FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE U.S. ROLE IN IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA ("THE IRANIAN GREEN LIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE")
House International Relations Committee - October 10, 1996 - 104th Congress; 2nd Session
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On May 8, 1996, the United States House of Representatives voted to establish and fund the Select Subcommittee on the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (the "Select Subcommittee"). The Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate and report on all aspects of United States government policy regarding shipments of arms and other assistance from Iran to the countries of the former Yugoslavia from September 21, 1991 until June 1996, the period in which an international arms embargo was in effect for the region. The scope of the investigation included the impact, if any, of such policy upon the safety and presence of United States troops stationed in and around Bosnia, the relations between the United States and its allies, and upon United States efforts to isolate Iran.
In addition, the Select Subcommittee was authorized to investigate and report on communications and representations to the people and the Congress of the United States regarding such policy, the international arms embargo and United States participation in the international arms embargo. Finally, the Select Subcommittee was authorized to determine what actions were taken to review any of these matters or, conversely, to cover up such matters. In order to report its findings, the Select Subcommittee was empowered to review all relevant deliberations, discussions, and/or communications within the United States Government as well as all communications between the United States Government and other governments, organizations, or individuals.
The following Minority Views to the report of the Select Subcommittee are based upon a thorough review of thousands of pages of classified and unclassified materials made available by the Departments of State and Defense (including the National Security Agency), the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council as well as press reports, materials prepared by Congressional Research Service, and other material in the public domain. In addition, the staff of the Select Subcommittee interviewed and deposed approximately seventy current or former employees of these agencies as well as two foreign nationals. The Minority wishes to thank the individuals who were deposed and interviewed as well as the many employees of the United States Government agencies who spent countless hours identifying and making available relevant documents. In addition, the Minority wishes to thank the investigators detailed to the Select Subcommittee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their invaluable assistance.
Select Subcommittee Organization and Structure.
Legislative History.
On May 2, 1996, the Committee on International Relations (the "Committee") reported House Resolution 416 creating the Select Subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia and Croatia. The Committee also reported House Resolution 416 which, as amended, established a budget of $995,000 to be used either until the Select Subcommittee ceased to exist or immediately before noon on January 3, 1997, whichever first occurs. (564)
Legislative Mandate.
House Resolution 416 charged the Select Subcommittee with investigating the following:
(1) The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of arms and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "FRY") during any period that an international arms embargo cation the Subcommittee's majority and minority reports. The final version of the majority report was provided on October 23. The final version of the minority report is dated October 25. Supplemental information to these reports was provided subsequent to both final reports being received. On November 6, the executive branch also received from Chairman Hyde a request to review for classification a 26-page letter to the Department of Justice signed by the Republican members of the Select Subcommittee. As these letters correctly note the reports are lengthy (approximately 600 pages) and contain a great deal of classified information.
(U) In response to these requests NSC staff distributed these materials to designated representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, including component elements, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In order to maximize knowledge, save time, and in the interest of the addressing the majority and minority reports at the same time, the executive branch treated these requests as a single request. Classification/Declassification experts from each of these entities have now completed their review by portion marking each paragraph and footnote. Additionally, we have bracketed the specific portions of the text that are classified within each marked paragraph or footnote.
(U) The executive branch reviewed the document for classified information only. The executive branch review did not address the substantive content of these documents. Neither does this letter. Further, this declassification review does not constitute concurrence in the public release of any declassified information enclosed.
(classified data deleted) Due to the length of these reports, and the voluminous nature of the classified material contained in them, including sources and methods of intelligence that directly inform and provide for the safety of U.S. forces in Bosnia, the executive branch is not in a position to offer substitute language. This would require rewriting the majority of both reports. (classified data deleted)
(U) Executive branch review of the letter to the Department of Justice referenced above, indicated that one sentence on page 18 could reveal an intelligence source or method. With the inclusion of this sentence, the letter would be classified TOP SECRET/GAMMA. With the deletion of this sentence, the letter would be unclassified. The "classified attachment" to the letter should be marked TOP SECRET/GAMMA.
(U) The text of this letter is also being sent to Mr. Van Dusen.
Sincerely,
William Danvers
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for
Legislative Affairs
Mr. Patrick Murray
Professional Staff Member
Committee on International Relations
Room 2170 RHOB
Washington, D.C. 29515-6128
Enclosure: a/s
One Hundred Fourth Congress
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Select Subcommittee on the United States Role in
Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
November 7, 1996
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In accordance with H.Res 416 (f), directing the Select Subcommittee to transmit a report to the Committee on International Relations not later than six months after the date of the Resolution, please find enclosed a copy of the Select Subcommittee's Report, together with Minority Views. The Report was approved by the Select Subcommittee during an executive session on October 10, 1996.
I urge the Committee to review the Report carefully for matters that the Committee may wish to pursue further in the next Congress. I also believe the Committee should continue the Subcommittee's efforts to get the Executive Branch to declassify as much as much of the Report as possible without endangering legitimately classified information. Assuming the Administration is reasonable in its approach to declassification, it would be of particular value to the American people if the Committee were able to work from the redacted classified version to prepare a revised, unclassified version for public release.
