was Obama's mother really doing in Ghana?
NYTimes Puff Piece on Ann Dunham below
Wikipedia: CIA Activities in Indonesia
Partial List of CIA Front Companies
was Obama's mother really doing in Ghana?
BACK October 19, 2010
NYTimes Puff Piece on Ann Dunham below
|The foreign travels of
Barack Obama, Jr., once also known as Barry
Soetoro, and his mother, Stanley Ann Dunham Soetoro/Sutoro have always
been clouded in mystery. Destroyed passports records for Dunham Soetoro,
her repeated name changes, and high-level political and intelligence
interest in the passport records of President Obama during the 2008
campaign have added to the contention, previously reported by WMR in
several articles, that
Obama and his mother were doing work for the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the hey-day of the renewed Cold
War under President Ronald Reagan. In such a light, the Africa travels
of Obama and his mother in the 1980s are of importance.
According to the only published biographical material available today, Dunham not only worked in Indonesia and Pakistan for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Java, the Regional Southeast Asia Office of the Ford Foundation in Jakarta, the Asian Development Bank for Pakistan Agricultural Development Bank’s Gujranwalla Agricultural Development Program in Lahore and Gujranwalla, all reportedly CIA fronts involved, respectively, in the post-Sukarno agency activities in Indonesia and CIA mujaheddin support activities in Pakistan, but she also spoke to varying degrees of fluency Bahasa Indonesian, Javanese, Urdu, Russian, and more interestingly, French. Dunham's presence in Indonesia and Pakistan would explain her knowledge of Bahasa Indonesian, Javanese, and Urdu, and her taking Russian at the University of Hawaii along with Obama's Kenyan father, Barack Obama, Sr., explains her knowledge of that language. However, it is Dunham's knowledge of French and the only other reported country she visited in Africa, other than Kenya, Ghana, that raises suspicions as to her true mission when she was in West Africa.
Dunham may have also visited Kenya after the birth of her son. She expressed a desire to move there with Barack, Jr. to be with her husband. Dunham revealed that she planned to move to Kenya with her new born son to be with her husband.
While working for the various CIA front entities, including the Ford Foundation, World Bank, and International Labor Organization, Dunham also spent time in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Philippines, and Thailand, all of which are of no surprise considering her Asian ties, but also, unusually, Ghana. Dunham re-applied for her U.S. passport in Honolulu on April 27, 1986. She supposedly left Hawaii for Indonesia in 1988 to complete her PhD in anthropology from the University of Hawaii. However, she also reportedly lived in Pakistan from 1987 to 1992 working for the Asian Development Bank.
Dunham was officially registered as a student at the University of Hawaii from the fall semester of 1984 to the summer semester of 1992, when she finally earned her PhD. Dunham's two-year employment contract for the Ford Foundation ended in December 1982, before which she may have been involved as a Javanese speaker with the Suriname exile community to help plan the CIA's overthrow of the country's left-wing dictator Desi Bouterse. Dunham reportedly returned to Jakarta to work for Ford until 1984. There is no indication as to when Dunham went to Ghana but in the mid-1980s, the country and one of its northern neighbors, Burkina Faso, were hotbeds for CIA activity.
It is also not known whether Barack Obama, Jr's first visit to Kenya, in 1987, before he attended Harvard Law School, coincided with his mother's visit to Ghana and whether the two had met in Africa as they reportedly did when Obama visited his mother in Indonesia in 1981 before he went to stay with "friends" in Pakistan and India, and possibly later, when his mother was supposedly in Pakistan from 1987 to 1992, at the same time she was supposedly studying Javanese village life in Indonesia for her PhD at the University of Hawaii.
The inconsistencies in Dunham's employment, academic, and travel records coincide with suspicions concerning Obama's college transcripts, all sealed, from Occidental College, a favorite CIA recruiting campus, and Columbia University, a favorite CIA think tank contractor, as well as his post-Columbia employment in New York City for Business International Corporation, a well-known CIA front company responsible mainly for reaching out to Communist and Marxist governments and political parties around the world.
In 1987, two leaders in West Africa had the full attention of the CIA's Africa division: Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, who overthrew Ghana's civilian leadership in a 1981 coup, and Captain Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, formerly Upper Volta. Although Rawlings was considered a leftist, his commitment to sustainable development project earned him the support of the World Bank and possibly, "Mrs. Rural Development Micro-loan" Stanley Ann Dunham. Hence, we have Dunham's only reported visit to the African continent.
However, Rawlings commitment to sustainable development and anti-corruption did not save him from an attempted CIA-backed coup in 1983, oddly during one of those periods where Dunham's whereabouts, following her departure from the Ford Foundation in New York, remain uncertain. It should be recalled that one of the reasons for the CIA's Airlift Africa project that brought Dunham's first husband from Kenya to Hawaii in 1960 was to influence future leaders of newly-independent African states. Obama. Sr's Kenyan mentor, Tom Mboya, became the arch-nemesis of Africa's most popular socialist leader, Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah was ousted in a CIA coup in 1966, one year after Dunham's second husband, Lolo Soetoro, Barack Obama's step-father, assisted General Suharto in the CIA-planned coup against President Sukarno of Indonesia.
In 1983, a Ghanaian named Godfrey Osei tried to launch a coup against Rawlings, considered to be a Marxist by the CIA. Osei managed to escape from a Ghanaian prison with the help of the CIA in June 1983 and he ended up in the United States where he made plans for another coup against Rawlings. Osei was based in Queens,, New York a few months after Dunham's contract with the Ford Foundation, where she worked for Peter Geithner, the father of present Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, expired and the Congress banned any further CIA attempts to overthrow Bouterse in Suriname. However, the ban did not extend to Ghana or Burkina Faso.
Osei was supported by the CIA and Mossad during his exile in New York. Apparently, Israeli crime syndicates were promised lucrative gambling casino, diamond, gold, cocoa, and coffee concessions in Ghana after Rawlings was overthrown and Osei was installed as president. Osei arranged with the CIA to purchase post-Falklands War surplus Argentinian weapons from a Texas arms broker who was also linked to the Mossad.
In 1986, a tug called the Norbistor departed Argentina with weapons bound for Ghana. Osei had also contracted with CIA mercenaries who were veterans of wars in Rhodesia, Laos and El Salvador. The mercenaries were also linked to a Solomon Schwartz of New York, someone who had suspected Mossad links. Upon setting sail for Ghana, the Norbistor's captain and mercenaries mutinied and docked near Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where they were arrested and jailed by Brazilian police for illegally transporting weapons into Brazilian waters. There are reports that since Osei, who was witnessed wearing Nazi SS regalia and believed to be mentally unstable, was ordered not to join the ship on its voyage to Ghana and that the CIA mercenaries subsequently aborted the mission, the entire CIA operation to land mercenaries and weapons in Accra after rendezvousing with Ghanaian soldiers off the Ivory Coast to start a coup against Rawlings had been compromised by the CIA on purpose. Two Americans jailed in Brazil later "escaped" from prison and returned to the United States. Rawlings, who may have also been tipped off to the coup plot, began to moderate his leftist position and announced plans for a return to civilian rule.
However, the CIA was not as sanguine about Rawling's colleague to the north, Sankara, the leftist leader of Burkina Faso who praised Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Sankara, like Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, became public enemies as far as the CIA was concerned. If Dunham was anywhere near West Africa in 1987, with her command of French, the language of Burkina Faso, she would, with her experiences with Indonesia's coup and, possibly, attempted coups in Ghana and Suriname, have been a perfect fit for the CIA to act as a liaison with French intelligence and Burkina Faso government coup plotters in Ouagadougou, the Burkinabe capital; Abidjan, the French-speaking Ivorian capital; and Accra, a CIA support station for a planned move against Sankara. The CIA's operations against Sankara also reportedly involved a number of CIA-backed English-speaking guerrilla assets in West Africa, including Charles Taylor (search Pat Robertson, Charles Taylor) of Liberia, Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone, and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia. All three also enjoyed close relations with Libya's Qaddafi. Taylor and Jammeh would later overthrow the civilian leaders of Liberia and Gambia, respectively, with CIA help. Sankoh would head the Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that would help plunge the country into a bloody civil war that was marked by the RUF's penchant for chopping off of the limbs of children.
In October 1987, Sankara praised Guevara at a commemoration ceremony honoring the 20th anniversary of the execution of the Cuban revolutionary leader at the hands of a CIA hit squad in Bolivia. Sankara said, in praise of Guevara's revolutionary ideals, "revolutionaries can be killed but you cannot kill ideas." Sankara also rejected aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank because he did not want to subject Burkina Faso to debt and taking orders from foreign powers. Sankara pressed for public health care, roads, railways, rural development, and pushing back desertification of the one-time French colonial backwater known as Upper Volta. Upon making his decision to reject IMF and World bank loans and grants, Sankara stated at a news conference, "We must speak in one voice, saying this debt cannot be paid. And since I am the lone voice, I will be assassinated. We must say together, we cannot pay, because we have to work to build a future for our people. If only Burkina Faso refuses to pay, I will not be here at the next conference."
Two weeks after making those remarks, on October 15, 1987, Sankara's second-in-command, Captain Blaise Campaore, walked into a room where Sankara was sitting and fired two shots at Sankara who slumped in his chair and died. Campaore had coordinated his coup with the CIA station at the US embassy in Ouagadougou and the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) station at the French embassy. There was also strong suspicion of Mossad involvement in the coup. Apparently, Qaddafi had also soured on Sankara, possibly because of his pan-Africanist revolutionary ideas, something Qaddafi reserved for himself, and quietly supported the French- and American-backed coup.
The voice of the man who said, "As an army at the service of the revolution, the National Popular Army will have no place for any soldier who looks down on, scorns, or brutalizes his people . . . this will be a struggle against those who starve the people, the agricultural speculators and capitalists of all types . . . health care available to everyone . . . trade with all countries on an equal footing and on the basis of mutual benefit . . . it fills me with indignation to think of the Palestinians, who an inhuman humanity has decided to replace with another people -- a people martyred only yesterday . . . I wish to also feel close to my comrades of Nicaragua, whose harbors are mined, whose villages are bombed, and who, despite everything , face their destiny with courage and clear-headedness . . . the most pitiful and appalling -- yes, the most appalling -- record in terms of arrogance, insolence, and incredible stubbornness, is held by a small country in the Middle East, Israel. With the complicity of its powerful protector, the United States -- which words cannot describe -- Israel has continued to defy the international community for more than twenty years . . . Ideas do not die," that voice was gone.
It is not certain what role, if any, Barack Obama's mother played in the coup against and assassination of Sankara in 1987. But in 2009, Obama and the First Lady feted Sankara's assassin, Campaore, and his wife at a reception in New York at the time of the UN General Assembly summit. Sankara's ideas about non-interference in the affairs of other countries, health care for all, rejection of international banking schemes, and self-sufficiency obviously fell on deaf ears for the first African-American president of the United States, who appears more interested in backing CIA machinations against his own cousins on the African continent. However by meeting Campaore last year and snubbing Suriname's president Bouterse this year, Obama may have been paying homage to the CIA activities of his dear old mom, the lady, who, like her son, has tremendous gaps in her employment and travel record.
|Obama's mother began her Indonesian field work at height of complaints about CIA involvement with foreign "research" BACK|
|March 28-29, 2011 - SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE REPORT.
In a continuation of WMR's investigation of the CIA backgrounds of President Obama and his mother, Stanley Ann Dunham Obama Soetoro, we have obtained a copy of an important report written by University of California-Los Angeles anthropology professor Dr. Ralph Beals for the Officers and Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) and delivered to the annual meeting of the AAA on November 17, 1966 in Pittsburgh.
Beals' significant report remains relatively obscure to those outside the field of applied anthropology but what it detailed is a critical indictment of the CIA and Defense Department in co-opting young and inexperienced field anthropologists like Dunham Soetoro to conduct "data mining" for CIA and Pentagon covert "counter-insurgency" operations. Dunham Soetoro's receipt of funding from the Ford Foundation is a troubling aspect of President Obama's upbringing. Far from being raised by a leftist "flower child" of the 1960s who for a time reportedly lived on food stamps, young Barack Obama was raised in a family that was never without need or want but benefited from a CIA-funded regime that permitted anthropologists like Dunham Soetoro to collect large tax-free salaries abroad while conducting dubious research for the CIA via foundation-laundered funding.
In its investigation of U.S. intelligence activities in the 1960s and 70s, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-ID) discovered that one-third of all the hard and social sciences grants awarded by the "Big Three" foundations - Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie - involved CIA money. In some cases, the CIA-funded "research" was later used for the CIA's torture, counter-insurgency, "termination with extreme prejudice," and surveillance of targets abroad and within the United States.
With a Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology from the University of Hawaii under her belt, Dunham Soetoro moved with her seven-year old son to Jakarta to be with her husband , Indonesian Army Colonel Lolo Soetoro - a hit man for the CIA-installed Suharto regime -- to ply her intelligence agency apprenticeship in mapping the political and social allegiances of the people of the island of Java, a longtime island of opportunity for CIA machinations.
Dunham Soetoro's work in Indonesia for USAID and Ford followed by two years President Lyndon Johnson's dictate to Secretary of State Dean Rusk: "I am determined that no Government sponsorship of foreign area research should be undertaken which in the judgment of the Secretary of State would adversely affect United States foreign relations." According to the Beals Report, this presidential directive placed the government in a commanding role in deciding who and what projects, including foreign anthropology research, would be funded. For good measure, to ensure that such research had a military or intelligence predicate, Rusk assigned oversight for foreign area research to Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research for the State Department.
As Dr. David Price, a pre-eminent expert in the use of anthropologists by the CIA and Pentagon in clandestine operations wrote in a 2009 article in Critique of Anthropology titled, " Subtle Means and Enticing Carrots: The Impact of Funding on Cold War Anthropology ," the Ford Foundation, State Department, and CIA were "involved in intricate covert political interventions in Indonesia. One of the top witting or unwitting U.S. assets in Java was Dr. Clifford Geertz , a pioneer in the anthropological surveys of Java for the CIA and would have most certainly have known Dunham Soetoro in Java or may have even been her de facto "control officer."
Geertz had an unusual interest in the Balinese blood sport of cockfighting. Price cites Professor Nancy Scheper-Hughes, director of the Medical Anthropology program at the University of California-Berkeley and whose investigation of an Israeli-based ring of human organ traffickers led to a number of arrests by the FBI of a number of perpetrators. [It is interesting to note that in her investigation of the Israeli organ theft operation, which targeted unsuspecting poor people in developing countries, Scheper-Hughes discovered that one of the motivating factors for the Israeli heft of organs from non-Jews was, as she stated in a 2008 lecture, "revenge, restitution, reparation for the Holocaust - the attitude being "'we're gong to get every single kidney and liver and heart that we can. The world owes it to us."]
In the Indonesia context, Scheper-Hughes wrote of Geertz:
"Clifford Geertz's celebrated Balinese ‘cockfight" scenario was developed within the larger context of a national political emergency that resulted in the massacre of almost three-quarters of a million Indonesians, though it took Geertz three decades to mention the killings that had engulfed his Javanese field site, now forever associated in our minds with those semiotic fighting roosters."
In the context of current events, where President Obama has, without a thought for the carnage wrought on innocent civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and now, Libya, has ordered wanton attacks by drone aircraft, Special Forces units, U.S. Army Stryker units, "precision-guided" munitions (including those tipped with depleted uranium warheads), and, in the case of Libya, stand-off Tomahawk cruise missiles, the involvement of Dunham Soetoro with "blood sport" aficionados like Geertz , a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the CIA-linked Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, raises troubling questions. If Geertz was a role model for Obama's mother, and his mother was a role model for Obama, there is a distinct possibility that the President of the United States was raised within a household where mass murder of civilians was not considered a crime against humanity.
Geertz was the beneficiary of the largesse of CIA-linked philanthropic foundations, Rand Corporation, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), CIA, and Pentagon funding in Java and Bali at the same time Dunham Soetoro was a young field anthropologist in western Java. Price writes that Geertz "ignored the Indonesian political setting that gave rise to death squads, military and police terror, institutionalized unemployment, and eventually to the bloodbath that followed the US-backed coup against Sukarno." And it was in this very environment that Obama's mother chose to raise her son who has stated that the massacre of between 750,000 and 1 million Indonesians was not known to his mother before she ventured to join her husband in Indonesia. Obama is either ignorant of history or engaged in a dishonest campaign to divorce his family from genocide in Indonesia that the record clearly indicates that they were involved to varying degrees in carrying out for the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administration.
Geertz's role as a patron for Dunham Soetoro is also problematic when one considers that Geertz, who first entered Indonesia under the aegis of the Ford Foundation (and CIA)-funded Project Modjokuto in 1954. The project was conducted through the auspices of the CIA-funded Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT and Harvard University. Modjokoto was similar to the Pentagon's Project Camelot in Chile in the 1960s, which represented the use of anthropologists to conduct counter-insurgency studies among various ethnic groups in countries ripe for U.S. covert intervention.
