BACK  Operation Cyclone was the code name for the United States Central Intelligence Agency program to arm, train, and finance the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan
Wikipedia Operation Cyclone was the code name for the United States Central Intelligence Agency program to arm, train, and finance the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, 1979 to 1989. The program leaned heavily towards supporting militant Islamic groups that were favored by neighboring Pakistan, rather than other, less ideological Afghan resistance groups that had also been fighting the Marxist-oriented Democratic Republic of Afghanistan regime since before the Soviet intervention. [1] Operation Cyclone was one of the longest and most expensive covert CIA operations ever undertaken;[2] funding began with $20–30 million per year in 1980 and rose to $630 million per year in 1987.[3] Contents [hide] 1 Background 2 The program 2.1 Funding 3 Aftermath 4 Criticism 5 See also 6 References [edit]Background

Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, stated that the U.S. effort to aid the mujahideen was preceded by an effort to draw the Soviets into a costly and distracting Vietnam War-like conflict. In a 1998 interview[4] with the French news magazine Le Nouvel Observateur, Brzezinski recalled: "We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would... That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap... The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, "We now have the opportunity of giving to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War."[5][6] [edit]The program

A mujahideen resistance fighter shoots an SA-7, 1988. On July 3, 1979, U.S. President Carter signed a presidential finding authorizing funding for anticommunist guerrillas in Afghanistan.[3] Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December and installation of a more pro-Soviet president, Babrak Karmal, Carter announced, "The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War".[7] To execute this policy, President Reagan deployed CIA Special Activities Division paramilitary officers to train and equip the Mujihadeen forces against the Red Army. Although the CIA and Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson have received the most attention for their roles, the key architect of the strategy was Michael G. Vickers, a young CIA paramilitary officer working for Gust Avrakotos, the CIA's regional head.[8][9] Reagan's Covert Action program assisted in ending the Soviet's occupation in Afghanistan.[10][11] A Pentagon senior official, Michael Pillsbury, successfully advocated providing Stinger missiles to the Afghan resistance, according to recent books and academic articles.[12] The program relied heavily on using the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as an intermediary for funds distribution, passing of weapons, military training and financial support to Afghan resistance groups.[13] Along with funding from similar programs from Britain's MI6 and SAS, Saudi Arabia, and the People's Republic of China,[14] the ISI armed and trained over 100,000 insurgents between 1978 and 1992. They encouraged the volunteers from the Arab states to join the Afghan resistance in its struggle against the Soviet troops based in Afghanistan.[13] Nonetheless, despite its heavy reliance on the Pakistanis, the U.S. also sent its own military trainers and advisors to mujaheddin bases in Pakistan, where they instructed Afghan fighters in the use of U.S.-supplied equipment as well as guerilla warfare in general. Civilian personnel from the U.S. Department of State and the CIA also frequently visited the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area during this time. The U.S.-built Stinger antiaircraft missile, supplied to the mujahideen in very large numbers, struck a decisive blow to the Soviet war effort as it allowed the lightly-armed Afghans to effectively defend against Soviet helicopter landings in strategic areas. The Stingers were so renowned and deadly that, in the 1990s, the U.S. conducted a "buy-back" program to keep unused missiles from falling into the hands of anti-American terrorists. This program may have been covertly renewed following the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001, out of fear that remaining Stingers could be used against U.S. forces in the country.[15] Soviet troops completely pulled out of Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, having suffered over 14,000 killed and missing and over 50,000 wounded. [edit]Funding See also: Reagan Doctrine The U.S. offered two packages of economic assistance and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The first six-year assistance package (1981–87) amounted to US$3.2 billion, equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. The U.S. also sold 40 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan during 1983–87 at a cost of $1.2 billion outside the assistance package. The second six-year assistance package (1987–93) amounted to $4.2 billion. Out of this, $2.28 billion were allocated for economic assistance in the form of grants or loan that carried the interest rate of 2–3 per cent. The rest of the allocation ($1.74 billion) was in the form of credit for military purchases.[13] Sale of non-U.S. arms to Pakistan for destination to Afghanistan was facilitated by Israel.[16][17] Somewhere between $3–$20 billion in U.S. funds were funneled into the country to train and equip Afghan resistance groups with weapons,[citation needed] including Stinger man-portable air-defense systems. The program funding was increased yearly due to lobbying by prominent U.S. politicians and government officials, such as Charles Wilson, Gordon Humphrey, Fred Ikle, and William Casey. Under the Reagan administration, U.S. support for the Afghan mujahideen evolved into a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, called the Reagan Doctrine, in which the U.S. provided military and other support to anti-communist resistance movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. [edit]Aftermath