Sincerely,
Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
(Unclassified when detached from Classified Report)
SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 1
ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE
On April 5, 1996, the Los Angeles Times ran a front-page article by James Risen and Doyle McManus that led with the sentence:
President Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations arms embargo that the United States was pledged to uphold and the Administration's own policy of isolating Tehran globally as a supporter of terrorism, according to senior Administration officials and other sources. (1)
This article was the first of several extraordinary articles that spelled out in detail, and with what turned out to be excellent sourcing, a policy decision that the Clinton Administration had carefully guarded for two years - forbidding reference to it in writing, denying it to the press, deflecting Congress, hoodwinking allies, and even trying to keep it secret from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secretary of Defense. The decision came to be referred to by higher ranking Administration officials as the "wink and nod," "the blind eye," and other terms, but the one that seemed to have stuck was given near the time of the decision's inception by one of its intellectual authors: the "green light." (2)
The articles authoritatively spelled out the advantages Iran had reaped from the green light policy, the confusion it had caused within the Executive Branch, and the other policy options that had been overlooked or rejected by the Administration as being too difficult.
The congressional response was one of incredulity. Members were shocked to learn that the Administration had chosen to give Iran an unprecedented foothold in an extremely unstable and vulnerable part of Europe. It was equally disturbing that for two years the Administration had purposely hidden from Congress, US allies, and the American people its highly questionable, major US policy shift.
There had been occasional press reports before that might have exposed the policy earlier; however, Congress continued to believe the Administration's denials of the Iranian green light policy. Congress found it unlikely that the Administration would adopt such a policy that was inconsistent and incompatible with the Administration's well-known and vigorously championed policies regarding the former Yugoslavia and Iran. Also, given the long-settled US policy of isolating Iran both economically and politically, Congress refused to believe that the Administration could have such bad judgment as to invite Iran, the world's largest exporter of terrorism, into Europe, much less into an area so ripe for fundamentalist exploitation as the Balkans.
The thought was that the Administration would surely inform Congress if it intended a major policy shift towards Iran and Bosnia. In retrospect, Congress cannot be blamed for presuming to trust the Administration's truthfulness, consistency, and strategic acumen.
In any case, when the story of the green light policy broke in April 1996, there were calls from both houses of Congress for an investigation; since then, several committees have looked into the issue, emphasizing aspects relevant to their specific areas of oversight. For example, both intelligence oversight committees -- the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence -- have examined the green light policy with an emphasis on its intelligence-related issues. Also, on May 8, 1996, the House approved Resolution 416, establishing a select subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee and gave it a broad charter to investigate all aspects of the policy and implementation. This subcommittee, the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia (also known as the "Iranian Green Light" Subcommittee) conducted an extensive investigation of the green light policy over the ensuing months and presents its findings and recommendations in this report.
The Uncovering of the Iranian Green Light Policy by the Press
As early as May 1994, allegations began to surface that Iran, with some sort of US complicity, was covertly transferring weapons to Bosnia, despite a United Nations (UN) arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. Each time the Administration issued denials of US complicity and managed to keep the story in the bottle. (3)
Unfortunately for those seeking to maintain the cover-up, James Risen and Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times became aware of these hidden policy missteps. From April through July 1996, they wrote a series of thirteen investigative articles exposing the missteps with incredible detail to large numbers of well-placed Administration officials who were willing to speak to them on a "not for attribution" basis. (4)
Because the Risen/McManus articles played such an important role in uncovering the green light policy and its consequences, their findings are summarized below.
Background
The Clinton White House was not the first Administration to face the question of Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia through Croatia, but its response was the opposite of the prior administration's. In September 1992, the Bush Administration discovered that Iran was attempting to smuggle arms on board a 747 airplane to Bosnia through Croatia in violation of the arms embargo and, according to former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, "raised hell." The Administration acted decisively and had the 747 and the weapons seized. According to Secretary Eagleburger, "We made it very clear that we were adamantly opposed to this going on. There was no question in the Bush Administration of where we were on this subject." (5)
Throughout the presidential campaign of 1992, Governor Clinton forcefully and repeatedly criticized President Bush for his consistent enforcement of the arms embargo and called for the United States to arm the Bosnians. The new Administration, upon taking office in 1993, found itself hamstrung. Unfortunately for President Clinton, the same policy constraints that faced President Bush -- Unwillingness on the part of the American public to commit troops and allied opposition to lifting the embargo -- equally applied to him. By the spring of 1994, Clinton's frustrations were at a peak. (6)
While Clinton felt compelled by circumstances to follow President Bush's much-criticized path, Iran was also chafing under the policies of containment consistently followed by the Bush Administration and, until the green light policy, under President Clinton. Iran's radical Islamic government was eager to increase its influence in the Balkans and saw the West's refusal to provide weapons to the Bosnian government as an opportunity. Though Iran had smuggled a small, insignificant amount of weapons to the Bosnian government prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, it was their subsequent truce and creation of the Bosnian Federation that set the stage for Clinton's green light policy decisions.
The Proposal
On April 27, 1994, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic entered the US embassy in Zagreb with a potentially explosive request: Would Washington accede to Croatia's plans to accept Iran's offer to open up a weapons pipeline from Iran into Bosnia? The Croatians were split over the question, having yielded to the Bush Administration's demands in 1992 that weapons shipments be stopped, and were seeking instructions. Granic was giving the US advance notice that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman planned formally to ask US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith how the United States would respond to new arms shipments from Iran. Granic himself was against the idea, a minority view in the Croatian government, but was following his orders to seek Washington's reaction.
