democrats Following the Committee’s agreement on February l2, 2004, to examine "whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information" the Chairman and Vice Chairman each provided a list of statements their respective Members wanted examined by the Committee staff. In the reports released today, only those statements submitted by the Democrats were reviewed. The Republican Members of the Committee submitted approximately 100 statements for review. These were statements made by officials in the previous administration and Members of Congress. Many of our Members believed it was relevant and important to include those statements, particularly from Democrats in Congress, to show that during the debate leading up to and during the authorization of the war in Iraq and during previous efforts to use force in Iraq, Members of both parties with access to intelligence information, not just the Republican administration, made very similar statements about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorism. In our opinion, the statements from most policymakers, whether or not they supported the decision to go to war in Iraq, were similar because everyone saw virtually the same intelligence and used that same intelligence in speeches to explain their own decision—making. Nuclear In the nuclear area, for example, the majority report’s first conclusion notes that policymakers’ statements about Iraq’s nuclear activities were substantiated by intelligence, but the majority concludes that some statements did not convey disagreements that existed within the intelligence community. Many Democrats in Congress also discussed Iraq’s nuclear efforts during the Iraq war debate and in other venues and similarly did not describe disagreements within the intelligence community. For example, all of the following statements discussed Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, but none of them noted that there was a dissent from one of the agencies within the intelligence community. Conversely, the report is critical of administration officials who did not discuss this dissent even though the dissent had not even been published by that agency at the point the statements by the administration officials were made. The majority apparently believes some policymakers should be mind-readers. All of the following statements made by Democrats in Congress were made after the publication of the Iraq WMD NIE in which the nuclear alternative judgment was published, yet none of them was allowed to be included in the report. 102

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  • • In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qa’ida members. — Senator Hillary Clinton, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. He could have it earlier if he is able to obtain fissile materials on the outside market, which is possible—difiicult but possible. We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress that Saddam Hussein has been able to make in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Saddam Hussein is an evil man, a dictator who oppresses his people and flouts the mandate of the international community. While this behavior is reprehensible, it is Hussein’s vigorous pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and his present and potential future support for terrorist acts and organizations, that ma.ke him a terrible danger to the people to the United States. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 • There is no question that Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons and that he seeks to acquire additional weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. That is not in debate. Senator Christopher Dodd, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • We know that he has chemical and biological weapons. He has already used them against his neighbors and his own people, and is trying to build more. We know that he is doing everything he can to build nuclear weapons, and we know that each day he gets closer to achieving that goal. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Almost no one disagrees with these basic facts: that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a menace; that he has weapons of mass destruction and that he is doing everything in his power to get nuclear weapons; that he has supported terrorists; that he is a grave threat to the region, to vital allies like Israel, and to the United States; and that he is thwarting the will of the international community and undermir1ing the United Nations’ credibility. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 The following statement from Senator John Kerry went a step further, claiming that "all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons." In fact, not "all" intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq was seeking nuclear weapons; as noted in the majority report, one agency considered the evidence inadequate to reach such a judgment. 103

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  • • According to the CIA’s report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons. The more difficult question to answer is when Iraq could actually achieve this goal. That depends on is its ability to acquire weapons- grade fissile material. If Iraq could acquire this material from abroad, the CIA estimates that it could have a nuclear weapon within 1 year. Senator John Kerry, October 9, 2002. This comment from Senator Durbin, made nearly a year earlier, actually indicated that I Saddam Hussein had “perhaps even nuclear weapons" at his disposal. At no time did the intelligence community assess that Iraq perhaps had nuclear weapons. • When you look at what Saddam Hussein has at his disposal, in terms of chemical, biological, and perhaps even nuclear weapons, we cannot ignore the threat that he poses to the region and the fact that he has fomented terrorism throughout his reign. Senator Dick Durbin, December 21, 2001, Larry King Live. Why were none of these statements considered worthy of analysis by the majority's review staff, particularly those made by Senators Durbin, Edwards, and Rockefeller, who were all members of the Senate Intelligence Committee at that time, and by Senator Clinton, who has publicly acknowledged being briefed on the NIE? UA Vs Regarding Iraq’s UAV capability, the report notes that some administration statements did not convey disagreements or evolving views within the intelligence community about whether Iraq intended to use UAVs for chemical or biological weapons delivery. The report, however, failed to analyze statements made by Democrats like: • Saddam’s existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow. Saddam has used chemical weapons before, both against Iraq’s enemies and against his own people. He is working to develop delivery systems like missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that could bring these deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the Middle East. He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • In addition, Iraq is developing umnanned aerial vehicles UAVs, capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents, which could threaten Iraq’s neighbors as well as American forces in the Persian Gulf Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. 104

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  •  “Intent " In a section titled "Intent" the majority report includes statements from several administration officials which discussed their concerns about what Saddam Hussein could do with his weapons of mass destruction considering his disdain for the United States and his long association with terrorist groups. We believe that these statements were not about Iraq’s "intent" at all, as the majority report says, but were explaining that with a lack of information about Iraq’s intent, these policymakers were concerned about Iraq’s capabilities. We note that many Democrats also expressed the same concerns about the threat Iraq posed or might have posed to the United States due to his weapons of mass destruction capabilities, connections to terrorists, or both in speeches that were not analyzed in the majority report: • I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the threat posed to America by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction is so serious that despite the risks and we should not minimize the risks we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that threat. There has been some debate over how "imminent" a threat Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat. I also believe after September ll, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the nature of these weapons that he has and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get. To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we afford to take that chance? I do not think we can. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002. • Is Saddam Hussein] a greater threat than he was in l99l‘? He surely is. There’s different ways of launching scuds and all kinds that go faster, farther. There is no question on that. .. And if our allies] are not there for us, does that mean in this debate, precedent-based, historically-based, that we sort of sit and take it, or are we going to end up basically being unilateral anyway because we cannot have our children smallpoxed. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, September 25, 2002. ` • When I vote to give the President of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002. • I believe that Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime represents a clear threat to the United States, to our allies, to our interests around the world, and to the values of freedom and democracy we hold dear .... Thousands of terrorist operatives around the world would pay anything to get their hands on Saddam’s arsenal, and there is every possibility that he could tum his weapons over to these terrorists...we can hardly ignore the terrorist threat, and the serious danger that Saddam would allow his arsenal to be used in aid of terror. Senator John Edwards, Congressional Record, September 12, 2002. 105

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  •  • When I consider that Hussein could either use or give to terrorists weapons of mass destruction biological, chemical or nuclear and that he might just be mad enough to do it I End, aiter careful research, the answer to my question: we cannot afford to leave him alone over the next 5 or even 3 years. Senator Charles Schumer, Congressional Record, October 10, 2002 • If you allow someone like Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons, how many people is he going to kill with such weapons? He’s already demonstrated a willingness to use the weapons. He poison-gassed his own people. He used poison gas and other weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors. This man has no compunction about killing lots and lots of people. So this is a way to save lives and to save the stability and peace of a region of the world that is important to the peace and security of the entire world. Vice President A1 Gore, Address to the Nation, December 16, 1998. • Our strategic objective is to contain Saddam Hussein and curtail his ability to produce the most deadly weapons known to mankind-weapons that he has unleashed with chilling alacrity against his own people. Leit unchecked, Saddam Hussein would in short order be in a position to threaten and blackmail our regional allies, our troops, and, indeed, our nation. Senator Joe Biden, Congressional Record, February 12, 1998. • Saddam Hussein, with one nuclear weapon, would be far more dangerous than the Soviet Union with 20,000. The difference is, they would not use their weapons]. They were not suicidal. He would. Senator Carl Levin, Congressional Record, October 9, 1998 • With the peace of the region and, and in fact, much of the world at risk, we cannot allow Iraq to continue its maneuvers designed to protect such a dangerous buildup of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Congressional Record, December 16, 1998. • It is not possible to overstate the ominous implications for the Middle East if Saddam were to develop and successfully militarize and deploy potent biological weapons. We can all imagine the consequences. Extremely small quantities of several known biological weapons have the capability to exterminate the entire population of cities the size of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. These could be delivered by ballistic missile, but they also could be delivered by much more pedestrian means; aerosol applicators on commercial trucks easily could suffice. If Saddam were to develop and then deploy usable atomic weapons, the same holds true. Senator John Kerry, Congressional Record, November 9, 1997 This is only a sampling of the approximately 100 statements submitted by Republican Members of this Committee for review and which we repeatedly requested be included in the 106