When the Soviet forces crossed into Afghanistan in December 1979, some believed the Soviets were attempting to expand their borders southward in order to gain a foothold in the region. The Soviet Union had long lacked a warm water port, and their movement south seemed to position them for further expansion toward Pakistan in the East, and Iran to the West. American politicians, Republicans and Democrats alike, feared the Soviets were positioning themselves for a takeover of Middle Eastern oil. Others believed that the Soviet Union was afraid Iran's Islamic Revolution and Afghanistan's Islamization would spread to the millions of Muslims in the USSR. After the invasion, Carter announced what became known as the Carter Doctrine: that the U.S. would not allow any other outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf. He terminated the Russian Wheat Deal, which was intended to establish trade with USSR and lessen Cold War tensions. He also prohibited Americans from participating in the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and reinstated registration for the draft for young males. The U.S. shifted its interest from Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. American funding of Afghan resistance leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezbi Islami party was cut off immediately.[18] The U.S. also reduced its assistance for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In October 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, triggering the imposition of sanctions against Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment (1985) in the Foreign Assistance Act. This disrupted the second assistance package offered in 1987 and discontinued economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan with the exception of the economic assistance already on its way to Pakistan. Military sales and training program were abandoned as well and some of the Pakistani military officers under training in the U.S. were asked to return home.[13] [edit]Criticism

The U.S. government has been criticized for allowing Pakistan to channel a disproportionate amount of its funding to controversial Afghan resistance leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,[19] who Pakistani officials believed was "their man".[20] Hekmatyar has been criticized for killing other mujahideen and attacking civilian populations, including shelling Kabul with American-supplied weapons, causing 2,000 casualties. Hekmatyar was said to be friendly with Osama bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda, who was running an operation for assisting "Afghan Arab" volunteers fighting in Afghanistan, called Maktab al-Khadamat. Alarmed by his behavior, Pakistan leader General Zia warned Hekmatyar, "It was Pakistan that made him an Afghan leader and it is Pakistan who can equally destroy him if he continues to misbehave."[21] In the late 1980s, Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto, concerned about the growing strength of the Islamist movement, told President George H. W. Bush, "You are creating a Frankenstein."[22] The U.S. says that all of its funds went to native Afghan rebels and denies that any of its funds were used to supply Osama bin Laden or foreign Arab mujahideen. Nonetheless, U.S. support for the native Afghan mujahideen contributed to the radical Islamization of Afghanistan as well as the weakening and near-disintegration of the Afghan state, which ultimately led to the Taliban takeover of most of the country in 1996. Moreover, U.S. support for the mujahideen enabled and prolonged their resistance to the Soviet presence, ultimately resulting in thousands of battle-hardened, radicalized, non-Afghan veterans returning to their home countries and forming the core of what is now referred to as Al Qaeda or "global jihad". (It is estimated that 35,000 foreign Muslims from 43 Islamic countries participated in the war). Additionally, the close relationships and cooperation established during the 1980s between the mujahideen and Pakistan's intelligence and military services, as well as the presence of mujahideen training bases on Pakistani soil, ultimately led to the infiltration of the Pakistani security services by militant Islamic elements as well as the de facto takeover of northwest Pakistan by pro-Taliban rebels. Critics of U.S. foreign policy consider Operation Cyclone to be substantially responsible for setting in motion the events that led to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. It is also probable that some terrorists presently fighting the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan were in fact trained, equipped, or funded by the U.S. or its allies during the 1980s, at which time they were more commonly referred to as "freedom fighters". [23][24][25][26] [edit]See also

Ahmad Shah Massoud Allegations of CIA assistance to Osama bin Laden Afghan Civil War Afghan training camp Badaber Uprising CIA activity in Afghanistan under William J. Casey 1981-1987 CIA Activities by Region: Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia (see: Afghanistan 1978) Celebratory gunfire Charles Wilson (Texas politician) Charlie Wilson's War Gary Schroen Gust Avrakotos Howard Hart Joanne Herring Michael Pillsbury Michael G. Vickers Milton Bearden Soviet war in Afghanistan [edit]References