The Beals Report cites the CIA's use of universities to carry out social science research: "There have also been disclosures of contracts involving the Central Intelligence Agency and certain U.S. universities, undertakings which appear to pose a threat to the integrity both of the universities as sponsors of social research and to the social sciences themselves."
The Beals Report states that Camelot, funded by a contract to the Special Operations Research Office at American University, used American social scientists who attempted to enlist Chilean social scientists, to carry out "a study of the social political factors related to the possibility of internal warfare in that country." The research was conducted some nine years before a bloody CIA-directed coup saw the assassination of democratically-elected President Salvador Allende, on September 11, 1973, and the imposition of a fascist regime under General Augusto Pinochet. The history of Obama's mother's involvement with anthropologists who were likely involved in Camelot may have been a factor in his failure to apologize while visiting Chile for the CIA's involvement in the assassination of Allende and its suspected involvement in the later murder of former President Eduardo Frei Montalva. Apologies for CIA crimes do not appear to be in Obama's political lexicon.
Modjokuto was the brainchild of the CIA's former assistant director of research and reports, Max Millikan, and Walt W. Rostow, who would later become a national security adviser to President Johnson. Supporting Modjokuto with a view that data gleaned from the project could ultimately be used to oust President Sukarno was Frank Wisner, Sr., a top CIA clandestine services official. Modjokuto's intentions were to transform Indonesia into a modern economic consumer-oriented nation-state, ripe for Western investment but resistant to armed insurgencies. It was a goal championed by Geertz and, later, Dunham Soetoro.
Another CIA operative who engaged in the use of anthropologists to carry out counter-insurgency campaigns was Colonel Edward Lansdale, who , in the CIA's campaign in the Philippines against Communist Huk guerrillas, broadcast messages in Tagalog from a loudspeaker mounted on a small aircraft flying above heavy cloud layer. The Huk-controlled villages that the curses , based on local myths, being broadcast by the aircraft were messages from the gods. In fact, Lansdale obtained the local cultural information from anthropologists on the CIA's payroll. Lansdale was later implicated in the CIA's and Pentagon's role in the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.
As Professor Price points out in his article, Millkan and Rostow were the brains behind the co-option of anthropologists and U.S. development assistance programs to carry out the war against Communism. In a 1954 CIA point paper written by Millikan and "WWR" (Walt Whitman Rostow), titled "Notes on Foreign Economic Policy," it is stressed that . . . "free world success in seeing the underdeveloped countries through their difficult transition to self-sustaining growth would deny to Moscow and Peking the dangerous mystique that only Communism can transform underdeveloped societies."
When Dunham Soetoro went to Indonesia in 1967 to help in the CIA's and General Suharto's anti-Communist "mopping up" operations, the use of anthropologists as CIA field agents had the support of McGeorge Bundy, who became the National Security Adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and who was succeeded by Walt Rostow, one of the masterminds of Modjokuto. After leaving the White House, Bundy became the President of the Ford Foundation, the organization that laundered CIA money for Geertz's Modjokuto work and Dunham Soetoro's Communist targeting in post-Sukarno Indonesia.
An even darker side to the CIA's use of anthropologists in its research was the involvement of the CIA front, the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecology Fund, in research projects that involved the study of sex, stress, and refugees. These studies, a personal favorite of CIA director Allen Dulles, involved the study of human pain, methods of persuasion, and enhanced interrogation practices. The CIA "human ecology" projects link the CIA's MK-ULTRA, MK-NAOMI, and MK-DELTA psychological operations to field programs such as those involving both Ann Dunham and her husband, Lolo Soetoro, a participant in counter-insurgency operations in Indonesia and West Papua om the island of New Guinea. The Beal Report cites "large and unstudied" New Guinea as being "saturated" by an "increasing number of social scientists" who began encountering one another in the field.
The CIA's money-laundering process for Obama's mother's anthropology field work in Indonesia and Pakistan.
President Obama's upbringing in such an environment may explain his approval for the continued operation of the Guantanamo Bay gulag, the torture of Private First Class Bradley Manning in Quantico, and the continued operation of CIA "black sites" that are involved in the worldwide kidnapping and torture of detainees. In other words, the possible exposure of Obama to such practices at a young age may have created a "Manchurian candidate" in reverse, a president who obeys every command emanating from the top secret lairs of Langley.
WMR previously reported that Dunham Soetoro's and Lolo Soetoro's alma mater, the University of Hawaii, which hosted the CIA-funded East-West Center, was one of CIA director Richard Helms' five favorite universities for "behavioral sciences" studies. Behavioral science was also of keen interest to the Rockefeller family. The Beals Report states that after President Johnson, on September 15, 1965, presented "a major new program in international education and in the communication of scholarly knowledge and thought on a broadened international basis," the Division of Behavioral Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council formed a committee under Donald Young of Rockefeller University to advise the government on behavioral sciences research, in coordination with the Departments of Defense and State. The Rockefeller Foundation had been involved in funding a number of anthropological studies that were geared to the forced assimilation of the native Indians of northern Central America into nation states, including Guatemala and Mexico. The Rockefeller-funded program, linked to the CIA, was conducted through the "Yucatan Linguistics Surveys."
Senator Fred Harris (D-OK) held hearings before his Subcommittee on Government Research on foreign area research in the area of behavioral studies. Committee files indicate that the "research" involved the State Department, USAID, the Peace Corps, US Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, and National Science Foundation. The Beals Report cites the National Defense Education Act as an important tool used by the Pentagon and CIA to ensure that universities succumbed to the foreign research dictates of the U.S. military and intelligence or risk losing their funding.
Dunham Soetoro's later work for the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Indonesia and Asian Development Bank in Pakistan came at a time when developing countries were prime targets for American anthropologists who were working for entities in addition to the CIA. As Professor Price points out: "In the 1970s and 1980s, applied anthropologists found a small funding gold mine in the superpowers' competition for clients as USAID, the World Bank, and IMF contested for the debts and loyalties of the Third World." Contrary to the "invented" biography of Dunham Soetoro as some female version of Dr. Albert Schweitzer, Prince points out the result of the various projects funded by USAID, World Bank, and others: "Arguably, in the end, the debt created by most of these projects turns out to have had a greater societal impact than the social, health, or agricultural benefits they produced."
Professor Price provides a summation of the actual goals of foundations, such as Ford, in their funding of projects such as those of Dunham Soetoro in Indonesia and Pakistan:
". . . these foundations serve as intergenerational anti-devolutionary fortresses which protect large portions of amassed capital from inheritance and estate taxes - allowing family members to manage these funds, and direct research in areas of direct interest to the families and their investments."
The chief foundations that use tax-exempt provision to push overt and covert agendas are the "Big Three" - Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller - as well as Duke and Kellogg. Price points out of the role of anthropologists in this grand design of the foundation families, "Anthropology was earning its keep as a passive player in America's imperial braintrust."
The Beals Report contains a paragraph that directly applies to the suspicious field work carried out in Suharto's Indonesia by Dunham Soetoro beginning in 1967: "There are strong reasons to believe that private research organizations offering ‘systems' approaches, but without competent social science staffs or sufficient experience with problems of foreign research, are contracting to do very large Camelot-type studies in countries where these are acceptable to U.S. Ambassadors and the host governments. Experienced personnel do not exist for research on this scale. Young, partially trained, and inexperienced people are being recruited and in some cases literally seduced by extravagant salaries. Former Peace Corps personnel are being recruited to provide local country "expertise," an action not likely to produce proper advice, and one certain to undermine the integrity of the Peace Corps."
Local suspicions of the activities of anthropologists in nations like Indonesia are described in the Beals Report: "Some problems are particularly acute in the so-called developing countries, especially where there is limited understanding of social science and its purposes and possible utility, or where anthropology formerly was associated with the goals and administration of colonial governments."
In a major criticism of the CIA's use of anthropologists abroad, the Beals Report declares: It is reported that: Agents of the intelligence branches of the United States Government, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, have posed as anthropologists or asserted that they were doing anthropological research. When in fact they were neither qualified as anthropologists nor competent to do basic anthropological studies. Journalists and others from the United States and elsewhere have also posed as anthropologists, and even though not involved in secret intelligence work for agencies of their governments, they have, through their behavior, created difficulties for legitimate anthropologists and their research." [It should be noted that after graduating from Columbia University in 1983, Barack Obama went to work for Business International Corporation, an entity that admitted to the use by the CIA of its journalists abroad as CIA agents under journalistic "cover."]
Beals launched a second broadside against the CIA for its use of anthropologists abroad (and appears to be a reference to those in Dunham Soetoro's category): "It is reported that: "Some of those qualified by training to call themselves anthropologists, and representing themselves as engaged in anthropological research, have actually been affiliated with United States intelligence agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Agency. This has come about through direct employment by these agencies, or through accepting grants from certain foundations with questionable sources of income [emphasis added], or through employment by certain private research organizations. In some cases, such persons have falsely represented themselves as still being associated with universities, although their prior academic affiliations no longer existed."
And in a third criticism of the CIA's use of anthropologists (and another possible reference to people like Dunham Soetoro), Beals states: "It is said that: Some anthropologists, particularly younger ones, who have encountered difficulties in securing funds for legitimate research, have been approached by obscure foundations or have been offered supplementary support from such sources, only to discover later that they were expected to provide intelligence information, usually to the Central Intelligence Agency. Some anthropologists are reported to have sought such support and to have accepted commissions willingly." Beals states that some of the foundations and "alleged foundations" could not be listed by name but could be "identified among those that do not publish balance sheets indicating the sources of their funds." Beals adds, "a few anthropologists report that they were approached by U.S. Embassy officials in the countries where they worked, or that they were interviewed by representatives of intelligence agencies after they had returned."
Beals concludes with two additional stark warnings about the use by U.S. intelligence of anthropologists abroad: "Although some individual anthropologists have been guilty of behavior that threatens to impair the access to foreign areas by their colleagues, the greatest dangers have actually come from contracts, actions, and projects of the United States Government and of some academic and private research organizations , even though these did not primarily involve anthropological activities." In addition, Beals states, "in several countries of South and Central America, Africa, and Asia financing from certain United States governmental sources is suspect and in some cases completely unacceptable. These sources include such mission-oriented agencies as the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Information Agency, and the Department of State." One of Dunham Soetoro's first jobs in Jakarta was one funded by the USIA - one of the suspect agencies cited in the Beals Report.
|Anthropological Research and the Freedom of Information Act|
|Online full text version of: Price, David H. 1997 "Anthropological Research and the Freedom of Information Act" Cultural Anthropology Methods 9(1):12-15. Some CIA Records held on the American Anthropological Association 1, 2. Not much here, but I guess that's the point. Look at the below item for documentation relating to the CIA purging its own files relating to the AAA (see Price 1995). Link #2 is the one partial page that CIA has released. This comes from a pre-1977 annual meetings of the AAA, and indicates that someone attended the meetings and kept notes for CIA. The page shown here is page 14 of a document who's entire length is unknown, all of the page has been blanked out by CIA's FOIA officers except for the paragraph shown here (see also Wakin 1992). A recent CIA letter documenting CIA's destruction of records relating to the American Anthropological Association. I have a lot of these CIA document destruction memos, here is a sample of one. George Murdock's CIA file-as well as a number of other anthropologists' files were destroyed under similar guidelines (see Price 1995 & 1996a for HRAF/CIA arrangements). Some FBI records held on an unnamed Sociology Professor at the New School for Social Research (From Theoharis 1988). 1 , 2 , 3 . I guess one of the lessons of history is that when given enough time, tragedy reads as comedy. Here we find Hoover's G-men evoking launching an investigation into the sociological imagination of an unnamed sociologist at the New School after he suggested that there were similarities to be found between the Boy Scouts of America ® and the Hitler Youth Movement. An early CIA document showing CIA's interest in the Summer Institute of Linguistics and the Wycliffe Bible Translators. Despite claims by Wycliffe, SIL and others, CIA has been interested in the SIL and missionary groups since the 1950s. In a bizarre attack on Gerard Colby & Charlotte Dennett's excellent book (1995) Thy Will Be Done-The Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockfeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil, Rusty Wright in Christianity Today has stated that claims of a CIA/SIL connection were without any documentation. Coby and Dennett's book is well referenced and contains plenty of such substantiation, the above link also (see also Stoll 1982) Max Millikan and Walt Rostow's 1954 CIA position paper written for Allan Dulles on the Cold War uses of Modernization Theory and Development Projects. In the essay "Subtle Means and Enticing Carrots: Cold War Funding and the Evolution of Academic Anthropology" (Price 1996) I use portions of this remarkable CIA document to show the Cold War context of anthropologists' involvement in Development work. This document show the CIA's awareness of Development primarily as a Cold War battle strategy. The "Subtle Means" paper also examines some of the relationships between Clifford Geertz's work at CENIS (where Millikan was the director after leaving his position at CIA & Rostow worked on classified research) and his Ford sponsored Modjokuto Project research in Indonesia. Some OSS Records relating to American anthropologist Cora DuBois An OSS report written by Gregory Bateson at the end of his clandestined work in Ceylon. A telegram sent by Margaret Mead to Melville Jacobs asking him to conduct Cold War survey research without disclosing the purpose and uses of this research. A few FBI memos and records relating to Clyde Kluckhohn and his relationship with the OWI, CIA, FBI and DoS.|
|Wikipedia, CIA activities in Indonesia|
Since the late 1950s, the
CIA has been involved in attempts to
reduce Communist activity in Indonesia. A coup in 1958 failed to affect
the rule of President Sukarno, but after a purge of Communists in 1965,
Indonesian military officers General Abdul Haris Nasution (Indonesians
often use only a single name) and Maj. Gen. Suharto led their forces to
liquidate the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and eventually oust
President Sukarno. Suharto's pivotal role led to his assumption of the
Indonesian presidency in 1967. In 1998, the US declassified a number of
records about the various covert actions. Contents [hide] 1 Indonesia
1958 1.1 Intelligence collection 1.2 Covert action 1.3 Indonesia 1964
1.3.1 Intelligence analysis 1.4 Indonesia 1965 1.4.1 Covert action 1.4.2
Intelligence analysis 1.4.3 Anti-communist purge 1.5 Indonesia 1998 2
References Indonesia 1958
Intelligence collection During an unguarded conversation in Washington before 1958, the Indonesian military attaché mentioned to Americans that there were many prominent and strong people in Indonesia who would be ready to rise against President Sukarno if they were given a little support and encouragement from the United States. One of those U.S friends was a CIA staffer who reported the words to Frank Wisner, then the Deputy Director of Plans. Covert action The attaché returned to Indonesia with CIA personnel under military cover. They learned enough about the potential strength of this opposition to encourage the CIA to set in motion its biggest operation up to that date. Those personnel contacted Filipino military men, especially a Colonel Valeriano, with whom the CIA had worked in Ramon Magsaysay's counterinsurgency against the Hukbalahap leftist rebels. CIA and Filipino counterinsurgents had, by early 1958, set up special operations training bases, apparently with United States Army Special Forces trainers, and made clandestine air bases on Palawan and Mindanao available to Indonesian rebels. On Feb. 9, 1958, rebel Colonel Maluddin Simbolon issued an ultimatum in the name of a provincial government, the Central Sumatran Revolutionary Council, calling for the formation of a new central government. Sukarno refused and called upon his loyal army commander, General Abdul Haris Nasution, to destroy the rebel forces. By Feb. 21 loyal forces had been airlifted to Sumatra and had begun the attack. The rebel headquarters was in the southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia. CIA supported the Indonesian rebellion from the main Far East base in Naha, Okinawa, under Ted Shannon. Another support facility was on Taiwan, where B-26 bombers were prepared to ferry them to the Philippine bases that would support the Indonesian rebels. CIA, drawing on US Marine and Army stocks, provided 42,000 rifles. Armed Indonesians returned to Sumatra by airdrop from the Philippines, and by landings from US submarines.  