Ambassador Galbraith had been impatient with the Clinton Administration for not doing more to aid the Bosnian cause, and was strongly in favor of the US allowing the new arms shipments. Risen noted that Galbraith had earned his reputation as an activist as a staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had sometimes rankled the career officials within the US government in his efforts to expand his role as the first US Ambassador to Croatia. It is clear that Galbraith supported the pro-weapons pipeline faction within the Croatian government, the most prominent member being Gojko Susak, Croatia's Defense Minister and Tudjman's right-hand man. (7)
Though the Administration thought the green light decision "obvious" and insignificant at the time, a senior US diplomat would later acknowledge that the pipeline probably would not have been established if the United States had opposed it forcefully. (8) Peter Galbraith would later testify," I can say that had we in a very, very forceful way made it clear that we would not tolerate the flow of arms to the Bosnians, they probably would not have done it . . . . When we did not object, they proceeded to go ahead and do it." (9)
The Decision
While most diplomatic exchanges require days, if not weeks or months, to coordinate and yet, this request for instructions reached President Clinton in a matter of hours. The first recipient of the cable was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alexander Vershbow, who referred the question to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who were travelling with Clinton to Nixon's funeral in Yorba Linda, California.
Talbott and Lake agreed on the solution: Do nothing. Galbraith was to give the coded response of "no instructions," which would tell the Croatians that the US would not act to stop the shipments. Lake asked for 20 minutes of President Clinton's time and was ushered into Clinton's office aboard Air Force One. James Risen described the meeting as follows: "Lake ran the President through the pros and cons and said, 'This is our recommendation . . . .' And he said 'yes' a senior official recounted. There was little discussion and no serious debate. It seemed like 'an obvious choice,' the official said." (10)
No other officials even at the highest levels of the US government were consulted before the green light was given to the Iranian arms transfers. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency, whose purpose is to protect national security by evaluating information on political and military developments abroad, was never officially notified of the policy. (11)
As a result of this closed and truncated decision-making process, US officials would later admit they gave little thought back in 1994 to the chance that Iran's political and military presence would grow in Bosnia as it did. A senior Administration official would concede they did not focus on the problem until the prospect of US troops going in was raised in 1995. (12)
The Alternatives
For the first two weeks following the breaking of the story, the Administration spin was that "there were no alternatives" to allowing the Iranian arms transfers, and that the decision was "obvious." Further research showed, however, that far from being "forced" into approving the arms transfers, the White House had actively rejected multiple calls for having nations friendly to the United States supply weapons to the Bosnians. The Administration rejected these equally effective alternative means of arming the Bosnians even though they would have negated the chance of increasing Iranian influence in Bosnia. (13)
The first such suggestion was made by Richard Holbrooke several months after the green light decision. In the fall of 1994, Holbrooke sought a legal opinion from State Department attorneys asking what diplomatic approaches to friendly nations could be made without triggering US covert action laws requiring Congress to be notified. Holbrooke thought that the unequal battlefield conditions faced by the Muslims in Bosnia could be eased if friendly nations would covertly supply the weapons with American encouragement.
When news of this proposal reached the upper levels of government, Holbrooke was rebuffed. According to Risen, Anthony Lake thought the idea was "too risky," and Secretary of State Warren Christopher was also opposed. (14) Indeed, Risen would write that, "senior administration officials opposed Holbrooke's plan because they feared that covert smuggling by friendly nations would make it too obvious the United States was encouraging the violation of a UN arms embargo against Bosnia." (15)
In a July 1996 article, Risen and McManus would document other alternatives to the failed green light policy that were rejected by the Clinton Administration. They would note that at least three times between 1993 and 1995, discussions were held about asking friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to move weapons and support to the Bosnians. The model for such aid existed before in the 1980s when Saudi Arabia served as the conduit between the US and the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency.
Galbraith himself had suggested using friendly intermediaries in late 1993. He reportedly asked the (classified data deleted) in his embassy how much it would cost to begin a covert operation to aid the Bosnians, wondering if $250 million would be enough. (16) The (classified data deleted) was surprised by the request, advised Galbraith that such an action would be illegal without formal authorization, and warned (classified data deleted) in Washington that Galbraith was thinking along these lines.
The Consequences
Among the negative consequences of the green light policy and how it was implemented, as identified by Risen and McManus, are the confusion it caused within the US government, the resultant increase in Iranian influence in the former Yugoslavia, and concerns that, beneath the Administration's obfuscation of the policy, there may have been an illegal covert action.
A. Policy Confusion
There was considerable confusion among Administration officials throughout the whole process. Very little time elapsed and even less thought took place from the time the original query was made to Galbraith until Lake met with the President on Air Force One. Even after receiving the "no instructions" instruction, Galbraith himself was still unclear what action to take. According to Risen, Galbraith called Jenonne Walker, the National Security Council's chief European expert, who told him Lake had indicated he was to stick to "no instructions," but she added, "Tony was smiling when he said it." (17)
Not only were other appropriate agencies of the US government not consulted, they were not advised of the decision once it was made. Neither the CIA nor the Pentagon were informed of the policy change. Accordingly, the (classified data deleted) in Zagreb continued to be under the impression that the official policy of the United States was to support the arms embargo, the same position which Assistant Secretary of State Talbott would also lead CIA Director James Woolsey to believe was still valid. The CIA continued to collect information on embargo busting and became increasingly mystified at the US government's unwillingness to act on that intelligence. The CIA would never be informed, and, as the evidence grew that Director Woolsey had been deliberately kept in the dark, he resigned in December 1994.