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  • _ report as agreed previously by the Committee Members. This request was ignored by the majority during two iterations of comments on the report drafts and a motion to include such statements, offered by the Vice-Chairman at the Committee’s business meeting, was denied a hearing by the Chairman. Che —Pickin Intelli ence We have several concerns about the intelligence information the majority chose to include, and chose to ignore, in its report. j First, the majority chose to include only "finnished disseminated intelligence" for comparison with policymakers’ statements. This is not only a departure from the Committee’s agreed upon terms of reference, it is unfair to policymakers whom we know had access to far more than just published intelligence assessments. For example, in preparation for Secretary Powell’s statement before the UN on February 5, 2003, the CIA provided an intelligence report called a TD (telegraphic dissemination) for use in the speech. In spite of the fact that the CLLX informed the Committee about this in early 2004 and that the information was included in the Committee’s first Iraq report published nearly four years ago, the majority refused to include, or even consider, the TD in its majority report. Instead the majority report included an intelligence assessment published after the Secretary’s speech and noted the existence of "operational intelligence traffic." Any intelligence officer who has been on the job more than a week knows that a TD is an intelligence report, not "operational traffic." Moreover, after refusing our request to include the TD, incorrectly arguing that it was "operational," the majority drafters included several actual operational cables of their choosing in another section of the report. Worse, these were operational cables which the Committee knows were not finished intelligence reports for policymakers and were not given to any administration officials; yet the much more widely disseminated TD, specifically provided to Secretary Powell for use in his speech, was not included in the majority report. Even worse, excluded those sections of the report which specifically analyze the President’s statements, is the President’s Summary of the NIE, a summary document prepared for and presented to the President. This is most disturbing since in two important cases- regarding reconstitution of Iraq’s nuclear pro gram and Iraq’s intent to use its small UAVs for biological weapons delivery—the judgments and dissents were presented differently than in the NIE’s key judgments and main text. In fact, in the case of Iraq’s UAVs, the dissent was not included in the President’s summary at all. Second, the report excludes other information relevant to any fair inquiry of whether policymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence. For example, the Committee obtained information related to the coordination, declassifrcation, and fact-checking of the President’s Cincinnati speech with the CIA, relevant portions of which we requested be included in the report. Specifically, a handwritten note by a CIA officer at the bottom of one of the drafts to then-DCI Tenet said that the CIA terrorism analyst had "read all the terrorism paragraphs and said it was all oka ’ (emphasis original.) We believed it was only fair to let the public know that the CIA checked the President’s speech and said that all of the terrorism paragraphs were M

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  • _ determined by CIA analysts to be "all okay." Apparently the majority did not think this was something the public needed to know since they denied our request to include it and did not allow a vote on the amendment offered to tix this shortcoming. Why do the Democrats want to hide the fact that the CIA cleared the President’s speech'? As another example, the majority report analyzes Secretary Powell’s UN speech, but does not explain that this speech was not only checked and rechecked by the intelligence community to ensure that the speech was well supported by the available intelligence, but also that the first draft of the speech was actually written by the CIA. Notably, the report fails to mention this. In some cases the majority report actually claims that Secretary Powell’s statements in this speech were not substantiated by intelligence, even though the intelligence was in the original draft written by the CIA. We are at a loss to explain how the majority can believe that a speech drafted by the CIA and then checked and rechecked by the intelligence community to ensure that it was strongly supported by the available intelligence could in any way be characterized as unsubstantiated by intelligence at that time. Third, in several cases, the report compares policymaker statements to intelligence published after, sometimes months after, the statements were made. This just does not make sense. For example, Amendment 97 addresses a conclusion which says the "President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UAVs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003." Whether the NIE judgments were reviewed after the President’s speech is irrelevant to whether the statement was substantiated at the time it was made. Furthermore, we note that t.his conclusion also distorts the President’s words because he did not say that Iraq was considering using UAVs to target the United States. Rather, he said: "we are concerned that Iraq was exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States," a comment that was fully consistent with the January 2003 NIE, Nontraditional Threats to the US. Homeland Through 200 7. Obviously the intelligence community had to be concerned that Iraq could use these UAVs to target the homeland or they would not have been included in an NIE about threats to the Homeland at all. We find the refusal to include all relevant intelligence and the inclusion of information published after the delivery of statements to be particularly ironic since in a letter on November 14, 2005, then-Vice Chairman Rockefeller, along with Senators Levin and Feinstein, wrote to the Majority and Minority Leaders explaining that they had "insisted that the Committee compare statements of government officials against all intelligence information prepared for circulation and relevant to the subject matter at issue, provided it was it was available at the time the statement was made." This appeared to be considered a worthwhile task when the burden of collecting all of the available intelligence from the end of the Gulf War through the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom fell to Republican Members and their staff, but when the Democrats took charge, including only some of the intelligence was deemed acceptable. Perhaps forcing the Republican staff to review over 40,000 documents was just a request intended to delay further publication of the Phase II effort and allow the continuation of charges of "obstruction." 108

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  • _ The idea of limiting the intelligence to that which was "available at the time the statement was made" must have seemed like a better idea when the Democrats thought policymakers would not be able to use information published even days after their statements to defend themselves. When it turned out that this could be used to the majority’s own advantage, however, information that was actually available to policymakers apparently became less important. Maybe the majority believes those reading the report will not bother to check the dates. On behalf of the minority, the Vice-Chairman filed 26 amendments in the category of "che1ry picking or excluding relevant information from the report." The Chairman refused to allow consideration of any of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See Appendix A, amendments 13, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 29, 32, 38, 39, 54, 71(a), 81, 82, 97, 106, 108, 130,132, and 133. Unsubstantiated Claims/Distorting Intelligence One of the most hypocritical aspects of the Majority report is that while it purports to cast judgment on how well policymakers characterized intelligence analysis in their public statements, the report itself distorts many policymakers’ statements and the intelligence analysis. This has the unfortunate consequence of undermining the Committee’s credibility in exercising oversight. Several of the mir1ority’s amendments focused on the issue of mischaracterizing policymakers’ statements., One example is Amendment 7 which addresses a portion of the majority report which says that the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of State "stated that the Iraq govemrnent had an active nuclear weapons program." However, even a cursory examination of the statements included for review in the report shows that none of the named individuals "stated" that Iraq had an "active nuclear weapons program," not one. Another amendment, Number 136, addresses a conclusion that claims the President and Vice President made statements that "Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States." Yet, neither the President nor the Vice President said this. The report also distorts the intelligence analysis to help bolster its case against policymakers. For example, Amendment 129 addresses a portion of the report which claims that the October 2002 NIE judged that "Saddam was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks targeting the United States at that time." The NIE never said this. In fact, this NIE judged that Iraq was investigating mapping software for its UAVs, useless outside the United States. The NIE said this "suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." ln addition, Amendments 81-82 address a portion of the report which says that the "intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities" in Iraq. This makes it sound as though the intelligence community did not assess that Iraq had deeply-buried facilities. In reality, the intelligence community had long assessed that Iraq had deeply-buried facilities in Iraq; they noted only that they were unable to specifically identify them, something hardly uncornrnon in intelligence. 109

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  •  A final example, Amendment 58 addresses a conclusion about Iraq’s biological weapons capabilities which states that policymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence information, but concludes that they "did not discuss gaps in Iraq’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the NIE." The NIE’s assessment of Iraq’s biological weapons program was that "all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war." This judgment and the NIE judgment that Iraq had biological weapons were "high confidence" judgments. In a ten-page discussion of Iraq’s biological warfare capabilities only one sentence noted any gaps in knowledge of Iraq’s BW program and this was only regarding "specific information on the types of weapons, agent, or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal." In other words, there were no gaps noted regarding the judgments that Iraq had an offensive biological weapons program or stocks, only uncertainty as to what kinds of agents were in those stocks—hardly a gap. On behalf of the minority, the Vice-Chairman filed 31 amendments in this category- unsubstantiated claims or distorting information. The Chairman reii1sed to allow consideration of any of these amendments at the Committee’s business meeting. (See Appendix A, amendments 7,11,16,17,17(a),19, 21, 22(a), 23, 30, 31, 33, 34, 4·1, 41(a), 58, 68, 70, 71, 83, 85, 86, 90, 96, 99,119,120,121,125,126,127,128,129,131,135,135,136,137, and 140. Reii1sal to Offer Polic akers the Qpp g; to Be Heard We also disagree with the majority’s decision not to request interviews with policymakers whom the report alleges made unsubstantiated statements. These individuals deserve the opportunity to respond to the majority’s allegations and be afforded the opportunity to inform the majority of intelligence information that may be lacking from the report that had been used in the preparation of their statements. We note that in the last Congress the Democrats argued that policymakers needed to be brought before the Committee to be interviewed about their statements even before the ‘ Committee had made a determination about whether their statements were substantiated. Then- Vice Chairman Rockefeller even wrote to the Chairman with a list of people to be interviewed which included Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, among others. In addition, Senators Rockefeller, Levin, and Feinstein wrote to the Senate leadership in November 2005 saying that a task force of Committee Members discussed the importance of interviewing current a.nd former officials within the Departments of State and Defense and the Office of the Vice President, among others. While the letter was, in fact, not an accurate portrayal of the discussions at that meeting (the transcript of the meeting shows that the only individual the task force actually discussed interviewing was Secretary Powell), it nonetheless shows that these Members wanted to conduct such interviews. We agreed that it was important to interview many of these individuals, and others, if the Committee Members found that any of their statements were not substantiated by the intelligence M0