In May 1958 an B-26 operated by CIA proprietary Civil Air Transport was shot down during a bombing and strafing mission and the resulting publicity ended the attempt. Indonesia 1964 Intelligence analysis An Office of Current Intelligence (i.e., not intelligence community wide, but a status report) memorandum observed early "stirrings of an anti-Communist movement in Indonesia". The opponents cite an ideology called "Sukarnoism." "The movement is ostensibly dedicated to the defense of the President's almost mystical Five Principles (Pantjasila), but its main purpose appears to be that of combating PKI (i.e., Indonesian Communist Party) influence in the government and throughout the country. Sukarno appears to have given it "indirect approval…but it could collapse overnight" if he moves to suppress it. The US became aware of the movement during Sukarno's absence on a foreign tour from 17 September to 5 November, when articles berating the PKI appeared in the Djakarta press. The PKI responded. Just before and after Sukarno's return, the anti-PKI rhetoric subsided, almost as if the Sukarnoists feared retribution from the President. The only government move against the group, however, was the banning of a single Sukarnoist newspaper soon after the President's return. In the absence of further repressive action, the group seems to have taken on new courage, and its leaders are trying to organize and expand the forces involved. The Sukarnoists are led by Minister of Trade Adam Malik, but Chaerul Saleh, third deputy prime minister and concurrently minister of development, is also deeply involved. Malik, who is a former Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Saleh are ideologically attuned to the "right wing" of the Murba (Proletarian) Party, usually described as the national Communist Party of Indonesia. With Indonesia having moved a considerable distance to the left under Sukarno, Malik and Saleh represent a "moderate" position, and their activities are arousing the hopeful interest of individuals who stand further to the right. Part of their platform is treating Malaysia as a bitter enemy. They also attacked PKI Chairman Dipa Nusantara Aidit for a statement he allegedly made disavowing the need for Pantjasila, to which all recognized political parties are obliged to subscribe--"once the revolution is won." Although this particular line of attack has been abandoned, the Sukarnoists continue to warn against those who are not true "Pantjasilaists." Malik told US Ambassador Jones on 19 November that his movement has the support of the Muslim party, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); the right wing of the National Party; and lower levels of the bureaucracy and political parties. Youth groups have organized a "Sukarnoist Student Movement"; several non-Communist labor federations reportedly have banded together in an "undercover body" to support Sukarnoism, but the labor groups feel they must keep their organization secret to avoid attack by the PKI. Malik feels that for the time being the movement must remain a loose coalition. Whether the Sukarnoists have the extensive support they claim cannot be verified. For the most part only the statements of Djakarta politicians are available. There is a large but disparate body of non-Communist opinion in Indonesia, however, which would rally if given a safe opportunity. Army leaders aligned the Sukarnoists. Minister of Information Achmadi, who earlier had opposed it, reportedly told Sukarnoist supporters in North Sumatra to ignore attacks and to spread the doctrine but to preserve national unity. Even First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, who has tried to curry favor with the PKI for the past year and a half, reportedly received a Sukarnoist delegation, was "very friendly," and gave "valuable advice." Parliament, scheduled to open on 3 December, has postponed its next session until the second quarter of 1965. The change may have been arranged to avoid an early showdown between the PKI and the Sukarnoists. The PKI, with its allies in the left wing of the National Party, was defensive. It labeled Sukarnoism a disguise for "Communist phobia"--a favorite term of Sukarno's--and stressed that the anti-PKI campaign developed behind Sukarno's back while he was out of the country. It charges that Sukarnoism is an attempt to displace NASAKOM, Sukarno's term for the cooperation of nationalist, religious, and Communist elements. Prospects of the Sukarnoists seem to depend largely on Sukarno, who is known for his political balancing. The successful development of Sukarnoism may be of interest to him. He could be willing to overlook for a time the fact that there are elements within Sukarnoist ranks whom he distrusts and whom he has considered expelling from the recognized political scene. A major factor in Sukarno's permissive attitude toward the new anti-PKI group may be his hope that he can use it in maneuvering to schedule new talks on the Malaysia issue, and he may even believe he can use it to get economic assistance from the West. Sukarnoist spokesmen urged the US Embassy to take steps to encourage UK-Indonesian or Indonesian-Malaysian talks, to avoid aggression against Malaysia, possibly to hide Indonesian economic problems. Sukarnoists seemed to be trying to change the Malaysian confrontation from a politico-military to a politico-economic one, as a means of pressing national economic development. Although the Sukarnoists are not necessarily being directed by Sukarno to approach the Americans, their needs and strategy for the moment coincide with his. Indonesia 1965 An action proposal was approved in March, with an intermediate intelligence memorandum in July, and a SNIE, on the situation regarding Indonesia and Malaysia, in September. The US did not anticipate the intensity with which the Indonesian military later purged the PKI. Covert action In the March action proposal, covert action personnel, since summer 1964, worked with the Department of State in planning political action in Indonesia aimed to support the Indonesian opponents of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), as well as the PRC. It emphasizes traditional Indonesian mistrust of China. This program has been coordinated in the Department of State with the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs and with the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia. It will involve liaison to, and financial support, of anti-Communist groups. It will also involve black propaganda and political action. One goal is to encourage coordination and common ground for the existing anti-Communist elements in Indonesia. The program is consistent with U.S. policy which seeks a stable, non-Communist Indonesia. Objectives Portray the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of Sukarno and legitimate nationalism and instrument of Chinese neo-imperialism. Provide covert assistance to individuals and organizations capable of and prepared to take obstructive action against the PKI. Encourage the growth of an ideological common denominator, within the framework of Sukarno's enunciated concepts, which will serve to unite non-Communist elements and create cleavage between the PKI and the balance of the Indonesian society. Develop black and grey propaganda themes and mechanisms for use within Indonesia and via appropriate media assets outside of Indonesia in support of the objectives of this program. Identify and cultivate potential leaders within Indonesia for the purpose of ensuring an orderly non-Communist succession upon Sukarno's death or removal from office. Identify, assess and monitor the activities of anti-regime elements for the purpose of influencing them to support a non-Communist successor regime. Risks involved Sukarno learning of the program and suspect that it is intended to weaken his control, causing deterioration of US-Indonesian relations. If the anti-PKI activity is too strong, it could invite repression of the Indonesian anticommunist groups by Sukarno. Recommendation and approval The 303 Committee approved this paper on March 4. [text not declassified] of the CIA took the opportunity to urge "a larger political design or master plan to arrest the Indonesian march into the Chinese camp" based on the Maphilindo concept. He argued a major effort was required to prevent the United States from being excluded from Indonesia, suggesting that the loss of a nation of 105 million to the "Communist camp" would make a victory in Vietnam of little meaning. McGeorge Bundy stated that as a major political problem, Indonesia was receiving attention, but it "could not be settled in the 303 forum."  Intelligence analysis In the July 1965 estimate, the most important point was the sharply accelerated growth of the Communist Party (PKI) role in government, which is expected to continue while Sukarno is in control. He has a vocal campaign to destroy Malaysia, although little chance of success, which he recognizes. Frustration has led him to denounce and harass the entire Western presence in Southeast Asia, and indeed in the Afro-Asian world. No break of diplomatic relations with the US is expected, but certainly continued hostility, as well as warmer relations with Peking. Since his military wants Soviet arms, he will maintain reasonably friendly relations with Moscow. Should Sukarno die or become incapacitated, he would be likely to be replaced by a non-Communist coalition. The military would exercise greater control, but it is not estimated they would risk a civil war to reduce Communist influence. The PKI is probably too entrenched to be denied a role in a coalition. Friction with Malaysia will intensify, but is unlikely to break up the Malayan federation. Malaysia is both totally dependent on the UK and the Commonwealth, has a foreign policy allied with them, but also is adequately defended by forces committed by the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Malaysia will still seek US defense commitment.  In the September estimate, problem was posed: "estimate the chances and implications of a Communist takeover in Indonesia within the next 2-3 years". In the discussion, the fundamental point is that Sukarno is "is the unchallenged leader of Indonesia and will almost certainly remain so until death or infirmity removes him from the scene." He is developing in Indonesia an authoritarian government of the "national-front" type on which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) exerts the strongest influence, though under his own continued domination. He plays one group against another, but the current reality is that the PKI, with 3 million members, is the strongest political entity in Indonesia. Sukarno's personal policies and those of the PKI are in harmony with the Communist states of Asia. He will be cautious about giving the PKI more official power, but, if he lives, the IC sees Indonesia becoming a de facto Communist state, although Sukarno may not proclaim it as such. Should he die or become incapacitated, the PKI might be slowed although it would still have an important role. The longer he lives, the stronger the PKI position. Indonesia is now presenting some of the problems, to the US, that an avowed Communist state would cause: confronting Malaysia and subverting the Philippines. This NIE does not suggest any probable successor government will change radically from this position. While Indonesia's limited military capability and its strategic vulnerability would make it only a potential threat to sea and air lanes, it still would strengthen Peking, while undermining Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam, and presenting a more immediate threat to Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as to Singapore. The Australians would be concerned about east New Guinea and their lines of communications. A Communist Indonesia, still with an independent party, would become a point of rivalry in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The longer-term impact would depend on the continuing independence of the PKI, and how focused it is on consolidating its control and fixing the Indonesian economy. During such a time, it might actually be a liability to China and the Soviet Union. Anti-communist purge The CIA supplied a list of 4,000 to 5,000 suspected communists, who were rounded up and executed or interrogated. The US government also supplied Indonesian generals with important logistical equipment which helped in this effort. Final estimates of the anti-communist killings range from between 250,000 to 500,000 deaths. Indonesia 1998 DCI George Tenet said declassification of nine operations constitute a secret history of American power as used against foreign governments by three Presidents. They include efforts to shore up the non-Communist left in France and Italy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, guerrilla operations in North and South Korea in the Korean War, efforts including political propaganda and bombing missions in Indonesia in the 1950s, paramilitary activities in Laos and Tibet in the first years of the American involvement in Vietnam and assassination plots in the Congo and the Dominican Republic in the early 1960s. 
|New York Times Puff Piece on Ann Dunham excerpts:....|
|The photograph showed the son, but my eye gravitated toward the
mother. That first glimpse was surprising — the stout, pale-skinned
woman in sturdy sandals, standing squarely a half-step ahead of the
lithe, darker-skinned figure to her left. His elastic-band body bespoke
discipline, even asceticism. Her form was well padded, territory ceded
long ago to the pleasures of appetite and the forces of anatomical
destiny. He had the studied casualness of a catalog model, in khakis, at
home in the viewfinder. She met the camera head-on, dressed in
hand-loomed textile dyed indigo, a silver earring half-hidden in the
cascading curtain of her dark hair. She carried her chin a few degrees
higher than most. His right hand rested on her shoulder, lightly. The
photograph, taken on a Manhattan rooftop in August 1987 and e-mailed to
me 20 years later, was a revelation and a puzzle. The man was Barack
Obama at 26, the community organizer from Chicago on a visit to New
York. The woman was Stanley Ann Dunham, his mother. It was impossible
not to be struck by the similarities, and the dissimilarities, between
them. It was impossible not to question the stereotype to which she had
been expediently reduced: the white woman from Kansas. Multimedia
Interactive Feature Milestones: The Life of Obama's Mother The president’s mother has served as any of a number of useful oversimplifications. In the capsule version of Obama’s life story, she is the white mother from Kansas coupled alliteratively to the black father from Kenya. She is corn-fed, white-bread, whatever Kenya is not. In “Dreams From My Father,” the memoir that helped power Obama’s political ascent, she is the shy, small-town girl who falls head over heels for the brilliant, charismatic African who steals the show. In the next chapter, she is the naïve idealist, the innocent abroad. In Obama’s presidential campaign, she was the struggling single mother, the food-stamp recipient, the victim of a health care system gone awry, pleading with her insurance company for coverage as her life slipped away. And in the fevered imaginings of supermarket tabloids and the Internet, she is the atheist, the Marxist, the flower child, the mother who abandoned her son or duped the newspapers of Hawaii into printing a birth announcement for her Kenyan-born baby, on the off chance that he might want to be president someday.
The earthy figure in the photograph did not fit any of those, as I learned over the course of two and a half years of research, travel and nearly 200 interviews. To describe Dunham as a white woman from Kansas turns out to be about as illuminating as describing her son as a politician who likes golf. Intentionally or not, the label obscures an extraordinary story — of a girl with a boy’s name who grew up in the years before the women’s movement, the pill and the antiwar movement; who married an African at a time when nearly two dozen states still had laws against interracial marriage; who, at 24, moved to Jakarta with her son in the waning days of an anticommunist bloodbath in which hundreds of thousands of Indonesians were slaughtered; who lived more than half her adult life in a place barely known to most Americans, in the country with the largest Muslim population in the world; who spent years working in villages where a lone Western woman was a rarity; who immersed herself in the study of blacksmithing, a craft long practiced exclusively by men; who, as a working and mostly single mother, brought up two biracial children; who believed her son in particular had the potential to be great; who raised him to be, as he has put it jokingly, a combination of Albert Einstein, Mahatma Gandhi and Harry Belafonte; and then died at 52, never knowing who or what he would become.
Obama placed the ghost of his absent father at the center of his lyrical account of his life. At times, he has seemed to say more about the grandparents who helped raise him than about his mother. Yet she shaped him, to a degree Obama has seemed increasingly to acknowledge. In the preface to the 2004 edition of “Dreams From My Father,” issued nine years after the first edition and nine years after Dunham’s death, Obama folded in a revealing admission: had he known his mother would not survive her illness, he might have written a different book — “less a meditation on the absent parent, more a celebration of the one who was the single constant in my life.”
Dunham, for whom a letter in Jakarta from her son in the United States could raise her spirits for a full day, surely wondered about her place in his life. On rare occasions, she indicated as much — painfully, wistfully — to close friends. But she would not have been inclined to overstate her case. As she told him, with a dry humor that seems downright Kansan, “If nothing else, I gave you an interesting life.”
New York Times Ann Dunham, who jettisoned the name Stanley upon emerging from childhood, was just 17 years old in the fall of 1960 when she became pregnant with the child of a charismatic Kenyan named Barack Hussein Obama, a fellow student at the University of Hawaii who was more than six years her senior. She dropped out of school, married him and gave birth shortly before their union ended. In the aftermath, she met Lolo Soetoro, an amiable, easygoing, tennis-playing graduate student from the Indonesian island of Java. They married in 1964, after Ann’s divorce came through, but their early life together was upended by forces beyond their control. On Sept. 30, 1965, six Indonesian army generals and one lieutenant were kidnapped and killed in Jakarta, in what the army characterized as an attempted coup planned by the Communist Party. Students studying abroad, including Lolo, whose studies were sponsored by the government, were soon summoned home. A year later, in 1967, Ann graduated with a degree in anthropology, gathered up her 6-year-old child and moved to Indonesia to join her husband.
The four years that followed were formative for mother and son — and are a subject of curiosity and an object of speculation for many Americans today. These were years in which Ann lived closely with the young Obama, who at the time was called Barry; she impressed upon him her values and, consciously and unconsciously, shaped his emerging understanding of the world. She made choices about her own life too, setting an example that in some ways Obama would eventually embrace, while in other ways intentionally leaving it behind. ........
Indonesia was still in a state of shock when Ann arrived in 1967 for the first of three extended periods of residence that would eventually add up to the majority of her adult life. The details of the attempted coup and countercoup remain in dispute even today, as do the particulars of the carnage that followed. But it is known that neighbors turned on neighbors. According to Adrian Vickers, the author of “A History of Modern Indonesia,” militias went door to door in villages, abducting suspects, raping women, even targeting children. “The best way to prove you were not a Communist was to join in the killings,” Vickers writes. Bill Collier, a friend of Ann’s who arrived in Indonesia in 1968 and spent 15 years doing social and economic surveys in villages, told me that researchers were told by people living near brackish waterways that they had been unable to eat the fish because of decaying corpses in the water. Many Indonesians chose never to speak about what had happened. .......
When Ann arrived, Lolo was in the army. His salary was low. On her first night in Indonesia, Ann complained later to a colleague, Lolo served her white rice and dendeng celeng — dried, jerked wild boar, which Indonesians hunted in the forests when food was scarce. But when Lolo completed his military service, his brother-in-law Trisulo used his contacts as a vice president at the Indonesian oil company Pertamina to help Lolo get a job in the Jakarta office of the Union Oil Company of California. By the early 1970s, Lolo and Ann had moved into a rented house in Matraman, a middle-class area of Jakarta. The house was a pavilyun, an annex on the grounds of a bigger main house. It had three bedrooms, a kitchen, a bathroom, a library and a terrace. Like the households of other Indonesians who could afford it, it had a sizable domestic staff. Two female servants shared a bedroom; two men — a cook and a houseboy — slept mostly on the floor of the house or in the garden. The staff freed Ann from domestic obligations to a degree that would have been almost impossible in the United States. There were people to clean the house, prepare meals, buy groceries and look after her children — enabling her to work, pursue her interests and come and go as she wanted. The domestic staff made it possible, too, for Ann and Lolo to cultivate their own professional and social circles, which did not necessarily overlap.
By January 1968, Ann had gone to work as the assistant to the American director of Lembaga Indonesia-Amerika, a binational organization financed by the United States Information Service and housed at the U.S. Agency for International Development. She supervised a small group of Indonesians who taught English classes for Indonesian government employees and businessmen being sent by U.S.A.I.D. to the United States for graduate studies. It would be an understatement to say she disliked the job. “I worked at the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta for 2 horrible years,” she wrote to a friend. As Obama describes the job in his memoir, “The Indonesian businessmen weren’t much interested in the niceties of the English language, and several made passes at her.” Occasionally, she took Barry to work. Joseph Sigit, an Indonesian who worked as the office manager at the time, told me, “Our staff here sometimes made a joke of him because he looked different — the color of his skin.”