B. Increased Iranian Influence
The most troubling consequence of the green light policy was the resultant exponential expansion of Iranian influence in Bosnia. Risen's sources helped him paint the following assessment of Iranian influence before and after the green light:
Western intelligence agencies detected several hundred militant Muslim guerillas from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in Bosnia as early as 1992, officials said, including several "Afghanis," veterans of the CIA-funded war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But these were largely ragtag volunteers, with no readily apparent command and control from Iran or anyone else. (18)
In 1994, however, a different kind of Iranian was showing up in Bosnia, officials said:
. . . military and civilian advisors who appeared to have been sent by the Tehran government on well-defined missions. Some were military trainers who taught the Bosnians how to use the wire-guided antitank missiles Iran was shipping, one source said. Others helped with logistics and with weapons factories, according to the Bosnian government. (19)
Ambassador Galbraith himself noted that the difference was like night and day. "Certainly what was being talked about in April 1994 was something very substantially greater" (20) than what had been shipped by Iran previously. Risen would elaborate:
From May 1994 to January 1996, the Iranians shipped more than 5,000 tons of arms to Bosnia through the Croatian pipeline. They provided the largest portion by far of Bosnia's military hardware -- two thirds by official US estimates. The Iranians delivered mostly small arms and equipment, including rifles, ammunition, and uniforms but also antitank weapons and shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles -- weapons that could threaten aircraft, including US aircraft.
Other countries did supply weapons to Bosnia without US encouragement . . . . But Iran was the largest supplier by far. By early 1995 the Iranian flights were landing as often as three times a week. The arms pipeline was managed largely by the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's militant Islamic shock corps, operating out of the Iranian embassy in Zagreb. Other Revolutionary Guard officers moved to Bosnia to serve as military advisors and trainers. The Bosnian Government's intelligence service and internal security forces soon had Iranian advisors too. To both secular Bosnians and US intelligence analysts, this was a worrisome trend: creeping Iranian influence in what once had been a multiethnic, secular state. (21)
The former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who had himself worked in the Balkans for several years as a US diplomat, declared the increase in radical Islamic support in Bosnia as a major blow to the national security of the United States. He referred to it as "the height of insanity. We are inviting Bosnian-Islamic connections with a terrorist state that wishes us as much damage as they sic can possibly inflict upon us." (22)
Of even more concern to the United States and the families of American servicemen deployed in Bosnia is the terrorist threat that materialized in Bosnia under the green light policy. Risen gave two examples in his articles of the increase in the terrorist threat, but alluded to having more information than he reported.
In February 1995, NATO troops raided a "terrorist training school" at which they arrested eight Bosnian and three Iranian "diplomats," who quickly invoked diplomatic immunity and flew back to Iran. Items seized in the raid included bomb devices within shampoo bottles and children's toys and a training video showing how to ambush a car on an open highway and to kill its occupants. (23)
In an even more ominous sign, American embassy officials in Zagreb and Croatia became aware in 1995 of suspected Hizballah (Party of God) members stalking embassy personnel and their families. Suspected Iranian terrorists were seen with video cameras recording Americans as they came and went. Officials feared that an attack was imminent and one official confirmed "the terrorist threat went right up the scale to levels you would see in preparation for an attack." (24)
C. Possible Illegal Covert Action
The final consequence of the Administration's giving the green light to the Iranian arms pipeline was the chance that actions taken by US government officials crossed the legal line from what the Administration terms as passive, i.e., "no instructions," to a concrete act which might reasonably be construed by foreign officials as an invitation to conduct covert action. Under US law, covert action is illegal unless it has been authorized by the President and reported to Congress.
According to Risen's sources, there were two instances when Administration officials came objectively close to the legal line. The first case occurred in May 1994 when Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia Charles Redman intervened with senior Croatian government officials to expedite the movement into Bosnia of a blocked convoy that is believed to have carried arms to the Muslim government troops. Redman claims to have never asked whether arms were being carried, but US officials now acknowledge that questions could be raised whether the Administration had gone beyond passive support for the Bosnian cause and taken on a more active role. (25)
The second case occurred in September of 1995 when a shipment of Iranian (classified data deleted) missiles bound for Bosnia was detained in Croatia because the Croatian government was nervous that the missiles were tipped with chemical warheads. (26) Experts from (classified data deleted) and the US Army rapidly moved to inspect the missiles, determined that they were not carrying chemical or biological warheads, and then permitted them to be delivered into Bosnia. (27) Some US officials were concerned that in this action the US had directly violated the UN arms embargo. (28)
The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) was secretly commissioned on November 29, 1994 to investigate the green light policy and to determine if any covert action laws were violated. The IOB's classified report sharply criticized the Administration for excessive secrecy but determined that notification of Congress was not necessary. The Administration's actions, according to the IOB, fell within the category of "traditional diplomatic activity," exempt from US covert action laws. (29)
The IOB investigation had the potential to put the matter to rest, but raised questions of its own. Moreover, the White House, even after receiving the report, failed to advise Congress of the green light policy. What made the situation worse in the minds of many in Congress was the decision by the Administration in April 1996, after the story was out, to bar IOB Chairman Anthony Harrington from sharing the report with Congress or testifying about it under oath. (30) Suspicions were heightened.