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  • or if they were in another way relevant to the Committee’s inquiry. At the time the Committee voted on the Phase II terms of reference in February 2004, Senator Levin agreed with us, noting "but you’ve got to ask policymakers who made statements relative to weapons of mass destruction what was the basis in intelligence for their statements, if we believe that their statements, reports, or testimony went beyond the intelligence that they were given." Despite this and despite Chairman Rockefeller’s own letter requesting these interviews, when we requested that the interviews be conducted so that policymakers could respond to the drafted conclusions that alleged unsubstantiated statements, the request was ignored, and a motion to conduct these interviews offered at the Committee’s business meeting was denied a hearing by the Chairman. Interestingly, in the additional views attached to a Committee report on "The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress," Chairman Rockefeller and Senators Levin, Feinstein, Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold wrote that the Committee Chairman had declined a request of the Vice Chairman for the Committee to interview White House officials, including speech writers, to fully understand how and why the intelligence assessments were included in major prewar speeches, such as the President’s State of the Union Address and Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN Security Council. Yet, none of these Members wanted to pursue these interviews once they were in charge of the review. The only reason we can imagine why the Democrats would not undertake interviews that they had repeatedly requested in the last Congress, is that the interviews were another tactic at delaying the report and allowing more false charges of "obstruction." Conclusion Although we are troubled by all of the issues we have outlined thus far—that the report released today was a waste of Committee time and resources that should have been spent overseeing the intelligence community, that the report is part of a partisan agenda, that the report cherry picked information and distorted policymakers’ statements and intelligence, and that the majority refused to offer those it is accusing the opportunity to be heard—we are most concerned about the damage that this report will do, and that the whole Phase II effort has done for the past several years, in creating the impression that policymakers should be bound to make policy based on only that which is published in intelligence assessments. This is not only wrong, it is dangerous and it is contrary to everything else this Committee has done since it published its first report on the Iraq intelligence failure. It has the effect of encouraging intelligence community analysts to become policymakers, and encouraging policymakers to adhere strictly to whatever analysts write, when we know that intelligence analysis can be dangerously inaccurate. Have we forgotten how wrong the intelligence judgments were in the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE and how many other intelligence failures we had before that one? Intelligence is not incontestable truth and it is only one factor out of many that a policymaker must consider before making a policy decision. This fallacy has also unnecessarily increased demands on the intelligence community. Requesting NIEs with unclassified key judgments has become sport in Washington as each side hopes the NIE will support its position. Cries of "politicization" usually follow from whichever M1

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  • side is unhappy with the results. This is not only unfair to the intelligence community, it is dangerous in that analysts will attempt to please all sides and their muddied judgments will help no one. We expect intelligence analysts to follow tried and true marching orders for intelligence: tell me what you know, tell me what you don’t know, tell me what you think, and make sure the policymaker understands the difference. Analysts cannot do this if they are constantly wondering if their assessments will be used for politics. The Democratic maj ority, in the partisan way it attempted to suppress intelligence information and skew the historical record, is betting that the public and the media will not take the time to read these and other minority views that expose its hypocrisy. We have written these views to shine a light on it, for if there is any oversight value left in this fruitless endeavor that has consumed so much of the resources of this Committee over a four year period, it would be to expose the true intent of this supposed "oversight." We regret the damaging effect the majority’s report has on this COI1’1II1llI€€’S credibility to oversee our intelligence community and we urge our colleagues to return to the non-partisan underpinnings that the Senate Intelligence Committee was founded upon. CHRISTOPHER S. Bonn SAXBY CHAMBLISS ORRIN G. HATCH RICHARD BURR _ 112

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  • _ Apendix A Filed Amendments 0n Phase II Report: Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence ("Statements") U3

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  • Amendment 6 Page 3, last paragraph — Overlaying this issue of the selective use of intelligence is the more fundamental issue of the selective declassification of intelligence. Intelligence information contained in many of the speeches analyzed in this report had to be declassified before being released publicly. The Executive Branch has the prerogative to classify information to protect national security, and unlike Congress the Executive Branch can declassified information relatively easily. Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an unclassified version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq ’s presumed weapons of mass destruction programs, the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few, if any, of the Intelligence Community ’s assessments on Iraq 's links to terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war conditions, or other relevant matters contained in the statements of senior officials were publicly released before the war. This ability of the Executive Branch to unilaterally declassified and divulge intelligence information at a time, place, and in a manner of its choosing must also be taken into account when evaluating policymakers ’ use of intelligence information. Amendment 6 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment- It is misleading to simply say that the Executive branch makes ‘“unilateral" decisions about what to declassify. Congress can also request declassification and usually gets what it wants unless the Executive branch can establish a sources-and-methods reason not to disclose it. In addition, Section 8 of S. Res. 400 offers a mechanism for the Senate to disclose classified information. The fact that the Senate chose not to do this does not mean that it did not have the opportunity. Amendment 7 Page 6, first full non-bullet paragraph — In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. Amendment 7- Strike the above sentence. Comment- None of the statements listed in the report shows that the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. We believe that if this Committee is going to scrutinize each and every word these policymakers uttered, we should clearly state what they said, not re-interpret what they said. U4

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  • _ Amendment 11 Page 7, first paragraph — They agreed that y' Iraq decided to restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign assistance it could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within five to seven years, and that q' Iraq in some way acquired adequate fissile material ]9·om a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear weapon within one year. Amendment 11 — Strike proper, in some way, and adequate. Comment- The coordinated assessments did not use the terms "proper," "in some way" and “adequate." The Committee should be accurate in describing the assessments; they should be deleted from the report. Amendment 13 Page 7, second paragraph — In April 2001 , the CIA noted that Iraq ’s attempts to purchase high- strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested that a reconstitution e]j’ort might be underway. This judgment was included in several other CIA assessments. In August 2002 the CIA published a paper on Iraqi WIMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WZMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threay, which concluded that these procurement activities indicated that the Iraqi government had restarted its nuclear weapons program. Amendment13 — Insert after the above sentence A December 2001 CIA Senior Executive Memorandum said that rocurement activities "show Ira is g pg to `um -start a clandestine uranium emichment ro am to roduce the fissile material for a wea on otentiall y late this decade assurnin it roduces the necess com onents indi enousl ." In J anu 2002 the CIA ublished an assessment which said "Procurement activities detected in the ast ear are consistent with Ira attem tin to 'um -start a clandestine uranium enrichment ro am to roduce the fissile material needed to make a nuclear wea on otentiall y late this decade. Ira retains a si `f1cant number of nuclear ro am scientists ro am documentation and robabl the manufacturin infrastructure to su ort a nuclear wea ons ro a1n." 1 Comment — We requested that several relevant reports below be added to this section, but they were added only to the footnote. We would at least like the December 2001 report, which seems to be the most important and relevant to policymaker’s statements in questions, added to the text. • A July 2001 CIA assessment, Iraq: New Effort to Get Centriiiige-Related Tubes, had the same assessment as the April 2001 paper already cited. • An October 2001 Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) discussed Iraq’s "nuclear- related procurement efforts," including the aluminum tubes and uranium from Ni er. • In a November 2001 Senior Executive Memorandum (SEM) the CIA wrote that k _ reporting indicate Baghdad still has a vast procurement network to seek materials and equipment that can be used in a centrifuge program, including the recent effort to get aluminum tubes for a Zippe-type centrifuge, but it is unclear if Iraq has embarked on an extensive nuclear weapons effort." M5