^ Eduardo Real: ‘’Zbigniew Brzezinski, Defeated by his Success’’ ^ "The Oily Americans". Time (magazine). 2003-05-13. Retrieved 2008-07-08. ^ a b Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc., Free Press, (2001), p.68 ^ ^ Actualité, Spécial islamisme ^ No Regrets: Carter, Brzezinski and the Muj ^ Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, Macmillan, 1988, p.56 ^ Crile, George (2003). Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History. Atlantic Monthly Press, page 246, 285 and 302 ^ "Sorry Charlie this is Michael Vickers's War", Washington Post, 27 December 2007 ^ ^ Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Paperback) by Peter Schweizer, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994 page 213 ^ Heymann, Philip (2008). Living the Policy Process. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195335392. ^ a b c d Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an Overview 1974-2004. PILDAT briefing paper for Pakistani parliamentarians by Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 2004. pp19-20. ^ Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski-(13/6/97). Part 2. Episode 17. Good Guys, Bad Guys. 13 June 1997. ^ "". ^ "Pakistan Got Israeli Weapons During Afghan War", Daily Times Monitor - Pakistan, 23 July 2003 ^ Profile: Charlie Wilson ^ Kepel, Jihad, (2002) ^ Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc., Free Press, (2001), p.67 ^ Graham Fuller in interview with Peter Bergen, Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc., Free Press, (2001), p.68 ^ Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Interventions, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.185 ^ "The Road to September 11". Evan Thomas. Newsweek. 1 October 2001. ^ "1986-1992: CIA and British Recruit and Train Militants Worldwide to Help Fight Afghan War". Cooperative Research History Commons. Retrieved 2007-01-11. ^ "CIA worked with Pak to create Taliban". India Abroad News Service. 2001-03-06. Retrieved 2007-01-11. ^ "CIA bin Laden". October 2001. Retrieved 2007-01-10. ^ "Did the U.S. "Create" Osama bin Laden?". US Department of State. 2005-01-14. Retrieved 2007-01-09.


Claims have been made that the American government, and in particular the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are responsible for enabling Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. In mid-1979, about the same time as the Soviet Union deployed troops into Afghanistan, the United States began giving several hundred million dollars a year in aid to the Afghan Mujahideen insurgents fighting the Afghan Marxist government and the Soviet Army in Operation Cyclone. Along with native Afghan mujahideen were Muslim volunteers from other countries, popularly known as Afghan Arabs. The most famous of the Afghan Arabs was Osama bin Laden, known at the time as a wealthy and pious Saudi who provided his own money and helped raise millions from other wealthy Gulf Arabs. As the war neared its end, bin Laden organized the al-Qaeda organization to carry on armed jihad in other venues, primarily against the United States — the country that had helped fund the mujahideen against the Soviets. A number of commentators have described Al-Qaeda attacks as blowback or an unintended consequence of American aid to the mujahideen. In response, the American government, American and Pakistani intelligence officials involved in the operation, and at least one journalist (Peter Bergen) have denied this theory. They maintain the aid was given out by the Pakistan government, that it went to Afghan not foreign mujahideen, and that there was no contact between the Afghan Arabs and the CIA or other American officials, let alone arming, training, coaching or indoctrination. Contents [hide] 1 Allegations 2 Opposing View 3 Agreements 4 See also 5 References [edit]Allegations