The Congressional Response
The congressional response to the revelations about the green light affair was strong. Senior Democrats joined Republicans in denouncing the Clinton Administration's failure to consult with or notify Congress of the important change in policy towards Iran and the arms embargo. It was only this wellspring of bipartisan condemnation that prompted the Administration to admit that it should have consulted Congress. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff acknowledged that he was unaware of any congressional notification, and an Administration official admitted that "there is a growing understanding in the Administration that in terms of Congress, this could have been handled better. " (31)
In the two years between when the green light policy went into effect and when it was uncovered, there had been innumerable meetings between Members of Congress and senior Administration officials discussing policy options on lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. The failure of the Administration to mention the green light policy in any of these discussions can only be intentional.
A week after the green light decision was made, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott responded to a lengthy list of specific questions on Bosnia that had been submitted by Republican Senator John Warner. In his letter to Senator Warner, Talbott warned that lifting the embargo, as many favored in Congress, could lead to an increased Iranian presence in Bosnia. Talbott did not mention that he had just taken part in a policy decision that would bring Iranians streaming into the region. (32)
In midsummer 1994, Democratic Senator and Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn met with Charles Redman, then chief US negotiator in the Balkans, to discuss ways of aiding the Bosnian cause. Redman failed to mention the fact that the Administration had already made the green light decision. "I don't ever recall anybody in the Administration telling me anything about that," noted Nunn after the cover-up came to light in 1996. (33) Senator Nunn later reflected on the Administration's keeping Congress in the dark, "It seems to me the question is whether Congress should have been informed, not so much as a matter of law but as a matter of comity." (34) In response, Ambassador Redman could only say, "It never came up." (35)
Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, speaking on the floor of the Senate, observed:
While we read and heard reports that Iran was smuggling arms to the Bosnians, we did not know the President and his advisers made a conscious decision to give a green light for Iran to provide arms. Indeed, those of us who advocated lifting the arms embargo -- Republicans and Democrats -- argued that if America did not provide Bosnia with assistance, Iran would be Bosnia's only option. (36)
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott offered another response in defense of the Administration: Since the press was reporting on Iranian arms shipments, Congress was properly informed. Democratic Senator Robert Kerrey sharply rebutted the argument, "Do you think, Mr. Secretary . . . that Congress getting its information through what really was half a dozen newspaper accounts in 1994 constitutes knowing more or less what you knew?" (37) Senator Kerrey also observed that for Congress to do its job properly, it must be kept informed by the Executive Branch, particularly in the area of foreign policy. "Certainly, you don't want us reaching a conclusion every time we pick up the newspaper or hear a news account of something terrible going on and knee jerk, particularly when its a foreign policy question." (38)
House Speaker Newt Gingrich described the chilling effect the cover-up of the green light has had on trust between the executive and legislative branches of government:
Never did Clinton indicate the Administration had given a green light to Iranian arms smuggling . . . . If you have been told face to face by the President of the United States for three years that you can't help the Bosnians and now you learn after all these face-to-face meetings that they were encouraging the Iranians, giving the Iranian arms shipments a wink and a nod, then how do you walk into the next meeting and believe what you are being told? (39)
Throughout, the congressional reactions to the uncovering of the green light policy was outrage that the Administration had given Iran, the rogue state most actively hostile to US interests around the world, a sanctioned foothold in Europe from which it could launch terrorist campaigns against US personnel across Europe. Congressman Henry Hyde, for example, warned that the policy had to be examined and could not remain "buried behind classified documents." He was of the view that "the introduction of the most radical nation in the world . . . into the Balkans in force with weapons to give them a foothold in that most volatile part of the world is incredible folly." He wondered, as many have since, why the Administration had not chosen readily available and far more palatable means of assisting the Bosnians, means that would not endanger the safety of the American people. "There were some dozen countries," Hyde explained, "that could reasonably be asked to provide weapons for the Bosnians -- not Iran." (40)
A strong majority in Congress was also incredulous that the Administration would violate its own declared policy of containing Iran in favor of inviting the radical terrorist regime into the Balkans. Congressman Christopher Cox would speak for many when he denounced the Administration's decision to give the green light. "This policy was absolutely insane," he noted. "Giving Iran a foothold into Europe . . . . That's what this policy is about." (41) In particular, a great many Members of Congress would express their concern over the increased terrorist threat to US and NATO troops resulting from the expanded Iranian influence in Bosnia, a threat the Administration chose to overlook.
Yet, not all Members of Congress, particularly in the House, were upset by the revelation of the green light policy. Congressman Alcee Hastings spoke for many of them when he publicly thanked Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman for their efforts in putting together the green light policy:
A central criticism of the "no instructions" policy that you two gentlemen have testified here about allows that, according to some, it permitted the dangerous military and intelligence penetration of Bosnia by Iran.