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  • _ • Also in November 2001 a CIA SEIB titled "lraq: Seeking to Rebuild Enrichment Capability" discussed Iraq’s procurement of aluminum tubes. • A December 2001 SEM said "Procurement activities detected within the past year show Iraq is trying to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the fissile material for a weapon, potentially by late this decade, assuming it produces the necessary components indigenously." • In January 2002 the CIA wrote in a Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR) that "Procurement activities detected in the past year are consistent with Iraq attempting to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment program to produce the tissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon, potentially by late this decade. Iraq retains a significant nrunber of nuclear program scientists, program documentation, and probably the manufacturing infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons pro gram." • In March 2002 a CIA SPWR said "We assess that Iraq currently may be trying to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program. Since intrusive inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has increased efforts to buy critical dual-use items that could support a gas centrifuge program, including aluminum tubes suitable for rotors, magnets, machine tools, essential chemicals and centrifuge cascade related equipment." Amendment 16 Page 7, last partial paragraph — The Department 0f Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CL4 ’s c0nclusi0ns regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was more likely that the tubes were intended for a dyferent use, such as a c0nventi0nal r0cket program. Based 0n 0ther evidence, including Saddam ’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and p0ssible attempts t0 pr0cure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Iraq might be attempting t0 reconstitute a nuclear weap0ns pr0gram, but suggested that the evidence was n0t conclusive. Amendment 16 — Strike the above paragraph and insert In a Jul 2002 p p the De artment of Ener DOE said "Multi le-source r ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smoking gun, continued vi 'lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re 'uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." Comment- We do not believe that an assessment which solely discusses DOE’s judgment about the end-use for the alumintun tubes is relevant in this section because the assessment did not discuss nuclear reconstitution at all. The statements under review from the Vice President make no mention of aluminun tubes. The report should say what DOE’s assessment was of reconstitution, which was: "Multiple-source reporting suggests that Saddam Hussein is seeking to reconstitute Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Although the reporting produces no "smoking gun," continued vigilance is required regarding Iraq’s attempts to rejuvenate its nuclear weapons program." H6

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  • _ Amendment 17 Page 8, first full paragraph — The Department of State ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes. This view was included in congressional testimony in September 2002, but State/INR did not publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside the State Department until afler publication of the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 17 — strike the above paragraph and insert INR did not ublish y assessments outlinin their views on reconstitution of Ira ’s nuclear ro am rior to the Vice President’s statement. Comment -— The comment that INR "disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes" has no citation. If the intent is to cite this to the Committee’s first report, the attribution is mischaracterizing the comments in that report. The Committee’s report was describing what INR analysts told the staff after the fact about their views at the time, which should not be construed to mean those views were articulated to policymakers. The report should cite a document or report in which INR "disagreed," otherwise this discussion should be deleted. In addition, if testimony to Congress is going to be offered in lieu of an assessment from INR, the report should include comments attributed to the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) at the same hearing. Testimony at the September 17, 2002 hearing was that "State/INR and DOE are still examining the latest specifications but currently believe that the tubes more likely are intended for alternative conventional weapons uses, such as the multiple rocket launcher program. The NGIC — the U.S. experts on foreign ground force weapons systems — notes, however, that Iraq’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings." Finally, we do not understand why testimony given in mid- September is being used in a section which analyzes the Vice President’s speech from August. This report is supposed to determine whether po1icymakers’ statements were substantiated by intelligence. How can we expect policymakers to be aware of a view that wasn’t published or briefed to them until after they made their statement? Mi

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  • _ Amendment 17 a _ Page 8, second full paragraph — Several of these intelligence agencies also made reference to assessments by the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC judged that "Iraq ’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings. " A later memo ]9·om State/INR said that "the L4EA and the - pertinent nuclear-technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq ’s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets. " q Amendment l7(a) - strike A later memo ]$·om State/INR said that "the L4EA and the pertinent nuclear-technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq 's nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings...DOE and DoD ’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets. " Corn1nent— We see that the Majority added this information to the report after the amendment filing deadline. We asked that the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) information be included, but we did not request and did not consent to including the State/INR paper for two reasons: first, because it was published more than two months after the Vice President’s speech; and second, because the report misquotes the INR document. The INR report did not say that DoD’s NGIC concurred with the assessment that the aluminum tubes were consistent with rocket casings. This is a gross distortion of the INR assessments and the position of NGIC. If this text is included, it will make the Committee look foolish since our own 2004 report explained that NGIC was one of the main proponents of the argument that the tubes were inconsistent with rocket casings. The INR report said that that NGIC agreed only with the assessment that high strength is used for tactical rockets by a number of countries; although NGIC said in the NIE that because of the unsuitability of the wall thickness and weight of the Iraqi aluminum tubes that they were "unIikely to be intended for rocket motor cases. The report, as drafted, clearly misquotes the INR paper. This should be deleted. H8

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  • Amendment 18 Page 8, third full paragraph — According t0 a DL4 report, the intelligence community continued to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi government to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed much faster y' adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign source, though an earlier CL4 assessment noted that “we have not detected a dedicated Iraqi ejjfort to obtain fissile material abroad. " Amendment 18 — Strike the above paragraph. Comment/Suggestion — This is a May 2002 DLA report referring to an intelligence community judgment which had not been updated since 2000. At the time of the Vice President’s speech, DLA assessed that Iraq could have a weapon as soon as 2006, and INR had no judgment on this since the 2000 ICA. This sentence should be changed to accurately reflect the judgments of each agency. Amendment 19 Page 8, last paragraph — In the President ’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction, and indicated that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Amendment 19 — Strike the paragraph above. Con1ment— None of the statements in the report taken from the President’s speech suggest that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. The President commented that Iraq employed capable nuclear scientists, retained physical infrastructure needed to build a weapon, and made attempts to buy aluminum tubes. As noted in the report, several intelligence community assessments mentioned these things without concluding that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. _ H9

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  • Amendment 20 Page 9, 'rirst full paragraph - Though the intelligence community as a whole had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program was underway, some (though not all intelligence agencies believed that Iraq ’s attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with supporting evidence such as Saddam ’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact being reconstituted. Amendment 20 — strike (though not alb and insert and the end of the paragraph All intelligence a encies assessed that the aluminum tubes could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons but DOE and State INR assessed that the tubes were more likely intended for a conventional weapons ro am. Comment — Again, the President did not say that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program or had an ongoing nuclear program in this speech. He mentioned the acquisition of aluminum tubes "used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.” All agencies, including DOE and State/INR assessed that these tubes could be used for this purpose and Saddam’s meeting with nuclear science personnel were discussed in numerous intelligence community papers from CIA, DIA, and DOE. A discussion of whether or not agencies judged that these efforts were part of a reconstituted nuclear program is irrelevant here because the President did not say they were part of a reconstituted nuclear program. Also, "some" always means "not all." This is redundant. Amendment 21 Page 9, second paragraph — Intelligence community analysts generally believed that the Iraqi government ’s failure to provide certain evidence and documents regarding its pre-] 99] nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi government was attempting to conceal this information. However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Guy War nuclear weapons program. Amendment 2l— strike However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Gab' War nuclear weapons program. Comment- Again, the last sentence is irrelevant because the President did not cite Iraq’s concealment of documents as evidence of a reconstituted, post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program. His comments about withholding information refer to the pre-Gulf War program. 120

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  • _ Amendment 22 Page 9, third full paragraph —— Numerous intelligence assessments made reference to open source information showing that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (MEC). Amendment 22 — Strike made reference to open source information showing ar1d insert showed Comment - The majority report changed this sentence from saying "ir1telligence reporting" to "open source infor1nation." The report should still say "intelligence" because numerous intelligence assessments cited the meetings between Saddam ar1d the IAEC personnel and much of the information was from intelligence reporting vice open source reporting. This information was provided to the Majority as requested and still it was not included in the report. • In January 2002, a DIA Executive Highlight (EH) said ". .. the increased frequency of operations at former and suspect nuclear facilities is highly suspect. In a possibly related incident, Saddam Husayn met with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission on 10 January and praised its efforts. Baghdad probably will continue trying to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. Although no firm evidence exists that reconstitution has begun, Iraq had continued to obtain dual-use equipment ar1d to maintain its scientific cadre." • In January 2002, ar1other DIA assessment said, "Persistent procurement efforts to acquire approximately 60,000 aluminum alloy tubes, coupled with recent statements by Saddam to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, suggest an intent to reconstitute the nuclear program." • In September 2002, a DIA Key WMD Operational Support study on Iraq said "Iraq likely revitalized its nuclear weapons program shortly after the end of UNSCOM inspections ended in December 1998. There is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort, but we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items, the assignment of key personnel to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction at nuclear facilities, ar1d Saddarn’s interactions with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Iraq revitalized its nuclear weapon program after 1998." • CIA SPWR 9/11/2002 — "Saddarn’s exhortations to his nuclear Mujahidin, periodically reported in the Iraqi press since 1998, are the most compellir1g indicator that his nuclear weapons work resumed in 1998, when inspectors were ordered out of Iraq." • DIA assessment September 2002, "The renewed regular contact between Saddam ar1d the IAEC, as well as the enhanced security, suggests the IAEC is again the focal point of Saddarn’s nuclear prograrn." • July 22, 2002, DOE assessment "Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway‘?" said, "Aecording to Iraqi press reports, Saddam recently met with personnel from the IAEC. He reportedly commended the staff for their efforts ‘to make science serve the programs of comprehensive development, which are under way in Iraq despite the circumstances of the wicked embargo.’ The staff was referred to in the press report as mujahidin . . . These meetings indicate that Saddam continues to place a high priority on a potential nuclear option for his strategic goals." 121

 

  • Amendment 22 ) Page 9, fourth full paragraph —At the time of the President ’s address t0 the General Assembly, the intelligence community had not changed its judgment that it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to seven years ’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four), and that Iraq could build a nuclear weapon within one year q' it in some way acquired an adequate amount of fissile material from a foreign source. Amendment 22(a) — strike it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (five to seven years ’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four), and that Comment- The beginning of this sentence is not related to t.he President’s comments. He said what Iraq could do should it "acquire" Hssile material. How long it would take Iraq to indigenously produce fissile material is irrelevant. In addition, since t.he 2000 ICA did not say "in some way" it should be deleted. Amendment 23 Page l0, first paragraph - Additionally, he said that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that 'facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. Amendment 23 — Strike there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that Comment- None of the statements cited in t.he report hom the Cincinnati speech quote t.he President saying that "there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon." The report should simply say what the President said. _ 122
 
IIa  110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed   
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go to:news, CIA Houston station chief gunned down by HPD.... connected to Port of Houston security, Israel, Russia mob

 

Link Deborah Jeane Palfrey CIA, Foggo, Wilkes,  Hookergate and Gov, Bob Ehrlich ... and Cheney, 911, Iran Attack?