“With and about him,” Sigit said, with no evident embarrassment.
Two years later, at 27, Ann was hired to start an English-language business-communications department in one of the few private nonprofit management-training schools in the country. The school, called the Institute for Management Education and Development, was started several years earlier by a Dutch Jesuit priest with the intention of helping to build an Indonesian elite. Ann trained the teachers, developed the curriculum and taught top executives. In return, she received not just a paycheck but also a share of the revenue from the program. She also became a popular teacher. Ann’s classes “could be a riot of laughter from beginning to end. She had a great sense of humor,” said Leonard Kibble, who taught part time at the institute in the early 1970s. Some of the laughter involved Ann’s still-incomplete mastery of the Indonesian language. In one slip that Kibble said Ann delighted in recounting, she tried to tell a student that he would “get a promotion” if he learned English. Instead of using the phrase naik pangkat, she said naik pantat. The word naik means to “go up, rise, or mount”; pangkat means “rank” or “position.” Pantat means “buttocks.”
That same year, on Aug. 15, 1970, shortly after Barry’s ninth birthday and during what would turn out to be the only visit by her mother, Madelyn Dunham, to Indonesia, Ann gave birth to Maya Kassandra Soetoro at Saint Carolus Hospital, a Catholic hospital thought by Westerners at that time to be the best in Jakarta. When Halimah Brugger gave birth in the same hospital two years later, she told me, the doctor delivered her baby without the luxury of a stethoscope, gloves or gown. “When the baby was born, the doctor asked my husband for his handkerchief,” Brugger said. “Then she stuffed it in my mouth and gave me 11 stitches without any anesthesia.” Ann tried out three different names for her new daughter, all of them Sanskrit, before settling on Maya Kassandra. The name was important to Ann, Maya told me; she wanted “beautiful names.” Stanley, the name Ann felt burdened with as a child, was not on the list.
In Indonesia, Ann was a striking figure who did not go unnoticed. “Maybe just her presence — the way she carried herself,” said Halimah Bellows, whom Ann hired in the spring of 1971. She dressed simply, with little or no makeup, and wore her hair long, held back by a headband. By Javanese standards, she was, as Felina Pramono, an Indonesian colleague, put it, “a bit sturdy for a woman.” She had strong opinions — and rarely softened them to please others.
“She used to tear me apart,” says Kay Ikranagara, one of Ann’s closest friends, in a tone that sounded almost fond. Ann told her she needed to be bolder and stronger. She made fun of her inadequacy in the kitchen. She told her she should give her housekeeper explicit instructions, not simply let her do whatever she wanted. “With everybody she was like that: she would tell them what was wrong with them,” Ikranagara said. Family members were not spared. “She was very scathing about the traditional Indonesian wife role,” Ikranagara recalled. “She would tell Maya not to be such a wimp. She didn’t like this passive Indonesian female caricature. She would tell me not to fall into that.”
Ikranagara was the daughter of a development economist from the University of California who taught at the University of Indonesia in the late 1950s. She lived in Jakarta as a teenager, studied anthropology and linguistics in the 1960s at Berkeley and then returned to Jakarta, where she met her husband. She met Ann while teaching part time at the management school and writing her dissertation in linguistics. They had a lot in common: Indonesian husbands, degrees in anthropology, babies born in the same month, opinions shaped by the 1960s. They were less conscious than others of the boundaries between cultures, Ikranagara told me, and they rejected what they saw as the previous generation’s hypocrisy on the subject of race. “We had all the same attitudes,” she said. “When we met people who worked for the oil companies or the embassy, they belonged to a different culture than Ann and I. We felt they didn’t mix with Indonesians, they were part of an insular American culture.” Servants seemed to be the only Indonesians those Americans knew.
But by the early 1970s, Lolo’s new job had plunged him deeply into the oil-company culture. Foreign businesses in Indonesia were required to hire and train Indonesian partners. The exercise struck some people as a sham: companies would hire an Indonesian director, pay him well and give him little or nothing to do. Trisulo, Lolo’s brother-in-law, told me he did not recall the exact nature of Lolo’s job with Union Oil. His son, Sonny Trisulo, said it may have been “government relations.” Whatever it was, Lolo’s job included socializing with oil-company executives and their wives. He joined the Indonesian Petroleum Club, a private watering hole in Central Jakarta for oil-company people and their families, which offered swimming, tennis and dining. Ann was expected to socialize, too. Any failure to do so reflected badly on Lolo. “It’s the society that asks it,” Ikranagara said. “Your husband is supposed to show up at social functions with you at his side, dressed in a kain and kebaya,” a costume consisting of a traditional, tightly fitted, long-sleeved blouse and a length of unstitched cloth wound around the lower part of the body. “You’re supposed to sit with the women and talk about your children and your servants.” Multimedia ... .......................... The relationship between Ann and Lolo appears to have begun deteriorating even before Lolo took the oil-company job. ............................... Ann had pieced together some of what happened in Indonesia in 1965 and afterward from fragmentary information that people let slip. Her new Indonesian friends talked to her about corruption in government agencies, police and military shakedowns, the power of the president’s entourage. Lolo would not talk about any of it. According to Obama, a cousin of Lolo’s finally explained to Ann what happened when her husband returned from Hawaii. Upon arriving in Jakarta, he was taken away for questioning and told he had been conscripted and would be sent to the jungles of New Guinea for a year. It could have been worse: students returning from Soviet-bloc countries were jailed or even vanished. Obama writes that Ann concluded that “power had taken Lolo and yanked him back into line just when he thought he’d escaped, making him feel its weight, letting him know that his life wasn’t his own.” In response, Lolo made his peace with power, “learned the wisdom of forgetting; just as his brother-in-law had done, making millions as a high official in the national oil company.”
Lolo had disappointed Ann, but her refusal to conform to his culture’s expectations apparently angered him as well. “She didn’t know, as little I knew, how Indonesian men change when suddenly their family is around,” Renske Heringa, a Dutch anthropologist and close friend of Ann’s in the 1980s who herself married a man who was half Indonesian, told me. .......................................................................... One morning in January 2009, at the offices of the management school for which Ann had worked, I met a man in his late 50s named Saman. Like some Javanese, he went by a single name. Speaking in Bahasa Indonesia, with Ann’s former assistant Felina Pramono translating, he told me that he worked as a houseboy for Lolo and Ann in the early 1970s. One of seven children from a family of farmers, Saman moved to Jakarta as a teenager to find work. When he worked for Ann and Lolo, his duties included gardening; taking care of a pet turtle, dog, rabbit and bird; and taking Barry to school by bicycle or becak. Ann and Lolo paid Saman well and treated all four members of the household staff equally, he said. He remembered Lolo as stern and Ann as kindhearted. ........................................ With her children, Ann made a point of being more physically affectionate than her mother had been with her, she told one friend. She was cuddly and would say, “I love you,” according to Maya, a hundred times a day. She was playful — making pottery, weaving decorations, doing art projects that stretched across the room. “I think that we benefited a great deal from her focus when we were with her, when she was beside us,” Maya told me. “So that made the absences hurt a little less.” Where her children were involved, Ann was easily moved to tears, even occasionally when speaking about them to friends. She preferred humor to harping, but she was exacting about the things she believed mattered most. Richard Hook, who worked with Ann in Jakarta in the late 1980s and early 1990s, said she told him that she worked to instill ideas about public service in her son. She wanted Barry to have a sense of obligation, to give something back. She wanted him to start off, Hook said, with the attitudes and values she had taken years to learn.
“If you want to grow into a human being,” Obama remembers her saying, “you’re going to need some values.” When necessary, Ann was, according to two accounts, not unwilling to reinforce her message. “She talked about disciplining Barry, including spanking him for things where he richly deserved a spanking,” said Don Johnston, who worked with Ann in the early 1990s, sometimes traveling with her in Indonesia and living in the same house. Saman said that when Barry failed to finish homework sent from Hawaii by his grandmother, Ann “would call him into his room and would spank him with his father’s military belt.” President Obama, through a spokeswoman, said his mother never resorted to physical discipline.
...................................... It was clear to many that Ann believed Barry, in particular, was unusually gifted. She would boast about his brains, his achievements, how brave he was. Benji Bennington, a friend of Ann’s from Hawaii, told me, “Sometimes when she talked about Barack, she’d say, ‘Well, my son is so bright, he can do anything he ever wants in the world, even be president of the United States.’ I remember her saying that.” Samardal Manan, who taught with Ann in Jakarta, remembered Ann saying something similar — that Barry could be, or perhaps wanted to be, the first black president.
“What do you want to be when you grow up?” Lolo asked Barry one evening, according to Saman. ....“Oh, prime minister,” Barry answered. ..... Kay Ikranagara ? ....Ann’s uncle Charles Payne ? ................................
|WMR: Ann Dunham Soetoro: a female "Indiana Jones" who "human terrained" Communists in Indonesia for the CIA. March 10, 2011 -- SPECIAL REPORT|
|A third world leader who had challenged the hegemony
of the United States was accused of trying to obtain an atomic bomb and
helping to create an "axis" of America's enemies. We are not referring
to either Saddam Hussein or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but to President Sukarno
U.S. support for the Indonesian coup and Project CAMELOT
President Obama's step-father, Lolo Soetoro, a reserve Indonesian army officer called back into service in the army in 1965 from his CIA-supplied scholarship at the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, was a foot soldier in the putschist cabal of General Suharto, the man who the CIA designated as the leader of the 1965 coup that deposed Sukarno and targeted between 500,000 and 1 million members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) for elimination. Lolo Soetoro was one of some 4000 Indonesian army officers who were trained in the United States between 1958 and 1965 and the CIA and Pentagon ensured that these officers would be available for the long-planned overthrow of Sukarno. In fact, an overwhelming majority of Indonesian army officers who were trained abroad received their training in the United States, not in the Soviet Union or China. The air force, on the other hand, was seen as pro-PKI and PKI influence extended into the junior officer ranks of the Indonesian navy, particularly in Surabaya, eastern Java.
The Indonesian army also included some PKI sympathizers, especially in units in central and eastern Java, which were also areas of interest to Ann Soetoro in her "anthropological field work" for the U.S. government. In addition, the police force in central and eastern Java were also sympathetic to the PKI.
Obama's mother, Ann Soetoro, was dispatched from Hawaii to Indonesia in 1967, along with seven year-old Barack Obama, to infiltrate villages in Java to carry out a CIA survey of political leanings among the Javanese population. Those unfortunate enough to be tagged as Communists or Sukarno supporters were then targeted for elimination by the CIA, which turned the target lists over to Suharto's army officers, including Lolo Soetoro. During the Cold War, the use of anthropologists by the CIA and Defense Department in the collection of ethnographic and cultural intelligence was commonplace, with modern roots in a classified U.S. intelligence program created in 1964, three years before Dunham Soetoro arrived in Indonesia, called Project CAMELOT. The first testing ground for CAMELOT was Chile and the target was that nation's indigenous population, including the Mapuche Indians.
The use of anthropologists like Dunham Soetoro was supported through grants laundered by the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations. Many of Dunham Soetoro's activities in Java were funded by the Ford Foundation.
CAMELOT was officially described as follows by the U.S. Army: "Success in such tasks as equipping and training indigenous forces for an internal security mission, civic action, psychological warfare, or other counterinsurgency action depends on a thorough understanding of the indigenous social structure, upon the accuracy with which changes within the indigenous culture, particularly violent changes, are anticipated, and the effects of various courses of action available to the military and other agencies of government upon the indigenous process of change."
CAMELOT's work was conducted at American University in Washington, DC by the Pentagon's Special Operations Research Office (SORO). SORO ran the Army's psychological warfare operations. In addition to CAMELOT "research" in Chile, SORO anthropological research also targeted the indigenous peoples of Colombia and Peru.
CAMELOT still exists under a new name and Obama supports it
Today, a number of elements in CAMELOT are integral to the much-discredited "Human Terrain System" (HTS) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As with CAMELOT and other covert operations involving anthropologists, HTS has been charged with exacerbating tensions between various indigenous groups and tribes to create intelligence opportunities for the U.S. military. The targeting of village leaders, a replay, of the CIA's PHOENIX assassination program in South Vietnam, part of CIA Southeast Asia regional chief William Colby's Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, has also been a charge levelled against those involved with HTS. President Obama has done nothing to curtail HTS funding, although there have been some moves by some in Congress to do so.
Obama continues to fund the follow-on to CAMELOT, PHOENIX, CORDS, and MODJOKUTO, all CIA/Pentagon operations familiar to his mother and her colleagues, the Human Terrain System, which has been responsible for massacres of civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan.
Members of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) have, like they did with CAMELOT and PHOENIX, have condemned HTS for its reliance on what the AAA has described as “mercenary anthropology." A survey of literature during the late 1960s and 70s indicate that Dunham Soetoro and many of her colleagues engaged in U.S. government- and Ford Foundation-financed anthropological field work in Indonesia met the definition of "mercenary anthropologists." Central and eastern Java were known as hotbeds of what was termed "rural radicalism," and, thus, were of extreme interest to CAMELOT and the CIA behavioral science and ethnographic elements. Other CIA-funded anthropologists fanned out after the 1965 coup to other areas of Indonesia known to be areas of strong PKI support, including Aceh in northwestern Sumatra and Bali. The massacres of actual and suspected PKI members was so great that sanitation in Java, Bali, and Aceh became an issue as a result from the rotting of human corpses. It was into this environment that Ann Soetoro brought seven year-old Barack Obama in 1967, yet Obama barely mentions these "years of living dangerously" in his autobiographical sketches about his mother's and step father's activities in Indonesia. There is only a brief mention of Lolo Soetoro's counter-insurgency operations in Indonesian occupied West Papua, which, like East Timor and Aceh, would attract the interests of a fair number of CIA-funded anthropologists in counter-insurgency -- and even genocidal campaigns in the case of East Timor -- into the 1970s, 80s, 90s, and to the present day.
At its height, the PKI was estimated to have some 20 million members, with its main areas of support in central and eastern Java, particular areas of focus after the Suharto coup for Ann Soetoro and her US Agency for International Development (USAID) and CIA official and non-official cover embassy and consulate colleagues in Jakarta and Surabaya. One of Dunham Soetoro's colleagues in Indonesia was Ford Foundation consultant Clifford Geertz who became known later as an eminent scholar on cultural anthropology in Indonesia and Morocco.
In a poem written by intelligence expert Professor Peter Dale Scott about the Indonesian massacre Geertz is mentioned in a cryptic passage:
Clifford Geertz having just reread your Notes on the Balinese cockfight
how you were first accepted by cautious villagers after you all fled
from the Javanese constabulary and how slaughter in the cock ring itself
after red pepper is stuffed down their beaks and up their anuses
joins pride to selfhood selfhood to cocks and cocks to destruction
a blood sacrifice offered to the demons to pacify their cannibal hunger
Geertz, who was heavily funded by the Ford Foundation, happened to have arrived in Indonesia the day before the coup against Sukarno. Geertz immediately went to Yogyakarta, the PKI hot-bed that would later also see Dunham Soetoro conducting "field research."
The use of cultural anthropologists for CIA work created a furor in the 1960s, especially with their use in South Vietnam and Thailand in support of the war effort. However, one of the most noted anthropologists in the world at the time, Margaret Mead, renowned for her seminal work in 1928, "Coming of Age in Samoa," and her controversial views on the sexual morés of the 1960s, defended the CIA's use of anthropologists in field work. In a 1971 report, called the Mead Report, Mead rebutted the Beals Report and stated that the use of anthropologists in counter-insurgency "research" met the "traditional canons of acceptable behavior" for anthropologists.
Mead found herself in opposition to senior anthropologists of the AAA who were opposed to the CIA's use of anthropologists in covert operations and counter-insurgency programs. In 1966, Professor Ralph Beals of UCLA presented a report commissioned by the AAA on the subject of CIA co-option of anthropologists. The Beals Report stated: "several anthropologists, especially younger ones who had difficulty in securing research funds, were approached by ‘obscure’ foundations or were offered support from such organizations only to discover later that they were expected to provide intelligence information to the CIA." The report added, "agents of the CIA have posed as anthropologists, much to the detriment of the anthropological research programs."
Note: WMR is attempting to obtain a copy of the full Beals Report, which was officially adopted by the AAA's Council of Fellows in 1967, the year Dunham Soetoro arrived in Indonesia. Professor Beals died in 1985.
Geertz worked with the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT on projects funded by the CIA and Ford Foundation. One was Project MODJOKUTO in Indonesia. In fact, in his book, "The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama," David Remnick cites Geertz as one of Dunham Soetoro's Indonesian colleagues. Geertz, a specialist in the post-war Javanese economy, believed in modernization of tribal and rural societies and was not sold on Dunham Soetoro's quaint ideas of promoting the interests and development of Indonesian village craftsmen and weavers.