Yet we know just from using open, public sources, the United States decisions in April of 1994 did not give Iran a beachhead in Bosnia; Iran and other Muslim countries were already there. And I might add for historians and the buffs of history, Islam has been involved in the Balkans since fights with the Ottoman empire, if we just want to go back into it . . . . And any Congressperson that did not know all of that, that serves on the Committee on International Relations, was not doing his or her job." (42)
The Genesis and Charter of the Select Subcommittee
The controversy over the secret green light policy culminated in calls for legislative investigations. The House of Representatives' Committees on International Relations, National Security, Intelligence, and Judiciary began investigations probing the Administration's green light policy in April and May of 1996. At the urging of his Senate colleagues, Senate Majority Leader Dole called upon the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Judiciary Committees for parallel investigations.
During initial hearings held by the House Intemational Relations Committee, many questions were raised that demanded further examination:
Was the US government directly or indirectly involved in the execution of the transfer of Iranian arms, and did any of the Administration's actions violate US law?
Where did the idea of an Iranian pipeline originate and with whom?
Why were Congress, the CIA and other government agencies, US allies, and the American public not notified of this decision when it was made or in the nearly two years until the policy was exposed by the press?
And, why did the President allow the world's most dangerous terrorist state, Iran, to provide arms and establish a foothold in Europe when other friendly nations were willing to help?
In an effort to consolidate the investigations of the four House committees and to further examine these questions, the House leadership and the International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman announced a proposal to establish a Select Subcommittee to investigate the United States' role in the transfer of arms from Iran to Bosnia and Croatia during the period when the international arms embargo was in effect. On May 8, 1996, the House approved Resolution 416 which created the Select Subcommittee within the International Relations Committee. The Subcommittee is composed of five Republican Members and three Democrat Members, and is chaired by Henry J. Hyde of Illinois, with Lee H. Hamilton as the Ranking Minority Member.
The Select Subcommittee was given the authority to investigate the following areas:
The policy of the United States Government with respect to the transfer of arms and other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during any period that an international arms embargo was in effect;
The nature and extent of the transfer of arms or other assistance from Iran or any other country to countries or entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the period that an international arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia was in effect;
Any actions taken by the United States Government to facilitate or to impede such transfers;
Any communication or representations made to the Congress of the United States or the American people with respect to the international arms embargo or with efforts to modify or terminate United States participation in that embargo;
Any implications from the Iranian arms transfers for the safety of United States armed forces deployed in or around Bosnia, for relations between the US and its allies and for United States efforts to isolate Iran;
And all deliberations and communications between the United States Government and other governments, organizations or individuals relating to such matters.
The Subcommittee's charter ends on November 8, 1996, by which time it is to have transmitted its report to the House International Relations Committee. Given its short lifespan and limited resources, the Subcommittee has attempted to address as many of the key questions as possible. What follows are the results of the Subcommittee's investigations.
CHAPTER 2
THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
AND THE EARLY YEARS OF THE BALKANS WAR
The events discussed in this report mainly occurred during and after April 1994. To understand these events, however, it is necessary to have a basic familiarity with the political developments in the former Yugoslavia prior to that date.
The autocratic rule of Yugoslav dictator Tito after World War II suppressed but did not eliminate the strongly divergent and divisive ethnic and religious tensions that have existed for hundreds of years between the various peoples living within the borders of what was Yugoslavia. These rivalries reemerged after Tito's death in 1980, and the centrifugal pull of ethnic identities led to increasingly bitter arguments over the scope and powers of the central government. Unable to convince Serbia and Montenegro that a loose confederation was a viable alternative to the existing Serb-dominated government, Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence on June 25, 1991. Further complicating the situation, several Serb-dominated regions of Croatia declared independence from the new republic.
The central Yugoslavian government based in Belgrade, Serbia promptly declared the Slovenia and Croatia secessions "illegal and illegitimate" and sent the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (YPA) to restore control over the breakaway regions. Hostilities broke out when the Croatian and Slovenian forces refused to lay down their arms. The fighting continued until the Brioni agreement was finalized in early July 1991.
The Brioni agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities in exchange for a three-month suspension of the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. The YPA soldiers began immediately to withdraw from Slovenia, where the Slovenian irregulars had been able to hold their own. Despite the agreement, however, the fighting continued within Croatia between the newly independent republic and the Krajina Serbs backed by the YPA forces.
In September 1991, the UN Security Council, through Resolution 713, enacted a general and complete arms embargo over the former Yugoslavia to try to temper the conflict. In October 1991, the three-month moratorium on secession elapsed, and the governments of Slovenia and Croatia formally separated from the former Yugoslavia. Germany recognized both countries as sovereign nations in December 1991. The European Community (EC) followed suit in January 1992.
As Slovenia and Croatia were leaving the former Yugoslavia, a more bitter and protracted conflict was developing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On October 14, 1991, the National Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina passed, by majority vote, a memorandum on sovereignty and independence which stopped just short of declaring outright independence. The following December 21st, the Bosnian Serbs held an unofficial referendum declaring their opposition to withdrawing from the withering Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and local Serbian leaders proclaimed their independence from Bosnia.
Following the lead of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia's Muslim and Croat citizens voted for independence in a March 1992 referendum. The Serbs boycotted. On April 6, the EC recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following day, the US recognized the nations of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lifted the economic sanctions against the three republics.