Robin Cook

Bandar bin Sultan The BBC, in an article published shortly after the 9/11 attacks, stated that bin Laden "received security training from the CIA itself, according to Middle Eastern analyst Hazhir Teimourian."[1] In a 2003 article, Michael Powelson of the Russian journal Demokratizatsiya wrote: It is difficult to believe that the United States played no role in the operations of the son of one of the wealthiest men in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it is much more likely that the United States knew full-well of bin Laden's operation and gave it all the support they could.[2] A 2004 BBC article entitled "Al-Qaeda's origins and links", the BBC wrote: During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA.[3] In a 2006 InDepth piece on Osama Bin Laden, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published that,[4] Bin Laden apparently received training from the CIA, which was backing the Afghan holy warriors – the mujahedeen – who were tying down Soviet forces in Afghanistan. A Der Spiegel article in 2007, entitled "Arming the Middle East", Siegesmund von Ilsemann called Bin Laden "one of the CIA's best weapons customers." [5] Hillary Clinton has mentioned funding Islamic extremists "the people we are fighting today we funded twenty years ago", she explains that this has included recruiting "Mujahideen" and importing the "Wahabi brand of Islam" from Saudi Arabia [6], but she did not mention Osama bin Laden personally neither the CIA. According to ABC News correspondent John K. Cooley, the Carter Administration allowed Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, later revealed as one of the conspirators in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, to come to the U.S. to recruit Arab-Americans to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets.[2][7][page needed] Andrew Marshall, a journalist for The Independent newspaper describes the Al Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, which raised money and trained foreign volunteers for Afghanistan, "a place of pivotal importance to Operation Cyclone, the American effort to support the mujahideen," and also the place where several of those "connected" with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were "recruited."[8] According to author Steve Coll, Overall, the U.S. government looked favorably on the Arab recruitment drives. ... Some of the most ardent cold warriors at [CIA headquarters at] Langley thought this program should be formally endorsed and extended. ... [T]he CIA "examined ways to increase their participation, perhaps in the form of some sort of international brigade" ... Robert Gates [then-head of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence] recalled. ... At the [CIA's] Islamabad station [station chief] Milt Bearden felt that bin Laden himself "actually did some very good things" by putting money into Afghanistan.[9] Robin Cook, former leader of the British House of Commons and Foreign Secretary from 1997-2001, believed the CIA had provided arms to the Arab Mujahideen, including Osama bin Laden, writing, "Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan."[10] In conversation with former British Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, two-time Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto said Osama bin Laden was initially pro-American.[11] Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, has also stated that bin Laden appreciated the United States help in Afghanistan. On CNN's Larry King program he said:[12] Bandar bin Sultan: This is ironic. In the mid-'80s, if you remember, we and the United - Saudi Arabia and the United States were supporting the Mujahideen to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviets. He [Osama bin Laden] came to thank me for my efforts to bring the Americans, our friends, to help us against the atheists, he said the communists. Isn't it ironic?

Larry King: How ironic. In other words, he came to thank you for helping bring America to help him.

Bandar bin Sultan: Right. Monte Palmer, senior fellow at the al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, believes that "it now appears that the American-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan was the first step in transforming the jihadist movements of Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan into an international network capable of challenging the United States. A coalescing of the jihadist movement would have occurred with or without Afghanistan, but the Afghan experience accelerated this process by years if not decades."[13] According to Iranian state-owned Press TV, FBI translator Sibel Edmonds, who has been fired from the agency for disclosing sensitive information, has claimed the United States was on intimate terms with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, using them to further certain goals in Central Asia.[14] According to author David N. Gibbs "a considerable body of circumstantial evidence suggests ... direct Agency support for Bin Laden’s activities."[15] Both Bin Laden and the CIA "held accounts in the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)."[15] "Bin Laden worked especially closely with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar"[16] who Gibbs calls "the CIA’s favored Mujahiddin commander".[15] Gibbs quotes Le Monde as saying bin Laden was "recruited by the CIA" in 1979, [17][15] Associated Press as saying a former bin Laden aide told them that in 1989 the U.S. shipped high-powered sniper rifles to a Mujahiddin faction that included bin Laden,[18][15] and Jane’s Intelligence Review as stating Bin Laden "worked in close association with U.S. agents" in raising money for the Mujahiddin from "vast family connections" near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.[19][15] Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations from 2002 to 2008, wrote in a letter published in the New York Times on January 19, 2008: "The strategy to support the Afghans against Soviet military intervention was evolved by several intelligence agencies, including the C.I.A. and Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Western powers walked away from the region, leaving behind 40,000 militants imported from several countries to wage the anti-Soviet jihad. Pakistan was left to face the blowback of extremism, drugs and guns.” [20] [edit]Opposing View