CENIS's anthropological work on behalf of the CIA was the brainchild of Max Millikan, CENIS's first director, and Walt W. Rostow who, in 1954, convinced CIA director Allen Dulles of the need for CIA involvement in development projects abroad. Rostow later became deputy national security adviser in the Lyndon Johnson White House. Rostow worked for McGeorge Bundy, who, after leaving the White House in 1966, became President of the Ford Foundation, the main source of the laundered CIA funding for Geertz's and Dunham Soetoro's field work in Indonesia.
Many of the pre-1977 CIA files on its interactions with the American Anthropological Association have either been heavily redacted or destroyed. Many of the MK-ULTRA documents on CIA behavioral science work in the United States and abroad were ordered destroyed in 1973 by CIA director Colby, shortly after he took over at Langley. Some of the CIA's anthropological studies were directed domestically a the Black Panther Party, which also gained the attention of Barack Obama, Jr. in the mid-1980s, while he was allegedly involved in "community organizing" in south Chicago, a Black Panther base of operations, after leaving a high-paying job as a "journalist" for CIA front Business International Corporation in Manhattan.
Three anthropologists serving with Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan have been killed since the inception of the program or what could be termed the resurrection of CAMELOT and PHOENIX. Dunham Soetoro and her colleagues were much luckier in Java and on other Indonesian islands following the 1965 military coup. For one thing, the CIA had already infiltrated and sponsored a number of Indonesian groups prior to the coup against Sukarno, providing a ready-made network of informants for Ann Soetoro and her anthropology colleagues. Groups sponsored by the CIA included the Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Employees (SOKSI), student organizations, and others.
Ann Dunham Soetoro: A female "Indiana Jones" surveying villagers to root out Communists for the CIA. She was not the only anthropologist involved in such activities.
As with the reasons why the United States went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were based on false premises, the covert U.S. incursion into Indonesia in 1965 was also based on fraudulent "new stories" and outright lies crafted by the CIA and Pentagon.
The CIA propaganda war against Sukarno
In September 1964, Sukarno accused leaders of the Murba Party, a "nationalist" Communist Party with ties to Moscow, as opposed to the pro-Chinese PKI, of attempting to launch a palace coup backed by the CIA. The Murba Party masked its true intentions by launching a new group, the "Body to Promote Sukarnoism" (BPS), however Sukarno saw it as a ruse to further the ambitions of Washington and Moscow and he banned the BPS. Ann Soetoro's knowledge of Russian, which she took, along with Barack Obama, Sr., at the University of Hawaii in 1960, would come in handy in her contacts with Murba officials, including Murba secretary general Adam Malik, who had been Indonesia's ambassador in Moscow in 1959. In January 1965, Sukarno banned Murba, which, after the coup later that year, became legal again under Suharto. Malik, who may have also acted as an agent of the CIA while in Moscow and as Indonesian Trade Minister in 1963, became Indonesian foreign minister and deputy prime minister under Suharto in 1966.
The western media began a full propaganda effort against Sukarno in late 1964. On October 16, China tested its first atomic bomb. In November, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Jakarta and almost immediately, there were bogus reports put out by the CIA in the Asian and western press that China was prepared to give nuclear weapons technology to Indonesia. There were also Western media reports that Sukarno was planing to set up an anti-western "axis" of Indonesia, Cambodia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and mainland China. Only Cambodia was a member of the United Nations. The similarities between this so-called "axis" and the "axis of evil" of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea promoted by the neo-conservatives before the U.S. invasion of Iraq are stark.
The CIA's propaganda efforts even extended to Indonesian seers and mystics, who began to predict Sukarno's imminent downfall or death.
The stage was being set for a coup against Sukarno. In January 1965, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations because its arch-enemy, Malaysia, was given a seat on the UN Security Council. There were also reports that Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai had promised to provide weapons to PKI cadres to provide Sukarno with his own armed militia against the suspect Indonesian army. The bogus story about the secret supply of Chinese weapons to the PKI for a communist revolt first appeared in a Malaysian newspaper, citing unnamed sources in Bangkok, who heard the story from Hong Kong sources who picked up the information from contacts in mainland China. Even by today's shoddy journalism standards of Fox News and CNN, the story lacked any credulity.
A mysterious letter surfaced in Indonesia in July 1965, purportedly written by British ambassador in Jakarta Andrew Gilchrist to the British Foreign Office in London, that referred to "our local army friends." Gilchrist was a British intelligence agent in India and Thailand during World War II. Gilchrist, in the months leading up to the coup, told London that regime change in Jakarta would entail "more than a little shooting." Before being posted to Jakarta, Gilchrist was British Consul General in Chicago. The University of Chicago's "New Nations Project, a suspected CIA-linked research project that examined nationalist movements around the world during the 1960s, involved none other than Dunham Soetoro's colleague in Indonesia, Clifford Geertz.
In March 1965, Sukarno infuriated the West by taking over the operations of western oil companies, including Shell, Caltex, and Stanvac, which was owned by Mobil. In 1970, after leaving the army, Lolo Soetoro went to work for Mobil, which was assured of no interference from the pro-U.S. Suharto government.
In April 1965, Sukarno expelled the Peace Corps from Indonesia as he grew more and more suspicious of American covert activities in his country. The next month, Sukarno accused the United States and Britain of planning a coup against him with the aid of the Indonesian army. Army forces began to call back Indonesian army reserve officers who were studying abroad in order to supplement their ranks for the planned coup against Sukarno. On July 20, 1965, Lolo Soetoro, who had been in the United States receiving CIA- and Pentagon-funded training since September 18, 1962, left Hawaii for Indonesia. He had married Ann Dunham on March 15, 1965. Ann Soetoro received her U.S. passport on July 19, 1965, the day before Lolo Soetoro left for Indonesia and just as events were heating up in Indonesia.
Suspiciously, Lolo Soetoro's Wikipedia entry has been altered to reflect his departure from Hawaii to Indonesia in 1966, the year following the coup. It appears that certain interests want to cover up Lolo Soetoro's involvement in the 1965 CIA coup.
In August, Sukarno committed the arch sin as viewed by the West and quasi-CIA support organizations like the Ford Foundation. Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and INTERPOL. In August, while receiving a foreign delegation, Sukarno began to vomit uncontrollably and he collapsed. This was during the height of the CIA's assassination program led by the "Black Sorcerer," Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the head of MK-ULTRA, who had previously attempted the poisonings of Fidel Castro, Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Qassem, and Congo's Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.
False flag assassinations blamed on the Communists
On September 30, 1965, what unfolded in Indonesia may have been a classic CIA disinformation and "false flag" operation. Low-ranking army officers, said to be part of an attempted PKI takeover and callong themselves the "30 September Movement," attempted to kidnap seven anti-PKI army generals, however, oddly, General Suharto, the CIA's point man for the coup, was not among the kidnapping targets. Generals Yani, Haryono, and Panjaitan were killed at their homes "while resistng arrest," while Generals Soeprapto, Parman, and Sutoyo were taken alive and shot later by the coup plotters. The bodies of all seven generals were dumped into a well.
The Minister of Defense and Security, General Nasution, managed to escape alive from his home and received asylum at the Iraqi embassy, although his five year-old daughter was killed in the attack. The coup was launched from the Halim airbase outside Jakarta. However, for a coup attempt blamed on the PKI, which was used to launch a bloody massacre of PKI members and their sympathizers and force Sukarno from power, it was amazing that most of the PKI leadership were not in Jakarta and were not in contact with the low-ranking coup leaders. Aidit, one of the PKI Politburo members, was present at the Halim base but Politburo members Njoto, Lukman, Subandrio, Chaerul Saleh and Sastroamidjojo were not in Jakarta. There is no conclusive evidence that the PKI staged the murders of the seven generals but there is ample evidence that given the CIA's and MI-6's pre-coup operations, that it was they and Suharto that staged the massacre to provide a reason to oust Sukarno and begin the systematic massacres of PKI members.
It was also odd that given General Yani's soft approach to the PKI, that he was marked for assassination by alleged PKI cadres. However, General Nasution, who was known to be extremely anti-Communist and who was counted in the pro-U.S. camp, was able to escape assassination and hide out in the Iraqi embassy. Although Nasution swore Suharto in as the new president after the formal ousting of Sukarno, Nasution later broke with Suharto.
Why Indonesia 1965 matters for America 2011
Obama's advent to the White House was hailed as a first for the United States, someone had been elected as the "leader of the Free World" who had a multi-cultural background and a unique international understanding, as opposed to the pedestrian nature of George W. Bush. As Obama's policies have become more clear, it is now a distinct possibility that Obama's "international understanding" has been influenced not so much by America's founders' principles but by the "strong man" characteristics of Asian personages such as Suharto, Adam Malik, and Obama's step-father Lolo Soetoro. And for that, all Americans should be fearful.
|PRINCIPLES OF DEEP COVER Created: 6/1/1961 OCR scan of the original document,|
| errors are possible wrnovra res bse
HtSTOKJCAL RFViEW PROGRfilil
TITLE; Principles Of Deep Cover
AUTHOR: C. D. Edbrook
A colledion of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol Intelligence.
All statements of laci. opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the auihors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Govemmenl endorsement of an article's faciual statements and interpretations.
Cardinal considerations incovert personnel abroad tn quasi-permanent private citizen positions.
PRINCIPLES OF DEEP COVER C. D. Edbrook
gence service has for getting Its unwelcome officers covertly Into other countries Is to assign them to cover Jobs In Itsdiplomatic missions, consulates, and other official representations there. The Soviet bloc services call this "legal" cover, most Western services simply "official" cover. Aside from providing for communicationsecure place to work,easure of protection from prosecution for espionage. It has the advantage that the cover duties can usually be made light enough to leave most of tbe officer's tune free for Intelligence activity. The official position also opens the way to many useful contacts, although It precludes others. It has tho accompanying disadvantage thatretty shabby one. It requires no Herculeaneffort to determine which foreign officials probably have Intelligence connections; they can be keptbut not really secret Moreover, some kinds ofactivity cannot be carried out from an official position.
It Is therefore necessary to supplement the "legals" withhe Intelligence officers under official cover withunder "deep" cover, living as legitimate privatewith such authenticity that their Intelligencewould not be disclosed even by an Intensive andinvestigation. These officers are sometimes career staff employees of the Intelligence service and sometimesof either the sponsoring or another country vlth aor agent relationship to the service. For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of them all aslthough they areifferent category from the indigenous agents recruited locallyase officer. They do have an agent
relationship to an official-cover case officer, for they must usually depend on the official-cover"legal rezjden-tura" In Soviet usage, the "station" intheirand administrative support and, at least In most Western practice, for direction and operational guidance.
Nonofficial cover Is sometimes used for brief ad hocand fixed-term operations, but the difficulties andof really deep cover are felt mostong-range operation of Indefinite duration, one expected to continue as' long as^lt'produces userul lnformatiOb?<perhaps thrp.ughkhe"^'. full career of the agent Infiltration into high circles ofgovernment an oppositionilitary clique, or an ethnic minority, or,estern service, penetration Into an Orbit Installation or the leadershipommunist party are types of missions for which deep cover of indefinitemay be required. It is the principles of thla kind of cover that concern us here.
Primacy of the Objective
Because the deep-cover agent must usuallyarge share of his time to carrying on his ostensible legitimatebis intelligence production is quantitatively small. He Is therefore an expensive agent, Justified only by the uniqueness ol the Information he produces or can be expected In long term to produce. The 'establishmenteep-cover operation should consequently derive without exception from the objective to be achieved, not from the availability of the agent or the opportunity for cover. Although this principle should be self-evident, it Is not in practice unusual that an intelligence service begins with an agent whoeep-cover assignment tries various kinds of cover on him for size, and then, more or less as an afterthought,lausible mission for him. Negligence of the objective through aon the agent's part with the establishment of cover is another frequent fault In one caseoung man was permitted to spend tour years exclusively building cover for himself, being required only toniversity in the target area and then establish himselfalesman there. By the time he wasosition to start producing he had lost interest in the Intelligence objective and resigned.
Importance for Planner!
Sometimes the unfailing symptomsig hurry to go nowhere In particular betray the fact that the planners of an operation have lost sight of Its long-term objective. Some years ago the cover specialists ot an agency were asked to produceflexible cover" that would give an agentot much work hi the way of cover duties, andogical reason for interest In diversified localt was not specified tn what way the ooverwas supposed,lex.^iwhatmlaees the agent shbulcTO'abl^ what kinds of local groups he should have an Interest There was available,over position in market research which seemed to meet these requirements and In which the agent had bad some experience; but this would require him toonth's training prior to departure, and It was therefore rejected. So he was put Into free-lance writing,he had had no experience in that field. The hope that an operation so thoroughly conditioned during its formative stage by an early departure date would somehow serve an Intelligence purpose was ofain one: when old Mobile and Flexible came back two years later he had produced nothing.
The rational preparation and conduct of an operation can have no other guide than Its purpose, and this purpose must therefore be defined at the outset. Mobility and flexibility may Indeed be required by somecientist or labor expert, for example, whose intelligence assignmenthim to meet target colleagues atumber of neighboring countriesover Job that gives him sufficient timelausible reason tothese conferences. But other Intelligence missions can be fulfilled only by agents whose cover work keeps themertain place, and there are on record cases Ineep-cover agent has been unable to give the necessary attention to his operations because bis cover job kept him constantly moving about The end must determine the means.
The purpose should alsoorthyeep-cover mission Is not Justified If it can do no better than wander along the fringes of an intelligence target, eliciting scraps of Information and mlslnformaUon. or "collect operational lnfor-
mation available In tbe normal course of cover work and spot potential agentt is wasteful toeep-cover agent doing the routine Jobs that can be done Just as well by an ofQcial-cover man or his ordinary local agents andThe targets that call for deep cover are those to which official government representatives lack access or In which they must conceal their Interest or from which only anchannel will elicit information not meant for official consumption.
he primacy ofa rigid sequence in which cover and agent cannot even be considered until the objective has been determined. It means only that the Intelligence objective should be establishedthe steps are taken that commit the service to theThe service's headquarters will have negotiated cover openings and Its Held stations will have spotted coverof various kinds without regard to any specificoperations. There are also usually available some good agents for whom there Is no suitable assignment at theIt Is better that these cover openings and these agents should remain unused for the time being than be misused ln the pursuit of an unworthy objective only because they are available. Experience shows that the successful operations are generally those in which the planners have arrivedalid objective and made sure that the cover and the agent were suitable tor the pursuit of that objective before going ahead with the implementation of the project.
The Intelligence objective, once chosen, Is of course notConstancy of purpose Is of vital importance in most long-range operations,ervice should be ready to make the most of any unexpected opportunity that permits it to raise its sights. In recenteep-cover agent who had been sent to the field to work through locally recruited agents suddenly found himself in the entourageigh-priority target; another, after one uneventful tourransfer under the same cover to another country, gainedto the toner circleery important target person. These agents were able to capitalize on their opportunitiestheir cover had been well prepared and they had been careful to preserve It during periods when operationalwere not bright.
Nevertheless, one cannot rely on chance to provide anwith purpose. The untimely termination ol coverintended to be long-range is often charged to the un-sultablllty ot the agent or the Inadequacy of his cover, but close examination may reveal that the faulty element Is itself the result of an underlying failure of the planners to derive the operationorthy purpose clearly understood at the start by everyone concerned.
a lack of specific purposeery disquieting effect on agent morale. Agents sometimes express the belief thatthought Is not given by their contact man, the field station, or headquarters to the ultimate achievement that Is desired from them on their project. Their remarks areto the effect that there Isonsistent plan orthat they are given the blanket advice "to get out and see what can be developed" with regard to practically any political party or government agency, that they are seldom given the opportunity to learn how, If at ail. their activities are Integrated into the overall area program or objectives, and that this iseliberate effort on the part of the field station or their station contact to keep them compart-mented but rather an indication of the nonexistenceong-range plan. Such impressions, even If groundless, are not conducive to vigorous and purposeful activity.
The field station has an essential role to perform inthe objective as well as the meanseep-coverin Its area and it must share in the early planning. Chiefs of station should keep headquarters currently informed as to which long-range Intelligence objectives they and their successors will need to approach through nonofflclal cover, what kinds of cover would be the most effective in reaching those objectives, and what kind of agent would beand personally suited for the cover job and thetasks Involved. Headquarters, in turn, should consult the station In the early planningarticular long-range cover project.eadquarters area desk willreater or lesser understanding of the field situation. Its information may be dated or Incomplete. The field station certainly has the most Intimate knowledge of the problems
said In addition will nave more faith In the prospects of an operation and feel more deeply committed to Its success If It has helped to shape it.