The Bosnian Serb minority vigorously opposed the withdrawal of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the rump SFRY that was rapidly becoming a de facto Serbian state. The Bosnian Serbs withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina into their self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
Fighting between the Serbs and the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government ensued. The Bosnian Serbs soon seized more than two-thirds of the Bosnian republic's territory and began the siege of Sarajevo. The Serbs managed their successes despite the fact that, according to a 1991 census, they comprised only 31 percent of the population, with the Muslims and Croatians having 44 and 17 percent, respectively. (43) Two key reasons the Bosnian Serbs gained such an advantage over the Bosnian Muslims so quickly were that the withdrawing YPA relinquished its large arsenal of weapons to the Bosnian Serb forces as it withdrew and that the YPA soldiers with a Bosnian Serb background stayed behind to become a formidable part of the new Bosnian Serb officer corps.
While the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims were fighting, the Bosnian Croatians were working to consolidate their positions in western Bosnia in their desired mini-state, Herceg-Bosnia, which they would proclaim in July 1992. The Bosnian Croatians, much like Croatia, would change sides in the Bosnian conflict as the circumstances affected their interests, supporting the Muslim government at this time, then later moving towards the Bosnian Serbs, until shifting again towards the Muslim government when the 1994 Washington Accords established the Bosnian Federation.
On May 30, 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 757. The resolution condemned the SFRY's defiance of UN demands that it cease its interference in the affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and placed an economic embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until it fulfilled its obligations under Resolution 752. Resolution 752, which was passed two weeks earlier on May 15, called for an end to the fighting in Bosnia, elimination of influence and forces from both the YPA and Croatia, and respect for the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Notwithstanding the UN's efforts, the war continued into the summer. In August 1992, representatives from over 30 countries and nongovernmental organizations met in London at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to bring about a negotiated end to the fighting. The London Conference, co-sponsored by the EC and the UN, named Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance co-chairmen of the EC-UN steering committee. The Conference affirmed the principle that international boarders should be changed only by mutual consent, and called for a cease fire, access to detention camps (by international organizations such as UN High Commission on Refugees or the Red Cross), and the protection of human and minority rights. Unfortunately, the London Conference, like the resolution before it, had little effect on the violence on the ground. Finally, on August 31, Cyrus Vance announced that all parties had already violated the terms of the Conference, including the cease-fire, which they had approved just days earlier.
The Geneva Peace Conference was held the following month, for the purpose of developing means of implementing the lofty principles declared by the London Conference. The Geneva Conference, under the co-chairmanship of Vance and Owen, established six working groups focusing on the most pressing issues confronting the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina, confidence-building measures, humanitarian issues, economic problems, minority rights and various other legal issues.
(classified data deleted) The US became aware of the program and demarche the Croats, who shut it down. The Iranians were forced to return to their small-scale arms smuggling and training efforts.
In October 1992, negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen advanced their plan (the "Vance-Owen" plan) to settle the conflict. Their plan was to establish a decentralized state with seven to ten autonomous provinces defined by economic and geographic, rather than ethnic, criteria. The Bosnian Serb leadership promptly rejected the plan the following day.
In response to the Bosnian Serbs, Vance and Owen reworked their plan several times, and in January 1993 the Bosnian Croats approved the measure. The Bosnian Muslims followed suit in March. On May 2, Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic signed the plan under intense pressure by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Two days later, the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected the plan, and the Vance-Owen process was finished.
There was no hiding the viciousness of the fighting. Genocide was frequently alleged by the combatants and, as the world discovered more and more about the atrocities being inflicted by all sides, the Security Council passed Resolution 808 in February 1993, establishing the War Crimes Tribunal. In support of the Resolution, the EC, the UN staff and the US State Department submitted reports documenting the crimes of systematic rape, murder, mutilation, deportation, illegal imprisonment, and "ethnic cleansing" by all parties.
All three sides committed a great many atrocities during this conflict upon innocents, but it appears the Bosnian Serbs were the most egregious in their violations of human rights. It was the Bosnian Serb leadership that set the war aim of creating an ethnically "pure" and geographically contiguous greater Serbia by (seemingly) any means necessary. Unfortunately, it will be future historians who will have to render a more complete accounting of the genocide which occurred.
In May 1993, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic warned of a "new aggression" by Bosnian Croatians, and relations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians steadily worsened. As the fighting intensified around the city of Mostar and throughout central Bosnia, both sides engaged in atrocities and "ethnic cleansing" to solidify gains made on the battlefield.
Also that May, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 824, which declared that Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Zepa should be treated as "safe areas" and that all Bosnian Serb military units should withdraw from those areas at once. The Security Council followed up this declaration on June 4, 1993 with Resolution 836 extending the mandate of UN Protection Forces and authorized measures, including use of force, to protect these "safe areas." By February of 1994, the situation on the ground had become intolerable for the NATO leadership as the Bosnian Serbs overran Srebrenica and Zepa and besieged and shelled the others, creating appalling humanitarian conditions. Serbian actions had made a mockery of the term "safe area."
The catalyst for increased international action came when a mortar shell landed in a crowded Sarajevo market on February 5, 1994, killing 68 and wounding over 200 civilians. The following day, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lifted his opposition to air strikes and asked NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to seek permission from the North Atlantic Council to secure a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. President Clinton supported the Secretary General's call for air strikes should more violence against civilians occur. On April 10, the NATO Alliance, in its first offensive action since its founding, launched air strikes against Serb positions which had been shelling Gorazde relentlessly. A second strike the following day helped bring the Bosnian Serb advance to a halt, although the Serbs maintained control over a large percentage of the territory acquired in their advance.