United States Central Intelligence Agency

Ayman al Zawahiri

Peter Bergen U.S. government officials and a number of other parties maintain that the U.S. supported only the indigenous Afghan mujahideen. They deny that the CIA or other American officials had contact with the Afghan Arabs (foreign mujahideen) or Bin Laden, let alone armed, trained, coached or indoctrinated them. Scholars and reporters have called the idea the CIA backed Afghan Arabs (foreign mujahideen) "nonsense",[21] "sheer fantasy",[22] and "simply a folk myth."[23] They argue that: with a quarter of a million local Afghans willing to fight there was no need to recruit foreigners unfamiliar with the local language, customs or lay of the land that with several hundred million dollars a year in funding from non-American, Muslim sources, Arab Afghans themselves would have no need for American funds that Americans could not train mujahideen because Pakistani officials would not allow more than a handful of them to operate in Pakistan and none in Afghanistan[24]; that the Afghan Arabs were militant Islamists, reflexively hostile to Westerners, and prone to threaten or attack Westerners even though they knew the Westerners were helping the mujahideen. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri says much the same thing in his book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner.[25] Bin Laden himself has said "the collapse of the Soviet Union ... goes to God and the mujahideen in Afghanistan ... the US had no mentionable role," but "collapse made the US more haughty and arrogant." [26] According to CNN journalist Peter Bergen, known for conducting the first television interview with Osama bin Laden in 1997, The story about bin Laden and the CIA — that the CIA funded bin Laden or trained bin Laden — is simply a folk myth. There's no evidence of this. In fact, there are very few things that bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the U.S. government agree on. They all agree that they didn't have a relationship in the 1980s. And they wouldn't have needed to. Bin Laden had his own money, he was anti-American and he was operating secretly and independently. The real story here is the CIA did not understand who Osama was until 1996, when they set up a unit to really start tracking him.[23] Bergen quotes Pakistani Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who ran the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Afghan operation between 1983 and 1987: It was always galling to the Americans, and I can understand their point of view, that although they paid the piper they could not call the tune. The CIA supported the mujahideen by spending the taxpayers' money, billions of dollars of it over the years, on buying arms, ammunition, and equipment. It was their secret arms procurement branch that was kept busy. It was, however, a cardinal rule of Pakistan's policy that no Americans ever become involved with the distribution of funds or arms once they arrived in the country. No Americans ever trained or had direct contact with the mujahideen, and no American official ever went inside Afghanistan.[27] Marc Sageman, a Foreign Service Officer who was based in Islamabad from 1987-1989, and worked closely with Afghanistan's Mujahideen, argues that no American money went to the foreign volunteers. Sageman also says:[28] Contemporaneous accounts of the war do not even mention [the Afghan Arabs]. Many were not serious about the war. ... Very few were involved in actual fighting. For most of the war, they were scattered among the Afghan groups associated with the four Afghan fundamentalist parties. No U.S. official ever came in contact with the foreign volunteers. They simply traveled in different circles and never crossed U.S. radar screens. They had their own sources of money and their own contacts with the Pakistanis, official Saudis, and other Muslim supporters, and they made their own deals with the various Afghan resistance leaders."[29] Vincent Cannistraro, who led the Reagan administration's Afghan Working Group from 1985 to 1987, puts it, The CIA was very reluctant to be involved at all. They thought it would end up with them being blamed, like in Guatemala." So the Agency tried to avoid direct involvement in the war, ... the skittish CIA, Cannistraro estimates, had less than ten operatives acting as America's eyes and ears in the region. Milton Bearden, the Agency's chief field operative in the war effort, has insisted that "[T]he CIA had nothing to do with" bin Laden. Cannistraro says that when he coordinated Afghan policy from Washington, he never once heard bin Laden's name.[30] Fox News reporter Richard Miniter wrote that in interviewes with the two men who "oversaw the disbursement for all American funds to the anti-Soviet resistance, Bill Peikney - CIA station chief in Islamabad from 1984 to 1986 - and Milt Bearden - CIA station chief from 1986 to 1989 - he found, Both flatly denied that any CIA funds ever went to bin Laden. They felt so strongly about this point that they agreed to go on the record, an unusual move by normally reticent intelligence officers. Mr. Peikney added in an e-mail to me: “I don’t even recall UBL [bin Laden] coming across my screen when I was there.[31]

Other reasons advanced for a lack of a CIA-Afghan Arab connection of "pivotal importance," (or even any connection at all), was that the Afghan Arabs themselves were not important in the war but were a "curious sideshow to the real fighting."[32] One estimate of the number of combatants in the war is that 250,000 Afghans fought 125,000 Soviet troops, but only 2000 Arab Afghans fought "at any one time".[33] According to Milton Bearden the CIA did not recruit Arabs because there were hundreds of thousands of Afghans all too willing to fight. The Arab Afghan were not only superfluous but "disruptive," angering local Afghan with their more-Muslim-than-thou attitude, according to Peter Jouvenal.[34] Veteran Afghan cameraman Peter Jouvenal quotes an Afghan mujahideen as saying "whenever we had a problem with one of them [foreign mujahideen], we just shot them. They thought they were kings." Many who traveled in Afghanistan — Olivier Roy,[35] Peter Jouvenal.[36] — reported of the Arab Afghans' visceral hostility to Westerners in Afghanistan to aid Afghans or report on their plight. BBC reporter John Simpson tells the story of running into Osama bin Laden in 1989, and with neither knowing who the other was, bin Laden attempting to bribe Simpson's Afghan driver $500 — a large sum in a poor country — to kill the infidel Simpson. When the driver declined, Bin Laden retired to his "camp bed" and wept "in frustration." [37] [edit]Agreements