 

 

Mukasey, Schumer, Feinstein, Conflict of Interest 

 

Amendment 26 Page l0, third paragraph — State/INR dissentedfrom the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up t0 a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Amendment 26 — strike State/INR dissentedj$·om the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did “not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution " of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. and insert State/INR dissented from the ma 'ori view and stated in the NIE ke 'ud ents that "the activities we have detected do not however add p to a com ellin case that Ira is currentl ursuin what INR would consider to be an inte ated and com rehensive a roach to a uire nuclear wea ons." In the main text of the NIE INR assessed that the available evidence did "not add p to a com ellin case for reconstitution" of an Ira i nuclear wea ons ro am. In the President’s summ of the NIE INR offered another version of its 'ud ent statin that "INR `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution effort." Comment - Because this section of the report is being used to consider whether the President’s statements were substantiated by intelligence, we believe it is appropriate to include the President’s summary of the NIE, a document specifically prepared for and briefed to the President. The President’s summary of the NIE said, "Most agencies judge that Iraq is reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. INR judges that the evidence indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution effort." In addition, the key judgments of the NIE said, "The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons." All of these are slightly different and should be included to show what was available to the President. Amendment 28 Page l0, fourth paragraph — Construction at sites known to have been part of Iraq ’s pre—GuU War nuclear weapons program was mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specyically in the NIE). Amendment 28 — strike (though not specyically in the NIE). and insert includin ir1 the NIE. Comment — The comment in the report is incorrect. Construction activity at Tuwaitha, a facility associated with Iraq’s pre Gulf war nuclear program was discussed in the 2002 NIE on page 24. This should be noted in the report. 123

Amendment 29 Page 10, last paragraph — State/INR ’s alternative views, which were incorporated in the NIE, said that State/INR accepted “the view of technical experts at the Department of Energy " who concluded that the aluminum tubes were ’poorly suited " for a nuclear weapons program. The alternative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other dual-use procurement ejjzorts were related to a nuclear program, and went on to say that “the information we have on Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent ejjzort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Amendment 29 — At the end of the paragraph insert ln the President’s summ of the NIE NR said it `ud es that the evidence indicates at most a limited Ira i nuclear reconstitution eHort." Comment - Again, we believe that if the Committee is going to compare intelligence to statements made by the President, it should include the President’s summary of the NIE. _ 124

_ Amendment 30 Page II, first paragraph - The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a “much less likebr scenario " in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that y' Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be "within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic ejfort to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. Amendment 30 - strike The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a "much less likely scenario" in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be “within several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a “systematic efort to acquire foreign fissile materials j$·om Russia or] other sources. " State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program and insert The NIE ke `ud ents said "if Ba dad a uires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear wea on within several months to a ear." The main text of the NIE added "althou we have seen onl a few Ira i attem ts to a uire material from abroad those efforts do not seem to be p of s sternatic effort to a uire forei Hssile materials from Russia or other sources." State/INR said that it could not redict when Ira gl; a uire a nuclear wea on since it lacked ersuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear ro am. Comment - The paragraph as drafted distorts the NIE’s key judgments which actually listed the assessment that Iraq could build a weapon in one year as the first bullet point. The characterization in the report makes it sound like an afterthought or as if it was the last and, therefore, most minor issue the NIE considered, which it was not. Also, how long it would take Iraq to indigenously develop Hssile material was irrelevant to what the President was talking about. He specihcally said he was discussing how long it would take Iraq to build a weapon if it "acquired" fissile material. Also, it should be clear that the detail about not detecting a systematic effort was from the main body of the NIE, not the key judgments. 125

Amendment 31 Page 11, second paragraph — In the President ’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons even while weapons inspectors were in Iraq. He also said that the Iraqi regime had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear program, and that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought signqicant quantities of uranium ]$·om Africa. " While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had initialhw attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following the imposition of post-Guy' War sanctions, most agencies believed that the MEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq ’s nuclear in]$·astructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors le]? the country. Amendment 31 — insert after the first paragraph above He noted that Saddam "has not credibl ex lained these activities." Strike the second paragraph and insert The intelli ence communi assessed that Ira had initiall attem ted to continue its nuclear wea ons ro a.m followin the im osition of ost—Gu1f War sanctions. In Se tember 2002 the DCI submitted testimon to Con ess that "revelations after the Gulf war starkl demonstrated the extent of | Ira ’s denial . . . The IAEA did not reco `ze on oin uranium emichment activities" at two sites ins ected y the IAEA. Most a encies believed that the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destro ` or neutralizin Ira ’s nuclear infrastructure in the mid—1990s. Comment- None of the above discussion from the report is relevant to what the President said. He said that Iraq had pursued a nuclear weapons program while inspectors were in Iraq. This statement is substantiated by intelligence. Director Tenet’s submitted testimony to the SSCI and SASC from September 2002 notes that, "Revelations afier the Gulf war starkly demonstrated the extent of that denial. Based on CIA briefings about two suspect nuclear sites, the IAEA inspected Tuwaitha and Tarmiyah in rnid-May 1991. The IAEA did not recognize on oin uranium enrichment activities using Electromagnetic Isotope Separation at these sites, as neither it nor the US intelligence community anticipated such work was underwa ." This testimony makes it clear that the intelligence community did say that Iraq’s nuclear progra.m continued while inspectors were in Iraq. Current views of reconstitution and views of whether the IAEA and UNSCOM stopped those activities are irrelevant to the analysis. Finally, there is no citation for these claims at all. 126

_ Amendment 32 Page ll, fourth paragraph — The October 2002 NYE contained an annex on the high-strength aluminum tubes. Although all the intelligence agencies agreed that the aluminum tubes were a dual—use technology, DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikely that the tubes were being used for nuclear weapons-related purposes. Other agencies concurred with the majority view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the primary evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the concurring nor dissenting agencies changed their view between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq. Amendment 32 — strike the above paragraph and insert - Ir1 the October 2002 NIE all intelli ence a encies a eed that the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear wea ons and that Ira was r uired to declare the im orts and sub ` ect them to UN/IAEA monitorin but DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikel that the tubes were intended to be used for nuclear wea ons-related u oses. On December 17, 2002 CIA re ared an anal sis of Ira ’s wea ons declaration which noted that it "fails to acknowled e or ex lain rocurement of gl; s ecihcation aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in as centrifu e uranium enrichment effort" and "fails to acknowled e efforts to rocure uranium from Ni er as noted in the UK dossier." Comment- The President was discussing the fact that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes it was prohibited from importing and that it had not credibly explained these activities. He did not say these items were part of a reconstituted nuclear program, only that Iraq had not credibly explained why it was importing such materials. Intelligence noting that all agencies assessed the aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear weapons and were prohibited items is more relevant to the statement in question. 127

Amendments 33 and 34 Page ll, last paragraph — An unclassyied British white paper from September 2002 had assessed that Iraq had sought large quantities of natural (non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed by a statement in the NIE, which said “Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. " This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. State/INR ’s alternative views said that “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR ’s assessment, highly dubious. " Amendment 33 — strike This was echoed by a statement and insert This assessment was also included Amendment 34 - strike This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. Comment- We suggest not using the word “echoed" which makes it sound like the intelligence community took the idea from the British White Paper, which was not the case. In addition we do not think the characterization of "key evidence" is accurate (we do not think the NIE used the term evidence) and the President did not say it was key evidence of reconstitution so this sentence is irrelevant. 128