A few years ago an agent was placed under commercial cover and sent to the field "to assess the area for deep-cover andpossibilities and to develop intelligenceheretation In the area and It should have been able to assess cover and operational possibilities, but apparently headquarters had not discussed with it what objectivesgTi*nc^^
agent wouldood chance of attaining them; nowas made to define the kind of operations the agent was expected lo develop or to specify the nature of thehe was to work against. This agent had neithernor operational experience; yet he was expected tousinessountry that had Inhibitory laws on trade and on currency exchange, toifficult assessment of operational possibilities, and to seek out his own Intelligence mission. The operation failed and was terminated after two years.
Collaboration between headquarters and the field station Is needed In the early planning stage In order to bringroad central view of Intelligence needs and an Intimate knowledge of the local scene. These two complementaryare required to give anrecise orientationriority objective, and this objective must beearly enough to Insure that the cover and the agent are suited to It
Preparing the Means The period of preparation is one of commitment; Ita series of major steps which steer theourse that becomes Increasingly difficult to change or halt,oint Is reached where the service is committed to go ahead with whatever Investment of funds and manpower may be required- These major steps have to do with the selection and preparation of the agent and his cover. Hasty preparations have no place In long-rangeHaste Is Justifiable and even necessary ln situations of urgency where one must work at top speedhort-term goal; In such cases security and durability are knowingly
. sacrificed to the extent required by the pressure ofBut to be durable, cover must be genuine, and to be genuine it must be preparedace consonant with the normal pace of the cover pursuit Itself, not according to an operational timetable. This is the only way to avoid buDt-ln causes of failure of allproblems, sdmlnistra-
i Uve snarls, unsuitable agent, thin cover, and other security hazards.
The first requisite of cover Is that it should convincingly explain the agent's presence In the area. This requisiteincreasingly stringent with time, and to endureheover must be such as to appear logical ln its own terms. There have been too many salesmen who did not sell, students who did not study, consultants who were not consulted, some of them livingenerous scale with large families, deluding themselves that all was well until perhaps the chief of station was queried by his cover boss, "Is so-and-so one of yours? He looks as phony to me as anyone I've ever seen I"
A few years ago an agent who had had medical training was sentity described In the project asistorical mecca for graduateis cover occupation was the sale of medical supplies and his intelligence mission was to develop sources In the scientific field. One month after his arrival the station estimated that his cover would be good for at least nine years. After six months, however, therequested his transfer because the cover was wearing thin. Now It came out that the day when the historical mecca enjoyed an excellent reputation for Its medical faculties had long since gone. Something had obviously gone wrong with someone's objectivity; the tendency to overstate the meritsroject Is particularly strong when It Is first submitted for approval
There had been warning indicators when this cover was being negotiated: two medical supply firms that had been approached had said they would not place their own men In that area because it would not be profitable, and one of them agreed to send the agent there only because the service wanted it that way and was willing to foot the bill.ervice
chooses to Ignore the counsel of old-line companies whose business it is to know what worksertain place and what does not, It should be tor compelling reasons and with an appreciation ot the problems ahead.
The cover with the best chance of enduring In any area Is one that docs not feed off tbe area but contributes needed skills or knowledgeommodity that is lacking. Inthat are trying to develop economic autarchy the au-_thortties may acrutinlze the wUvltlesrelgnbusb^esmen with'^cr^*ruuTr| that^enyrated enterprise must benefit the national economicHere agents Involved In businesses that are not financially sound or have no significant volume of business are sadly out of place. But local firms may need citizens of another country to help them In their dealings with firmsIn that country, and such employees would probably have greater freedom of movement and better access to local targets than those of the local branchoreign firm, as well as protection in case of expropriation or nationalization of foreign assets. Or non-commercial cover may be morein some places: In newly Independent countries, for Instance, teachers or technicians may be more needed and welcome than business representatives, and the desire of the new governments to get them elsewhere than from the former colonial power may provide another nation with coverfor its own nationals or for third-nationalhe plan for long-range cover must take Into account any likelihood of drastic changes in the area that could affect the viabilityarticular type of cover. If there is such aan agent cannot use cover whose survival depends on an Indefinite continuation of the status quo. Aside from the hazards to commercial cover entailed In the trend towards economic autarchy, there may be political changes which would make It more difficult for Westerners, or citizensarticular Western country, to move about. Such prospects call for timely preparations in the establishment of third-natlonal cover agents in advance.
Finally, the most Important element of cover durability is legitimacy. There are suspect covers Just as there are suspect persons,over cannot confer upon the agent ait does not itself possess. ewly founded company
once offered to cover any numberervice's agents asln several underdeveloped countries, expecting that the service In return would subsidize its own earlyThese consultants would have come under the scrutiny of the genuine foreign consultants who had been there for years, and the Inevitable checks on the standing of the borne office would have quickly exposed the masquerade. Cover and the Objective
The function of explaining the ugent's presence1 difficult though It Is under unfavorable circumstances, Is stillart of what cover should do for an operation. Cover should always be considered ln relation to the intelligenceand insofar as possible It should provide legitimateto the targets being attacked. The ideal solution is achieved when the activities of the agent in doing his cover Job provide the basis for the operational contacts desired. If this ideal arrangement Is not possible, the cover should at least be compatible with the objective. Otherwise, there can be only competition and conflict between them.
One agent, married and with children, was recentlyto be workingeek for his cover firm andoeek for intelligence. The poor fellow was running himself ragged, neglecting his family, and even so not doing Justice to either of his unrelated Jobs. His cover had been chosen almost exclusively to establish him In the area, too little attention being paid to the operationalit should provide. The two functions must beconcurrently during the planning stage; If avenues to the intelligence objective are left to be Improvised later, the agent's access, if be ever develops any, may be to targets already within easy reach through the official cover of the station, and his presence In tbe field, while adding to tbeproblems, will not add to its resources-There isecurity advantagelose relationcover and Intelligence work. If the two occupations are unrelated, the operational comings and goings do notfrom the protective interpretation that the known cover Job should normally suggest to observers. The field stationosition to know which specific cover pursuit canand explain operational contact with the target persons;
in tact, the station would normally want to have an agent under cover only after finding it Impossible, or unwise ortoerson already In placeimilar situation.
Knowledge of the facts of the local situation will reduce the large amount of guesswork that often goes into the choiceover and thereby obviate the unreasonablethat otherwise come to be placed on it. An agent was
once sentolonial country to recruit agents within# ^Europeanfcommunlty. but twb'years IrtnfrJ&bW&tti'*
his efforts should have been directed at the native groups. His cover did not permit him to make this about-face, and so the Impasse was blamed on "rigidertain amount of latitude may be desirable In some forms of cover, and this latitude can be planned at the start tonownneed, but latitude or flexibility in cover should not be usededge against failure to study and Interpret the pertinent facts In the first place and toover hi the light of those facts. The factors that enter into theof cover that Is both durable and operationallyare numerous and Intricate, and that la why it Is risky to go ahead without the best knowledge of the field situation tbat the station can provide.
Cover negotiationsusiness firm afford thealuable preview of what kind ot collaboration It can expect In the Joint enterprise. If the firm wants the service toisproportionate share of the business expenses. It Isthat Its professed desire to contribute to government alms is specious and that Intelligence interests will be pushed aside. There is no need for high cost In an agreementompany already doing business In tbe area In question, particularly if the agent is already in place or Is destined to go there. If the company goes out of Its normal way andadditional financial expenses and risks, the servicehas toarger share of the burden; but if the company offers to place any number of agents In all sorts of positions without regard to the facts of business, it probablyuick and generous bounty from the government rather than reasonable business profits patiently earned.
The cover negotiations can of course also give the company some idea of the seriousness of the service's intentions. If the service professes to need andound and durable cover and at the same time proposes to use it to rotate aof agents on two-year tours, the firm cannot be expected to think very highly of Its long-range planning, or of Itsof cover, or of Its practice of economy for that matter, and may be tempted to make the most of the opportunity
The agreements witha3^snnpleian*dV clear as possible and understood In the same way by both parties. In addition, those arrangements that affect the agent should be clearly understood by him at the very start and be made known to tbe field station involved at the same time; otherwise the station case officer's meetings with the agent and his correspondence with headquarters will be taken upong time by the too common three-way debate on the substance and Interpretation of tbe cover arrangements, to the detriment of tbe operation.
over agreement Is negotiated It should be decided early who In the company has to be made witting. If theis left for spot decisions to be mode as arrangementsthe number of people In the know will keep growing as one after another Is brought into the picture to facilitate the solution of problems that arise. There is no assurance, of course, that the witting company people will observe tbe need-to-know principle, but the firm Itself has an Interest insecret Its connection with intelligence. The wittingare more likely to maintain secrecy If they know that there are very few of them and If they realize the Importance tbe service attaches to keeping that number small.
Experience shows that there are security problems both ways, from cutting In too many people and from not cutting in enough. The problem In both cases generally stemseal or imagined urgency which prompt* the service towith the natural development of cover. For Instance, It has an agent who Is not very well qualified for the cover Job and is not company-trained, perhaps not yet hired by tbe company; but he Is ready to go! The personnel manager Is cut In to hireection chief Is cut ln to streamline bis training, the field manager is cut In so that he will not expect
too much from him, and so on. Or else the companyremoves all obstacles by fiat without explainingto anyone; everyone is hostile and suspicious, and the operation is offad start. Time Is wasted In trying so desperately to save it: the agent often returns from anassignment without having done anything for the service.
Career Contract Agents
^One of^en?os*tvserious has been the uncertainty about career that results from their dual status in the Intelligence service and in their cover; they have felt the demands of both pursuits and the reassurance of neither. Some services have tried to protect their own Interests by requiring that agents going into business firms waive at the outset, when the cover arrangements are made, any right to transfer to their cover firms for some years after resigning from the service, the firms for their part agreeing not to hire them for that period.rovision confines the agent to his intelligence career, In which, however, he may tend to have less and less confidence the longer he remains on the outer rim of the intelligence organization. In such circumstances It is probably wiser for the service to permit immediate transfer to the cover firm and maintain Itsrelationship with the agent by means of contract.
In one suchtaff agent with three years ofexperience but still quite clean was placedover Job while yet young enough to be startingareerprior Job experience. An intelligent, enterprising, andyoung man, he did excellent work for the cover firm foronths; he looked genuine to the general public, and his long-range intelligence prospects seemed good. But his Intelligence performance, according to rigid standardsapplied, did notromotion In the service. It was clear that he would be better off with the cover salary and allowances than with his service pay, and the discrepancy was likely to Increase as time went on.
Re was therefore transferred outright to the firm, which was happy to have himermanent employee, with aassurance from the service that it would attempt tohimuitable grade if he should lose bis Job
cause of his Intelligence association or for some other cause not of his own making. Heontract agent of the service, paid according to his usefulness and reimbursed for expenses incurred on its behalf. The release of this sgent does not mean that intelligence Interests will be sacrificed or that Intelligence work will be only Incidental, because heigh-caliber young manent for Intelligence, and his motivation lies In the very nature of the work. It is unlikely that the service will ever lose Whl^ laauasmwnn'JfM^-- *WJWVIthe manue>'thantrH?*fact of separsWn'froro the taffervice that deprives It of the work of trained and experienced officers.ood agent has found careerand security In his cover firm. It Is sensible tothe transition and put an end to his equivocal status If the transfer stands to serve the Interests of all concerned. Similarly, agents can be allowed or even encouraged toprofessional or other types of self-employed cover to the point that their economic security rests principally on their cover activity, buttressedtipend from the service and underwritten by the understanding that, if they do wellthey can be assuredareer in the service In case unavoidable circumstances destroy their cover.
This kind of arrangement has two great advantages: first, the cover takes on real depth and solidity as the years go by, and second, the service Is freed from Innumerableheadaches that may otherwise plague its cover operations. One of these administrative headaches Is that dependableto relations with the agent, the recovery of coverthat exceed his service entitlement. One terminated agent felt so strongly about kickinghristmas bonus that be wrote to headquarters, saying he was willing tothe money to the cover company but would not turn It over to the service under any circumstances. WhenIn the cover firm Is rapid and the difference between cover salary and service pay gets progressively larger, thetangle becomes so frustrating that there have been serious proposals to freeze the cover salaries of agents while their colleagues are being promoted. Such an expedient would violate security as well as decency, and it would beto expect an agent In such circumstances to give the coverroper effort.
If lo particular Instances tbe interests of the service and the agent call for his retention on the staff although assigned to long-range cover duties, the career contract should bewith special administrative provisions to assure him of service rights, benefits, and career opportunitiesto those he would have on regular duty. Thenature of nonofflcial cover requires destandardlxedand diversified personnel patterns. This diversification can be further advanced by greater use of natural cover.
Many of the problems of deep cover are avoided whencan recruit suitable agents already embarkedompany president who claimed noexperience once suggested out of common senseof placing its man in hiservice mightone of his employees ln the overseas branch Inwas Interested. In anotherovernmentInformation on the deployment and activity offorces did not have tooan under cover becausein the area recruited one of Its own citizens whoa gasoline company and was In constant contactofficials of the target air forces. This agent was ablethe needed informants in the normal course of
Some companies are willing to furnish Information on all the young men they recruit for their foreign branches and to make those selected as potential agents available forwith reasonable assurance that they will eventually be assigned where the service wants them Similarly, someare willing to furnish biographic and evaluativeon their overseas employees for assessment andrecruitment, and to arrange to bring back the recruitsraining period- The agents recruited In these ways would continue to pursue normal business careers and tofrom that source their salaries, allowances, bonuses, and promotions, as well as their financial security and their status In the community. They would be compensated equitably for intelligence services rendered, and there should be noproblems or dual-status administrative difficulties.
The recruitment of persona already employed or about to be hiredirm would require fewer company employees made witting than the placingan from the service; normally it should be only one or two key officials. There would be none of the difficulties which the family of astaff employee has to face when It needs to adjustew mode of living. The greatest advantage of all. however, lies in the quality of the cover Itself. Natural cover Is the most convincing of all, and the best way to fool alljthe time is to be genuine Only^on rare occasions, -aucuover reassignment, would there perhapseed to interfere discreetly with the normal course of events. The principal dangers, here as elsewhere, would be impatience and the real or fancied urgency of short-term goals.
Once It has been decided what forms of cover can serve the Intelligence objective, the task Is to find an agent who has the qualifications for one of the possible cover Jobs and who can, hi addition, do the Intelligence Job that constitutes the sole reason for the undertaking. It Is easy to hope for, but very difficult to find, the ideal agent who has dualThe problem, in fact. Is often regardedilemma: If the agent Is already established in the cover company he never really gets the feel of Intelligence; If he Is anofficer venturing forth into the business world, he Is generally unconvincing In his cover life, and his tour of duty is of short duration despite original long-term plans; in the rare cases where the experienced Intelligence officer has good cover qualifications, the service risks losing him to tbe cover pursuit, and sometimes does. Notilemma, thiserious problem which can be solved only by making
over operation Is to endure, the agent's qualifications for his cover Job must be unimpeachable. These qualifications are more exacting In some pursuits than In others and the amount of expertness required may be lessoung agent than for an older man, but no agent can be expected toIn his cover unless his cover preparation and performance are convincing in their own terms. For this reason, when the
ideal agent with dual qualifications is not available (or along-term cover mission, cover and durability must take precedence over Intelligence training andeficiency in these is not Insuperable if the agent has the necessary aptitude for Intelligence work. His training will have to be highly concentrated to suit his specific rnisslon, and his experience will have to be gained on the Job under the close direction of his case officer.
capable of living his cover effectively, an operation which Is successful in terms of cover will still fall if the agent lacks the ability to perform his Intelligence mission. In sacrificingexperience to requirements of cover, therefore. It is vital not to sacrifice on the point of the agent's native ability tolandestine intelligence Job. Many people areby espionage and like to talk about it, even in firstbut not so many are suited, by character andto engage ln it. There are even loyal and patriotic businessmen who question the need for the clandestineof information; one company president being sounded outover possibility quickly put an end to the exploration when he remarked that he did not "see the need for such devioushisather widespread attitude among businessmen, who in their own highly competitive fieldappreciate the importance of obtaining andinside information.
On the other hand, there may be Indications of an agent candidate's flair for intelligence work In the amount ofand discretion hehe conduct of his overtIn any case he willot to learn andot of energy to learnative ability for intelligence work entails not only the right attitude but also the necessary amount of drive; and the cover agent must possess thedynamism and resourcefulness needed to workat the end of the line. The translation of an agent's native ability Into the skills required by his mission isIn the next section of this article.