One allegation[8] not denied by the US government is that the U.S. Army enlisted and trained a cashiered Egyptian soldier named Ali Mohamed, and that it knew Ali occasionally took trips to Afghanistan, where he claimed to fight Russians.[38][page needed] According to journalist Lawrence Wright who interviewed U.S. officials about Ali, the Egyptian did tell his Army superiors he was fighting in Afghanistan, but did not tell them he was training other Afghan Arabs or writing a manual from what he had learned from the US Army Special Forces. Wright also reports that the CIA failed to inform other US agencies that it had learned Ali, who was a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, was an anti-American spy.[38][page needed] Bergen and Wright also agree it is noteworthy that Islamist Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman was allowed into the United States, although Wright suggests this lapse was incompetent rather than sinister.[39] [edit]See also

United States and state terrorism CIA activities in Afghanistan [edit]References

^ "Who is Osama Bin Laden", 18 September, 2001 ^ a b Powelson, Michael (2003-04-01). "U.S. support for anti-Soviet and anti-Russian guerrilla movements and the undermining of democracy". Demokratizatsiya. Retrieved 2009-10-06. ^ Al-Qaeda's origins and links, BBC News, July 20, 2004 ^ Who is Osama bin Laden?, January 19, 2006, CBC News ^ von Ilsemann, Siegesmund (2007-08-06). "Arming the Middle East: The Checkered History of American Weapons Deals". Der Spiegel. Retrieved 2008-11-22. ^ Hillary Clinton speaks out about US links with Taliban ^ Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, ABC News correspondent John K. Cooley ^ a b Marshall, Andrew (1 November 1998). "Terror 'blowback' burns CIA". London: The Independent on Sunday. Retrieved 2009-09-16. ^ Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp.145-6, 155-6. ^ Cook, Robin (2005-07-08). "The struggle against terrorism cannot be won by military means". London: Guardian Unlimited. Retrieved 2005-07-08. ^ Benazir Bhutto, "Dinner with Portillo", BBC Four ^ America's New War: Responding to Terrorism CNN Larry King Live. October 1, 2001. ^ Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists, and America's War on Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004) p. 97. ^ ^ a b c d e f "Forgotten Coverage of Afghan 'Freedom Fighters'" Forgotten Coverage of Afghan 'Freedom Fighters', The villains of today's news were heroes in the '80s extra January/February 2002, F.A.I.R. (Fairness in Accuracy and Reporting) ^ The Economist, 9/15/01 ^ Le Monde (9/15/01) ^ (AP, 10/16/01) ^ Jane’s Intelligence Review, 10/1/98 ^ Akram, Munir (2008-01-19). "Pakistan, Terrorism and Drugs". New York Times. Retrieved 2009-10-17. ^ Roy, Olivier, Globalized Islam : the Search for a New Ummah, by Olivier Roy, Columbia University Press, 2004, p.291-2 ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks by Marc Sageman, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.57-8 ^ a b "Bergen: Bin Laden, CIA links hogwash". 2006-08-15. Retrieved 2007-01-09. ^ Peter Jouvenal quoted in Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc. New York: Free Press, c2001., p.65 ^ "Did the U.S. "Create" Osama bin Laden?". U.S. Department of State. 2005-01-14. Retrieved 2007-01-09. ^ Messages to the World, 2006, p.50. (March 1997 interview with Peter Arnett ^ Holy War Inc. by Peter Bergen, New York: Free Press, c2001., p.66 ^ Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.57-58 ^ Sageman, p.57-58 ^ New Republic, "TRB FROM WASHINGTON, Back to Front" by Peter Beinart, Post date 09.26.01 | Issue date 10.08.01 ^ Miniter, Richard (2003-09-23). "Dispelling the CIA-Bin Laden Myth". Fox News. Retrieved 2009-10-06. ^ Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, by Lawrence Wright, NY, Knopf, 2006, p.107 ^ Interview with Arab Afghan fighter Abdullah Anas and Afghan CIA station chief Milt Berden. Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower, Knopf, 2006, p.105 ^ Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc. New York: Free Press, c2001., p.66 ^ Roy, Olivier Globalized Islam : the Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University Press, 2004, p.293 ^ Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc. New York: Free Press, c2001., p.65 ^ Simpson, John, A Mad World, My Masters: Tales from a Traveller's Life, London, Macmillan, 2000, p.83 ^ a b Wright, Looming Tower (2006) ^ Bergen, Peter, Holy War Inc. New York: Free Press, c2001., p.66-7