_ Amendment 38 Page 13, last paragraph — On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor said that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq "are only realbv suited for nuclear weapons programs Although both the CIA and DIA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited " for centry'uges, and that other explanations were “inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. Amendment 38 — strike Although both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were “best suited "for centry'uges, and that other explanations were "inconsistent with the total body of intelligence the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE ’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets. and insert Both the CIA and DLA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear wea ons ro am with the CIA notin that the tubes were "best suited” for centrifu es and that other ex lanations were "inconsistent with the total bod of intelli ence.” ln A ril 2001 CIA ublished a a er which said "Ira is gyg ng to urchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment ro am." In Au st 2002 CIA ublished another a er which said "A1thou we have considered alternative ex lanations for the tubes — such as their use in multi le rocket launchers Q ) — CIA concurs with ound forces wea ons ex erts in the lntelli ence Communit that such an ex lanation is inconsistent with the overall bod of intelli ence on the sub 'ect." More than a ear earlier the DOE ublished an assessment that said an a lication other than centrifu e use was "more likel ’ but noted that "re ardless of end use the delive of aluminum tubes with the r orted s eciiications to Ira would be rohibited” items under the Nuclear Su liers Grou and UN Securi Council Resolutions. Comment- We believe the report as drafted excludes relevant information which was far more likely to have been provided to Secretary Rice than a DOE assessment published a year earlier. These should be included andlDOE’s judgments should be put in its own words, rather than those of the report authors. DOE used the words "more likely" not ‘“unlikely. • CIA, SEIB 01-083CHX April 10, 2001, "Iraq is trying to purchase items that have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program.” • CIA, August 2002, "A1though we have considered alternative explanations for the tubes — such as their use in multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) — CIA concurs with ground forces weapons experts in the Intelligence Community that such an explanation is inconsistent with the overall body of intelligence on the subj ect." _ 129

_ Amendment 39 Page 14, second non-bullet paragraph — - Intelligence obtained after the Guy War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. Amendment 39 — strike - Intelligence obtained after the Guhf War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both apparently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated yield of less than _ and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of- could not be delivered by missile. and insert 1 Numerous intelli ence assessment noted that Ira had develo ed two desi s rior to the Gulf War. Accordin to a 1999 IC nuclear assessment "nuclear desi efforts from 1988 throu mid-1990 were focused rimaril on conce ts and in 1990 Ira be an to ex lore more advanced desi s to ermit smaller size and hi er g eld." Comment- - The Secretary’s comments were made prior to the publication of the NIE, so the citation of the NIE here is irrelevant. The Committee should include intelligence assessments which were published before the statement in question such as the following: • "By 1991, Iraq had demonstrated sufficient calculational capability and an understanding of high-explosive systems to design devices with yields of as much as - for large diameter weapons and as much as _ for more advanced designs." PWR031202- 12 • 1999 JAEIC assessment- "According to all available information, nuclear desi efforts from 1988 through mid-1990 were focused primarily on - concepts and, in 1990, Iraq began to explore more advanced designs to permit smaller size and higher yield." • 1999 DIA assessment, DoD Futures Intelli ence Pro am, "It reviousl erformed field • March 14, 2002 SPWR, Iraq: Nuclear Weapon Design Program PubNo.· SPWR031402- 02, According to Iraqi-supplied documents, seized Ir i documents, and re ortin from Iraqi defectors, Iraq by early 1991 had researched desi and had conducted substantial work on an advanced esign 130

Amendments 41 and 41 a Page 14, last paragraph — In September 2002 the Vice President stated that there was “irrefutable evidence " that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. As noted, several intelligence agencies assessed that reconstitution was underway, but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Amendment 41 — strike but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive. and insert . In an assessment in Au st 2002 the DOE said multi le-source re ortin su ests that Saddam Hussein is seekin to reconstitute Ira ’s nuclear wea ons ro am. Althou the re ortin roduces no "smokin n " continued vi `lance is re uired re ardin Ira ’s attem ts to re `uvenate its nuclear wea ons ro am." At hearin before the SSCI in S tember 2002 however the DCI testified that "Ira ’s a essive ursuit of gh stren aluminum tubes rovides com ellin evidence that Saddam is attem tin to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Ba dad’s nuclear wea ons ro am." No dissentin o inion re ardin reconstitution was included in this testimon and the DOE witness testified that his a enc had no disa eement with testimon resented about Ira reconstitutin its nuclear ro am. Amendment 4-1(a) — strike (State/INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that poinU. Comment — Testimony from the DCI on September 17, 2002 to the SSCI and the SASC says "Iraq’s aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes provides compelling evidence that Saddam is attempting to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program? There are no dissenting views mentioned on reconstitution during this testimony at all. The DOE never used the words "less conc1usive." We also note that State/INR could not possibly convey an agreement with DOE to policymakers if it did not publish a judgment. In addition, this information was added to the report after the majority imposed amendment filing deadline, without the permission of the minority, which is inappropriate. 131

Amendment 42 Page 15 - Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community. Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department ’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program. Amendment 42 — strike the conclusion as drafted and insert All olic aker statements reviewed in this section were substantiated y the available intelli ence. Comment- It is impossible for us to properly analyze the claims in this conclusion without knowing which specific statements the report is referencing. Also, it is incorrect to say that "others" disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence of a reconstituted nuclear program. At most, only one agency expressed any doubt about the reconstitution judgment and not in any document published outside its own agency prior to publication of the NIE. Although not stated definitely we believe that the statements this conclusion is referencing were made prior to the ‘ publication of the NIE, so the inclusion of INR’s dissent referenced in the NIE is irrelevant and unfair to those speakers. Additionally, it is misleading to discuss DOE’s dissent on the aluminum tubes but not include the fact that DOE agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Amendment 43 Page 16, Postwar Findings — entire section. Amendment 43 —- strike the postwar findings section Comment - None of the postwar Endings has citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 132

Amendment 54 Page 26, third paragraph - The DIA issued a report in February 2003, Iraq.· Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, ‘palm and date tree groves ..., " but this report was issued ajier Secretary Powell ’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There was operational intelligence trajjzic on this issue prior to the Secretary ’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical assessments. Amendment 54 — Strike the above paragraph and insert The CIA rovided an intelli ence re ort for use in Secret Powell’s UN s eech which said that an lra i missile bri ade commander su ervised the dis ersal of his bri ade’s al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in order to hide them from UN ins ectors. The re ort said that some of the missiles had warheads containin an ‘“unknown biolo ` cal a ent’ and that the missiles were hidden in "lar e alm oves." Comment- The document which we asked the drafters to incorporate is not "operationa1 intelligence traf’ric" as stated in the report. lt is a TD (telegraphic dissemination), or intelligence report, and it was provided to the Committee by the CIA when the Committee asked specifically what information it provided to Secretary Powell for use in this speech. The fact that the Committee is unaware of "analytical assessments" is irrelevant, because the Committee agreed to use "intelligence" to compare to statements, not just "ana1ytic assessments." This report was included in the Committee’s Erst Iraq report on page 243 and should be included in this report as well. 133

_ Amendment 58 Page 28, BW Conclusions — Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments from the late J 990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was activebi producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Amendment 58 — Strike Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments lef open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq ’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Comments — We do not think that the report has given any examples of intelligence assessments prior to the 2002 NIE which "left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them" except the 2000 ICA, which was published more than two years before the policymakers’ statements were made and before any of them entered office. In addition, we do not believe there were any intelligence gaps articulated in the October 2002 NIE about Iraq’s BW program, with the possible exception of a lack of understanding of the specifics about the types of weapons and biological agents that analysts stated were in the possession of the Iraqi government. If the report drafters think there are such gaps they should be described in the report. Amendment 59 Page 28, Postwar Intelligence, entire section Amendment 59(a) — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. 134

_ Amendment 68 ‘ Page 37-38, Conclusions — Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq ’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community ’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confirm that production was ongoing. Amendment 68 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 4: Statements y senior olic akers re ardin Ira ’s chemical wea ons roduction ca abili and activities were all substantiated y intelli ence information. - Comment- We dispute several of the contentions in this conclusion. The intelligence community assessed both before and alter the NIE that Iraq had a chemical weapons production capability, not just that Saddam wanted one. (See the CIA SEM Dec 2001 — "Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual- use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plants .... ") Most of the assessments which judged that actual production was ongoing were contemporaneous with the NIE or slightly prior (see Tenet’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee and SSCI below and the unclassified White Paper), but not all of them. More importantly, prior to the production of the NIE, no policymakers said that production was ongoing. If the report concludes that such statement is not substantiated, the report should clearly identify it so that it can be analyzed. • We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent . . . Moreover, Iraq is rebuilding former chemical weapons facilities, developing plants, and trying to procure chemical warfare-related items covertly . . . Based on these construction and procurement activities, we assess that Iraq has a covert chemical wea ons roduction ca abili embedded in its civilian indus . Tenet testimony before SASC and SSCI September 16, 2002. • The main production building at Ira ’s Fallujah III chemical plant appears to have resumed operation, according to h . . . The Intelligence Community suspects this site supports production of CW precursors as well as the biological warfare agent ricin, extracted from castor oil beans. INR, Iraq: Suspect CB WProduction Facility Active, November 5, 200]. _ 135