Conduct of me Operation
Living one's cover Is an around-the-clock job. It requires first of all that the agent In his cover work have as much competence and put out as much effort as his colleagues in comparable Jobs. In certain Instances special qualifications like language skill or area familiarity may compensate for other lacks, but he must conform to whatever pattern Is es-
tlve field feelewcomer; any special treatmentIn order to get things done easily and quickly, suchhortening of company training or protective intercession by the top management, will only Intensify this hostility and arouse suspicion. And, of course, the agent himself mustthe very human tendency to surround himself with the mysterious aura of one engaged ln special work-Occupational Interest Is an important factor in living one's cover because competence and Interest go together and each helps the other. It Is only natural, moreover, that the agent should be expected to show an Interest in the occupation he ostensibly has chosenobby can therefore be an Indication of an agent's suitabilityarticular cover position- One manassion for firearms was placed under cover as the representativeealer ln small arms; wherever he was the conversation inevitably turned to guns, and his cover took care of Itself.
There Is an important corollary to the requirement for good performance on the cover job. and that Is the need to live the kind of life that goes with tbe Job. Here the demands on the agent are extended to his family, and the difficulties of living in accordance with cover status sire generally greater for the family than for the agent himself. When there are young children there may be real hardships that should beBut It shouldrerequisite for any deep-coverthat the agent and bis family be able to adapt themselves to the living conditions and social life of people In the cover situation.
Tbe pull exertedrivileged way of lifeonstant danger among staff agents who have previously served under
official cover. No amount of cover work can hide suchbreaches as access to PX suppliesloserwith the official government colony than tbe cover occupation would normally bring about. Staff officers are often vehement in their professed desire to go out under non-offlclal cover but, once there, unwilling to forego any of the amenities of official cover; they are probably not so muchby the challenge of the lone game as repelled by the regimentation at headquarters and the larger stations. Aand fiUblr^fiiaff cjffleer under.nonoffleial
iompulsive urge toowling alley where he knew many of his former associates wouldeague; when the Incident was raised with him laterrobable security hasard, he ruefully admitted hisbut explained that he Just had to see someone with whom he could identify himself.
The Right Case Officer
Thereendency at large stations to entrust the less active operations to the less experienced case officers, and long-range cover operations are of course seldom productive Immediately. Operations that have prospects of quick and valuable Intelligence dividends are often run as vest-pocket affairsop station officer or the chief himself; those that have no prospects of quick results are often delegated far down the line. Field stations are pressed with work and pressured to produce,tation's chief should work out adistribution of Its effort between immediate needs and long-term investment
Nonofflelal-cover operations cannot be mass-produced and run by the book; each one has Its own character and Its own problems, and each requires the right ease officer for tbe right agent If It Is to have any real chance of success. The casetask Is to develop and maintain the agent'sand he cannot succeed in this task without the agent's absolute confidence in bis competence and reliability. He must have the necessary experience, maturity, andto deal with that particular agent He Is generally the agent's sole link with the service; In fact. In tbe agent's mind he Is the service, and his merits and fallings are extended to the servicehole. His whole manner with the agent must
suggest that he has no duty more Important than that ot directing and supporting the agent in his mission. Thepractices whose importance he wants to impress upon the agent he must teach by his own example and not by precept alone. Finally, he mostell-balancedof imagination and Judgment in order to deal with the constant novelty ot deep-cover situations and problems.
It Is also Important to provide for the availability of the same case officerelativelvf.
-man any other kind to ihe disruptive effect of frequent case officerItrequent complaint of agents that with each change of case officer there appears tohange inand guidance, and inasmuch as the case officer Is the sole channel for the agents direction, there Is no corrective for this Impression of Inconsistency.ase officer must be replaced, the transition should be planned well enough in advance not only to permit the choiceuccessor wellprofessionally and personally to direct the particular agent but also to allow this successor to get the feel and tempo of the operation. The agent will not fear that the operation Is apt to be swayed by the whim of bis immediate handlers if the new case officer introduces any necessary changesmooth period of transition.
The procedure for initial contact with the agent should be decided before he Is In place, and it must be compatible with the ultimate purpose of the operation; If the agent's cover Is to endure, he has to be handledensitive agent from the veryontinuous clandestine relationship is needed from the outset to condition the agent properly for his role; It will help keep his clandestine mission ever present In hisdespite the demands of cover work, and It will sustain his morale by demonstrating the Importance the case officer attaches to the security of the operation. Tbe regularity, the relative frequency, and the average duration of case-officer contacts necessary to the successful developmentong-term mission require that most if not all of them be clandestine meetings under safe conditions.
Whether or not there should be overt contact andof overt contact would be advantageous are problemsa number of factors. The best bet Is to keep theentirely clandestine until both case officer andanalyze these factors and make an Informed decision.necessary to restrain the tendency towardoften characterizes the period of coverthe agent more or less abstains fromhe tendency,e!.complacent is all the
alion can change quickly and it may then be too late to tighten up.
The factors that should influence the decision to surface or not to surface the contact lie In the nature of theand of the Intelligence mission Itself. In areas wherecontact between the nationals In question or between them and local persons is commonplace, an occasional overt contact may serve to avert suspicion In case one of the clandestineis accidentally exposed. Many successful operations are handled In this manner. In other areas, overt contactcase officer and agent may not be advisable. The agent's mission may be such as to make overt contactIn any circumstances, for instance one In which he is acting the partolitical renegade.
There Is another consideration that should enter Into the decision whether or not to surface, even in the mostoperational climate. Case officers under official cover whoarge number of legitimate overt contacts may feel that one more will appear equally Innocent to allBut not all onlookers will add the same figures and reach the same totals, and It may be that this one relationship will arouse the curiosity of certain persons and lead them to probe beneath the surface; it Is always possible to chance upon the right conclusionartial set of facts. There arevalid arguments both for and againstise decisionnowledge and appraisal of the fine points Involved before the Irrevocable act Is committed.
ecision to surface has been reached, the coverof the two principals should determine the manner of the surfacing. It should be done inay as to appear
natural and to minimize any suspicion of contrivance.and case officer who had children in the same schoolin school support activitiesoddingsusceptible of further development. Somelegitimate reason to consult the case officer in hiscapacity. Others meet their case officers at themutual acquaintances. Still others may have tomeeting If their overt positions do noteadyJustification for their
ThcreSls also tne^question of frequencyvert con tacts. One chief of station avoids all but the rarest social contact with his covert agent because, he soundly reasons, theopposition, if alerted, would probably never bear the contrived explanation but only note the fact ofAnother case officer reports that some close friends whom he saw severalonth were wrongly suspect to the opposition, whereas his deep-cover agent, whom he very rarely saw overtly, was apparently considered clean. If these officers should relax and slide Into the habit of carelessthey might soonoint of no return: onceinterest in an agent is suspected the damage cannot be undone.
It is Important to maintain regular contact with the non-official-cover agent from the very start, even though he may not yet be fully embarked on his intelligence mission. The case officer must condition his agent to live according to his cover status, within his ostensible cover Income, and be sure that he does not allow himself telltale benefits such as the acquisition of PX commodities to which he is not normallyThe period when the agent establishes his cover Is the critical time when his attitude towards his twofold Job takes shape Too often an agent is allowed to occupy himself solely with cover workong time; afterwards it is always difficult, and In some cases It is impossible, to revive hisIn Intelligence. The cover-Job, for lack of competition, quite naturally occupies the agent's full time and interest, and the longer one waits the more difficult it Is toa second Job.
Furthermore, the case officer has an operational interest ln the successful establishment of cover, that necessaryto active operations. One case of agent neglect during this early period had consequences even worserift away from the intelligence objective. Two agents were placed together in the same cover office, told to build cover, and left pretty much to themselves. Theyitter hostility toward each other which the station was either unaware of or unconcerned about. Headquarters repeatedly heard of*his yery,eo-operatlve person must haveoor opinion of the kind of supervision exercised by the service, and the agentscould not have helped making the inevitablebetween the commercial and the operational management.
The case officer's concern with the period of coveris not only protective, that is to avoid cover pitfalls and prevent the agent from losing Interest In intelligence. This period must also, and principally, serve to prepare the agent for the tasks ahead. The nature and extent of the preparation needed will vary from case to case, depending on the agent's prior experience and training and on the trade-craft and reporting demands of his Intelligence mission.training, valuable as It is. Isreparationubstitute for It, and the case officer will have to develop the results of any pertinent past training the agent may have had into practical skills.
First of all, the case officer must keep abreast of the agent's cover problems and progress ln order to blend matters ofimport Into his activity at the right time and ln the proper gradation. At the same time he must make sure that the agent understands his mission thoroughly, for that Is the entire purpose of the operation, anything else beingeans to the end. He must see to it that the agent gets sufficient practice, to the point of perfection if necessary, in the particular tasks that his mission will require, such aselidtattoo, and assessment, practice that can be done In the normal course of cover work. The product of these exercises should behe form ofbiographic reports, target data, general Information reports, and written assessments. The agent may need technical skills, some of which, like photography, can be practiced as a
eclusion.skills he needs he must roaster, for there should bedeficiency in the makeup of the long-term agent trilningn0tSn-
The agent should regularly report his contacts, somemay be of interest to tbe station whether or notfor him to use them. He must be trained toaccurately and completely, and he the. imrjortauU (tlaWpelauonal 'data m'the
of his Information. He must be alert to tbe by-product* of his work toward his own objective, such aa spottingand other operational leads. He must understandomplementary purposes ofprotect the agent and expose thehe must learn to use his own cover safely and effectively. These fundamentals will naturally have been covered ln his briefing and training, but the case officer needs always to bear Ln mind that an agent who Lives in Isolation canurprisingly short time become oblivious of the most elementary principles ofnless they are kept constantly before him.
A long-term nonofficlal-corer agent, we have noted, must hove the right attitude towards clandestine work and the necessary drive to keep going without constant prodding. There is much that he can do by himself In preparing for his mission, and If he Is to become conversant with all aspects of the situation related to his Intelligence mission, no amount of briefing can make up for his own lack of Initiative. It Is up to the agent, with appropriate station support, to acquirebackground Information and keep up with overt developments ln his field of Intelligence Interest, so that he can recognize the significance of his requirement* and of the Information he collects to fulfill them. If his objective, for instance, is the penetrationolitical group, he should findeasily available on Its leaders present and potential. Its sources of support. Its stand on Important Issues, Its allies and enemies. It* relationships abroad, the divisions within its ranks, and so on; and he must of course also beith tbe wider national background In which the group operates.
All this information is ^dispensable for the agent'sof his mission, but it Is Important even Ln thestage when he discusses with his case officer hisobjectives, his Ideas with respect to attaining them, and his progress in working his way closer to his targets. The intelligence tasks and discussions of this early period will work toward the necessary correlation In the agent's mind of his cover occupation with his intelligence mission, and they will
officer expressed It. where he views his whole environment "through Intelligence eyeglasses."
At the same time, the exercises and discussions willunning gauge of the agent's competence and enable the case officer to keep currentlyorkable progression of Intelligence tasks. This progression should nourish the agent's confidence and self-reliance and help him advance smoothly to the point where he can develop and handle his own sources of Information, the primary skill of ancollection officer. There are Instances where theof tasks does not quite achieve this desired result; In these, the case officer may further ease the agent'sto active operations by turning over toecure going operation If thereuitable one at hand In thesector of his intelligence mission.
A long-range Intelligence agent under nonofficlai cover isone operator in the sense that he can be expected to work without direction. For reasons of security he must be able toonsiderable amount of Isolation from the service, but It should be clear to him that this Isolation is an operational necessity, not the result of neglect or oblivion. His morale has to be maintained over the years, andood agent can be sustained only by the Innerthat he Isaluable job as an integral part of the service. This feeling cannot be Instilled by reassuring words; It can come only from the agent's own day-to-day recognition of the value of his mission and his work ln furtherance of the
broader missions of the station and even of the servicehole. An agent once pictured his uneasiness in these terms:
"The rule is followed that there Is no use showing the agent any material that does not concern his project. He has little opportunity to call on someone else for advice. It is unlikely that he will ever hear what happens to the Information he turns In, or whether headquarters found It useful or not. He Is In the unfortunate position where his shortcomir .almost instants an
Too narrow an Interpretation of the need-to-know principle can demoralise the man at the end of the line. In theof his effectiveness no less .than of his morale, the agent must beufficiently well-rounded interpretation of his progress; and that means that the case officer himself has to be well Informed on the station's general operational program and performance In order to discuss the agent's work with him In its wider context. The agent should also receive currently, beyond the usual requirements and targetany background data and any general guidance that will help him recognize operational opportunities outside of his assigned tasks and propose new approaches to his ownIf he receives anything less than all-out operational support, the expensive deep-cover agent will be workingraction of his capacity.
Furthermore, the considerable amount of time and effort required toood agent primed for his bestIs not so much an operational overhead as annot only should Itetter intelligence product, but it should also develop andound Initiative in the agent and enable him to become less dependent on his case officer for day-to-day guidance. In short, nothing is more Important to the agent than timely evaluations of hisand production, and there is no better stimulus and guide for Improvement. If It Is at all possible, an occasional secure contact with the station chief would contribute to the agent's sense of belonging and It wouldhoHn-the-arm for him to hear from the topew well-informedabout his work and Its value. The goal of Intelligence support of the long-term agent Is to keep him constantly oriented and Inspired towards his informational objectives.
Maintenance of Purpose
We have already stressed the fact that the agent mustlear understanding of his mission at the outset and that he and his case officer must keep It constantly in mind.and the station must have the same understanding of the purpose of the operation, they must both agree to It, and if this purposealid one they should stick to It The temptations to redirect cover operations are many and varied: they should be examined thoroughly and, unlessmX^-'f no?estionably*ior^^
There Is no surer way to bewilder the agent than to force him repeatedly to change his course, and often there is no more certain way to doom theadical change Inaa for example from one ethnic group to another, will be wholly incompatible with the pattern of activity already established by the agent, and It may be Incompatible with his basic cover.
Frequent organizational and personnel changeserviceuccession of officers with differing views Into control of cover operations, and some new officers are prone to make changes before they fully understand the intent of theirSometimes deep-cover operations are diverted and exposed for the sake of expediency: the chronic urgencies in some unsettled areas lead, sometimes Justifiably, to theof cover resources to purposes for which they were not originally intended. Much less Justified are those purely administrative urgencies whichervice loonofflclal-cover agentoutine and perhaps Insecure operation because someone Is needed and he happens to be at hand. Operations in which such hasty resort is made toare usually characterized by general Lazily: thelimits of the cover are overstepped, the elements of risk are glossed over, and tradecraft Is Ignored. One Long-range agent who was well established In his cover and had obtained good access to targets was assigned toeparting case officer In charge of an operation that was already com promised; he had to be withdrawn from theew months later. The agent was lost without benefit to the operation. Long-range operations demand consistency.
progress and Production
The unorthodox nature of the deep-cover agenteed to Judge his work by different standards from those used in evaluating the performance of persons under official cover. Even among themselves deep-cover operations differ from one another, and their value cannot be determined by anycriteria. Some operations officers, who may complain loudly when deep-cover operations are put through the budget wringer along with the rest of the^wash, areistiU -prone to>hrasureHHelr*yBJue" with the same yardstick they use for other agent operations, that is production statistics. Some officers, on the other hand, miy go to the opposite extreme, treating the agents as sleepers and demanding patience and the long-range view without giving any Inkling of the time and manner of the awakening.
The right view, of course, Is In the happy medium, aeasier to state than to define. The long-range agent should not be pressured to produce as soon as he is In place, but except In rare cases he Isleeper, exempt from all operational performance. In the preceding section we have described tasks he can perform from the very start, tasks that will contribute to his training and experience, maintain his interest and morale, and sometimes be of Immediate value to the station. These tasks will also hasten the day when hetruly operational. If no Intelligence production IsIn the early stage, there must still be progress, and the operation should be Judged by the operational headway It makes toward Its objective, according to an estimate ofonabte expectations outlined In advance.
A premature demand from headquarters for production may change tbe case officer's concern from operational progress to project Justification, he mayesult direct the agent towards readily accessible targets, and the operation win haveewownong-rangeoperation deserves headquarters' patience; but headquarters In turn Is entitled to progress, and eventually to production. There Is no placeature service for the epitapherminated operation that It had beenvaluable as experience" although it had produced
nothing or for the consolatory viewalingering agent thatot producing but "his cover Is excellent"
The goal of clandestine intelligence operations la theof clandestine Information. If thereajor defect In an operation, that Is If It Is apparent that It cannot and will not become productive. It should be terminated In order to give the case officer time to develop better operation* To the question, when should one expect production to begin? there is no single answer, because circumstances vary with the op-
dabMt"Is probably not^
progressing towards production. Thereatural reluctance tooing operation, even If it Is not going anywhere It was once reported In the review of an operation thatind of operational Inertia set In. and It was easier for allto let the operation run than to terminate it and sort out theut to prolong an unsuccessful venture on mere hope or through force of habit Is an expensive exercise In futility.
long-range cover operations will always be difficult toand to maintain, and there Isertainty ofThey are always vulnerable In the sense that one weak element can nullify the excellence of all the others, and even the soundest cover operation can be destroyed by pure bad luck. But although one can never be sure of success, the odds against it can certainly be reduced. They can be reduced by not persisting in doing things the hard way. The recrult-ment of suitable agents already under natural cover and the transfer to career contract agent status of staff agents who make goodover organization can limit the use of staff agents in long-range cover operations and spare much of tbe grief that stems from their morale problems and their tight-fitting, buttons-in-the-back administrative suit, with salary adjustments, bonus kickbacks, covert tax returns, and so on.