The Serbs had also been put on less advantageous terms by the Washington Accords reached the month before, in March, between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats. The Accords set up a Federation which, in addition to relieving military pressure on the hard-pressed Muslims, put the Serbs in a difficult strategic situation. The Croats were now freed up to begin preparations for a major offensive to retake the Krajina, and the Muslims were able to shore up their defenses and keep other Bosnian Serb units engaged elsewhere in Bosnia.
This was, in brief, the situation in the region in April 1994, when Iran again sought to interject itself into the war on a large scale.
CHAPTER 3
THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
ON THE BOSNIAN ARMS EMBARGO -- DENIAL AND DECEPTION
This chapter will examine the Clinton Administration's public policy on the UN arms embargo on Bosnia. Starting with the formulation of the Iranian green light policy in April 1994, the actual policy became very different from what the Administration represented it to be in its statements to Congress, the press, and the American people. As is discussed in Section II of this report, where the development and implementation of the Iranian green light policy are discussed at length, the Administration went to extraordinary lengths to keep its diplomatic duplicity under wraps. Senior Administration officials were intent that there should be no US "fingerprints." In the public realm, this went beyond the usual practice of offering "no comment" on allegations of US covert activity; instead, Administration officials from the President on down lied.
Some have criticized the Clinton Administration for a lack of consistency in foreign policy. While this charge could be leveled at several aspects of its Balkans policy, it would largely be unfair in describing the Administration's public record on the Bosnian arms embargo.
Regarding the embargo, the Administration consistently expressed its opposition to the embargo while also consistently stating its unwillingness to take unilateral action to lift it. The concept of unilateral action by the US was fundamentally inconsistent with the "assertive multilateralism" that became the centerpiece of the Administration's foreign policy. Assertive multilateralism rests on a high regard for the UN as an instrument of foreign policy, a profession of the moral obligation to follow the spirit and letter of international law, and the imperative of multilateral cooperation. In its public statements about the arms embargo, the Administration never deviated from the positions necessitated by these principles, despite the fact that the Administration learned within days of taking office that assertive multilateralism effectively tied its hands in working to lift the embargo it believed to be against US interests. It was this quandary that would, in April 1994, lead the Administration to subvert the embargo clandestinely through third parties, specifically Iran and Croatia.
The Administration's Sea Legs: The Idealism of "Assertive Multilateralism"
Although foreign policy was not a centerpiece of Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, Bosnia was an exception. Candidate Clinton condemned the Bush Administration's policy of nonintervention, "The continuing bloodshed in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia demands urgent international action . . . . It is time for real leadership to stop the continuing tragedy in the former Yugoslav republics." (44) He expressed confidence that, as president, he could define a policy, working jointly with other countries and the UN, that would stop the fighting and lead to a peace settlement. "We will make the United States the catalyst for a collective stand against aggression, the action I have urged in response to Serbian aggression in Bosnia." (45) He provided some specificity in the first presidential debate in October 1992:
I agree that we cannot commit ground forces to become involved in the quagmire of Bosnia or in the tribal wars of Somalia. But I think that it's important to recognize that there are things that can be done short of that, and that we do have an interest there . . . . I think we should stiffen the embargo on the Belgrade government, and I think we have to consider whether or not we should lift the arms embargo now on the Bosnians, since they are in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on "ethnic cleansing." We can't get involved in the quagmire, but we must do what we can. (46)
And, as Governor Clinton would repeatedly stress, "what we can do" meant what we can do in tandem with others, that is to say, within the framework of assertive multilateralism.
As might be expected, considering her key role in implementing multilateral foreign policy, US Ambassador to the UN and cabinet member Madeleine Albright became one of the preeminent public advocates of assertive multilateralism. As she has explained it, the US has three roles it can play internationally: " world cop," "ostrich," or "partner," and the Clinton Administration prefers the role of partner. As Ambassador Albright explained:
The fancy word is 'multilateral,' but the ordinary word is 'partner.' I fully believe it is my job at the U.N. and the job of all of us within the foreign policy structure to put an adjective with the partner -- senior, managing, leading, whatever way you want to phrase it. So the term assertive multilateralism comes from having a leadership role within a multilateral setting to deal with the problems that we have to deal with. (47)
Bosnia, for the Clinton Administration, is exactly such a problem; one of those many occasions when, in the words of George Stephanopoulos, "we need to bring pressure to bear on the belligerents of the post-Cold War period and use our influence to prevent ethnic and other regional conflicts from erupting. But usually we will not want to act alone -- our stake will be limited and direct U.S. intervention unwise." (48)
The weeks leading up to the inauguration in January 1993 saw the start of new UN-sponsored diplomatic talks on Bosnia in New York. These talks fed the hopes of the new Clinton foreign policy team, anxious to exercise its policy of multilateralism, as well as the hope of an American populace sickened by the viciousness of the fighting.
The heady days of transition brought forth within the new Administration declarations of major reviews of Bosnian policy alternatives and the strong desire for "improved" options. (49) Nonetheless, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, these ýÿÿÿ‚ |
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