Amendment 69 Page 38, Postwar Findings section Amendment 69 — Strike the postwar findings section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policy1nakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to mislead readers who might think statements are unsubstantiated if they turned out to be wrong. Amendment 70 _ Page 40, second f11ll paragraph, (Scope Note) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass a’estruction' (or ‘WIMDQ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Amendment 70 - Strike the scope note paragraph and insert Accordin to the October 2002 Ira WMD 'White Pa er Ira ’s biolo ` cal chemical ballistic missile and nuclear wea ons ro arns were collectivel referred to as wea ons of mass destruction { WMQ) Comment! Suggestion — We disagree that the intelligence community’s use of the term "WMD" excluded ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery vehicles. The Iraq WMD White Paper (or unclassified NIE) specifically states, "The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn’s biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WIv D)." The 2002 classified NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs included four categories including delivery systems. The report’s definition of what is included in the term WMD is incorrect and should include delivery systems. 'While this report’s inclusion of the DOD’s definition of WMD is interesting, this report is examining intelligence community judgments, not DOD’s. What matters is what the intelligence community included in defining WMD in 2002 which, the above reference to the NIE and White Papers makes clear, included delivery systems. _ 136

_ Amendment 71 and 71 a Page 40, last full paragraph - In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction, " and that “there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of prolq’eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Amendments 71 — Strike He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing “the imminence of proly'eration of weapons of mass destruction " with regard to Iraq as evidence that preemptive action was necessary. Amendment 71(a) - Strike As noted the term 'weapons of mass destruction ’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. Comments — We have several comments about these paragraphs: (1) Again, as stated above and as defined by the IC, the term WMD also includes delivery systems; (2) It seems that the report is actually trying to show that the Vice President misrepresented the intelligence because he used the collective term WMD rather than specifically stating biological, chemical weapons and the means to deliver those weapons. The Vice President clearly said in the speech that Iraq was working on developing nuclear weapons—which shows there was no effort to include nuclear weapons among the WMD he said Iraq had; and (3) The use of a collective term does not indicate that all elements of that term must exist for the term to be true and the intelligence community regularly uses the term WMD to refer to some WMD elements. For example: • Tenet’s Threat Hearing testimony said: "Intelligence reporting on Saddam’s intentions to use WMD is clear and consistent .... " • CIA/NESA PC briefing book points stated that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement." • Tenet testimony for SASC/ S SCI "Thus, experience shows that his regime will maintain weapons of mass destruction for use, not just deterrence" and "Saddam will never end his pursuit and possession of weapons of mass destruction" and Saddam "rnay decided that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance . . . ." • August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a strategic deterrent .... " 137

Amendments 81-82 - Page 48, third non-bullet paragraph - The Iraqi regime was known to have constructed underground facilities for a variety of purposes, but the intelligence community was not aware of any large, deeply-buried facilities. US intelligence analysts suspected that the regime might be using underground facilities to conceal weapons activities, and there was some unconfirmed reporting that suggested this, but no intelligence agency claimed to know the location of any active underground WIMD facilities, and none expressed certainty that such facilities existed. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2001 that “elements of the regime ’s weapons of mass destruction (WYMD) and ballistic missile rograms probably are located in under round facilities but iieieii iiiiii _ nor intelligence sources have confirmed any WMD- or ballistic missile related underground facilities. " An August 2002 DL4 report noted that “Iraq has reportedly rebuilt its full ojfensive B W program in well-concealed, underground, mobile or dyficult-to- locate facilities " but went on to state that “no biological weapons (BW)—related underground facilities are currently confirmed to be in use in Iraq Amendment 81-82 -— Strike the above paragraph and insert - The intelli ence communi had lon assessed that the Ira i re ` e had hardened or under ound WMD stora e facilities and W"MD facilities dis ised as civilian installations both to im ede detection y ins ectors and intelli ence services and to rotect facilities from air attack. Intelli ence a encies assessed that Ira had dee l buried under ound facilities but had not identiied y of these facilities.2O4 The Defense Intelli ence A enc assessed in 2001 that "elements of the re `me’s wea ons of mass destruction ( W MQ) and ballistic missile ro ams robabl are located in under ound facilities " notin that "numerous re orts before and after DESERT SHIELD/ STORM mentioned the existence of nuclear biolo ` cal chemical and ballistic missile roduction and stora e sites that were shallow buried UGFs or in a few instances even de under ound facilities. The assessment also noted that i

have confirmed y WMD- or ballistic missile related under ound facilities." An Au st 2002 DIA re ort also discussed r orts of shallow and de l buried biolo `cal warfare facilities. The r ort said that "des ite these man credible re orts and no functionin biolo `cal wea ons B - related under ound facilities are currentl confirmed to be in use in Ira ".2°5 Comment- Despite fixes made to this paragraph based on our earlier comments, as draiied it still is far more dismissive of the intelligence community’s assessments of underground facilities than the assessments themselves were. The reports should use the language used in the analytic papers. ’°‘N1c, Denial and Deception Nm, 1998 2°5 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December l4, 2001; DIA, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook, August 2002. iii

Amendment 83 Page 48, last paragraph — page 49, Erst paragraph - In November 2002, the National Intelligence Council noted in an assessment prepared in response to a request from the Secretary of Deknse, that "all the military and regime-associated UGFs underground facilities] we have identyied thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried Amendment 83 — strike the above paragraph Comment- The November 2002 NIE was published two months after the Secretary spoke and is therefore irrelevant to what he said. In addition, only select information was taken from this NIE which gives a distorted picture of what the NIE said. The following relevant information was excluded: • "To date, the Community has located over 490 Iraqi operational UGFS associated with the military or the regime. • "We assess that Iraq has some large, deeply buried UGFS, but, because of the Iraqi denial and deception (D&D) program, we have not been able to locate any of these. • "All the military and regime-associated UGFs underground facilities] we have identified thus far are vulnerable to conventional, precision-guided, penetrating munitions because they are not deeply buried. • "The number of UGFs identified and the suspected number of UGFs still tmlocated pose problems for effective operations of any UN inspection regime."2O6 206 National Intelligence Council, Implications of Iraqi Underground Facilities for US National Security, November 2002. 139

_ Amendment 85 Page 49-50, conclusions - Conclusion 5: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding Iraq ’s possession of weapons of mass destr·uction were generally substantiated by intelligence information, though many statements made regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002 reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves. Many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt that the Iraqi government possessed or was producing weapons of mass destruction. While the intelligence community assessed at this time that the Iraqi regime possessed some chemical and biological munitions, most reports produced prior to fall 2002 cited intelligence gaps regarding production and expressed room for doubt about whether production was ongoing. Prior to late 2002, the intelligence community did not collectively assess with any certainty that Iraq was actively producing any weapons of mass destruction. Amendment 85 — strike generally and strike everything after information Comment - We disagree with the use of the term "generally," because all of the statements were substantiated by the intelligence. Furthermore, the lack of identifying information about exactly which policymakers’ statements were viewed by the authors as reflecting a higher degree of certainty than the intelligence judgments makes it impossible for us to challenge the assertion (which we believe we could if the specific statements were identified). The conclusion is incorrect in asserting that there were "many statements regarding ongoing production prior to late 2002." This is simply false. None of the statements from this time period mentioned ongoing production at all. It is also false to state that "many senior policymaker statements in early and mid-2002 claimed that there was no doubt" about Iraq’s possession of VVIVID. Only one policymaker used the term "no doubt" during this time period and it was in August 2002, not early 2002. This type of careless review certainly will be noticed by the readers of the report and harms the credibility of the Committee. We disagree with the comment that prior to 2002 the intelligence community "expressed room for doubt" about whether Iraq possessed chemical and biological munitions and believe, even if it were true, assessments prior to 2002 are irrelevant to what policymakers said in late 2002. We also disagree with including the comment that the intelligence community did not "collectively" assess that Iraq was actively producing any WMD. Whether the intelligence community had a "collective" judgment is irrelevant. The task of this report is not to look at only collective judgments; it is to examine available intelligence. 140