Chances of success can be improvedore basic way by keeping In check the habits and the tempo that sometimes ooze over from official cover practices to nonofflclal cover, with lamentable results. NonofScial cover requires, not theefficiency of the assembly-line worker, but the pa-
tlent Inventiveness of the artisan, and an official-coverIs especially harmful to operations Intended for long-term coverage of sensitiveepetition of previous mistakes is generally the result of congenital hasteondness for short cuts: long-term cover operations allow few concessions to expediency.
This paper has laid particular stress on planning andbecause the early period is decisive;ertain point the die Is cast and little .can be done to lmproreorannd yet. though totally sterile) it may continue for years, at great expense andime-consuming treadmill for the case officer In whose lap It falls. That Is why long-range cover operations require patient and painstaking effort from start to finish.
Read more: http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/92/0000608982/PRINCIPLES-OF-DEEP-COVER.html#ixzz1KdCfVML9
|The USAID-CIA consortium in which Obama was raised. September 8-9, 2010|
|The world of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and U.S. government-run foreign assistance
priograms in which President Obama was raised has
long been dominated by the CIA. It is against this
backdrop that Obama's continuation of Bush-era
covert and overt intelligence operations abroad must
be seen. Obama's mother, father, and step-father
directly benefited from U.S. government assistance
programs in countries where the CIA backed despotic
regimes, lavishing them with hundreds of millions of
dollars of assistance.
USAID and the Soetoros' years of living dangerously in Indonesia
Obama's mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, worked on micro-financing projects for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Ford Foundation, both linked to the CIA, that helped prop up dictatorships in Indonesia and Pakistan. After Suharto seized power in 1965, USAID returned to Indonesia, with Stanley Ann Dunham Soetoro as one of its chief employees, to help Suharto create the New Order (Orde Baru) that would usher in decades of fascist and kleptocratic rule. Suharto established the Bureau of Logistics (BULOG) that steered USAID-provided rice and other food staples to Suharto's business cronies. Suharto also relied on a group of U.S. economists, including Obama's mother, to re-engineer Indonesia's socialist economy. The group was called the "Berkeley mafia" and it ensured that Indonesia was compliant with dictates of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and large Western commercial banks. It is a family history that Obama refuses to comment on and one that is certainly nothing to be proud of.
While USAID was moving into Indonesia in 1965, USAID contractors flying for the CIA airline, Air America, were dropping off weapons and picking up drugs in Laos and dropping off the contraband in Thailand and South Vietnam.
One of the covert CIA operations that Obama continues is the use of USAID as a front for destabilizing foreign governments.
Obama continues USAID operations with the CIA
One USAID contractor, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) of Bethesda, Maryland, has been caught red-handed providing assistance to opposition forces in Cuba and Venezuela. DAI contractor Alan Gross was arrested in Cuba last December. Gross claimed to be installing Internet and other communications networks for the Jewish community in Cuba, however, leading members of that community reported they had never heard of Gross. The Cuban leadership has kept Gross in prison, believing him to be a spy. Recently, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson went to Cuba seeking Gross's release.
USAID has long been involved in trying to oust the Castro government in Cuba, funneling money through the Cuban-American National Foundation, the Center for a Free Cuba, and even a German foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, an adjunct of Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Party.
DAI is heavily involved with USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, which transfers U.S. funds to opposition parties, labor and student movements, and other groups that are pro-American. DAI, under USAID contract, was caught providing U.S. funds to Venezuelan labor unions and media outlets that supported the CIA-led coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2002.
In Haiti, USAID, acting at the behest of the CIA, funded political opposition to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, ousted in CIA-backed coups in 1991 and 2004. After Aristide's return to power in 1994, USAID money used to oppose Aristide was funneled through a "Project Democracy." Today, USAID is providing dubious small and micro-financing loans to small businesses in Haiti. The legacy of the micro-loan scheme created, in part, by Obama's mother continues in the earthquake-ravaged nation.
Bolivian President Evo Morales tossed USAID out of his country, charging it with acting with the CIA to destabilize Bolivia and bring about a coup. To this day, USAID is providing hundreds of thousands of dollars in aid to groups trying to undermine Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.
During his ten-year rule, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori and his intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, thought to be a CIA asset, reportedly received USAID funds to put down the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru guerrilla movements.
Continuing USAID and CIA covert ops in Pakistan and Indonesia
Currently, private military contractors working for the ex-Blackwater, now Xe Services, have been reported to be posing as USAID employees in Pakistan. Last year, the Pakistani press reported that USAID was bypassing the Pakistan ministries of Education and Information and providing direct educational assistance to Pakistani students. One USAID program in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan resulted in some $45 million disappearing down a virtual black hole.
In the 1980s, when Stanley Ann Dunham and Barack Obama, Jr. spent time in Pakistan, USAID opened up a major office in Islamabad that distributed "non-lethal aid" to Afghan mujaheddin refugees in Pakistan, particularly in Peshawar. Some of the USAID assistance was also reportedly used to buy weapons for the Afghan mujaheddin but some of the weapons ended up in the hands of Pakistani Muslim radicals intent on ousting Pakistani dictator Muhammad Zia-ul Haq. Other USAID money ended up paying for expensive automobiles for leading Afghan mujaheddin commanders in Pakistan. Zia-uk Haq, his top generals, U.S. ambassador Arnold Raphel, and the head of the U.S. military aid mission in Islamabad General Herbert Wassom were killed in the suspicious crash of their C-130 aircraft in August 1988. A board of inquiry concluded that poisonous gas was released inside the aircraft causing it to crash after take-off in Bahawalpur.
The June 18, 1998, Jakarta Postreported that USAID programs in Indonesia continued to be fronts for CIA activity. Specifically, the paper said two Indonesian NGOs, the Indonesian Environmental Forum and the Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation, were charged with accepting money from USAID but should have known that the aid did not come "free of charge" and was linked to the CIA.
USAID: no aid is free of charge
In 2002, USAID in Palestine, where DAI is also active, demanded detailed personal information on all the members of NGOs that received American funding. The Palestinian press reported that the information, including personal political opinions of NGO members, was to be turned over to the CIA and eventually, Mossad, to apply pressure on the NGOs to comply with U.S. and Israeli policies.
For years, USAID operated in Manila from the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency building at the Ramon Magsaysay Center on Roxas Boulevard in the Malate district of the city. In 2000, the offices moved to the Makati district of the city but the building that hosued USAID was always known to locals as the "CIA building." The building, owned by the Ramon Magsaysay Foundation, in honor of the Philippines President who died in a 1955 plane crash, was built in 1959 with a loan from the Rockefeller family. The Rockefellers also provided grants to the Magsaysay Foundation.
In 2004, USAID was charged by Philippines opposition parties of using CIA agents to "monitor" elections in the country. The deal to permit USAID observers was signed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The head of the Anakpawis Party, Crispin Beltran, told the Philippine Daily Inquirer, "So much for independence when foreign intelligence agents can broker an official agreement with the Comelec (election commission) allowing them to interfere in the polls."
The CIA-linked Asia Foundation, which worked closely with the CIA-funded East-West Center at the University of Hawaii in Manoa, where Obama's mother met her second husband, General Suharto's colonel, Lolo Soetoro, was linked closely to USAID covert programs in Laos, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Palau, Malaysia, and other Asian-Pacific nations. In Laos and Thailand, USAID officials provided counter-insurgency military training to Laotian and Thai special forces. In 1970, Dan Mitrione, a USAID official who was working for the CIA training Uruguyan special police on torture tactics, was kidnapped and killed by Tupamaro guerrillas.
In 1988, USAID opened a huge compound in a suburb of San Jose, Costa Rica that many Costa Ricans charged was the CIA headquarters for the "parallel state" established by the CIA in Costa Rica to support the contra-led civil war in neighboring Nicaragua. USAID also pumped millions of dollars in loans, some at zero percent, to private banks in Costa Rica to undermine the state banking system.
In 1995, Representative Mel Reynolds (D-IL), who was convicted of having sex with an underage female campaign worker, was also revealed as working for U.S. intelligence in the 1980s, via employment with the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and USAID in Africa, particularly in Sudan. Reynolds, an African-American, also spent time in Israel under USIA cover.
Obama has continued USAID's involvement in CIA-directed programs in former Soviet states, including Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. In so doing, USAID complements the destabilization efforts of George Soros and his network of NGOs. Soros was a major financial backer of Obama's presidential campaign. In 1999, Croatian media reported that USAID was working through various NGOs, some connected to Soros, to oust the ailing Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. The paper Vjesnikcharged that USAID, as well as the U.S. Information Service (USIS), were used as ''tampons between the American non-governmental agencies and American state bodies." The paper said the USAID program to aid Tudjman's opposition was run by the CIA and coordinated by the U.S. ambassador in Zagreb, William Montgomery.
In a 2008 Russian documentary film, "Technology of Modern Coup," Bermet Akayeva, the daughter of ousted Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, ousted in the 2005 Tulip Revolution, stated, "USAID is very actively financed by the Soros Foundation, by the National Democratic Institute and some kind of training is carried out constantly. However, it is difficult to describe USAID as an NGO given that it is under the U.S. Department of State. They work very actively." Akayeva said there were rumors in Kyrgyzstan that the U.S.-backed coup plotters distributed narcotics to rioters who participated in the coup.
In the north Caucasus, NGOs supported by USAID, have been accused by Russian authorities of having links to Chechen terrorists.
In 2002, Eritrea expelled USAID from the country, accusing it of working with the CIA to overthrow the government and assisting Ethiopia, which had engaged in a border war with Eritrea.
USAID in Africa: involvement in political assassinations and corruption
In 2009, Susan Tsvangirai, the wife of Zimbabwean Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, was killed in an automobile accident in which the Prime Minister was injured. The truck that struck their automobile was bought with USAID funds and bore a U.S. embassy license plate. USAID denied it had anything to do with the truck. Public Works Minister Theresa Mokone, a friend of Mrs. Tsvangirai, likened the crash to the mysterious auto accident that killed popular and incorruptible Tanzanian Prime Minister Edward Sokoine in 1984. Sokoine was the designated successor to President Julius Nyerere, who antagonized the CIA by his close ties with the Soviet Union and China. Sokoine created a number of enemies among the elite class when he ordered the assets of embezzlers and smugglers seized. USAID, at the time of Sokoine's possible assassination, was heavily-involved in Tanzania.
In Zaire, millions of dollars in USAID money was diverted by CIA-backed dictator Mobutu Sese Seko to amass his personal fortune making him one of the world's wealthiest leaders. Other USAID funds for Zaire were diverted to help the Angolan rebel forces of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, in violation of U.S. law prohibiting aid to Angolan rebel groups. The covert aid program to UNITA was started in 1976 by Gerald Ford's Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Similarly, during the Reagan administration, USAID money was funneled through the National Endowment for Democracy to the Nicaraguan contras, again in violation of a specific law prohibiting such assistance.
During the late 1970s and 80s, USAID-funded "researchers" established links with African liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress of South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) of Zimbabwe. Actually, these programs were CIA activities using "leftist" academics to spy on the nationalist movements. The operations were concentrated in Harare, Zimbabwe and Cape Town, South Africa, and cities that had a large expatriate African student community, including London and Melbourne and Perth, Australia.
USAID and the oil industry
In 1998, USAID participated in a closed-door meeting between major oil companies and the CIA, National Security Council, and three State Department officials, Stuart Eisenstat, Thomas Pickering, and Susan Rice (now Obama's ambassador to the UN) . The topic was exploitation of Africa's oil resources and the senior executives of Exxon, Mobil, Chevron (where Condoleezza Rice was a board member), and Texaco were present along with Department of Energy and Petroleum Finance Corporation officials.
In 2000, the CIA and USAID worked jointly through a private military company, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) to train the Nigerian army in tactics to combat secessionists in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region. The CIA also commissioned the services of a private business intelligence and risk firm, Evidence-Based Research (EBR) of Vienna, Virginia, which appears to be a very similar operation to the CIA front, Business International Corporation, for which Obama worked in 1984, to conduct an assessment of the tribal revolt in the Niger Delta region, referred to by the CIA as a "semi-riot zone." EBR was formed in 1987, a year after Business International was sold to the Economist Intelligence Unit in London.
A formerly Secret CIA Intelligence Assessment, dated June 1983, and titled "Indonesia: Deteriorating Prospects for Energy Diversification," warns of a drop in Indonesia's oil export capacity. The CIA, along with USAID and the World Bank/IMF, had invested heavily in Indonesia, most importantly, to secure the nation's oil supply for the United States and its allies.
After helping Suharto seize power, Soetoro became an official of the Indonesian state-owned oil company, Pertamina, and Mobil Oil. The CIA assessment states: "Huffco and Mobil, two U.S. firms, rapidly developed natural gas exports for the Japanese market in the past decade in partnership with Pertamina." The memo states that this development, as well as coal, hydro, and geothermal, was carried out with strong financial and technical assistance from the World Bank and foreign aid donors like USAID. Huffco is Huffington Oil, founded in 1956 by Texas oil man Roy M. Huffington, the father of former Representative Michael Huffington (R-CA), a former vice chairman of Huffco and the ex-husband of Arianna Huffington, founder of the Huffington Post. The Huffingtons divorced in 1997 and a year later Michael Huffington announced that he was gay. More noteworthy is the fact that Roy Huffington, who died in 2008, was a seven-year chairman of the Asia Society, linked to the East-West Center in Hawaii, where Obama's father and step-father resided and the CIA.
Case Study on how USAID was used by the CIA for political purposes
A case of how the CIA used USAID to prevent a left-wing political party to winning at the polls is Mauritius. In a formerly Secret CIA Intelligence Memorandum, dated June 1982, and titled "Mauritius: Moderate Government Threatened at Polls," the CIA discusses the use of USAID money to prop up the pro-Western Labor government Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam at the expense of the leftist Militant Mauritian Movement (MMM) of Paul Berenger.
Ramgoolam was forced to adopt economically destructive austerity measures dictated by the IMF that resulted in high unemployment, wage reductions, and currency devaluation. The beneficiary of the economic downturn would have been Berenger and his socialist MMM. But the CIA and USAID intervened to send aid money to Ramgoolam. The CIA memo states: "Labor is attempting to limit the political fallout from the restrictive measures and regain the political initiative by the announcement in mid-May of . . . a large public works program that would employ 8,000 people. The funds for the program are derived from the USAID "Food for Work" agreement."
The importance of Ramgoolam to the CIA was his quiet support for the U.S. military base on Diego Garcia, a British island in the Indian Ocean over which Mauritius officially claimed sovereignty. The Pentagon also intervened in the Mauritian economic situation by agreeing to employ Mauritian workers on Diego Garcia. Ramgoolam also succeeded in getting an agreement for the United Kingdom to compensate 1200 Diego Garcians who were removed from the island to Mauritius in 1971 to make way for the military base.
USAID funds were used by the CIA to prevent the nightmare scenario for the agency. The memo states: "An MMM victory would be a political victory for the Soviets, shifting Mauritius from a pro-Western to an non-aligned or even pro-Soviet position. [sentence redacted]. Based on MMM rhetoric, however, Moscow has reason to believe that an MMM regime would deny the Western powers the limited, though useful, military access they now enjoy on Mauritius. An MMM regime would be a valuable ally in Moscow's campaign for an Indian Ocean zone of peace and against the US military presence on Diego Garcia."
The CIA also believed the MMM to be influenced by Libya, which it accused of stirring up Mauritian Muslim youth. However, MMM leader Berenger was, at the time, the prominent Christian political leader in Mauritius. The CIA memo states "The Libyans have been rumored to be storing weapons in the Seychelles for the MMM, according to the US Embassy in Seychelles."
The CIA memo states that an MMM victory would reduce the Hindu community's influence. Mauritian politics was dominated by Hindus of Indian origin. The CIA also believed that the MMM would invite Cuban medical doctors and teachers to the island nation.
The CIA memo also reveals that South Africa's apartheid regime was assisting Ramgoolam's re-election campaign costs to avert an MMM victory.
President Obama's entire career and family history strongly suggests that the person who now resides in the White House has a crass view of the world's downtrodden peoples. Years of exposure to CIA operatives operating under corporate, USAID, World Bank, micro-financing schemes, NGO, and diplomatic cover has extended the U.S. Intelligence Community's massive control over America's foreign and domestic policies. Frankly, it would be best for the United States if Obama does not run for another term as president. Let the secret control over the United States by groups answerable to no one finally end with the Obama administration.
|Partial List of CIA Front Companies endlessly copied from the Internet|