Amendment 86 Page 50, conclusions - Conclusion 6: The Secretary of Defense ’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WYWD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes was not substantiated by available intelligence information. While many intelligence analysts suspected that the Iraqi government might be using underground facilities to conceal WMD activities, no active underground WZMD facilities had been positively identyfied. Furthermore, none of the underground government facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be sa]% from conventional airstrikes. Amendment 86 — Strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 6: The Secreta of Defense’s statement that Ira i WMD facilities were not all vulnerable to attack from the air was substantiated y available intelli ence information. Comment — First, the Secretary did not say "conventional" airstrikes, he said that sites "were not all vulnerable to attack from the air." No intelligence assessments prior to the Secretary’s statement said that "none of the underground WMD facilities that had been identified were buried deeply enough to be safe from conventional airstrikes." Furthermore, the Secretary was not only talking about facilities that were vulnerable due to being deeply buried. He also discussed facilities that were believed to have been located near mosques, schools, and hospitals which made them "not vuh1erable" to airstrikes unless we were willing to possibly strike those civilian facilities. Amendment 87 i Page 50, postwar findings Amendment 87 — strike this section. Comment - We do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substar1tiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is unnecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsub star1tiated if they turned out to be wrong. 141

Amendment 90 Page 54, third paragraph - Intelligence assessments regarding UA Vs shy‘ted ajter the October 2002 NIE. A subsequent NIE, Nontraditional Threats t0 the US Homeland Through 2007, published in January 2003, did not describe Iraq ’s UA V program as 'probably intended " for biological weapons delivery, and instead stated that “Iraq may be modyjiing UA Vs "for CBW delivery. This NIE also noted that Iraqi UA Vs could reach the United States, gf they were transported (in some unspecy‘ied manner) "to within a few hundred kilometers. " Amendment 90 — strike the above paragraph and the next two paragraphs. Comment- We do not believe that a document published in January, three months after the President made the speech should be analyzed in this section. It is not relevant to what the President said in October and, even if it were, the Threats to the Homeland NIE expressed the same concems that the President addressed in his speech, that the UAVs could be used to target the Homeland. Additionally, the NIE used the term "strike" the Homeland, not "reach" the Homeland. 142

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Amendment 96 Page 57-58 - Conclusion 8: Statements by the President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UA Vs) that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons were generally substantiated by intelligence information, but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said that Iraq “may " be modiyjring UA Vs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was “not sujficiently compelling to indicate that the Iraqis have done so. " Amendment 96 — strike generally; strike but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views that existed in the intelligence community. The majority view of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate judged that Iraq had a UA V program that was intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Air Force intelligence dissented from this view, and argued that the new UA Vwas probably being developed for reconnaissance. The majority view of the January 2003 NIE said merely that Iraq might be modiyying UA Vs for chemical or biological weapons, and the Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency argued that the evidence for this was unpersuasive. and i11sert @ intelli ence a encies assessed that lra ’s UAVs could be used for CBW delive . Comments — Again, we disagree with the terms "generally" and we disagree that there was any disagreement within the intelligence community about whether the UAVs "could" be used to deliver CBW as the conclusion states. All agencies agreed that the UAVs could be used to deliver CBW, which is all that policymakers said. We further note that the Air Force dissent on the intended use of the UAVs was not included in the President’s summary of the NIE. 143

Amendment 97 Page 58 - Conclusion 9: The President’s suggestion that the Iraqi government was considering using UA Vs to attack the United States was substantiated by intelligence judgments available at the time, but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that an Iraqi procurement network had attempted to purchase commercial mapping software that included data on the United States, and suggested that the Iraqi government was considering using UA Vs to target the US. The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Amendment 97 — strike but these judgments were revised a few months later, in January 2003. strike and suggested and insert which the IC said su ested ‘ strike The January 2003 NIE revised this claim, and said only that the software could be used for this purpose. The Air Force, Army and Defense Intelligence Agency dissented from this judgment as well, and argued that the purpose of the Iraqi request was to acquire a generic mapping capability. Comment — We believe it is irrelevant whether the judgment later changed. This report is supposed to determine whether statements were substantiated by the intelligence policymakers had when they made the statement, not intelligence that came out later. Additionally, the President said "we are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States." This statement is not inconsistent with the NIE published in January. The IC remained concerned about this possibility. Amendment 98 Page 58, Postwar findings — entire postwar findings section g Amendment 98 — strike this section. Comment - None of the postwar findings have citations so we cannot check their accuracy. Even with citations, we do not believe that postwar findings are in any way relevant to whether policymakers’ statements made prior to the war were substantiated by intelligence available at the time. This information was already reported in another Phase II report, is Lumecessary, and is likely to confuse readers who may think statements are unsubstantiated if they tumed out to be wrong. _ 144

Amendment 99 Page 62, fifth paragraph - Finally, the President stated that Saddam Hussein was "harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. " While this statement was not specQ‘ic to any group, the placement in the speech and the context suggests that the President was stating that Hussein was harboring al Qaeda. The statement appeared two paragraphs after statements that “...Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy, " that some "al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq, " and that “Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. " (These statements are discussed elsewhere in this report. ) The President ’s statement came in the same paragraph as the statement "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror. " Amendment 99 — Strike the above paragraph alter the first sentence. Comment- We do not believe the President ever stated or implied that Saddam Hussein was harboring al-Qa’ida. In the referenced text he spoke specifically about harboring non-al-Qa’ida groups. We think it is stretching this project too far to not only purport to be the judge and jury of what policymakers said, but also what staff believes they "suggested" or "implied." Amendment 106 Page 65, third paragraph - The September 2002 CIA report Iraqi Support for Terrorism, which was coordinated with the DIA, stated that al-Libi said Iraq had ‘provided " unspecU‘ied CBW training for two al-Qa ’ida associates in 2000, but also stated that al Libi “did not know the results of the training. " Amendment 106 —ai°rer the sentence above insert Another version of the a er rovided to the Committee with the same date did not include the comment that al-Libi "did not know the results of the trainin ." The Committee did not ask wh there were two versions of this p p and did not ask whether one or both versions were sent to the White House. Comment - The Committee needs to get an answer about why there were two reports and find out whether both of them were disseminated. The report also should include the comments from both versions, not choose the one that best supports the point the authors are trying to make. _ 145

Amendment 108 Page 65, last paragraph — Months prior to the speech and in the latter intelligence products cited above, questions were raised in finished intelligence about al-Libi ’s credibility. Amendment 108 — insert a new paragraph before the discussion of the State of the Union which says the following: Des ite these issues when the White House submitted the s eech for CIA fact checkin and sources and methods clearances a CIA staff member told the DCI in writin that the CIA anal st had "read all the terrorism ara a hs and said it was all oka .” em hasis ori ` al (all okay should be underlined.) Comments - We know that this speech was fact checked by the CIA and we have this handwritten comment which shows that the CIA approved the language in the terrorism section. This should be stated in the report 146

_ Amendment 1 19 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence. Intelligence assessments, including multiple CL4 reports and the November 2002 NIE, dismissed the claim that Iraq and al-Qa ’ida were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al-Qa ’ida. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al-Qa ’ida with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned by DL4, and later by the CL4. The Committee repeats its conclusion from a prior report that “assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al-Qa ’ida. " Amendment 119 —— strike the above conclusion and insert Conclusion 12: Statements y the President and Secreta Powell that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea ons trainin were su orted y the intelli ence. Numerous intelli ence assessments stated that Ira had rovided al- a’ida with wea ons trainin and s eciiicall trainin in oisons and ases. VVhi1e some DIA re orts raised uestions about the credibili of this re ortin and one CIA re ort noted that the source ma have exa erated his re ortin in a se arate area the CIA did not raise uestions about the source’s wea ons trainin re ortin an in fac rovided and a roved the use of this lan a e in both the President’s and Secreta ’s remarks. Comments - None of the statements provided in this report suggested or implied that Iraq and al- Qa’ida had "partnership." Additionally, while there were policymakers who commented that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, those comments were fully supported by the intelligence. The al-Libi reporting on CBW training was never questioned by the CIA and the information was approved by the CIA for use in both the President’s Cincinnati speech and Powell’s UN speech. In the case of the Powell speech CIA actually provided the information to him to use in the speech in the draft of the speech the CIA wrote. Furthermore, the conclusion as drafted says that intelligence community "asses sments were inconsistent" so accordingly, how can the Committee judge policymakers to not have any statements substantiated by the intelligence? 147

Amendment 120 Page 71, conclusions - Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq ’s contacts with al-Qa’ida were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa ’ida. Amendment 120 — strike However, policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the .. contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa ’ida. Comments - We disagree that policymakers’ statements did not accurately convey the nature of the contacts or left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation. Policymaker comments throughout this section nearly exactly matched what the intelligence community said about contacts. No policymaker implied that the contacts led to any Iraqi _ support of al-Qa’ida other than the safehaven, training, reciprocal non-aggression, which is well documented in numerous intelligence assessments. Furthermore, the comments from many of the policymakers outlined in the section were factchecked by the CIA. The report should identify the policymakers and the specific statements that are judged to be misleading so that we can analyze those statements. Amendment 121 Page 72, conclusions - Conclusion 14. The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. Amendment 121 - strike the above conclusion Comments - At the time that the Vice President commented that "it’s been pretty well confirmed that Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service" a CIA assessm